Anorexia nervosa: discourses of gender, subjectivity and the body by Malson, H.M.
AAOYV N.Jc(\J0'S(-t, DISCc11sQ o-
Gender, Subj ectivity and the Body
Helen M. Malson
Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of London 1995
1
( i1.)
t	 V.
Abs tract
This thesis investigates how anorexia nervosa is constructed
and deployed as a discursive social and psychological
category, drawing critically on feminist psychoanalytic and
Foucauldian theories of gender, subjectivity and discourse.
The introduction provides a brief discussion of diagnostic
criteria and the epidemiology of anorexia. It outlines the
thesis as a whole, providing a brief explanation of the
approach adopted in the thesis. Chapter 2 critically reviews
recent research into anorexia nervosa. Chapter 3 sets out the
theoretical framework of the thesis, discussing Foucauldian
and psychoanalytic theory, particularly, feminist Lacanian
theory. Chapter 4 provides a brief critique of empiricist
methods in the social sciences and argues the need for a
feminist post-structuralist approach to research. In the two
empirical studies of this thesis I have adopted a discourse
analytic methodology. Hence, Chapter 5 discusses the different
forms of discourse analysis within psychology before setting
out the specific form of discourse analysis and the
methodology for the first study. Study One (chapters 6 and 7)
examines the emergence of 'anorexia nervosa' as an object of
medical discourse. It first provides an historical overview of
Georgian and Victorian medicine and then presents a discourse-
oriented history of the emergence of anorexia nervosa as a
clinical disease entity. The study demonstrates firstly, an
historical variability in discursive constructions of women's
self-starvation and of anorexia nervosa and secondly, that
these constructions interface with particular socio-
historically specific constructions of femininity. The second
study (chapters 8 to 12) is based on in-depth, semi-structured
interviews with women diagnosed as anorexic. Discourse
analysis was used to analyze the interview transcripts to
explore how anorexia, femininity, subjectivity and the body
are discursively constituted. The analyses are discussed in
relation to the theoretical framework of the thesis as well as
previous psychological research into anorexia. The conclusion
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discusses the analyses of both studies, drawing out the
implications of the research in terms of understanding
anorexia nervosa, femininity, subjectivity and the body.
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Chapter One
An Introduction
Pathology, as you know, has always assisted us, by
isolation and exaggeration, in making recognizable
things which would normally remain hidden. (Freud
1933, quoted in Klein, 1945: 339)
1.1 Introduction
The focus of this thesis is 'anorexia nervosa'. I chose
to explore this problem because it seems to me that it
crystallizes many of the complex issues surrounding
femininity, subjectivity and the body. Having come from a
'natural sciences' background, I was inspired during my
undergraduate degree by the social sciences, by structuralist
conceptualizations of the individual-society relationship, by
critiques of gender as a natural, biological category, by
critiques of scientific Truth, by feminist theories and anti-
psychiatry, by the creativity of interpretation. Perhaps in
particular I was inspired by psychoanalytic theorizations of
psychopathology and of gender and identity, by the ways in
which Freud, and later Lacan, elucidated the precarious and
constructed nature of (gendered) identity. I wanted,
therefore, to explore 'femininity' as a fluid concept in a way
that rejected any rigid dichotomization of normality and
abnormality and in a way that incorporated the problem of
embodiment. I had read some of the feminist psychoanalytic
work on hysteria and femininity (e.g. Mitchell, 1974;
Bernheimer and Kahane, 1985) and wanted to examine the concept
of femininity in a similar way but in relationship to a more
contemporarily salient 'disorder' (see also Malson, 1992).
Anorexia seemed to constitute such a 'disorder' both because
of the over-representation of women in its diagnoses and
because of its high media profile. It seemed to me to
epitomize a culturally specific, complex ambivalence about
gender, subjectivity and the problems of embodiment.
This perspective was, however, quite different from much
of the 'traditional' psychological literature on anorexia
which often, at least implicitly, accepts a medical model of
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anorexia nervosa as a distinct clinical entity. Such
literature is frequently concerned with discovering a
distinct, universally applicable aetiology or with documenting
characteristics of 'the typical anorexic'. It is much less
concerned with analyzing the concept of anorexia itself or
with exploring issues of gender within a socio-cultural
context. And indeed, even where socio-cultural context and
gender are considered, conceptions of the individual-society
relationship and of gender are often under-theorized (see
chapter 2). The limitations in current understandings of
anorexia are also further compounded by the lack of effective
treatments available for those diagnosed as anorexic.
Fatalities are estimated at 10-15%, long-term prognosis is
often poor (Hsu, 1980) and accounts of unsympathetic, even
hostile treatment (e.g. Pembroke, 1993) are not uncommon.
Whilst this thesis does not examine treatments per se, I have
aimed to provide an alternative account of anorexia that might
in some way contribute towards the development of more
effective and acceptable help for those diagnosed as anorexic.
One of the aims in producing this account has been,
therefore, to provide a critique of the current perspectives
on anorexia (see chapter 2). I did not want to adopt a
'traditional' psychological stance that would re-produce
'anorexia' as an individual pathology. Rather, I wanted to
take a stance, both theoretically and methodologically, which
would enable a critique of 'scientific' knowledges of anorexia
and which would provide an understanding of (gendered)
subjectivity as fluid, contradictory and as socially embedded.
My thesis has drawn, therefore, on post-structuralist theory
as well as on the feminist, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory
mentioned above (see chapter 3). As I have argued in chapter
3, this theoretical framework provides an understanding of
(gendered) subjectivity in terms of multiple, shifting, often
contradictory subject positions produced and regulated within
discourses. It provides, I think, an opportunity to research
anorexia in a way that more fully acknowledges its socio-
cultural and gender-specific context and makes it possible to
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re-conceptualize 'anorexia' and 'the (anorexic) woman' as
multiply produced discursive constructions. And by rejecting
the notion of any absolute, objective truth, post-
structuralist theory also provides a framework within which to
critique the (scientific) Truths both about 'anorexia' and
about 'woman'. As Foucault argues, discourses do not
objectively describe objects existing anterior to them but
rather "systematically form the objects of which they speak"
(Foucault, 1972: 49). And "it is in discourse that power and
knowledge are joined together" (Foucault, 1979: 100). Such a
perspective seems particularly suited to a critique of
'traditional' knowledges of anorexia but it must also be
applied reflexively to my own thesis.
The account that I have produced both through a critique
of the current literature and through two empirical studies is
no more objectively true than those accounts that I have
critically reviewed (see chapter 2). It equally forms the
objects of which it speaks. My critique of current approaches
and my analyses of the nineteenth century discourses within
which 'anorexia nervosa' first emerged as a disease entity
(study one) and of those discourses and discursive resources
used by women today in talking about their experiences of
anorexia (study two) constitutes an inevitably partial account
of anorexia. It is conditioned by my own subjectivities, by my
theoretical stance (see Woodiwiss, 1990), by the
particularities of those discourses available to me and to
others. Nevertheless I hope that it provides some insights
into the ways in which gender is imbricated in the discourses
and discursive practices within which 'anorexia nervosa' is
produced.
1.2 Anorexia Nervosa: Diagnostic Criteria, Prevalence and
Demographic Distribution
'Anorexia nervosa' has existed as a distinct clinical
entity since the early 1870s when it first emerged in the
medical literature as a nervous disorder associated with young
women (Gull, 1874; Lasegue, 1873a). Now described as a mental
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and behavioural disorder or syndrome (WHO, 1992) or as a
psychosomatic disorder (Wolff et al., 1990), anorexia is
currently defined as:
1. a refusal to maintain a 'normal' body weight with body
weight at least 15% below that expected (either because of
weight-loss or lack of expected weight-gain),
2. an intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat despite
being underweight,
3. body image distortion, 'feeling fat' and overvaluation of
thinness,
4. a reduction of food intake, avoidance of 'fattening foods',
often with extensive exercise, self-induced vomiting, laxative
or diuretic abuse so as to achieve the weight-loss and
maintain a low body-weight (APA, 1987; WHO, 1992).
Other symptoms, including amenorrhea, hypothermia,
bradycardia, hypotension, edema, lanugo and a variety of
metabolic changes that may also occur because of weight-loss
(APA, 1987; Halmi 1983; Hughes, 1991).
It is important to note, however, that diagnostic
criteria have varied (Russell, 1984; 1985; casper, 1983).
Feighner et al. (1972), for example, includes an age of onset
prior to twenty-five as a diagnostic criteria and Russell
(1970) includes endocrinal disorder as well as behaviour
leading to weight loss and a morbid fear of becoming fat.
There are also variations in the percentage weight-loss
considered necessary for diagnosis. Whereas lCD-b (WHO, 1992)
and DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) state that weight-loss (or lack of
expected weight-gain) should be at least 15%, DSM-III (APA,
1980) states 25% and others (e.g. Merskey, 1980) state 20%. In
addition, the now central symptoms of 'weight-phobia' and a
drive towards thinness only emerged in the 1960s as a common
characteristic of anorexia (Casper, 1983; Habermas, 1989) and
the symptoms of self-induced vomiting and laxative abuse,
rarely mentioned before the l930s (Casper, 1983), have become
central features of the now separate syndrome, bulimia
nervosa, as well as being symptoms of anorexia nervosa (APA,
1987; WHO, 1992).
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The lack of standardization in formal and informal
diagnostic criteria has caused problems in determining the
prevalence of anorexia (Brumberg, 1986). However, there is a
general consensus that diagnoses of this formerly rare
condition (Merskey, 1980; Bruch, 1978) have increased
dramatically since the 1960s (Bruch, 1978; Maloney and
Klykylo, 1984; Sheppy et al., 1988; Szmukler et al., 1986;
Hoek, 1993; Moller and Nystrup, 1992) and it has been claimed
that anorexia is reaching epidemic proportions (Bruch, 1978;
Sheppy et al., 1988), at least in Europe and North America
(see Wardle et al., 1993). Epidemiological research has found
a much lower prevalence of eating disorders in non-Western
countries (Wardle et al., 1993). However, the proportions of
this Western 'epidemic' remain unclear (Brumberg, 1986).
Current estimates of the prevalence of anorexia in the general
population range from about 8.1 to 406 per 100,000 (Hoek,
1993; Szmukler et al., 1986) although estimates of its
prevalence amongst young women and girls are much higher (APA,
1987; Hughes, 1991; Wolff et al., 1990).
Approximately 90-95% of those diagnosed as anorexic are
female (Hughes, 1991; Wolff et al., 1990; APA, 1987; Brumberg,
1986; Rastam et al., 1989; Wolff, 1990; Hsu, 1989). Estimates
of its prevalence amongst young women rise to 1% (Hughes,
1991; APA, 1987; Brumberg, 1986) and are higher in particular
groups. Garner et al. (1987), for example, estimated that as
many as 25.7% of female ballet students may be anorexic. Other
occupations such as modelling and beauty therapy (Garner and
Garfinkel, 1980; Hughes, 1991; Wolff et al., 1990) and women's
athletics (Weight and Noakes, 1987) have also been associated
with a particularly high prevalence of anorexia. High
prevalence rates of 4.2% and 1% (Pope et al., 1984) and 5.7%
(Mintz and Betz, 1988) have also been found in different
female college populations. It has also been reported that
anorexia is more common amongst girls attending private or
grant-aided schools than those attending state schools (Crisp
et al., 1976) and that eating disorders are more common in the
professional or middle and upper social classes (Hughes, 1991;
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Wolff et al., 1990; Hsu, 1989; Goldblatt et al., 1965) and
amongst white rather than black and Asian women in Europe and
North America (Kendell et al., 1973; Jones et al., 1980;
Hooper and Garner, 1986; Wolff et al., 1990; Hughes, 1991;
Wardle et al., 1993; Edwards-Hewitt and Gray, 1993; Goldblatt
et al., 1965). However, studies of the ethnic distribution of
anorexia have produced conflicting results with some authors
finding that ethnicity was not predictive of eating disorders
(Gross and Rosen, 1988) or that abnormal eating attitudes
occurred in women of all ethnic backgrounds (Dolan et al.,
1990). Several studies have also suggested that eating
disorders, including anorexia nervosa, have spread to all
social classes (Pumariega et al., 1984; Thomas and Szmukler,
1985) and that their incidence are now similar across all
socio-economic levels (Gibbs, 1986; Gray et al., 1987;
Edwards-Hewitt and Gray, 1993; see also p.67).
In short, it is difficult to determine the prevalence and
demographic distribution of anorexia nervosa because of
variations in formal and informal diagnostic criteria, because
of conflicting results from different epidemiological studies,
because of differences in referral practices for different
sections of the population (Wardle, et al., 1993) and because
eating disorders may pass unrecognized when health-care
workers believe, for example, that eating disorders do not
occur in minority groups (Dolan, 1991). Nevertheless it is
widely accepted that anorexia predominantly occurs in young
Western women and that anorexia has become increasingly common
in the latter part of this century.
1.3 Culture and Gender in Anorexia Nervosa
That many more women than men are diagnosed as anorexic
strongly suggests that it is still as much a feminine disorder
as it was in the nineteenth century (see Orbach, 1993;
Brumberg; 1988; Chernin, 1986; Boskind-Lodahl, 1976). And
anorexia and anorexia-like problems are also more widespread
amongst women than prevalence studies might suggest, firstly,
because there is an over-representation of eating disorders in
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women who elect not to participate in surveys on eating
disorders (Begun and Fairburn, 1992). Secondly, studies of
diagnostic trends may not include 'sub-clinical' eating
disorders. As the literature review in Chapter Two discusses,
body-dissatisfaction, a desire to lose weight, pre-occupations
with body-weight, shape and food, dieting and also binging and
vomiting are disturbingly common in Western women and young
girls (e.g. Grunewald, 1985; Gilbert; 1986; Hooper and Garner,
1986; Wardle and Marshland, 1990; Hill and Robinson, 1991).
Indeed, Polivy and Herman (1987) have suggested that dieting
and an attendant 'diet mentality' are both descriptively and
prescriptively normative. Notwithstanding the arguments of
Bruch (1985) and Crisp (1980) that dieting and eating
disorders are distinctly different, there is clearly some
relationship between the cultural idealization of female
thinness and the prevalence of dieting and the recent
increases in eating disorders (Hsu, 1989; Wetherell and White,
1992; Malson, 1992).
Moreover, as Garner et al. (1983a) argue, the fairly
specific distribution of anorexia nervosa as well as its
apparent increase strongly suggest a cultural influence. And,
indeed, its apparent spread to non-white, non-middle-class
women has been interpreted by some as due to increased
acculturation to Western values (Pumariega, 1986) and
increased dissemination of cultural ideals of female beauty as
thinness (Edwards-Hewitt and Gray, 1993; see also pp.65-68).
In addition, the high profile particularly of anorexia
nervosa in both the popular and academic press suggests a
cultural fascination with eating disorders. It indicates that
anorexia is not simply an individual pathology but is also of
wider cultural relevance (see Bordo, 1992; Orbach, 1993).
Indeed anorexia is increasingly recognized as a 'culture-bound
syndrome' (Prince, 1983; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1985; 1987;
Swartz, 1985b; Selig, 1988). And, as Littlewood and Lipsedge
(1987: 291) argue, culture-bound syndromes represent public
concerns as well as personal predicaments; they "appeal to
values and beliefs which cannot be questioned because they are
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tied up with the most fundamental concerns and political
organization of the community." Anorexia nervosa, like some
other illnesses (see Sontag, 1978; 1989; Turner, 1992) can be
viewed as a metaphor for socio-cultural concerns of the late
twentieth century (Orbach, 1993; Turner, 1992; Bordo, 1992).
It "demonstrates core cultural notions of body imagery and
sexual identity (see Poihemus, 1978)" (Littlewood and
Lipsedge, 1987: 312). Indeed, as the following quote from
'Elle' (Smither, 1994: 20) illustrates, eating disorders have
been taken as a metaphor for the very fashion industry with
which they are associated (see also p.70) a further discussion
of anorexia as a metaphor).
The fashion industry is tirelessly voracious -
frighteningly so for the girls who work at the sharp
end. It's an industry that eats up trends and spits
them out faster that a superbulimic.
The anorexic body, like other bodies, is then (always already)
caught up in a system of meanings, symbolic representations
and power-relations (see Turner, 1984; Littlewood and
Lipsedge, 1987; Kirmayer, 1992; Bordo, 1992; Foucault, l977b,
1979). And, as will be argued in this thesis, 'anorexia' is
saying something about what it means to be a woman in late
twentieth century Western culture (see Orbach, 1993, Malson,
1992; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1987; Bordo, 1992).
1.4 Outline of Thesis
As the above discussion illustrates, anorexia can only be
adequately understood within its cultural context and within
a feminist perspective that places gender at the centre of
analysis. Such a perspective will equally apply to other
eating disorders such as bulimia as well as to other physical
and mental health problems. And, as is apparent from the
analyses in the second study (see also Knudsen, 1993) many
women diagnosed as 'anorexic' also have 'bulimic' symptoms.
However, this thesis will be largely confined to a study of
anorexia. In addition, as Ussher (1991) notes, there are many
feminist perspectives. The feminist perspective adopted in
this thesis shares with other feminisrns a critical opposition
19
to the ways in which women are oppressed and 'regulated'
within patriarchal societies and analyses the position(s) of
women within the theoretical framework set out in chapter 3.
Such a perspective, it is hoped, will further understandings
of anorexia as a particularly female problem and may thus, in
some way, contribute to a reduction in the alarmingly high
mortality and 'relapse' rates that women diagnosed as anorexic
suffer. (Mortalities are estimated to be 10-15% (Hsu, 1980);
see also Crisp et al., 1992; Patton, 1988; Kennedy and
Garfinkel, 1992).
This thesis attempts to examine anorexia within a
theoretical framework which (a) refuses the 'traditional'
dichotomization of individual and society whilst retaining a
concept of subjectivity (see Henriques et al., 1984) and (b)
provides a theorization of the ways in which subjectivity is
gendered (see Freud, 1905, 1924; Lacan, 1958a; Sayers, 1982;
Mitchell, 1974). Thus, after critically reviewing the
extensive literature in this area (chapter 2), chapter 3 will
set out the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis. It
will be argued that a perspective drawing on psychoanalytic,
particularly feminist Lacanian, theory and Foucauldian post-
structuralist theory will enable a more adequate exploration
of anorexia as a culture-bound and specifically gendered
phenomenon. In addition, this perspective provides a critique
of many of the epistemological assumptions of many current
perspectives. Specifically, Foucault's theorization of the way
in which power is inextricably iinbricated in knowledge
(Foucault, 1979) undermines the claims of scientific
objectivity made by many researchers in this and other areas.
His theory that discourses do not transparently reflect
reality but are rather constitutive of their objects
(Foucault, 1972) enables a questioning of the generally
accepted medical model of anorexia (see Swartz, l985a) as an
individual pathology existing independently of discourses and
discursive practices (see chapter 3). In contrast, this thesis
adopts a concept of anorexia and of subjectivity, femininity
and the body as objects of a number of different discourses
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which nevertheless have very real and powerful effects (see
Walkerdine, 1986).
Chapter 4 provides a brief critique of empiricist methods
in the social sciences and argues the need for a feminist
post-structuralist approach to research. In the two empirical
studies of this thesis a discourse analytic methodology has
been adopted. Hence, chapter 5 discusses the different forms
of discourse analysis. It then sets out the particular
approach to discourse analysis adopted in this thesis and the
particular methodological procedure for study one.
The first study (chapters 6 and 7) examines how anorexia
first emerged as an object of medical discourse in the
nineteenth century. Chapter 6, therefore, provides a
background discussion of medical discourse from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century. It focuses on 'early
descriptions' of anorexia, on discourses of hypochondria and
hysteria and on the ways in which medical discourse
constituted 'women' as sickly and nervous. Chapter 7 uses
primary source material, analyzing the nineteenth century
medical journal articles in which anorexia first emerged as an
object of medical discourse.
The second study (chapters 8 to 12) consist of discourse
analyses of transcripts of interviews conducted with 23 women
(21 medically diagnosed as anorexic and 2 self-diagnosed). In
these interviews the women were asked to discuss the ideas
about and experiences of anorexia and femininity. The
analyses, conducted within the theoretical framework set out
in chapter 3, focus on the ways in which 'anorexia', 'the very
thin/anorexic body', subjectivity and 'femininity' are
discursively constituted within the transcripts. After
summarizing these analyses, the concluding chapter will then
draw together the implications of the two studies for
understanding anorexia nervosa, femininity, subjectivity and
the body.
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Chapter Two
Recent Research and Theor y on Anorexia Nervosa:
A Critical Thematic Review
2.1 Introduction
Research into anorexia nervosa and other eating disorders has
been conducted from a variety of perspectives (see Darby et
al., 1983; Garfinkel and Garner, 1982, 1983) and is extensive.
Within psychology anorexia nervosa has been theorized and
researched within bio-medical/bio-psychological, genetic and
cognitive perspectives. Further theory and research has been
conducted within psycho-dynamic, psychoanalytic, feminist and
soclo-cultural frameworks. Researchers have also investigated
body image disturbances, risk factors, pre-morbid
characteristics, the possible aetiological roles of the
family, possible relationships between anorexia and depression
or affective disorders and possible continuums between
'anorexics', 'restrained eaters' and 'normal' women. And in
the light of the somewhat limited success of uni-dimensional
research, some researchers have also adopted a multi-
dimensional perspective both in therapy and in theory and
research.
This chapter will critically review the recent research
literature on anorexia from the various perspectives listed
above. In doing so it will necessarily be selective,
presenting a critical thematic review of the approaches used
to investigate anorexia. The chapter will conclude with a
discussion of the limitations of current approaches; the main
problems being an under-theorization of gender, a lack of
attention to social context and a reliance on
empiricist/positivistic assumptions concerning the nature and
status of 'anorexia'. Hence, this chapter will provide both a
background to my own research and also a rationale for the
theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this
thesis.
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2 • 2 Bio-Medical/Bio-Psycho].ogical Research
Researchers have speculated about the possible organic causes
of anorexia nervosa since its emergence as a disease entity at
the end of the nineteenth century. De Berdt Hovell (1888b:
949), for example, considered anorexia nervosa to be "the
result of intestinal rather than uterine irritation, coupled
with a perturbed state of the nervous system" and Myrtle
(1888: 899) similarly claimed that anorexia had "its seat in
the nerves of the stomach". (Nineteenth century theories of
anorexia are discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7).
More recently bio-medical researchers have investigated
dermatological, cardiovascular, gastro-intestinal, endocrine,
neurophysiological, therinoregulatory and inusculoskeletal
abnormalities (Kaplan and Woodside, 1987) as well as
disturbances in plasma substrates such as plasma growth
hormone (GH) or serum tri-iodothyronine (see Halmi, 1983).
Researchers are often urged to continue to
examine such abnormalities in the hope of
identifying those that are not epiphenoinena... but,
instead reflect underlying biological pathogenic
variables. (Kaplan and Woodside, 1987: 648)
However, as will be discussed below, physiological changes are
often not specific to anorexia and have often been found to be
secondary effects of starvation rather being etiologically
significant (Wakeling, 1985; see also Malson, 1992 for a brief
critical review of bio-medical theories).
Bio-medical research has focused primarily on endocrinal
and neuro-endocrinal abnormalities. It has been suggested, for
example, that anorexia may be caused by primary hypothalamic
dysfunction (Russell, 1977; Weiner and Katz, 1983). Support
for this hypothesis comes from a number of observations. For
example, lesions to the hypothalamus and hypothalamic tumours
have been shown to produce weight loss and anorexia (loss of
appetite) (Kamalian et al., 1975; White et al. 1977). And
Hotta et al. (1986) have found elevated levels of
corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF) in cerebrospinal fluid
(CSF) in underweight 'anorexics' which they argue are due to
increased secretion by the hypothalamus.
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Bio-inedical researchers have found considerable evidence
that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is
particularly activated in at least some anorexics (Weiner and
Katz, 1983). Several studies have used the dexamethasone
suppression test (DST1), measuring plasma cortisol
concentrations before and after DST, to examine pituitary-
adrenal and hypothalamic disturbances in anorexic and other
psychiatric populations (see Zis et al., 1989; Mullen et al.,
1986; Schweitzer et al., 1990). Schweitzer et al. (1990), for
example, compared 18 'normal' and 20 'anorexic' female
participants using the DST. They found that whereas all of the
controls were supressors only half of the anorexics were; both
pre- and post-DST plasma cortisol concentrations being
significantly higher. Similarly, Walsh et al. (1981) found an
incomplete suppression of adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH)
and cortisol levels by dexamethasone in underweight anorexics.
However, this was also seen with 'protein calorie
malnutrition' (Walsh et al., 1981). Mullen et al. (1986) have
also shown that fasting in 'normal' individuals can result in
DST non-suppression thus indicating that HPA-axis dysfunction
in anorexia is a secondary effect of malnutrition and low body
weight rather than being an etiological factor. This assertion
is further confirmed by Hotta et al. (1986) who found that
both CSF-CRS and pituitary-adrenal functioning returned to
normal with weight recovery and by Treasure et al. (1985) who
have suggested that increased adrenal activity may be
associated with weight gain.
As Schweitzer et al. (1990) note, it is frequently
assumed that the hypercortisolism (evidence of HPA-axis
dysfunction) in anorexia is a consequence of low weight itself
and that this is corrected with a return to normal weight.
However, it is not known why excessive cortisol production
rate (evidence of HPA activation) returns to normal when
1 DST non-suppression in anorexics is interpreted as
evidence of hypothalamic dysfunction which in turn is associated
with disturbances in cortisol and other metabolite levels. See
Caroll et al. (1981) for further details of DST.
24
patients gain even small amounts of weight (Weiner and Katz,
1983). In addition, Schweitzer et al. (1990) suggest that,
contrary to previous assumptions, the results of their study
indicate that DST non-suppression is not simply due to
severely low weight since cortisol concentrations did not
correlated with percentage-initial-body-weight and
normalization of DST response was not always associated with
significant weight gain. They argue that recent acute weight
loss rather than severity of weight loss alone might be
responsible for non-suppression and that HPA-axis dysfunction
may be more complex than previously thought. In short, the
physiological meanings of DST non-suppression and HPA-axis
dysfunction remain unclear (Halmi, 1987; Weiner and Katz,
1983; Schweitzer et al., 1990) although it appears to be the
result of severe or rapid weight loss rather than having
etiological significance.
Because, according to self-reports, amennorhea sometimes
precedes weight loss (Fries, 1977; Daily, 1969) and does not
always return with weight gain (Morgan and Russell, 1975), it
has also been suggested (see Halmi, 1987; Kaplan and Woodside,
1987) that amennorhea may be due to primary hypothalamic
dysfunction. However, interpreting evidence about menstrual
irregularities may be complicated by, for example, the effects
of stress and by underestimating the percentage body fat and
weight gain necessary for return of menses (Garfinkel and
Garner, 1982). Other researchers have argued that severe
reduction in caloric intake may trigger amenorrhea before
there is substantial weight loss (Halmi and Falk, 1983) and
that a 'normal' diet, including adequate carbohydrate intake,
may be necessary for menstrual function to return (Halnii and
Falk, 1983; Crisp and Stonehill, 1971). Halmi and Falk's
(1983) study of 40 female anorexics, for example, suggested
that 'anorectic behaviours' are the strongest contributing
factor to amenorrhea. It is, therefore, far from clear that
amenorrhea is an indicator of primary hypothalamic dysfunction
in anorexia.
Further	 research	 into	 reproductive	 endocrinal
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disturbances has investigated abnormalities in the
hypothalamic-pituitary-ovarian axis in anorexia (e.g. Weiner
and Katz, 1983; De Marinis et al., 1991; see also Kaplan and
Woodside, 1987; Halmi, 1987). Golden et al. (1992), for
example, examined the possible role of central dopaminergic
suppression of gonadotropin secretion in relation to
amenorrhea associated with anorexia. They gave a dopamine
receptor blocker to ten women diagnosed as anorexic and ten
age-matched regularly menstruating controls to examine its
effects on serum prolactin and luteinizing hormone levels and
found prolactin and estradiol levels to be significantly lower
in the anorexic group. Significant differences were also found
in prolactin levels at baseline. Other studies (e.g. Katz et
al., 1978) have also shown that underweight women diagnosed as
anorexic demonstrate luteinizing hormone and follicle
stimulating hormone patterns similar to those of prepubertal
and pubertal girls and that these patterns sometimes persist
after weight-recovery. Similarly, both urinary and plasma
levels of gonadotropins have been found to be decreased in
anorexia (Nillius and Wide, 1979; see Halmi, 1987).
This 'immature pattern' of gonadotropin levels which
accompanies low weight has often been interpreted as
supporting the notion that anorexia is a developmental
psychobiological pathology (see Hsu, 1984). Crisp (e.g. 1970),
amongst others, has repeatedly asserted that anorexia is
rooted in the biological and experiential aspects of adult
weight. Hence, starvation is seen to represent a
psychobiological regression and a need to avoid adolescent and
related family turmoil (crisp 1970). However, whatever their
psychological significance, gonadotropic disturbances should
not be viewed as evidence of an organic aetiology for anorexia
nervosa. As Wakeling (1985: 195) argues:
although clearly many questions remain to be
answered, the balance of evidence suggests that the
amenorrhea and abnormalities in the HPG
(hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadotropic) axis occurring
during the course of the illness are most
economically viewed as being related to body-weight
and the effects of behaviour associated with weight
control.
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More recently Chiappelli et al. (1991) have investigated
the possible association between plasma-pituitary adrenal
hormones (PIA) and numbers of a type of peripheral blood
lymphocytes (PBL) in 11 'anorexics' and 14 participants with
normal PIA functioning. They found a number of neuroendocrinal
dysfunctions (including hypercortisolemia) in 'anorexic'
participants. 'Normal' subjects showed a positive correlation
between ACTH and numbers of PBL and helper T lymphocytes and
a negative relationship between cortisol and these
lymphocytes. However, this latter inverse relationship was not
found in 'anorexic' participants (Chiappelli et al., 1991).
Research has also investigated the possible role of
growth hormone (GH) and Gil-releasing hormone in anorexia. De
Marinis et al. (1991), for example, have investigated the
effects of naloxone on prolactin and GH response to GH-
releasing hormone in 'anorexic' participants. Similarly, Rolla
et al. (1991) have investigated the ability of pirezepine to
blunt GH response to Gil-releasing hormone in anorexics in
acute and recovery phases and in matched female controls. They
suggest that the anomalous GH response patterns in acute
anorexia is not simply the result of undernutrition and its
biological consequences although again the meaning of this
disturbance remains unclear.
Another line of research was taken up by Katz (1986) who
has examined the development of increased physical activity,
dietary restriction, depressive symptoms and binge-eating in
two male long-distant runners who developed 'a manifest eating
disorder'. He suggested that extreme exercise may play a role
in precipitating and maintaining anorexia in psychologically
and biologically vulnerable individuals and postulated that
endorphins are involved in this process. In support of this
possibility De-Marinis et al. (1991) have found lower
circulating levels of beta-endorphins in some anorexic
patients. However, Brambilla et al. (1991), comparing
peripheral opioid secretion in 10 anorexic women and 10
matched controls, found a number of alterations in anorexics'
neurophysiology including increased, rather than decreased,
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nocturnal secretion of beta-endorphins. They also found
increased diurnal-nocturnal secretion of beta-lipotropin (LPH)
and a loss of circadian rhythmicity of both peptides and a
blunter beta-LPH response to 5-hydroxytryptophan stimulation.
In addition to Katz' (1986) report of 2 long distant
runners developing eating disorders, Nudel et al. (1989) in
their study of psychological and physiological aspects of long
distant runners also note that two girls of the 16 runners
involved in their study were being treated for anorexia thus
suggesting a possible association between prolonged exercise
Lfld anorexia. Conversely, however, Thoren et al. (1990) posit
a potential therapeutic role for exercise. After reviewing the
research in this area they suggest that prolonged rhythmic
exercise activates central opioid systems by triggering
discharge from mechano-sensitive afferent nerves arising from
contracting skeletal muscle.
Recent research has also focused on neurophysiology and
neurotransmitters in anorexia nervosa (Halmi, 1987). Laessle
et al. (1989), for example, found that half of the 17 anorexic
and 22 bulimic participants in their study displayed enlarged
ventricles. However, their performance was no worse on
cognitive tasks than those with normal sized ventricles and it
was concluded that this cerebral atrophy did not appear to
severely effect either neuropsychological or psycho-
pathological functioning. Krieg et al. (1987) in their study
of morphological brain alterations in 100 participants with
anorexia and bulimia nervosa also found enlarged ventricles
and sulci. However, these alterations were found to be
reversible with clinical remission, thus suggesting that they
were due to malnourishment induced hormonal and metabolic
disturbances rather than having an aetiological role (Krieg et
al., 1987). However, conflicting evidence was produced by
Palazidou et al. (1990) who found that 17 female anorexics did
not differ from 9 age-, sex-, and education-matched controls
in terms of ventricular size. They did, however, find that
anorexics had comparatively enlarged external cerebrospinal
fluid spaces and that enlargement correlated significantly
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with worse performance on the cognitive 'Symbol Digit Test'.
In short, there is considerable evidence of physiological
alterations associated with anorexia, as well as other eating
disorders, and a knowledge of biological aspects of anorexia
may be important in advancing medical treatments of secondary
effects of starvation such as hypokalemia. The low bone
mineral density associated with anorexia, due to low
nutritional intake and low body weight (Salisbury and
Mitchell, 1991), for example, may require particular medical
interventions. Such research may also provide information that
would be useful in educating women about the health-related
consequences of undernutrition. However, despite promise-laden
titles such as 'The neuronal basis of com pulsive behaviour in
anorexia nervosa' (Mills, 1985), results are often conflicting
and there is no firm evidence to suggest any biologically
based aetiology for anorexia. The organic argument is further
undercut by the culture-, class-, age- and gender-bound
demographic distribution of anorexia and the coincidence of
its increase with cultural ideals of thinness (see Garner and
Garfinkel, 1980; Garner et al., l983a; see also p.67).
Moreover any attempt within the bio-medical model to account
for the over-representation of women in diagnoses of anorexia
is in terms of dysfunctions of the female hormonal
reproductive system (see also Garfinkel and Garner, 1983). As
numerous authors (e.g. Ussher, l992b) have argued, we should
be suspicious of such reasoning which relies on implicit
beliefs about the female body's propensity for illness.
2.3 Genetic Research
In addition to exploring possible organic causes and
consequences of anorexia, some researchers have also examined
the possibility that anorexia involves an inheritable risk
factor. It has long been noted that children with psychiatric
problems often have parents who also have mental health
problems (Rutter et al., 1990). However separating
environmental from genetic factors remains problematic and the
possibility of a genetic role in anorexia nervosa has
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frequently been discounted (Rutter et al., 1990). Yet recently
a number of researchers (e.g. Elliott, 1985; Mitchell and
Eckert, 1987) have argued that evidence from genetics studies
suggest the possibility of genetic predisposition for anorexia
nervosa (see Rutter et al., 1990).
Garfinkel and Garner (1983), for example, report several
observations of increased risk of anorexia (6%) in siblings
and a 4-5 fold difference in concordance rates of inonozygotic
(MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twins. Holland et al. (1988) used
data from the EDI (Eating Disorders Inventory: Garner et al.,
1983b) and twin and family data for 25 MZ and 20 DZ twins in
a combined twin and family study of anorexia nervosa. They
found 56% of the MZ twins and 5% of the DZ twins were
concordant for anorexia whilst almost 5% of female first
degree relatives also had histories of anorexia. They (and
also Garfinkel and Garner, 1982) concluded that their data
suggest a significant genetic component in the aetiology of
anorexia and that up to 80% of the variance in liability might
be accounted for by genetic factors. Consequently they suggest
a genetic/environmental etiological model of anorexia such
that a genetic predisposition to anorexia nervosa might become
manifest under adverse conditions such as "inappropriate
dieting" or emotional stress (see also Holland, 1984).
Similarly, reviewing recent studies, Elliott (1985) found
concordance rates of 33-40% for anorexia among MZ twins, again
supporting the possibility of a genetic component in its
aetiology.
However, one should be cautious in accepting the results
of genetic studies since most of the probands are volunteers
(Rutter et al., 1990). Of the few empirical genetic studies
many are beset by methodological difficulties (Strober, 1991).
Two of the most systematic studies with appropriate
methodological controls (see Rutter et al., 1990), conducted
by Gershon et al. (1983) and by Strober et al. (1985) do
however, in conjunction with the twin data, also suggest a
possible genetic mediation. Gershon et al. (1983) found a
combined rate of anorexia and bulimia of 6% in first-degree
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relatives of anorexic probands compared with only 1% in the
relatives of controls. And Strober et al. (1985), pooling the
data on anorexia, bulimia and sub-clinical anorexia found that
9.7% of female relatives of anorexic probands had an eating
disorder compared with 1.9% of relatives of controls (2.2% and
0.7% for "anorexia nervosa proper").
Gillberg (1985), investigating 4 families in which a
female with anorexia had a close male relative with infantile
autism, has also suggested that in some cases there may be a
common, possibly genetic predisposition which interacts with
the environment to produce anorexia in girls and infantile
autism in boys. Strober (1991) similarly suggests that
evidence from twin studies, chromosomal and association
studies and studies of inherited personality traits, whilst as
yet inconclusive, indicates familial aggregates of eating
disorders. Predisposing factors, he argues, are best
understood in terms of genetically transmitted dispositional
traits.
However, the role of genetics in personality is highly
controversial (Pervin, 1989). And dispositional trait theory
has been criticised as "relatively atheoretical and
tautological" (Snyder and Ickes, 1985: 892; see also McAdams,
1992). Situationalists have argued that behaviour is not
stable but is highly situationally and temporally specific
(Mischel, 1968; see also Epstein, 1985, Epstein and O'Brien,
1985; McAdams, 1992; Allen and Potkay, 1973). And many reviews
of the personality literature have concluded that dispositions
account for only a small proportion of variance in human
social behaviour (e.g. Argyle and Little, 1972; Bem, 1972;
Bowers, 1973; Mischel, 1968, 1973; McAdams, 1992), thus
undermining the concept of 'dispositional traits'. Indeed,
there is "a very lively debate about the existence or
nonexistence of traits" (Digman and Inouye, 1986: 116) and it
has been suggested that 'traits' merely represent linguistic
conventions for describing people (see Digman and Inouye,
1986; McAdams, 1992). Although trait theory in the form of
'the big five' has recently become more popular (Bayne, 1994),
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the notion of dispositional traits remains controversial.
Hence the proposition that heritable dispositional traits may
predispose individuals to anorexia must remain highly
contentious.
The genetic argument is further confounded by the
conflicting results of some research. For example, the results
of Water et al.'s (1990) study conflicts with Strober's
conclusions above. Waters et al. (1990) compared eleven twin
anorexic females with eleven non-twin anorexics by
interviewing their mothers to elicit information about the
development of anorexia in the daughter. They found no
significant differences between pre-morbid personalities of
either twin or non-twin anorexics and their non-anorexic
sisters thus suggesting that dispositional traits might not
constitute a genetically transmitted predisposition to
anorexia. Further evidence against the genetic predisposition
argument is provided by Sueinatsu et al. (1986) in a study of
7 pairs of MZ twins. They found five pairs of HZ twins to be
discordant and only 2 pairs to be concordant for anorexia and
that even in the concordant cases the degree of anorexia
differed.
In short, genetic research has been beset by theoretical
and methodological difficulties and by conflicting results
from different studies. And, as Elliott (1985) and Strober
(1991) note, there is as yet too little evidence to draw any
firm conclusions concerning an inheritable predisposition to
anorexia.
2.4 Anorexia Nervosa and Depression
Further research has examined the possible relationships
between anorexia nervosa and affective disorders. As Swift et
al. (1986), Altshuler and Weiner (1985) and Rivinus et al.
(1984) note, a relationship between anorexia nervosa and
depression has been frequently postulated. And considerable
research has investigated this possible relationship from a
number of perspectives. However, research has produced
conflicting views about whether and how the two disorders may
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be related.
Clinical features of depression such as insomnia, weight
loss and reduced libido are reported as also occurring
frequently in anorexia (Jampala, 1985). Strauss and Ryan
(1988), for example, using Becks Depression Inventory, found
that dysphoria and depression were prominent in anorexic and
other eating disordered participants. And anorexic symptoms
are also reported to be common in depressed patients (Wolpert,
1980).
In addition there is substantial evidence of abnormal
functioning in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis of at
least some anorexics (Weiner and Katz, 1983; See also pp.24-25
above) and it has been suggested that this might be a function
of depression (see Schweitzer et al., 1990). Kolata (1986),
for example, has argued that whilst depression and anorexia
are 'clinically distinct' they share some common symptoms and
sufferers either overproduce or over-respond to the stress
hormone cortisol. Similarly, Jampala (1985) has argued that
abnormalities in adrenocortical and thyroid activity and
catecholamine metabolism are common to both depression and
anorexia and bulimia. Schweitzer et al. (1990) also found
evidence of HPA-axis dysfunction. However, they also found
that those anorexic participants evidencing HPA-axis
dysfunction were no more severely depressed, as measured by
the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (Hamilton, 1960),
than those without such dysfunction. The study therefore
indicates that any relationship between anorexia and
depression may not be mediated via HPA-axis dysfunction.
Further research into anorexia and depression by Lauer et
al. (1990) has also produced ambiguous results. They measured
the baseline EEG sleep patterns of 10 depressed, 20 anorexic,
and 10 buliinic women and found the patterns to be
indistinguishable except for an increased REM density in
depressed participants. Yet a concomitant major depressive
episode in anorexics and bulimics did not effect EEG sleep
thus suggesting a physiological distinction between the two
disorders. Results of a cholinergic REM sleep induction test
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indicated a hypersensitive REM sleep-triggering cholinergic
transmitter system in depressed women but not in eating
disordered women.
Recent psychiatric genetic research has also investigated
possible genetic relations between anorexia and affective
disorders (Zerbin, 1987). Rivinus et al. (1984), for example,
collected family history data on 40 anorexic non-adopted girls
and women and 23 'normal', non-adopted, age-matched controls
using the family history research diagnostic criteria
(Andreasen et al., 1977). They found that first and second
degree relatives of anorexics had significantly more
depression or substance abuse than did relatives of non-
anorexic controls. 9.9% of first degree relatives of anorexics
were found to have depressive disorders compared with 2.4% of
first-degree relatives of controls. Similarly Winokur et al.
(1980) found rates of depression of 26% and 10% respectively
and Strober et al. (1982) found a two-fold increase in rates
of affective disorders in relatives of anorexics compared with
relatives of controls. Higher incidences of depression in
relatives of anorexics and bulimics was also found by Jampala
(1985). However, as Rutter et al. (1990) note, rates of
affective disorders in relatives of anorexics vary
considerably across studies and results conflict on whether of
not increased rates apply only to a subset of anorexics with
concurrent depression. Further, they argue that to show a
genetic association between anorexia and depression requires
the demonstration that not only is depression more common in
anorexics' relatives but also that anorexia is more common in
relatives of those with affective disorders. Neither Strober
et al.'s study (1986) nor Holland et al.'s twin study (1984)
supported this possibility, thus suggesting that the two
'disorders' are probably genetically separate (Rutter et al.,
1990)
Furthermore, when Strober and Katz (1987) examined recent
research into possible relationships between anorexia and
affective disorders in terms of clinical phenomenology,
genetics, biological correlates, course, outcome and
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epidemiology, they concluded that available evidence indicates
greater divergence than overlap between the two disorders,
thus suggesting that they do not share a common aetiology
although they argue that depression may play a role in a
predisposition to eating disorders.
In short, evidence concerning possible relationships
between affective disorders and anorexia nervosa is as yet
ambiguous and inconclusive. The nature of any possible
relationship between anorexia and depression remain unclear
(Swift et al., 1986). Whilst there is evidence that affective
disorders are more prevalent in the families of those
diagnosed anorexic, it is unclear how such family histories
might trigger eating disorders (Hsu, 1984). And "strong
positive arguments exist against an important relationship
between major depression and anorexia" particularly in terms
of demographic distribution (Altshuler and Weiner, 1985: 330).
Moreover, like other disorders, depression (Rutter et al.,
1990) and anorexia (Halmi, 1983) are clearly heterogeneous
categories. Hence, the positing of any relationship must be
further complicated by the lack of clarity surrounding the
definition of both 'disorders'.
2.5	 cognitive Research
2.5.1 'Anorexic' Schemas and Deficits
A fourth line or research into anorexia has been that
taking a cognitive perspective. As Vitousek and Hollon (1990)
note, numerous theoretical perspectives assign a central role
to the meanings of weight for individuals with eating
disorders and describe 'anorexics' as equating body shape with
personal value, as using weight regulation for a variety of
functions in their lives and as possessing rich
conceptualizations of weight. This, they argue, suggests that
cognitive factors play a prominent role in anorexia as well as
other eating disorders. Evidence within cognitive psychology
suggests that the existence of a schema in a particular domain
will produce systematic 'errors' in processing information
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relevant to that domain and it is therefore hypothesised that
such schemas may play a role in eating disorders (Vitousek and
Hollon, 1990)
Additionally, the failure of short-term behavioural
weight-gain programmes in the treatment of anorexia has led to
an increased focusing on cognitive disturbances and the
development of cognitive-behavioural therapies in which
cognitive 'dysfunctions' are viewed as important factors in
both the aetiology and maintenance of anorexia (see Garner et
al., 1982; Garner and Bemis, 1985).
Thus, within the cognitive-behavioural model, anorexia is
conceptualized in terms of abnormal beliefs, attitudes and
behaviours originating either in central features of the
disorder or from physiological effects of starvation
(Andersen, 1987). As Clark et al. (1989: 377-8; see also
Fairburn et al., 1986) note, it is often suggested that
"cognitive constructs such as overvalued attitudes and
dysfunctional beliefs are central to the maintenance of
disordered eating patterns". Consequently much research is
devoted to the identification of possible 'distortions' and
'deficits' in anorexics' cognitions. And there are numerous
reports of, for example, all-or-nothing thinking,
superstitious thinking, and ego-centric thinking in anorexics
(see Garner et al. 1982).
Recent research into negative cognitions and cognitive
'deficits' associated with eating disorders have used methods
such as recall procedures, recognition procedures (Clark et
al. 1989), cognitive tests and cognitively-oriented eating
disorder questionnaires such as EAT (the Eating Attitudes
Test: Garner and Garfinkel, 1979), EDI (Eating Disorders
Inventory: Garner et al., 1983b) and the Anorexic Cognitions
Questionnaire (Mizes and Klesges, 1987).
Strauss and Ryan (1988), for example, used Becks
Depression Inventory and the Loevinger Sentence Completion
Test to investigate cognitive errors and thought disorder in
eating disorders. They found that both restrictive and bulimic
anorexics manifested more logical errors than controls
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although they found no significant differences in cognitive
slippage and conceptual complexity. Similarly, Laessle et al.
(1989) found that 'anorexic' and 'bulimic' participants,
tested during acute stages, performed significantly more
poorly in cognitive tasks than did 'normal' controls. And
Palazidou et al. (1990) found that both anorexic and bulintic
participants performed 'abnormally' on the Symbol Digit Test2.
Strupp et al. (1986), however, comparing 17 female anorexics
with 15 controls, found that although their performances were
worse on tests that assessed automatic or incidental
information processing, 'anorexics' performed as well as or
better than controls on cognitive tasks requiring effortful
processing.
Additionally, cognitive differences have been found
between eating disorders subgroups. Vitousek and Hollon (1990)
suggest that the different symptomatologies of anorexia and
buliniia may be due underlying differences in schemata and that
only anorexics assign special meanings to extreme thinness.
Further, Toner et al. (1987) found that bulimics were more
'cognitively impulsive' than anorexics 3
 and also that bulimics
made significantly more errors than did anorexics and controls
on the Matching Familiar Figures Test. Jones et al. (1991),
however, produced conflicting results. They compared 30
underweight anorexics, 38 normal-weight bulixnics, 20 long-term
weight restored 'anorexic' women and 39 'normal' controls and
found that underweight anorexic women demonstrated lower
performance than 'bulimics' in 4 of 5 neuropsychological
domains. They argue that their results indicated small and
subtle cognitive difficulties associated with eating
disorders, thus supporting previous assertions of attention
2 These scores were also found to correlate significantly
with enlarged external cerebrospinal fluid spaces. See also p.23
for a discussion of bio-niedical abnormalities in CSF associated
with anorexia.
Sohlberg et al. (1989) have also suggested that impaired
cognition may explain poor prognosis of impulsive anorexic
patients as they found that impulsivity was the strongest
predictor of long-term outcome.
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difficulties associated with eating disorders.
Further cognitive differences between women with and
without eating disorders and between anorexics and bulimics
have been described by Hansson et al. (1988). They studied
cognitive style and psychological defense in 25 anorexic
women, 29 buliinic women and 31 women undergoing reduction
mammoplasty (RMs). Using a version of the rod and frame test
and the Meta Contrast technique (to measure 'psychological
defense'), anorexics and RNs were found to be more field-
independent while bulixnics were described as more field-
dependent. Bulimics were also found to demonstrate more
frequent signs of depression and isolation whilst anorexics
showed signs of greater sensitivity to marginal cues and fewer
signs of repression.
In terms of possible cognitive 'deficits' associated with
eating disorders, Bruch (1978) has also argued that
'anorexics' lack the capacity for abstract thought
characteristic of the formal operational stage of cognitive
development and that they function with the style of younger
children. However, again conflictual evidence has been
provided by Kowalski (1986). This study investigated whether,
as is frequently suggested, anorexics tend to reason in a
childlike manner. She compared performance of 19 anorexic
females (aged 13-25) with 19 age matched female 'normal'
controls and 19 younger girls (aged 10-12) using formal
reasoning tasks. She found that anorexics were far more
similar to the age-matched controls and that in only 1 of 4
tasks were they more similar to the younger girls.
The evidence therefore for distinguishing between
individuals with and without eating disorders and between
different types of eating disorders in terms of cognitive
'deficits' remains inconclusive, with different studies
producing conflicting results. However, as noted above,
cognitive psychologists have also investigated the possibility
that anorexics might be distinguished by particular cognitive
schemata.
Some studies suggest that 'anorexics' tend to have a more
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negative self-image (Casper et al., 1981), to be more
perfectionist and obsessive (Garfinkel and Garner, 1982), to
be harshly self-critical (Vitousek and Hollon, 1990) and to
endorse irrational beliefs (Ruderinan, 1986). Primarily,
however, research has focused on weight-related schemata and
self-schemata in anorexia and bulimia since, as numerous
authors assert (e.g. Bruch, 1973; Garner et al., 1982;
Vitousek and Hollon, 1990), weight and body shape represent
central referents of self evaluation. Bemis (1983, 1986), for
example, asserts that anorexics and bulimics are clearly
distinct from 'normal' and recovered individuals in terms of
their negative reactions to weight gain and positive reactions
to weight loss. And Davis (1986) argues that these concerns
become crystallized into hypervalent, affect-laden schemas
that virtually control all aspects of an anorexic's
functioning.
It is important to note, however, that whilst many
cognitive studies (discussed below) have found differences
between 'anorexic' and non-anorexic participants, there are
also numerous studies (e.g. Huon and Brown, 1984; Minz and
Betz, 1988; Polivy and Herman, 1987; see also pp.55-56) that
document the prevalence of body dissatisfaction, weight
concerns and a preference for 'slimness' in the general
population, particularly amongst women.
Recent cognitive research into anorexia has found that
when participants were asked to read and later recall an essay
about another person, anorexic (and also obese) participants
recalled more weight- and food-related items than did female
college students (King et al., 1991). Clark et al. (1989)
studied 42 bulimics, 20 anorexics and a control sample of 165
women nursing students. They used a battery of questionnaires
including the Modified Distressing Thoughts Questionnaire and
the 26-item version of EAT with re-test after 3 months. They
found that both anorexic and bulimic participants scored
higher on Anxious, Depressive and Weight-related scales than
did the nursing students. Clinical observations (Phelan, 1987)
have suggested that anorexics also tend to remember teasing
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comments about being 'chubby' prior to the 'onset' of anorexia
and approving comments about being slim after onset better
than they can recall dis-confirmatory information. This has
been interpreted as a selective memory bias (Vitousek and
Hollon, 1990) although it might equally be argued that such
memories may reflect actual frequency of 'teasing' and
complimentary comments. Indeed, a study of social attitudes
towards anorexia (Branch and Eurman, 1980; see also Hsu, 1989)
found that friends and relatives did admire the thinness and
control of those diagnosed anorexic.
Although few studies have examined either the processing
or organization of information about the self (Vitousek and
Hollon, 1990), Stroop tests, used to measure interference
caused by schema-based conflicts, have also been used to
research concerns about food and body shape. Ben-Tovini et al.
(1988), for example, found that anorexics and bulimics were
significantly slower at naming the ink colour of food- and
weight-related words than of neutral words. Similar results
were obtained from anorexics' for food-related words by
Channon et al. (1988). However, Ben-Tovim et al. (1988) also
note that the absolute differences between those with and
without eating disorders was fairly modest and that there was
a considerable overlap in distribution.
Support for the assertion that anorexics have different
cognitions concerning weight and food has also been provided
by the findings of researchers using Repertory Grid Tests.
Fransella and Button (1983) and Mottrain (1985), for example,
suggested that anorexics tend to organize perception around a
uni-dimensional weight-related system and that they construe
both themselves and others in extreme terms. Cooper et al.
(1987) have also used the Body Shape Questionnaire to assess
the phenomenological experience of 'feeling fat' and have
found differences between buliinics and 'normal' controls
although anorexics were not included in the study.
There is, then, substantial evidence to suggest that
anorexics may have different cognitions concerning weight and
food. However, as Clark et al. (1989) assert, cognitive
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methodologies are often limited. For example, they often fail
to distinguish between cognition, affect and behaviour. They
also tend to focus exclusively on frequency of negative
thought, ignoring, for example, dimensions of emotional
intensity (the degree of sadness, worry and guilt), belief
(the degree to which they stated that a thought was true of
themselves) and controllability of thoughts. Vitousek and
Hollon (1990) also note that the recent burst in cognitive
assessment has been largely restricted to investigations of
the low-levels of abstraction using, for example, self-
statements about eating and weight, ignoring higher-order
cognitive elements. Data obtained from many of these studies,
they argue, cannot therefore reveal either the nature or
influence of core schemas. They suggest that if there is any
distinctive cognitive style to eating disorders equivalent to
the memory bias for negative events posited for depression
then it might be a 'New Year's resolution' cognitive style of
the form: "I must just do X, so that Y will come to pass - and
I shall be the better person for my efforts" (Vitousek and
Hollon, 1990: 209). However:
There is as yet nothing in the literature to verify
the existence of any truly distinctive cognitive
structures in anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa
that are independent of eating or weight content.
(Moreover) it is unarguable and ultimately
uninteresting that someone who has organized her
life around weight control will think a great deal
about food and weight, will try to restrict her
intake, and will experience considerable emotion as
she encounters success and failure in pursuing her
goal. (Vitousek and Hollon, 1990: 195, 198).
In addition, it is sometimes found that the 'general
beliefs' associated with anorexia are not specific to anorexia
but are concomitants of various psychopathologies (Cooper et
al., 1985). And, as noted above (see also pp.55-56), numerous
studies have documented a prevalence of dieting, body
dissatisfaction and food- and weight-related concerns amongst
women in general.
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2.5.2 Body Image Distortion
Further related research into anorexia nervosa has
investigated body-image distortions (BID). BID has been
described as a defining characteristic of anorexia whose
correction is critical for recovery (Bruch, 1962). "Body-image
distortion" (WHO, 1992), "disturbance in the way in which
one's body weight, size or shape is experienced" (APA, 1987)
or a "distorted, implacable attitude towards eating, food or
weight" (Feighner et al., 1972) constitutes a central
diagnostic criteria of anorexia.
Distorted body image is an almost universal finding
in anorexia nervosa with many patients insisting
that they are overweight when their bodies have
become grotesquely emaciated (Bemis, 1979: 490).
This assertion is supported by a variety of studies. And, as
Cash and Brown (1987) note, there are numerous techniques for
assessing BID in anorexia and bulimia. These included body-
part size estimation techniques, distorting image methods,
silhouettes and attitudinal measures. Manley et al. (1988),
for example, used a battery of tests including a Perceived
Body Image Scale to compare 25 'anorexic' women with 15 age-
and height- matched bulimic women and 24 sex- age- and height-
matched 'normal' controls to explore perceptual, cognitive and
emotional aspects of body image. They found that both
'bulimics' and 'anorexics' exhibited greater BID than did
controls and that bulimics expressed significantly more body
image dissatisfaction than either anorexics or controls.
Conversely, however, Steiger et al. (1989) found that
'anorexics' but not 'bulimics' exhibited BID.
Fichter et al. (1986), using a video monitor, moveable
callipers and image marking, also found that anorexics
significantly over-estimated waist and upper thigh size.
Interestingly they found no significant influence of caloric
intake on body width estimation. Freeman et al. (1983), using
a modified TV camera which electronically distorted the
subject's image to assess BID in 'normal', restricting
anorexic, bulimic, and psychiatric control participants. They
also found BID in participants with eating disorders, although
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distortion was only consistent for buliinics. Their findings
also suggest that BID is related to self-esteem, eating
restraint (see pp.55-65) for a discussion of restrained
eating), sense of competence and efficacy and adherence to a
cultural stereotype of 'thin is competent'. Similarly,
Hartley (1989), comparing 10 anorexics (9 female and 1 male)
and 10 college students matched for age, sex and educational
attainment, again found that anorexics evidenced significantly
greater BID than did controls and that estimation of body size
was related to both attitudes towards the body and towards
oneself. Similar results are reported by Sunday et al. (1992)
who found that anorexics and bulimics overestimated hip size
and body depth compared with obese, restrained-eaters, and
unrestrained participants.
However, whilst BID is a frequently cited symptom of
anorexia, there is a marked inconsistency in research findings
(Cash and Brown, 1987; Fraenkel and Leichner, 1989). Fransella
and Button (1983), for example, used a repertory grid
technique to assess constructs about being thin and being
normal weight in 20 hospitalized anorexics. Their findings
confirmed those of Fransella and Crisp (1979) that present
'thin self' was seen as undesirable and 'normal weight self'
as preferable. In addition, they found no evidence of denial
of illness since inter-correlations were generally very high
between the construct 'anorectic' and various 'illness'
constructs. Whitehouse et al. (1988) also found that whilst
anorexic women significantly overestimated waist size, there
was very little distortion in perception of the whole body.
However they did find that amongst the controls body size
over-estimation was related to drive for thinness.
It has been suggest that much of the uncertainty about
BID may be due to methodological short-comings (Meerman et
al., 1986), in particular the reliance on the calliper
technique in which two moveable indicators are used to mark
the perceived edge of the body at various points (Freeman et
al., 1983). Of the 9 studies using this technique, reviewed by
Freeman et al., only one (Slade and Russell, 1973) did not
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report overestimation of body size in both anorexics and
controls. Pierloot and Houben (1978) and Fries (1977) did
however find greater distortion in anorexics. Freeman et al.
(1983) argue that these results suggest that there is an
inherent 'noise' in the calliper technique which may reduce
differences in BID between anorexics and non-anorexics. An
alternative explanation, however, is suggested by Heilbrun and
Friedberg (1990) who also found evidence of BID in thin non-
anorexic undergraduate women with personality characteristics
similar to 'anorexics'. They argue that this suggests a
continuum between anorexic and non-anorexic women in both BID
and other features of anorexia. McWhirter (1985) has further
suggested that the frequently reported body size
overestimation associated with anorexia may be due to a
'performance effect' resulting from demand characteristics of
clinical and experimental settings. Moreover, as Vitousek and
Hollon (1990) argue, it is not clear that anorexics and
bulimics always see themselves as 'fat' in the sense that
overweight people do (see Markus et al., 1987). And, as
Fairburn (1987) notes, 'feeling fat' may be a labile
experience that varies with environmental events, mood, eating
habits and actual weight. Such a conclusion is supported by
Brinded et al. (1990) who found that BID in 7 hospitalized
anorexics fluctuated across and within individuals over a 4
week period to different extents and in different directions.
As they argue, such variations may often be obscured when
group data alone is considered.
In conclusion, there is substantial evidence to suggest
that many women diagnosed as 'anorexic' often experience body
image distortion. However, controversy remains over its
nature, stability and prevalence and also over the degree to
which this distortion may differ from that found in 'normal'
women.
2.6 Family-Oriented and Psychodynamic Research and Theories
2.6.1 Anorexia as a Familial Pathology
A further body of research has also focused on the
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psychological characteristics associated with 'anorexia'. And
paralleling research and theory in other areas such as
schizophrenia (Bentall, 1990), numerous authors have sought to
understand anorexia within the context of the familial
environment. That is, rather than conceptualizing anorexia in
terms of bio-physiological disorder, genetic pre-disposition
or individual cognitive distortions or deficits, family-
oriented researchers have theorized anorexia as a
psychological or psychodynamic disorder, created and
maintained within a dysfunctional family context (see also
Malson (1992) for a brief critical review of family-oriented
theories of anorexia).
As already mentioned (pp.15-16), 'anorexia' is primarily
defined in current literature in terms of food-refusal, severe
weight-loss, a 'pursuit of thinness' and a 'fear of fat'
(Bruch, 1966, 1973; Wilson et al., 1983). Several studies have
located these characteristics within the context of various
parallel or complimentary 'maladaptive attitudes' and
behaviours of the 'anorexic's' family. Thus, for example,
Kalucy et al. (1977) have described a familial 'weight and
eating pathology', consisting of deviations in weight and
eating behaviour, reflecting pathological or pathogenic
attitudes towards eating, food and appearance. Family-oriented
studies have identified high rates of over- and underweight
parents (Kalucy et al., 1977; Garfinkel and Garner, 1982), of
'noticeable' weight fluctuations, particularly in mothers
(Kalucy et al., 1977) and of 'anorexia-like syndromes' in the
adolescent histories of parents (Kalucy et al., 1977; Halmi et
al., 1977; Morgan and Russell, 1975; see Yager, 1982), sisters
(Morgan and Russell, 1975; Daily and Gomez, 1979) and first-
degree relatives (Crisp et al., 1980) of 'anorexics'.
Researchers have also described 'anorexic families' as
tending to have 'abnormal' eating styles (Kalucy et al.,
1977), as having a propensity for odd diets and vegetarianism
(Dally, 1969; Dally and Gomez, 1979) and as being overly
preoccupied with appearance (Bruch, 1973; Sheppy et al., 1988;
Minuchin et al., 1978). Huon and Brown (1984) have asserted
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that they tend to focus family conflicts around food, eating
and appearance. Other studies have found increased
psychopathology in the parents following their daughter's
weight-gain (Crisp et al., 1974) and that parents tend to
over-estimate their daughters size, not wishing her to be
larger (Crisp and Kalucy, 1974; Ben-Tovim et al., 1977).
Kalucy et al. (1977) have also described mothers of
'anorexics' as frequently equating weight-gain with a lack of
control of sexual and aggressive feelings.
As Rakoff (1983) argues, the family may play an important
role in mediating attitudes towards eating, as well as other
behaviours and desires. However, the concept of familial
'weight pathology' is also problematic. Firstly, the evidence
is contradictory. Halmi et al. (1978), for example, reported
no significant differences in the weights of parents of
'anorexics' compared with a matched control group. And
Garfinkel et al. (1983) found no evidence that parents of
'anorexics' had disturbed attitudes towards eating nor that
they over-estimated their daughter's size or were unduly pre-
occupied with weight-control. Secondly, it seems problematic
to pathologize attributes such as vegetarianism (Dally, 1969),
an avoidance of red meat (Daily and Gomez, 1979), a pre-
occupation with appearance (Sheppy et al., 1988) or an
idealization of thinness (Kalucy et al., 1977). Whilst such
familial characteristics may be detrimental to family members,
their pathologization relies upon an idealized concept of
normality that has been assumed rather than demonstrated. The
much-documented over-pre-occupation of 'the anorexic family'
with health, appearance and food are prevalent to some degree
throughout contemporary Western society: the family is a
"bearer of general culture" (Rakoff, 1983: 29; see also pp.65-
71). And the value judgement implicit in the pathologization
of, for example, 'weight-deviations' may itself be seen as a
fetishization of cultural ideals about weight and appearance.
Research also indicates that, in addition to food-refusal
and an 'obsessive pursuit of thinness' (Bruch, 1966),
'anorexia' may be associated with many other psychological
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disturbances for which the more apparent symptoms of anorexia
act as a cover or pseudo-solution (Bruch, 1982). Thus, Sheppy
et al. (1988; see also Humphrey, 1986) described 'anorexics'
as more depressed, anxious, self-punitive, alienated,
rebellious and hostile than 'non-anorexics'. Various studies
have suggested that 'anorexics' also tend to be highly
performance-oriented (Becker et al., 1981) and perfectionist
(Humphrey, 1986), having high social, educational and
financial aspirations (Guttman, 1986). They are frequently
portrayed as feeling helpless and ineffective (Bruch, 1982;
Humphrey, 1986), as lacking in self-esteem and in a sense of
autonomy and control (Palazzoli, 1974; Guttman, 1986; Bruch,
1973; 1982, Garner et al., 1982; Huon and Brown, 1984) and as
having deficits in self-concept (Sheppy et al., 1988; Bruch,
1973)
Again, family-oriented researchers have sought to locate
these 'typical' psychological disturbances within the context
of familial psychopathology. Thus, 'anorexic families', as
well as 'anorexics' are described as highly performance-
oriented (Becker et al., 1981), as having high aspirations
(Guttman, 1986) and as psychologically disturbed (Sheppy et
al., 1988; see also Halmi, 1987). Some research suggests that
'anorexic families' have increased rates of affective
disorders (see p.34), 'addictive syndromes' (Kalucy et al.,
1977; Strober, 1981, see Yager, 1982; Kog and Vandereycken,
1985) and other psychosomatic and psychological disorders (Kog
and Vandereycken, 1985). Mothers are often described as
anxious and perfectionist (Garfinkel and Garner, 1982). And
Kalucy et al. (1977), for example, describe migraines and
phobic avoidance reactions as particularly common in mothers
and manic depressive psychoses and obsessive compulsive
reactions as particularly common in fathers.
Research has also indicated that 'anorexic families' tend
to be controlling (Rakoff, 1983), sexually repressive (Becker
et al., 1981) and hostile (Haggarty, 1983), to have high
levels of conflict, particularly between parents (Bruch, 1982;
Hall and Brown, 1982; Sheppy et al., 1988) and to have
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difficulties in resolving conflict (Palazzoli, 1974; Haggarty,
1983; see also Yager, 1982). Others have observed disturbed
family communications (see Kog and Vandereycken, 1985). And
several studies have described these families as tending to be
socially isolated (Becker et al., 1981; Humphrey, 1986; Hall
and Brown, 1982), as having a "deep sense of ambivalence
concerning separation" (Kalucy et al., 1977: 393) and as
having overly close (Kalucy et al., 1977; Bruch, 1973;
Humphrey, 1986; Verheij and Booij-van Reek, 1986) or
'enmeshed' (Minuchin et al., 1978) relationships. In
particular, mothers of 'anorexics' are typified as over-
identifying with their daughters (see Kog and Vandereycken,
1985) and as "intrusive, over-protective, anxious,
perfectionist and fearful of separation from their children"
(Strober and Humphrey, 1987; 654; Bemis, 1979) whilst fathers
are "commonly described as emotionally constricted,
obsessional, moody, withdrawn, passive and ineffectual"
(Strober and Humphrey, 1987: 654).
Whilst many family-oriented studies leave the (causal)
relationship between such family pathologies and anorexia
largely untheorized, Minuchin et al. (1978) do provide an
influential 'systemic theory' (see Sours, 1980) which
elucidates how dysfunctional family attitudes, behaviours and
inter-personal dynamics may be implicated in the aetiology of
anorexia. (This systemic theory has also been used to explain
a number of other psychosomatic illnesses in terms of familial
'pathology'.) They argue that the 'anorexic' daughter (or son)
is an active participant within a dysfunctional family system
and that her symptoms play a functional role, for example, by
diverting attention from parental conflict and thereby
maintaining family stability. Further, they assert that the
anorexic or psychosomatic family is typically very 'enmeshed'.
That is, extra-familial contact is resisted whilst intra-
familial relationships are overly close and intrusive (c.f.
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above) and the boundaries between different sub-systems4
 of
the family tend to be blurred. Such a system, they argue, may
result in a child giving primacy to interpersonal family
proximity and loyalty over autonomy and self-realization.
Hence, 'the typical anorexic-to-be' has difficulty in
consolidating a separate, individual identity, distrusts the
validity of her own feelings and perceptions (see also Bruch,
1973, 1982; Garner et al., 1982) is overly dependent on
parental approval and is unable to meet the demands of
adolescent development, turning instead to 'anorexia' as a
pseudo-solution to these intra- and inter-personal
difficulties.
2.6.2 Psychodynamic Theories of Anorexia
Minuchin et al.'s description of 'the psychosomatic
family' converges with many of the above portrayals of 'the
typical anorexic family'. Their systemic theorization of
anorexia also converges in part with psychodynamic and some
psychoanalytic work in this field. Psychoanalysts, for
example, have stressed the symbolic meanings of self-
starvation in unconscious fantasy (Boris, 1984). Hence,
anorexia has been interpreted as a defensive regression from
adolescent sexuality (see Sayers, 1988) or from mature
femininity (Plaut and Hutchinson, 1986) towards infantile
orality. Refusal to eat has thus been interpreted as a fear of
oral impregnation (see Sayers, 1988) and as a response to
unresolved conflicts in the separation-individuation process
(Fischer, 1989; see also Bruch, 1982) and the greed and
longing associated with that process. Boris (1984: 318), for
example, argues that "the anorexic is not to be found wanting,
in both senses of the word" whilst Birksted-Breen (1989)
argues that anorexia may be understood as a girl's attempt to
have a body and sense of self separate from her mother's
" Minuchin et al. (1978) describe the family system as made
up of different sub-systems such as spouse, parental and sibling
sub-systems. They argue that the boundaries and transaction
patterns between these form a 'matrix' for the psychological
development of family members.
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f.
as if maturing into adulthood is experienced as
becoming the mother (Hughes et al., 1985) ... The
wish to be fused, the refusal to take and the attack
on the representation of the mother's body through
self-starvation are given fuel by feelings of envy
The anorexic is caught between the terror of
aloneness ... and the terror of psychic annihilation
(Birksted-Breen, 1989: 30).
In short, psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians have
interpreted anorexia as a symptomatic manifestation of
unresolved oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts, associated, in
particular, with inadequate ego development (Birksted-Breen,
1989; Fischer, 1989) and with a failure to accept female
psychosexual maturity (Plaut and Hutchinson, 1986; see also
Sayers (1988) Wilson et al. (1983) and Sours (1980) for
further discussions of psychoanalytic theories of anorexia;
see also chapter 3 for a further discussion of psychoanalytic
theory).
Although critical of psychoanalytic therapy (Bruch,
1978), the extremely influential work of Bruch and of
Palazzoli also draws on psychoanalytic theory. And as with
much of the psychoanalytic literature (see Sayers, 1988), this
work tends to focus on the role of the mother, particularly on
disturbances in the early mother-child relationship which is
viewed as an origin of the anorexic's poor sense of self.
Bruch (1982: 1532), for example, interprets 'anorexic's' self-
starvation, their "display of defiance" as "a defense against
the feeling of not having a core personality of their own, of
being powerless and ineffective". That is, anorexia is
conceptualized as a 'self-pathology' (Geist, 1989) in which
the body has become the focus of a psychological conflict in
which food-refusal signifies greater control (over the body,
the self and others) (Palazzoli, 1974). This description of
'the anorexic' as lacking in a sense of autonomy and
individual identity is also similar, therefore, to that of
Minuchin et al. (1978) discussed above.
Both Bruch and Palazzoli locate the origins of 'the
anorexic's' 'ego-deficits' and subsequent anorexia in
disturbances of the earliest mother-child relationship (Bruch,
1973), in terms of a real failure of the mother to respond
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appropriately to her infant daughter's needs (see also Sayers'
(1988) discussion). Instead, it is argued, the mother super-
imposes inappropriate needs on the child refusing to recognize
and thereby legitimate the child's own needs (Bruch, 1973;
Palazzoli, 1974). Hence:
If confirmation and reinforcement of his (sic) own,
initially rather undifferentiated, needs and
impulses have been absent, or have been
contradictory or inaccurate, then a child will grow
up perplexed when trying to differentiate between
disturbances in his biological field and emotional-
interpersonal experiences and he will be apt to
misinterpret deformities in his self-body concept as
externally induced. Thus he will become an
individual deficient in his sense of separateness,
with diffuse ego-boundaries, and will feel helpless
under the influence of external forces. (Bruch,
1973: 56)
That is, the refusal or inability of the mother to confirm the
child's perceptions of her own needs results in the child
doubting the legitimacy of her self-perceptions. She becomes
confused about appetite and satiety, focusing on what others
want rather than what she wants so that her desires become
indistinguishable from those of others (see also Caskey, 1986;
Minuchin et al., 1978). And her resulting lack of sense of
self, her 'diffuse ego-boundaries', is later compounded by the
imposition on the child of a role of submissive, high-
achieving, perfect child (Bruch, 1982; Palazzoli, 1974).
Adolescence further exacerbates her predicament because of its
pressures to achieve independence, autonomy and separation
from the parents and
because it scotches the illusion of being a boy, of
being able to achieve the same as boys. The
anorexic's achievement-oriented response is to be
"as good as a man", to be "super-special by being
super-thin" (Bruch, 1977: 56, 78, quoted in Sayers,
1988: 366).
Thus, like Minuchin et al., Bruch and Palazzoli
conceptualize anorexia as a pseudo-solution to the inter- and
intra-personal disturbances created and maintained within a
dysfunctional parent-child relationship.
Family-oriented psychological, systemic and psychodynamic
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theories and research clearly provide a detailed and
contextualized portrayal of the psychological problems that
may be associated with 'anorexia nervosa'. However, as noted
above (see also Yager, 1982), there are inconsistencies in the
research findings and such research can only give a partial
explanation of anorexia. The research also suggests that not
]J. families of 'anorexics' are dysfunctional and, even where
they are, non-familial factors may also be involved (see e.g.
Bruch, 1978). Moreover, when studying the 'anorexic' and her
family after the onset of anorexia, such research also cannot
easily distinguish between those attributes caused by the
stress of a daughter's 'illness' and those that may be
causative (Hsu, 1984). Yager (1982), for example, has
suggested that their 'exceptional enmeshinent' may be explained
as a reaction to the crisis of their daughters' anorexia.
Similarly, it is not always possible to distinguish between
those psychological disturbances caused by prolonged
starvation and those that may be more relevant to an aetiology
of anorexia (see Bruch, 1982).
Studies have also often been beset by numerous
methodological problems in terms of sampling and assessment
techniques (Yager, 1982; Halmi, 1983). As Yager (1982) notes,
'classic' descriptions of familial dysfunction are often based
on relatively small, skewed samples and may therefore present
an over-generalized picture of the 'typical anorexic' and her
family. Moreover, several authors (see Yager, 1982; Garfinkel
et al., 1983; Rakoff, 1983; Halmi, 1983) have noted a
heterogeneity in the personalities and pathologies attributed
to both the anorexic and/or her family which make any attempt
to define a universal aetiology or to describe a typical
'anorexic' or 'anorexic family' somewhat implausible.
In sum, it remains to be substantiated that specific
abnormal family interaction patterns occur in
anorexia nervosa and that they are causally related
to the development of the condition. (Hsu, 1984:
410)
"There is no uniform personality" for anorexia and "as with
most clinical problems, there are no universal patterns" of
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familial aetiology (Yager, 1982: 44).
Finally, whilst several authors recommend a multi-
dimensional approach to anorexia (e.g. Sheppy et al., 1988:
Garfinkel and Garner, 1982; Bruch, 1978) and have acknowledged
the importance of cultural factors (e.g. Bruch, 1978; Minuchin
et al., 1978), the emphasis is often on an exclusively
familial aetiology. The extent to which the pathologized
'anorexic family' can be distinguished from the 'normal'
family or from other 'psychosomatic families' remains unclear
and the possible reasons for 'familial dysfunction' remain
untheorized. Public and private spheres are kept artificially
separated (Goldner, 1989) so that 'system' is narrowly equated
with 'family', thus precluding an exploration of the
reciprocal interplay between individual, family and society
(Walsh and Scheinkman, 1989). That is, family-oriented theory
tends to conceptually isolate 'the family', dislocating it
from its social context (Walsh and Scheinkman, 1989), thus
allowing an uncritical pathologization of familial
characteristics such as (over) pre-occupation with food and
weight or maternal (over) involvement. As Luepnitz (1988)
argues, family theorists (and therapists) need to develop a
critical socio-historical understanding of their subject.
Consequently, despite the fact that many more women than
men are diagnosed as anorexic (see chapter 1), the category of
gender, both within and outside of the family, also remains
under-theorized. As several feminist critics have noted, tithe
category of gender remains essentially invisible in the
conceptualizations of family therapists" (Goldner, 1985: 33;
see also McGoldrick et al., 1989a) and there is often a naive
illusion of marital equality in patriarchal society (Goldner,
1989). The prominent family theorist, Jackson (1977: 23), for
example, asserted that:
it is possible that one could outline marriage as a
totally non-sexual affair, nearly excluding all
sexual differences, or at least minimizing the
causal role usually assigned such differences.
(quoted by McGoldrick et al., 1989b: 19)
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Similarly the influential Timberlawn group found that women in
'adequate' or 'normal' families tended to be "overwhelmed with
responsibility, obese, psychosomatically ill and sexually
dissatisfied" whilst their husbands were "functioning well".
Yet they concluded that "the family is alive and well" (quoted
by Luepnitz, 1988: 11). This patriarchal normalization of
gender inequality within the family tends to preclude an
exploration of its effects on (the daughter's) female
psychosexual development (see pp.73-74 for a discussion of
feminist analyses of anorexia and mother-daughter
relationships). It also leads to an uncritical pathologization
of parents who deviate from gender stereotyped behaviour (see
Luepnitz, 1988) and to an over-implication of the mother
rather than the father in the daughter's 'illness' (see also
Caplan, 1990; Caplan and Hall-McCorquodale, 1985; Sayers,
1988; Yager, 1982). As Bemis (1979: 491) notes:
mothers of anorexic patients are commonly depicted
as dominant and intrusive, and the 'peculiar
relationship' and 'striking ambivalence' between
mother and child are frequently mentioned ... In
contrast to the unflattering prominence of the
'scolding and overbearing mother' in clinical
reports (Cobbs, 1950) fathers are briefly
characterised as passive and ineffectual figures who
play a minor role in the family structure.
As the above discussion illustrates, family-oriented research
and theory tends to focus on the mother's 'failings' rather
than the father's in explaining anorexia in the daughter (see
also Sayers, 1988).
In short, family-oriented research and theory has
provided a detailed, contextualized portrayal of the
psychological problems that may be associated with 'anorexia
nervosa'. The research findings are, however, contradictory
and studies tend to present an over-generalized picture of
'the anorexic' and her family. As noted above, there appears
to be considerable heterogeneity in both 'anorexics' and their
families. Moreover, whilst there is considerable evidence that
family dysfunction may (sometimes) play a role in the
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development and maintenance of anorexia, the explanatory power
of family-oriented theory and research is seriously undermined
by the frequent under-theorization of gender and of the
individual-family-society relationship.
2.7 Restrained Eating and the Continuum Between Anorexia
Nervosa and 'Normal' Eating
As noted above (see p.44), the findings of some research
have suggested that women diagnosed as anorexic may not
represent a population entirely distinct from so-called normal
women. Hence, as Butler et al. (1990) note, 'experts'
frequently view eating disorders as on a continuum with
dieting and 'normal' eating. Further support for this
hypothesis comes from research into dietary restraint and the
many studies that have documented the high frequency of
dieting in the general population. As Polivy and Herman (1987:
635) note:-
The current societal preference for a thin physique
has spawned a corresponding societal preoccupation
with dieting and weight loss. The extent of this
preoccupation is such that it may now be accurate to
regard dieting and its attendant diet mentality as
normative, both descriptively and prescriptively.
The recent shift in societal preference for thinness is well-
documented (DeJong and Kleck, 1986; Garner and Garfinkel,
1980; Garner et al., 1980; Silverstein, 1986; see also
discussion of socio-cultural perspectives on anorexia below)
as is the increased prevalence of diet-related media articles
(Garner et al., 1980; Woolf, 1990) and of dieting and body
dissatisfaction in normal-weight women (Gilbert, 1986; Polivy
and Herman, 1987; Drewnowski and Yee, 1987; Kaplan et al.,
1988; Wardle et al., 1993; see also Polivy and Herman, 1983
for a review). Jacobovits et al. (1977), for example, found
that 75% of all female college students in a survey dieted to
control their weight. Grunewald (1985) also found that more
than 60% of female college students in her study had dieted in
the last year even though only 9% were overweight. Similarly,
Minz and Betz (1988) found that only 33% of the 682
undergraduate women in their study reported ' normal' eating
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habits. And Rand and Kuldau (1991) in a random sample of 887
men and 1211 women (aged 18+) found that restrained eaters
were predominantly normal and overweight women under 65. These
findings are also confirmed by a recent magazine survey
(Unsworth, Cosmopolitan, 1993) of 1000 women (130 of whom
described themselves as having suffered from an 'eating
related problem in the past year'). 21.80% of these women
described themselves as 'always dieting', 47.60% as dieting
every few months or yearly, and only 30% described themselves
as having not dieted last year or as having never dieted. Huon
and Brown (1984) found that 56% of girls (aged 15-19 years) at
a Sydney High School gave a desired weight of at least 10%
below the norm for the age and height. Similarly, Hall and
Brown (1982) found that 75% of non-anorexic girls and their
mothers gave a preferred weight below their actual weight.
Further, Grunewald (1985; see also Wardle and Beales, 1986;
Hill and Robinson, 1991) found that the majority of girls (but
not boys) as young as 12-13 years felt too fat, attempted to
reduce food and felt guilty about eating. It appears then that
dieting and body dissatisfaction may be more prevalent, and
therefore more 'normal' or normative, than non-dieting amongst
women and girls (Polivy and Herman, 1987; Polivy et al.,
1986; Rodin et al., 1985).
However, the current prevalence of dieting does not
itself constitute an explanation of the much-documented
apparent increase in anorexia nervosa. Hence, recent research
into dietary restraint may provide useful information about
the effects of dieting and its possible links with eating
disorders.
The concept of restraint was developed in the mid-70s
(Herman and Mack, 1975) and follows previous work on eating
behaviour in which obesity, for example, was understood in
terms of an 'internal-external theory' (Schachter, 1968,
1971). It was proposed that the eating behaviour of 'normal'
weight people was controlled by internal physiological cues
such as gastric contraction whereas obese people were more
responsive to external environmental cues such as the sight,
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smell or taste of food (Ruderman, 1986). However, whilst the
findings of many studies supported this theory, many others
did not (Ruderman, 1986). Further research problems arose
from, for example, distinguishing external and internal cues,
palatability being particularly problematic and also being the
only variable consistently producing obese-normal differences
(Ruderman, 1986). Moreover, as Rodin (1981) argued, this
internal-external dichotomy may be too simplistic to
adequately explain eating behaviour.
A second explanation of differences in eating behaviour
was offered by Nisbett (1972) who proposed that each person
has an individually determined, homeostatically defended "set
point" or ideal weight. Consequently societal emphasis on
thinness may result in normatively, but not physiologically,
overweight people attempting to suppress their weight. Thus,
dieting equated with biological deprivation and resulted in a
number of behavioural responses such as increased responsivity
to external cues as a physiological attempt to regain the set
point (Ruderinan, 1986). Although difficult to test, this
theory has spawned much of the recent theorizing and research
into dietary restraint and its possible relationships to
eating disorders.
Polivy and Herman (1985), for example, have examined the
relationship between dieting and binging. Recent surveys of
college students (e.g. Halmi et al., 1981; Olmsted and Garner,
1982) have found quite high incidences (13-67%) of binging. A
recent magazine survey (Unsworth, Cosmopolitan, 1993) also
found that 40 of 1000 women regularly vomited to control
weight whilst 101 did so occasionally. Others (Boskind-Lodahi,
1976) also suggest that there is a substantial number of
normal-weight people who binge but who have not attracted
medical attention. It also appears that approximately 50% of
anorexia nervosa patients binge and purge (vomiting, laxative
or diuretic abuse) fairly regularly (Polivy and Herman, 1985).
As Polivy and Herman (1987; see also Polivy and Herman,
1985; Hawkins and Clement, 1980) note, there is considerable
evidence that binging and dieting co-occur. They argue against
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the notion that binging causes overweight which then results
in dieting. Rather, they claim dieting increases the
likelihood of binging. In accordance with Nesbitt's set point
theory, it is argued that dieting may produce chronic hunger
and result in a weight below the individual's set point
(Polivy and Herman, 1985). Hence, binge eating may be
understood as an attempt by the body to restore a more
biologically appropriate weight. Casper et al. (1980: 1034)
similarly argue that bulimia often begins as "a failure to
control overwhelming hunger feelings in anorexia nervosa".
This assertion is supported by several clinical reports (e.g.
Russell, 1979; Garfinkel et al., 1980; Pyle et al., 1981) in
which dieting and weight loss preceded the onset of bulimia.
Further evidence for this was provided by Keys et al's
research on normal-weight World War II conscientious objectors
(Franklin et al., 1948; Keys et al., 1950) who were 'induced'
to starve themselves to 74% of their initial weight. When
unlimited food and water was later made available these men
persistently binged even after regaining their initial weight.
The set point theory does not seem to provide an explanation
for the persistent binging of the conscientious objectors
involved as they continued to binge even after they had
regained their 'normal' weight. Nevertheless, these findings
do strongly suggest that dieting may increase the likelihood
of binging.
Much of the research into the effects of restrained
eating involves 'pre-load' experiments in which, most
commonly, college students are categorized as either
restrained or unrestrained eaters on the basis of a restraint
scale. In a typical experiment half of the participants are
then given a pre-load (usually one or two milk shakes) and
half are not before a taste-test (often of ice-cream) in which
the quantity eaten is measured (see Ruderman (1986) for a
review of such studies). The rational behind such studies is
based on the 'disinhibition hypothesis'. This states that the
self-control usually exhibited by dieters/restrained eaters
may be interfered with cognitively, emotionally or
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pharmacologically. That is, a large high-calorie pre-load acts
as a disinhibitor by causing the restrained eater to feel that
she has 'blown' her diet. Once disinhibited she would then eat
larger quantities of food than non-restrained eaters. (The
ethical problems in such research seem apparent.) Hence, it is
predicted that unrestrained eaters/non-dieters will eat less
food after a large pre-load than after either no pre-load or
a small pre-load. Conversely dieters/restrained eaters will
eat little food after either no pre-load or a small pre-load
but will eat a great deal after a large, high calorie pre-
load. This 'counter-regulation' of food intake has been
repeatedly confirmed in numerous studies (see reviews by
Ruderman, 1986; Polivy and Herman, 1985).
One explanation for both counter-regulation in dieters
and for eating disorders is the boundary model (see figure 1)
proposed by Herman and Polivy (1984: see also Ruderman, 1986)
in which hunger and satiety are conceptualized as biological
pressures functioning to maintain consumption within a set
range. Between these two boundaries, it is suggested, is a
range of 'biological indifference' within which psychological
factors have their greatest influence on food intake. Dieters
(and 'anorexics') differ from non-dieters in that they are
described as having a third 'diet' boundary below the satiety
boundary. If this is transgressed they will then eat until the
satiety boundary is reached, an assertion gaining support from
numerous pre-load studies. Furthermore dieters and 'anorexics'
are thought to have lower hunger boundaries (i.e. tolerate
greater food deprivation before reporting hunger). This
assertion is supported by the findings of Halmi and Sunday's
research (1991). They evaluated hunger and fullness in 84
eating disordered participants and 19 normal weight, healthily
eating controls during an experimental liquid meal and found
that both 'anorexic-restrictors' and 'anorexic bulimics' had
similarly abnormal patterns of hunger and fullness. However,
in contrast with Herman and Polivy's boundary model, they
suggested that this indicated confusion about these
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Figure 1
TheBoundary Model of Food Regulation
proposed by Herman and Polivy (1984).
(taken from Ruderman, 1986: 205)
Normal eater (non-dieter)
Zone of biological
Aversive	 <____ indifference ____>i Aversive
hunger	 satiety	 capacity
Restrained eater (dieter) Binge eater
I	 Zone of biological I
1 Aversive ---------indifference ----> Aversivej
I___________ ________ ____________________________ I ___________ I
hunger	 diet	 satiety capacity
Anorexi c
I	 Zone of biological 	 1
1 Aversive ---------indifference ----> i Aversive1
______ __ ________________ I ______I
hunger diet	 satiety capacity
concepts.
Further research has suggested differences in eating
behaviour may be understood primarily in terms of cognitive
and situational factors. Spencer and Fremouw (1979), for
example, gave all participants identical milk-shake pre-loads
but told one half of participants it was high in calories and
the other that it was low in calories. They found a
significant interaction of restraint and belief, thus
suggesting that cognitive as well as physiological factors
trigger disinhibition. Similar findings are reported by Polivy
(1976) and Woody et al. (1981). 'Disinhibition' is also
reported in restrained eaters when other 'disinhibitors' such
as alcohol are used (Polivy and Herman, 1985).
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Dieters are also reported to eat more when distressed in
contrast with non-dieters who are found to eat more when calm
(Polivy and Herman, 1985), an assertion supported by several
studies. Schotte et al. (1990), for example, tested the
effects of negative mood induction on food intake in 60 women
with varying degrees of dietary restraint using exposure to a
frightening or neutral film. High restraint eaters exposed to
the frightening film ate significantly more than high
restraint eaters exposed to the neutral film and significantly
more than low restraint eaters in either condition whilst low
restraint eaters ate slightly less after exposure to the
frightening film than the neutral film, thus suggesting that
negative affect may trigger disinhibition in high but not low
restraint eaters. Cools et al. (1992) conducted a similar
study in which they tested the effects of neutral, positive,
and negative mood induction on food intake in 91 women with
varying degrees of dietary restraint again by exposing them to
part of 1 of 3 films (a travelogue, a comedy and a horror film
respectively). In the neutral condition food intake decreased
with increased level of restraint whilst in both the positive
and negative conditions food intake increased with dietary
restraint, thus suggesting that emotional arousal per se,
rather than only negative affect, may trigger binging.
It is therefore suggested that whilst dieters eat less
than non-dieters under many circumstances, they will eat more
following experimental pre-load or when stressed, anxious or
depressed (Polivy and Herman, 1987) or when happy (Cools et
al., 1992). Thus, it appears that dieting may be linked to
eating disorders in that it may produce disrupted eating
(Polivy and Herman, 1987). And, although the binging exhibited
by restricted eaters in laboratory settings is generally less
extreme than in those with diagnosed eating disorders, this
may be due to the time constraint (usually 10-15 minutes) of
ad-lib eating in laboratory situations (Polivy and Herman,
1985)
Research into restrained eating therefore supports the
assertion (e.g. Hsu, 1989) that the increased prevalence of
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dieting is related to the increase in diagnosis of eating
disorders in that dieting appears to increase the likelihood
of disrupted eating patterns. In addition, it has been
repeatedly demonstrated that weight-loss and self-starvation
are associated with increased pre-occupation with food, eating
and weight (Bruch, 1978; Franklin et al., 1948). These in turn
are thought to entrench rigid, dichotomous, all-or-nothing
thinking styles, also attributed to anorexics (Garner et al.,
1982), in which 'good' diet foods are opposed to 'bad' non-
diet foods and 'good' dieting is opposed to 'bad' diet-
breaking. This assertion has been recently supported by the
research of King et al. (1991). They asked restrained and
unrestrained female college students and female obese and
eating disordered participants to read and later recall an
essay about another person. Restrainers, obese and eating
disordered participants all recalled more food- and weight-
related items than did non-restrainers. Restraint scores were
also found to correlate positively with the frequency with
which weight and food were mentioned in an 'accessibility'
task. King et al. therefore concluded that the cognitions of
both restrained eaters and eating disordered participants were
characterized by a focus on weight and food. Further research
has also provided evidence to suggest that body
dissatisfaction and a desire for perfection, often described
as characteristics of 'anorexics', are also found in 'normal'
dieters (Garner et al., 1984). Dewberry and Ussher (in press),
for example, found that 'high restraint' participants in a
sample representative of the general British population felt
more guilt about food, were more likely to overeat when
stressed, depressed or tired and were more likely to
overestimate their body size than were participants with low
restraint scores. Women, they found, reported significantly
higher levels of restraint than men. A recent magazine survey
(Unsworth, Cosmopolitan, 1993) similarly found that
58.44% of women described themselves as not satisfied with
their bodies despite 61.71% of the women surveyed weighing 10
stone or below whilst 63.3% reported thinking about food
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either all the time or a lot.
As noted above, cognitive research has failed to reliably
distinguish anorexics from non-anorexics in terms of cognitive
structures except for those with food- or weight-related
content. The finding therefore that these cognitions (as well
as other characteristics of anorexics) can be found in non-
clinical populations of dieters further undercuts the disease
model of anorexia nervosa as a distinct individual pathology.
These similarities between anorexia (and other eating
disorders) and 'normal' dieting have led many authors to
suggest a continuum between eating disordered and 'normal'
eating (Polivy and Herman, 1987; Butler et al., 1990), thus
paralleling debates in many other areas of psychology about
the relationship between 'normality' and psychopathology
(Polivy and Herman, 1987).
The notion that eating disorders and 'normal' eating form
a continuum was first proposed by Nylander (1971) after
interviewing Swedish high school girls and finding the
majority perceived themselves to be overweight or fat and that
nearly 10% reported three or more symptoms of anorexia.
Similar observations are reported by Fries (1977) and Garner
and Garfinkel (1980). Others however disagree, arguing that
'true' anorexics differ from 'normal' dieters in their reasons
for dieting (e.g. Crisp, 1965), in that anorexia but not
'normal' dieting involves body image distortion, distortion of
internal perceptions (Bruch, 1973), deficits in self-esteem,
and profound interpersonal distrust (Selvini-Palazzoli,
1974). The research of Garner et al (1984) partly confirms
this contention. They compared normal college dieters, non-
dieters, ballet students and anorexics using the EDI (which
contains sub-scales measuring drive for thinness, bulimia,
body dissatisfaction, ineffectiveness, perfectionism
interpersonal distrust, lack of interoceptive awareness and
maturity fears). They argue that whilst intense concern with
weight, eating, appearance and body shape may be shared with
'normal' dieters, thus representing a continuum, ego-deficits
and perceptual disturbances appeared to be more confined to
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a smaller number of participants. Huon and Brown (1984)
similarly found that anorexic participants differed from
controls in terms of self-esteem and attitudes about control,
eating and self-presentation. However, research also indicates
that adolescent girls in Western societies generally
experience more anxiety, insecurity and self-consciousness and
exhibit a stronger relationship between self-esteem and body
satisfaction than do boys (Hsu, 1989).
Whilst further research is needed before any firm
conclusions can be drawn regarding this possible continuum it
is clear that there is some relationship between dieting and
eating disorders (Hsu, 1989) which may be complex. It also
appears that even if 'normal' eating, dieting and eating
disorders are not on a continuum they are not distinguishable
in terms of disordered eating. Rather, it may be that it is
only when 'pathological' eating/normal-dieting patterns are
combined with psychological problems such as low self-esteem
or fears about interpersonal relationships (that are not
specific to anorexia) (Polivy and Herman, 1987) or when weight
loss is very severe that a diagnosis of pathology is given.
However, as Halmi (1983: 248) has pointed out "there is no
data or consensus of opinion as to the degree of weight loss
that is necessary for the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa".
The situation is also further complicated by the
assertion of Tomarken and Kirschenbaum (1984) who argue that
disinhibition does not only occur in dieters. Following their
studies of the effects of future meal plans on present
consumption, they claim that extreme disinhibitory stimuli may
result in unrestrained, as well as restrained, eaters
overeating. Their study indicates therefore that the
distinction between restrained and unrestrained eaters may not
be as clear cut as previous research had suggested. Indeed,
restraint scales such as the Dutch Eating Behaviour
Questionnaire use a median cut-off point to define high and
low restraint. Hence, high and low restraint are only defined
relatively (see Dewberry and Ussher, in press)
It remains unclear then whether or not 'normal' eating
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and dieting represent points in a continuum with anorexia and
other eating disorders. Yet so-called normal dieting is
obviously associated with many of the accepted core features
of anorexia and of eating disorders generally. Moreover, as
Polivy and Herman (1987) argue, it appears that societally
'normal' eating might itself be regarded as disordered or
pathological whilst many of the 'pathologies' attributed to
anorexics (such as obsessive concerns with weight and
appearance) are not only shared by 'normal' dieters, and
perhaps by non-dieters too, but are sometimes even regarded as
commendable (see Branch and Eurman, 1980; Hsu, 1989). Thus
"terms such as normal, acce ptable, and overwei ght can only be
understood in the context of societal realities and ideals"
(Polivy and Herman, 1987: 635). The prevalence of dieting
amongst 'normal' women suggests that there may be cultural
factors 'promoting' anorexia in contemporary Western society.
It also suggests that it may be problematic to regard anorexia
as a distinct individual pathology rather than as a societal
problem manifested in individual women.
2.8 Socio-cultural Research
To date research has 'failed' to identify any particular
physiological or genetic aetiology of anorexia or to reliably
distinguish 'anorexic' and non-anorexic cognitions except in
terms of food- and weight-related schemas. And, as discussed
above, dieting, body dissatisfaction and 'feeling fat' are now
prevalent amongst women generally. Research into body image
also suggests that BID might not be entirely reliable in
distinguishing between 'anorexic' and non-anorexic women.
Hence, several authors have posited a continuum between
anorexia, dieting and 'normal' eating. This, together with the
much-documented prevalence of dieting and body dissatisfaction
amongst women, suggests that anorexia can only be adequately
understood within its socio-cultural context. That is,
'anorexia' must be understood within a context in which
cultural ideals of thinness, particularly for women, are
dominant (see DeJong and Kieck, 1986; Garner and Garfinkel,
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1980;	 Garner et al., 1980; Silverstein, 1986; see also
above).
Several studies have documented the increasing slimness
of cultural stereotypes of feminine beauty. Silverstein et al.
(1986), for example, examining female body shape in women's
magazines (Vogue and Ladies Home Journal) between 1901 and
1981, found smallest body sizes in the l920s and in the late
60s and 70s, linked to increased pressure to diet. Similarly,
Garner et al. (1980) found that in the previous 20 years
'Playboy centrefolds' and American 'beauty queens' had become
thinner. Woolf (1990; also Garner et al., 1980; l983a) has
noted a steep rise in the number of diet related articles in
both women's magazines and in the popular press between 1968
and 1980. Moreover, Wooley and Wooley's literature review
(1979) suggests that women are more affected than men by overt
prejudices about fatness.
Research into cultural attitudes suggests that the
negative attitudes to fatness found in those diagnosed
anorexic (see above) are also common in society generally.
Popular images of obesity denigrate fat people as
psychologically disturbed, lacking in will-power and lazy
(Harris et al., 1991). Richards (1961) for example, found that
children rated pictures of obese people as less likeable than
either pictures of physically impaired or 'normal' people
while Steinberg and Birk (1983) found that both sexes were
more likely to comply with requests from 'normal weight' than
obese people. And Freeman et al. (1983) have found preferred
body size to be below average for both anorexic and 'normal'
weight 'women, although others have found it to be lower in
anorexics (e.g. Touyz et al. 1984).
As noted above, it has been suggested that the current
social emphasis on slim female body shape constitutes a strong
social reinforcements to diet (Garner and Beniis, 1982) and may
in part lead to anorexic concerns and behaviours (Russell,
1986; Hsu, 1989). The prevalence of body dissatisfaction and
dieting in 'normal' weight girls and women has been well-
documented (e.g. Dewberry and Ussher, in press; Wardle and
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Marsiand, 1990; Hill and Robinson, 1991; see also above).
Moreover, a fear of fatness and a preoccupation with body
weight are relatively recent phenomena in anorexia (Russell,
1986). In fact weight related fears in those diagnosed as
anorexic were not noticed outside of France until the 1930s
(Habermas, 1989) and are rarely mentioned in the literature on
anorexia before the 1960s (Casper, 1983). It may be pertinent
that these dates coincide with societal changes in dieting and
attitudes to female body shape.
The specificity in the distribution of diagnoses of
anorexia in terms of sex, age, ethnicity and socio-economic
class as well as its recent increase (Garner et al., 1983a;
Hsu, 1984) also suggests a cultural influence. As discussed in
the Introduction, diagnoses of anorexia have increased
dramatically since the l960s (Bruch, 1978; Maloney and
Klykylo, 1984; Sheppy et al., 1988; Szmukler et al., 1986;
Hoek, 1993; Moller and Nystrup, 1992). Approximately 95% of
those diagnosed anorexic are girls or women (Hughes, 1991;
Wolff et al., 1990; APA, 1987; Brumberg, 1986; Rastam et al.,
1989; Hsu, 1989). And anorexia is also particularly associated
with certain occupations such as ballet dancing (Garner et
al., 1987), modelling and beauty therapy (Garner and
Garfinkel, 1980; Hughes, 1991; Wolff et al., 1990), women's
athletics (Weight and Noakes, 1987) and college students
(Klemchuck et al., 1990).
Traditionally, it has also been thought that the cultural
emphasis on dieting and thinness (Gibbs, 1986; Striegel-Moore
et al., 1986) and a high incidence of eating disorders were
limited to higher socio-economic groups (Goldblatt et al.,
1965; Crisp et al., 1976; Hsu, 1984; Hughes, 1991). However,
some studies have suggested that eating disorders, including
anorexia, have spread to all socio-economic classes (Pumariega
et al., 1984; Thomas and Szmukler, 1985; Gray et al., 1987;
Edwards-Hewitt and Gray, 1993; see chapter 1).
Epidemiological research has also found a much higher
prevalence of eating disorders in Western rather than non-
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Western countries 5 and in white rather than black or Asian
women (Kendell et al., 1973; Jones et al., 1980; Hooper and
Garner, 1986; Wolff et al., 1990; Hughes, 1991; Edwards-Hewitt
and Gray, 1993). However, results have not been entirely
consistent (see Wardle et al., 1993). Muinford and Whitehouse
(1988), for example, found that Asian schoolgirls in England
had higher EAT scores than their Caucasian counterparts. And
eating disorders have been found in women of all ethnic
backgrounds (Dolan et al., 1990; Gross and Rosen, 1988; Smith
and Krejci, 1991). Interestingly, Pumariega (1986) found that
eating attitudes in young Hispanic American women were
correlated with their levels of acculturation to American
culture. Thus, the spread of eating disorders to all socio-
economic and ethnic groups might be understood in terms of an
increasing dissemination of cultural ideals of female
beauty/thinness and dieting, reinforced by the media (Edwards-
Hewitt and Gray, 1993). And, as Dolan (1991; also Edwards-
Hewitt and Gray, 1993) suggests, comparing prevalence rates in
groups with different cultural influences may einphasise the
role of culture in eating disorders and may lead us to
question the ideals to which women are pressured to conform.
However, whilst culture is increasingly recognised as a
significant factor in eating disorders (see e.g. Wolff et al.,
1990; Hughes, 1991), there are some researchers who maintain
not only that there may be non-cultural causes (e.g pp.23-32
above) but also that some forms of anorexia may exist
independently of culture. Beinporard et al. (1989), for
example, examined the case history of a congenitally blind
woman who developed anorexia. They assumed that she was less
affected by visual media pressure to achieve current the
social ideal of a slim body and argued that since the woman's
. See also sing (1991) who reports several diagnoses of
anorexia amongst Hong Kong Chinese. Sing argues that these cases
differed from descriptions of 'typical' Western anorexic women.
There was very little difference between original and desired
body weight and an intense fear of fat and BID were described as
inconspicuous. Hence, an imposition of Western models of anorexia
on non-Western cases may be inappropriate (Sing, 1991).
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history and course of illness was quite similar to sighted
anorexics, anorexia may sometimes develop independently of
cultural prescriptions of thinness. However, not only is
anorexia in congenitally blind women a rather rare occurrence,
Bemporard et al.'s argument also assumes rather than
demonstrates that blindness results in a lack of awareness of
body size and of cultural prescriptions of thinness and that
non-visual prescriptions about body shape may not become
important.
There is, then, substantial evidence that cultural ideals
of female slenderness are dominant in Western cultures, that
many girls and women experience body dissatisfaction and that
dieting and even binging and purging are prevalent amongst
women and girls. And research also suggests the possibility of
a continuum between disordered and 'normal' eating. It is,
therefore, necessary that therapy and research acknowledges
this modern cultural context (Garner et al., 1986).
Yet, it would be both superficial and simplistic to
attempt to explain anorexia only in terms of cultural
pressures for slimness, to characterize anorexia as a
'slimmer's disease' (Malson, 1992). Many socio-cultural
explanations of anorexia are, however, limited to a
documentation of the increased emphasis on a thin body and the
increased prevalence of dieting in contemporary society. As
such they tend to rely on a notion of internalization in which
'anorexics' are conceptualized as 'super-dieters' (e.g. Polivy
and Herman, 1985), as over-adhering to omnipresent cultural
ideals of feminine beauty as thinness. They therefore tend to
focus on thinness and dieting to the exclusion of other
aspects of anorexia or female subjectivity without exploring
the cultural and political significances of female
slenderness.
Yet, as the work of Bruch, for example, suggests,
anorexia is also associated with low self-esteem, with a lack
of sense of self, of independent autonomy and control as well
as with a 'fear of fat' or 'relentless pursuit of thinness'.
Thus, Bruch (1978) and Minuchin et al. (1978) describe
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anorexia as 'a communicative disorder' (Caskey, 1986) which is
experienced as a means of taking control over one's body, as
a pseudo-solution to intra- and inter-personal difficulties
(see also Caskey, 1986). And culture may also play a role in
the 'promotion' of such difficulties. Appels (1986: 481), for
example, has argued that "the cultural dynamics of post-
industrial society seem to foster many of the conflicts
(around identity, self-esteem and autonomy) which underlie the
genesis of anorexia nervosa."
Furthermore, the high profile of anorexia, both in the
popular and the academic media, suggest a cultural fascination
with eating disorders (Malson and Ussher, 1994). As Turner
(1992) argues, anorexia is meaningful at a societal as well as
a phenoinenological level. Paralleling the work of Sontag
(1978, 1989), Turner (see also Orbach, 1993) has argued that
anorexia, like some other illnesses, can be understood as a
metaphor for contemporary socio-cultural concerns and
dilemmas. Just as AIDS 'expresses' cultural concerns about the
global spread of disease and about uncontrolled, anonymous sex
(Sontag, 1989), so anorexia expresses, for example, a
cultural conflict between mass consumption and normative
thinness (Turner, 1987), between the indulging 'consumer-self'
and the controlled, abstinent 'producer-self' demanded by
capitalism (Bordo, 1990):
modern consumerism appropriates all forms of
symbolism (including oppositional, anti-capitalist
symbolism) to its own commercial purposes. Being
hyper-sliin, while in opposition to the signs of
affluence, is also cool (Turner, 1992: 221).
Brumberg (1988; see also Turner, 1992) has similarly argued
that anorexia has been expressive of concerns with
consumption, personal display, feminist politics, the fashion
for dieting and slimness and the individualistic
competitiveness of late capitalism. Anorexia can therefore be
described as a 'culture-bound syndrome' (Littlewood and
Lipsedge 1985, 1987; Prince, 1983; Schwartz, 1985; Selig,
1988); it represents public concerns as well as personal
predicaments (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1987; Turner, 1992). It
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appeal(s) to values and beliefs which cannot be
questioned because they are tied up with the most
fundamental concerns and political organization of
the community. (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1987: 291)
And anorexia clearly has a gendered distribution, suggesting
that it is also expressive of gender-political concerns and
dilemmas (see also Bordo, 1990; Brumberg, 1988). As the work
of Turner, Brumberg and many feminist theorists demonstrates,
women's relationships to their bodies and to food are more
complex than a simple (over) adherence to cultural
prescriptions for thinness (see discussion of feminist
theories of anorexia below; see also Malson, 1992). The
cultural idealization of feminine thinness itself involves
complex issues of gender politics (e.g. Lawrence, 1979).
Indeed Garner et al. (1983a: 72) note the "compelling analogy"
between "the popularization of the thinner physique" and more
obviously misogynistic practices (see Ussher, 1991) such as
foot binding. That is, socio-cultural and political issues of
women's status(es) and roles are also implicated in the
phenomenon of anorexia and must also be explored.
2.9 Feminist Approaches to Anorexia
In 'The Golden Cage', Bruch (1978) has argued that
anorexia is, in part, a personal response to the confusion and
contradictions of female maturation (Turner, 1992). Women are
expected to have successful careers, to be intelligent,
competent and ambitious. Yet they are simultaneously expected
to be desirable and alluringly feminine (Guttman, 1986),
particularly if they are heterosexual. Adult women are
expected to be both autonomous and compliant, independent and
needful of security, sexual and androgenously neutral (Turner,
1992). And Palazzoli (1974), for example, has suggested that
recent increases in anorexia may be due to:
the new and often contradictory roles and
expectations currently affecting women in modern
society as well as the family's failure to adapt to
the changing societal demands. (Garner et al.,
1983a: 76)
71
Bardwick (1971) has also argued that women's roles are no
longer so restricted as they had been in the past and that our
increased 'freedom of choice' may be experienced as a
difficulty by some individuals (Garner et al., l983a).
Similarly, Bruch (1978: ix) wrote that many of her patients
expressed the feeling that they were overwhelmed by
the vast number of potential opportunities available
to them which they 'ought' to fulfil, that there are
too many choices and they are afraid of not choosing
correctly (quoted in Garner et al., l983a: 77).
Problematically, such explanations might be interpreted as
attributing the increased prevalence of eating disorders to
the 'liberating' impact of 'Second Wave Feminism', suggesting
that women may have been 'safer' when more restricted.
Alternatively, however, these explanations may also indicate
that society has not progressed sufficiently towards gender-
equality; that women are expected to be simultaneously
traditionally feminine career-oriented; that we still
"'ought' to fulfil" a number of often contradictory roles -
clearly an impossible predicament. Moreover, it may also be
misleading to suggest that contradictions in prescribed
femininity are new. As several feminist theorists indicate
(e.g. Mitchell and Rose, 1982; see chapter 3), the concept of
feminine identity within patriarchy is fundamentally
problematic. Indeed 'anorexia nervosa' emerged out of the
wider category of hysteria (see chapters 6 and 7), itself
often described as epitomizing female sickness and as epidemic
amongst women in the nineteenth century (Showalter, 1985;
Smith-Rosenberg, 1985) and often theorized in terms of the
problematics and politics of feminine identity (Sayers, 1982;
Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Foucault, 1979). Indeed feminist
authors (e.g. Ussher, 1991) have demonstrated a long
historical link between femininity and illness, arguing that
'illnesses' such as PMS, depression, and madness may be both
consequences of women's oppression and expressive of
patriarchal pathologizations of femininity (see also chapter
6).
Social anxiety about sexuality (has been) directed
against women and this anxiety has been expressed
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historically through a variety of medical categories
which pinpoint and articulate the subordination of
women to patriarchal authority (Turner, 1987: 88).
Feminist theorists have been at the fore in examining the
culture- and gender-bound nature of anorexia. Lawrence (1984),
for example, provides a political analysis of women's control
of their bodies in relation to our lack of power in other
areas of life. Chernin (1983) similarly argues that
prescriptive stereotypes of the female body as slim and child-
like reflect gender power-relations.
Within the feminist approaches to anorexia there is a
considerable diversity of opinion about the relationships
between anorexia and gender. For instance, Boskind-Lodahi
(1976) argues that 'anorexics' strive to achieve an
exaggerated ideal of patriarchally prescribed femininity,
including a thin body. The psychological problems of
'anorexic' women are seen here as the result of an
unquestioning acceptance of the prescription of femininity as
beauty/thinness, passivity, dependency, a 'need' for
validation of self by a man, and a desire to please (Swartz,
1985). Moreover, as she argues, "our heritage of sexual
inequality" (Boskind-Lodahi, 1976: 354) is implicated not only
in the aetiology of anorexia but also in the much documented
'negative' attributes of the 'anorexogenic' mother (see p.54).
Thus, she suggests that the female therapist should provide a
positive role model of non-patriarchal femininity for the
anorexic. Conversely Orbach (1979, 1993) asserts that anorexia
reflects not so much an unquestioning acceptance as an
ambivalence about and a rebellion against femininity. Her view
"that the anorectic body is a parody of the fashion for
thinness is very compelling" (Swartz, 1985).
Drawing on psychoanalytic theories, feminist theorists
have also provided more gender-sensitive and culturally
contextualized explanations of how mothers may be implicated
in their daughters' 'anorexia' (c.f. family-oriented
research). Eichenbaum and Orbach (1983), for example, describe
'anorexic' women as typically feeling shameful of their needs
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and, like Bruch, they trace this feeling to the mother-infant
relationship. They argue that the mother conveys this feeling
to the daughter
out of a sense that her daughter will have to learn
this lesson in order to become properly socialized
into the traditional female role of caring for
others (Bordo, 1992: 107)
and because the girl represents for the mother "the 'hungry
needy little girl' in herself which she denied and repressed"
(Bordo, 1992: 108). That is, the mother conveys the
contradictory message to her daughter that she must hide her
needs if she is to get love and approval (Eichenbaum and
Orbach, 1983). This message is then reinforced by cultural
gender ideology so that the daughter comes to experience her
needs and wants as wrong (see Bordo, 1992). Chernin (1986) has
similarly focused on the mother-daughter relationship in
explaining anorexia. She argues that
women's eating disorders stem from the guilt women
feel about becoming different from their mothers in
a society that still accords this right less to
women than to men. (Sayers, 1988: 365)
Referring to Klein's theory of infantile aggression and
ambivalence and to the mother's ambivalence about mothering
Chernin also argues 'the fat woman' evokes the terror and
longing we experienced as infants.
When we attempt to determine the size and shape of
a woman's body, instructing it to avoid its
largeness and softness and roundness and girth, we
are driven by the desire to expunge the memory of
the primordial mother who ruled over our childhood
with her inscrutable power over life and death.
(Chernin, 1981: 143)
Anorexia, she argues, represents this ambivalence towards the
maternal body, "towards regression and development and towards
affirmation and denial of identification with the mother as
female" (Sayers, 1988: 365). However, whilst both Orbach and
Chernin locate the mother-daughter relationship within
patriarchal society, they, like family-oriented theorists,
tend to focus on the role of the mother to the exclusion of
the father and others (Sayers, 1988).
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Whilst debate continues about the exact relationship of
'femininity' to anorexia, feminist analyses have clearly
furthered understandings of anorexia by demonstrating the
centrality of gender in relation to eating disorders. They
also elucidate the relevance of gender power-structures
(Chernin, 1983; Lawrence, 1984; Sayers, 1988) and of the
negativity and pathology6
 of prescribed femininity (Orbach,
1979; Boskind-Lodahl, 1976) to anorexia as a predominantly
female problem. However, as Swartz (1985) rightly argues,
there is a problematic tendency in some feminist analyses to
naturalize this life-threatening condition and to present
anorexia as a reasonable expression of quasi-feminist
discontent. And rather than adopt a multi-determinist position
(see e.g. Garfinkel et al., 1983), some analyses tend to
employ a model of unilinear causality in which the
dysfunctional hormones, faulty thinking or 'bad' mothering of
traditional theories are replaced by patriarchal society
(Swartz, 1985). In addition, there is often a conceptual
opposition of 'nature' and 'culture' in which the woman's
'natural needs' are obstructed by cultural prescriptions of
thin and passive femininity (Swartz, 1985). While such
prescriptions are undoubtedly oppressive, their analyses rest
upon a false dichotomy - the natural female body versus its
social oppression - in which 'the body' is understood as
outside of rather than as constituted in culture. Yet, as
Riley (1988: 102) argues, "the body is not, for all its
corporeality, an originating point nor yet a terminus; it is
a result or an effect." That is, whilst our conceptualizations
of the (gendered) body inevitably lean on corpo-reality, the
body does not precede the social but rather is socially and
discursively constructed; there are no needs that we can know
before culture intervenes (see chapter 3). Hence, in
understanding the (female 'anorexic') body and the cultural
6 See, for example, Broverman et al. (1970) whose study
illustrates how 'adult femininity' is equated by Psychology
professionals with mental ill health while 'adult masculinity'
corresponds with conceptualizations of 'the healthy adult'.
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symbolisms, identities and conflicts that are played out on
it, it is necessary to explore how it is culturally,
discursively constituted in its changing socio-historical
specificity.
2.10 conclusions: Towards a Re-formulation of 'Anorexia'
This chapter has presented a critical thematic review of
recent theory and research on 'anorexia nervosa', examining
bio-medical, genetic, cognitive and family-oriented research,
research into body image distortion, restrained eating, and
the possible links between eating disorders and depression as
well as theory and research conducted within psychodynamic,
socio-cultural and feminist perspectives. Clearly, much of
this work has furthered understandings of 'anorexia'. However,
there are many limitations to current perspectives. Research
findings from different studies often conflict and evidence
for any particular aetiology remains inconclusive.
Bio-medical/bio-psychological research, for example, has
not only failed to identify any organic aetiology; its
reductionist conceptualization of 'anorexia' as a
physiological disorder inevitably fails to engage with any
psychological or societal meanings of 'anorexia' or 'the
anorexic body'. And, as noted above (p.29), the bio-medical
argument is further undermined by its inability to account for
the culture-, class-, and age-bound distribution in diagnoses.
Any attempt to explain the over-representation of women in
diagnoses is inevitably conducted in terms of dysfunctional
female hormones. As Ussher (1991: 248-9; see also Sayers,
1982) argues, we should be suspicious of attributing women's
distress to their/our 'raging hormones'.
The discourse which positions women as biologically
inferior, and thus prey to all manner of disorders,
both physical and psychological, became established
in the Victorian era 7
 ... Women are still seen by
many authorities today as biologically labile, and
It was in the 1870s that 'anorexia nervosa' emerged as a
'distinct disease entity' from the wider category of hysteria,
'the quintessential female malady' (Showalter, 1987; see also
chapters 6 and 7)
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madness as caused by biology. ... The dictat
'biology as destiny' has in the twentieth century
taken on the status of scientifically supported fact
The message is still the same - women's bodies
send them mad.
Similar problems apply to genetic research in terms of
methodological shortcomings, inconclusive evidence and a
reductionist concept of 'anorexia'.
Cognitive research and research into body image
distortion has also failed to identify any cognitive deficits
specific to 'anorexia'. Nor has it succeeded in reliably
distinguishing 'anorexic' from 'non-anorexic' participants in
terms of food- and weight-related schemas or BID. And whilst
the cognitive conception of 'anorexia' acknowledges its
meaningfulness, it is also individualizing. That is, cognitive
research seeks to differentiate between individuals with
'normal' or 'abnormal' cognitions. It is premised on a notion
of individual, internal cognitive 'distortions' or 'biases',
thus marginalizing cultural context and suggesting that
'anorexia' is caused by individual deficits. Yet the findings
of such research indicate precisely a lack of any clear
differentiation between the 'cognitions' of 'anorexic' and
'non-anorexic' women, thereby indicating (a) a continuum
between 'normality' and 'anorexia' and (b) that 'anorexia'
might be better conceptualized as a societal problem
(manifested in individual women) rather than as an individual
pathology.
Moreover, cognitive research is also premised on the
notion of relatively stable, individual clear-cut attitudes
(see Marshall and Raabe, 1993). Yet, as many discourse-
oriented psychologists have argued, what people say or write
should not be seen as a reflection of internal attitudes
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987) but as context-specific
articulations of particular, socially available discursive
resources (Marshall and Raabe, 1993). People draw on a variety
of discourses and thus articulate a number of conflicting,
shifting 'attitudes' (Marshall and Raabe, 1993; Burman and
Parker, 1993). It may therefore be more fruitful to research
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anorexia from a discourse-oriented perspective rather than
from within a cognitive framework of relatively stable,
consistent individual attitudes (see chapters 3-5 for a fuller
discussion of this issue).
Moreover, socio-cultural research has amply demonstrated
the dominance of a cultural idealization of the thin female
body and the prevalence of body-dissatisfaction, dieting and
weight- and food-related concerns amongst Western women. And,
as several theorists have argued, 'anorexia' is also of wider
cultural significance. It is expressive of cultural and
political concerns about mass consumption and normative
thinness, personal display, feminist politics, and the
individualistic competitiveness of late capitalism (Turner,
1987; Bordo, 1990; Brumberg 1988).
Finally, it is clear that 'anorexia' is a gender-bound as
well as a culture-bound phenomenon. As feminist theorists
(e.g. Boskind-Lodahi, 1976; Chernin, 1981; Lawrence, 1984;
Orbach, 1993) have repeatedly argued, 'anorexia' is expressive
of gender-political issues. Hence, gender must be central to
an understanding of 'anorexia'. Socio-cultural and feminist
research and theory thus indicates, again, the necessity of
researching 'anorexia' in ways that acknowledge its socio-
cultural, gender-specific context.
Paralleling developments in other fields 8 , a number of
authors (Garfinkel and Garner, 1982; Bruch, 1988; Sheppy et
al., 1988) have suggested the adoption of a multi-dimensional
approach to anorexia, arguing that 'anorexia' is a multi-
determined phenomenon (Garfinkel and Garner, 1983). Whilst
such an approach includes cultural as well as biological and
cognitive factors, it is nevertheless problematic.
Firstly, not all the perspectives discussed above are
epistemologically compatible. For instance, combining the bio-
medical concept of 'anorexia' as a physiological disorder with
some feminists conception of 'anorexia' is particularly
8 See Ussher (1992c) for discussions of parallel
developments research and therapy in depression, schizophrenia
and PMS.
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problematic. From the post-structuralist feminist perspective
adopted in this thesis, the physical reality of the body and
of starvation must be acknowledged whilst the 'absolute
truth' of bio-medical discourse must be challenged. Bio-
medical explanations of anorexia do not simply and objectively
describe the physical reality of 'anorexia'. Rather, they
discursively constitute anorexia in particular ways which lean
on but do not objectively reflect an extra-discursive reality
(see chapter 3 a discussion of post-structuralist theory,
chapter 4 for a critique of positivistic epistemologies, and
chapter 5 for a discussion of a post-structuralist approach to
discourse analysis). Indeed, as argued above, the notion that
'anorexia' may be caused by dysfunctional (female) hormones is
profoundly sexist as well as reductionist. The various
perspectives on 'anorexia' cannot simply be added together to
produce a 'fuller picture'.
Secondly, current approaches tend to uncritically accept
a medical model of 'anorexia' as a distinct individual
pathology (Hepworth, 1991). Yet the research indicates no such
clear-cut distinction between 'anorexic' and 'normal' women.
And,as argued above, anorexia is expressive of cultural
concerns as well as personal predicaments. Many approaches
also adopt an empiricist/positivistic stance, assuming that
anorexia exists independently of the language in which it is
described, that it can be objectively identified through
empiricist research. Yet this stance is problematic. Firstly,
several authors have commented on the heterogeneity of those
diagnosed as 'anorexic' (see Yager, 1982; Garfinkel et al.,
1983; Rakoff, 1983; Halmi, 1983), thus illustrating the
inadequacy of perspectives that attempt to provide objective,
universal descriptions of 'anorexia' and its aetiology.
Secondly,as noted above, feminist and post-structuralist
critics have also elucidated the problems of empiricist
research and of the notion of objectivity. As Foucault (1972)
argues discourses constitute their objects. Medical and
psychological discourses do not simply describe 'anorexia'
more or less objectively but rather construct it in particular
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ways (Foucault, 1972; 1979).
This is not to argue that current perspectives cannot be
useful in understanding 'anorexia'. Rather, it is to suggest
that research should be conducted within a theoretical
framework that (a) problematises empiricist/positivistic
assumptions concerning the nature and status of 'anorexia',
(b) places gender at the centre of analysis and (c) refuses
the traditional individual-society dichotomy that has resulted
in individualizing and pathologizing 'knowledges' of
'anorexia'. Chapter 3 attempts to set out such a theoretical
framework, drawing on feminist, psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist theories of discourse, subjectivity and gender.
Chapter 4 will discuss critiques of positivistic approaches to
psychological research whilst chapter 5 discusses the
discourse analytic approaches, promoted in psychology by, for
example, Potter and Wetherell (1987), Burman and Parker
(1993), Hollway (1989) and Walkerdine (1986; 1988). It also
discusses the compatibility of the post-structuralist approach
to discourse analysis adopted in this thesis with this
theoretical framework. And in the subsequent chapters this
approach will be applied in two empirical studies of
discursive constructions of 'anorexia nervosa'.
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Chapter Three
Psychoanalytic and Post-structura].jst Theories
of Gender. Subjectivity and Discourse
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I argued for the necessity of
researching anorexia within a theoretical framework which
situates anorexia within its socio-cultura]. context and which
provides a more thorough theorization of gender. I also argued
that it is necessary to question the medical model of anorexia
and the empiricist or positivistic assumptions concerning that
nature and status of 'anorexia' that underlie many current
perspectives. This chapter will attempt to provide such a
perspective by drawing on psychoanalytic and post-
structuralist theory. The discussion will focus particularly
on Lacanian, feminist psychoanalytic theory and on the work of
Foucault. It will thereby seek to set out a theoretical
framework for this thesis in which the category of gender is
theorized rather than assumed, in which an individual-society
dichotomy is refuses and in which the nature and status of
knowledges (about 'femininity' and 'anorexia') is questioned.
This chapter will, then, firstly discuss Freud's
psychoanalytic theorization of subjectivity as fundamentally
gendered and of gender as the effect interpretation of the
body rather than as a 'natural' effect of biology (see Sayers,
1982). It will then discuss Lacan's re-reading of Freud in
which the role of interpretation or signification is
emphasised. This discussion will also draw on feminist
appropriations and critiques of Lacanian and theory and will
then discuss Foucault's post-structuralist theorization of
discourse, power subjectivity and the body. (Several of the
theoretical themes discussed here are elaborated further in
the analyses in studies one and two.)
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3.2 Psychoanalytic Theory
3.2.1 Freud's Theory of Psychosexual Development
As several authors have noted, many feminists have viewed
Freud as an enemy (see Mitchell, 1974; Ussher, 1991), claiming
that psychoanalysis is phallocentric and patriarchalist (see
Sayers, 1990) and that it is a justification of the
patriarchal status-quo, regarding women as biologically
inferior and 'true femininity' as subordination (see Mitchell,
1974). Feminists, including de Beauvoir (1953), have often
criticized Freudian theory as a biological determinist account
of gender (Sayers, 1982). Other feminists, however, have
actively engaged with psychoanalytic theory in one form or
another as a useful analysis of patriarchal power relations
(Grosz, 1990). As Bowiby (1989) and Grosz (1990) note, there
has long been an ambivalent but intense relationship 'between
feminism and psychoanalysis' (see Brennan, 1989). The breadth
of Freud's work, its theoretical developments and paradigmatic
shifts (Loevinger, 1978) clearly enable a diversity of
readings. Yet, as will be argued below,
if we actually look at Freud's account of the
development of psychological sex differences we find
that he did not subscribe to a biologically
determinist account of female psychology. Instead he
regarded the development of the characteristically
female (and male) personality as the effect of the
way the child construes her (or his) biology.
(Sayers, 1982: 127)
That is, femininity and masculinity are not mechanistically
determined by biology (Sayers, 1982; Grosz, 1990) but are
effects of society's ideas about biology (Mitchell, 1974).
Psychoanalysis conceptualizes gender, not as a natural given,
but as the possible and probable consequence of unconscious
interpretations of genital sex differences (sayers, 1982).
Indeed Freud (1935, quoted by Mitchell, 1982: 1) objected to
those who attempted to "establish a neat parallelism" between
the biological and the psychic. And because psychoanalysis
thus deconstructs our 'phallic illusions' about gender and
identity (see Sayers, in press/a, in press/b); because
"psychoanalysis is not a recommendation .
	 patriarchal
82
society, but an analysis g one" (Mitchell, 1974: xv), it may
be useful in understanding feminine identity, and therefore
anorexia, within the context of 'patriarchal' society (see
Grosz, 1990).
Freud argued that the early infantile sexuality of boys
and girls was similar (Sayers, 1982). Neither initially
differentiates self from other (see Mitchell, 1974; Laplanche
and Pontalis, 1973). There is at first no unified ego distinct
from the external world for either sex (Laplanche and
Pontalis, 1973). There is no distinction between ego-libido
and object-libido (Freud, 1914). Rather, the baby is born in
a 'primary narcissistic' state characterised by a total
absence of relationship to the outside (Laplanche and
Pontalis, 1973). And it is only through the mother's absences
that the infant recognizes her as a separate object and thus
experiences itself as discrete (Mitchell, 1974). Hence the
fort-da game in which the infant attempts to master this
experience of loss, central to the development of the ego
(Freud, 1920)
Both boys and girls also take the mother as primary love-
object and both show active and passive aims during the oral
and anal phases of psychosexual development (sayers, 1982;
Mitchell, 1974; Freud, 1905; Nagera, 1969). The infant is not,
therefore, born with a differentiated and integrated sense of
self (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973) nor with a ready-made,
complete sexuality (Mitchell, 1974). Rather, it is
'polymorphously perverse', bisexual 1
 and initially auto-erotic
(Freud, 1905: Mitchell, 1974), Hence, 'normality' is only
(precariously, if ever) achieved after a long and tortuous
process of psychosexual development (Mitchell, 1974). And it
is not until 'the phallic phase' of development that the two
sexes begin to diverge psychologically (Sayers, 1982).
During this stage the penis and the clitoris become the
1 The term 'bisexuality' refers to the idea that "the boy
has a bit of the female, the girl a bit of the male" but also to
"the very uncertainty of sexual division itself" (Mitchell, 1982:
12; see also Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986).
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principal erogenous zones and their physical differences thus
become significant (Sayers, 1982: 127). For the boy, phallic
eroticism leads to phallic desires for the mother so that the
father becomes an Oedipal rival. Fearing castration by the
father in retaliation for these desires, he renounces the
mother as love-object, forming instead an identification with
the father and thus achieving a masculine identity (Freud,
1924; Sayers, 1982). That is, the Oedipal father is fantasized
(by both sexes) as a powerful figure who would punish the
child with castration for realizing its oedipal desire for the
mother (Freud, 1923 in Sayers, 1990). Genital sexual
difference is construed as signifying this paternal authority
and the boy's renunciation of his mother is a recognition not
only of his father's power but also that he will eventually
acceded to it (sayers, 1990). The boy's belief in castration
is, Freud (1924: 318) argues, substantiated by
the sight of the female genitals. Sooner or later
the child, who is so proud of his possession of a
penis, has a view of the genital region of a little
girl, and cannot help being convinced of the absence
of a penis in a creature who is so like himself.
With this the loss of his own penis becomes
imaginable, and the threat of castration takes its
deferred effect.
For girls, however, 'castration' is not a feared
possibility but an accomplished fact (Freud, 1924: 321).
They notice the penis of a brother or playmate.
strikingly visible and of large proportions, at once
recognise it as the superior counterpart of their
own inconspicuous organ, and from that time fall a
victim to envy for the penis. (Freud, 1925: 335; see
also Freud, 1905: 114)
Freud argues that during the phallic phase the girl's clitoris
has been her tttrue substitute for the penistt (Freud, 1905:
114) and that the penis is always preferred to the clitoris
(Sayers, 1982). Hence, her realization that she does not have
a penis results in her sense of inferiority. "She acknowledges
the fact of her castration, and with it, too, the superiority
of the male and her own inferiority" (Freud, 1931: 376). Freud
argued that mothers are often blamed for their daughters'
being ' 1 S0 insufficiently equipped" (Freud, 1925, quoted by
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Sayers, 1982: 128). And when the girl discovers that all women
lack a penis her mother also appears similarly devalued. In
consequence the girl abandons her mother, taking instead her
father as primary love-object (Sayers, 1982). And by replacing
her wish for a penis with a wish for a baby she adopts a
'normal' feminine position (Freud, 1924). Alternatively, she
may avoid this unfavourable comparison with male genitals by
giving up "her sexuality in general" (Freud, 1931, quoted in
Sayers, 1982: 129). Or she may continue in her wish for a
penis and develop a "masculinity complex" (Freud, 1931, quoted
in Sayers, 1982: 129; Freud, 1925). In short, Freud argued
"that female psychology is based on envy of the greater size
and visibility of the penis" (Sayers, 1982: 133) and on
'recognition' that it is only the penis that signifies
(paternal/patriarchal) power.
For Freud, then, the female body is negatively defined by
what it is not and femininity begins with an acknowledgement
of lack. However, as noted above, this 'femininity' is not
conceived as a natural category nor as a sim ple consequence of
female anatomy.
It is essential to understand clearly that the
concepts of 'masculine' and 'feminine', whose
meaning seems so unambiguous ... are among the most
confused that occur in science ... 'Masculine' and
'feminine' are used sometimes in the sense of
activity
 and passivity, sometimes in a biological,
and sometimes, again, in a sociological sense.
The third, or sociological, meaning receives its
connotation from the observation of actually
existing masculine and feminine individuals. Such
observation shows that in human beings pure
masculinity or femininity is not to be found either
in a psychological or a biological sense. Every
individual on the contrary displays a mixture of the
character-traits belonging to his own and to the
opposite sex; and he shows a combination of activity
and passivity whether or not these last character-
traits tally with his biological ones. (Freud: 1905:
141-142, footnote added in 1915)
In short, Freud's work can be read as pre-figuring post-
modern understandings of subjectivity because he de-
naturalizes and de-stabilizes both identity and gender (Grosz,
1990). In asserting that the self/other distinction is
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predicated on a loss or absence (of the mother) and in
emphasizing the centrality of the unconscious in psychosexual
development, Freud 'deconstructs' our 'phallic illusions'
about the individual (see Sayers, 1990, in press/a). His
theorization of the unconscious subverts the fantasy of the
unitary, rational, self-knowing 'man' because the conscious
subject can no longer know her (or his) unconscious thoughts
(Grosz, 1990). "The ego is no longer master of its own house"
(Freud, 1917: 141-3). That is, Freud posits a subject
radically split in itself and therefore "radically incapable
of knowing itself" (Grosz, 1990: 13). Similarly,
psychoanalysis deconstructs the notion of gender as a natural
given. Gender identity is achieved only after a complex
process of psychosexual development and is a result of
interpretation of physical sexual differences (Sayers, 1982;
Mitchell, 1974). It is not until the Oedipal complex that
active or passive aims can be described as either masculine or
feminine since it is only then that they are placed within the
social structure of sexual differentiation (Nagera, 1969).
Gender and, therefore, human subjectivity are constituted by
the unconsciously acquired ideas and (patriarchal) laws of
human society (Mitchell, 1974; Coward et al., 1976).
3.2.2 A Lacanian Re-reading of Psychoanalysis
For Freud then "the ego is first and foremost a body-ego"
but "it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the
projection of a surface." (1923: 703). Lacan's re-reading of
Freud emphasises the importance for psychosexual development
of this projection or interpretation of the body. For Lacan,
the unconscious is "the site of interaction between the body,
history and psychic representation" (Coward et al., 1976: 8).
As Mitchell (1974: 403) argues,
In each man's (sic) unconscious lies all mankind's
'ideas' of his history; a history that can not start
afresh with each individual but must be acquired and
contributed to over time. Understanding the laws of
the unconscious thus amounts to a start in
understanding how ideology functions, how we acquire
and live the ideas and laws within which we must
exist. A primary aspect of the law is that we live
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according to our sexed identity, our ever imperfect
'masculinity' and 'femininity'.
Hence, Lacan's description of the unconscious
simultaneously refers to what is 'within' the subject and also
to what is beyond her. More specifically, Lacan argues that
the unconscious is "precisely constructed in the acquisition
of language" (Coward et al., 1976: 17) which always precedes
the individual and comes to her (or him) from outside of
herself (Mitchell, 1982). Hence, "(t)here is no subject
independent of language" (Sarup, 1988: 12).
Human beings become social with the appropriation of
language; and it is language that constitutes us as
a subject. Thus we should not dichotomise the
individual and society. Society inhabits each
individual. (Sarup, 1988: 7)
Lacan's emphasis on language makes it possible to
interpret his work as a non-humanist (Mitchell, 1982), de-
centring (MacCannell, 1986) account of the subjectivity; as
sociological (Squire, 1983) account or, more specifically, as
an account which refuses any individual-society dichotomy (see
Sarup, 1988). That is, for Lacan (1949: 6) the ego is always
constituted in a mis-recognition (meconnaissance) of something
outside of itself as itself. Firstly, during 'the mirror
stage' the initially undifferentiated infant, whose body-image
is fragmentary, identifies with its integrated 'whole' mirror-
image. It mis-construes itself as its 'specular image' (Lacan,
1949; see also ver Eecke, 1985).
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by
the child ... would seem to exhibit in an exemplary
situation the symbolic matrix in which the . is
precipitated in a primordial form, before it is
objectified in the dialectic of the identification
with the other, and before language restores to it,
in the universal, its function as subject. ... this
form situates the agency of the ego before its
social determination, in a fictional direction.
(Lacan, 1949: 2)
This 'specular I' thus "prefigures its alienating
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destination" in the 'social I' (Lacan, 1949: 2). It
prefigures the moment at which the subject is constituted in
language or the Symbolic order (Rose, 1982), in an
alienating2
 mis-identification of itself in the pre-
existing linguistic position of "I" (Sarup, 1988).
Lacan, therefore, 'deconstructs' the subject, showing
it to be social (Sarup, 1988), de-centred (MacCannell,
1986), and fictional (Lacan, 1949) or literary (MacCannell,
1986): "identity' and 'wholeness' remain precisely at the
level of fantasy" (Rose, 1982: 32) because subjectivity does
not arise from within the individual, from the Real 3 , but
from without, created by and within language or the Symbolic
order. It is "created in the fissure of a radical split"
(Mitchell, 1982: 5) in which subjectivity is constituted as
an effect of the symbolic (Sheridan, 1977; Rose, 1982).
For Lacan, the phallus stands for this moment of
division in which subjectivity is constituted (Rose, 1982):
it is to this signifier (the phallus) that it is
given to designate as a whole the effect of there
being a signified, in as much as it conditions any
such effect by its presence as signifier. (Lacan,
1982a: 80)
That is, the phallus has "the privileged function of
representing human identity" (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986:
187). It signifies the effect of the signifier, of language
or the Symbolic order in creating subjectivity (Lacan,
l958a). And, being constituted only in relation to the
phallus, identity is also profoundly gendered. Sexual
2 For Lacan, this is not an 'alienation' from some
pre-existing 'identity', but is rather a 'lack-in-being' of the
profound splitting of subjectivity (Rose, 1982: 40).
. For Lacan, language, the symbolic, 'stands in' for
objects. 'The real' therefore refers to "the moment of
impossibility" (Rose, 1982: 31), describing "that which is
lacking in the symbolic order". In "it 'raw' state ... (it) may
only be supposed" (Sheridan, 1977: x).
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difference
must exist because no human being can become a
subject outside the division into two sexes. One
must take up a position as either a man or a
woman. Such a position is by no means identical
with one's biological sexual characteristics
(Mitchell, 1982: 6)
And because it is the phallus that represents human
identity, sexual difference is always constructed in
language (Coward et al., 1976) such that masculinity is
positively signified as 'I' whilst femininity is negatively
signified, the 'not-I'.
Sexual difference is inscribed in language only in
relation to the phallus; the other sex is such,
only because it does not have the phallus.
(Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986: 189)
That is, the phallus defines identity, the 'I', as
masculine. As that which represents the effect of the
Symbolic order, it designates the masculine as the position
of 'Oneness', of knowing and of being and the feminine as
the negatively defined "other of being", not-I, not-all,
not-One (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986: 186; Rose, 1982).
'Woman' enters the Symbolic negatively "in a relation of
lack" (Coward et al., 1976: 15), "guarantee(ing) that unity
(of identity) on the side of the man" (Rose, 1982: 47).
Thus, like Freud, Lacan defines femininity negatively in
terms of a lack.
3.2.3 Feminine Subjectivity: 'Woman' as Ideology
As argued above, Lacan's work can be read as a non-
humanist, and de-centring theory of subjectivity in which
(gender) identity cannot be reduced to biological difference
or to the individual because it is fictionally constituted
within the Symbolic order.
It (sexuality) cannot be solved by any reduction
to biological factors, as the mere necessity of
the myth underlying the Oedipus complex makes
sufficiently clear. (Lacan, l982a: 75; see also
Rose, 1982: 40)
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Lacan's re-reading of Freud thus emphasises that gender
identity is an effect of signification (or interpretation).
The definition of the feminine as a lack is symbolic because
"something can only be seen to be missing according to a
pre-existing hierarchy of values ('there is nothing missing in
the real' PP p.113)" (Rose, 1982: 42; see also Lacan, 1982b).
Thus, the negativity of the feminine is a consequence not of
a 'real' lack but of the phallic nature of signification. And,
drawing on structuralist linguistics, Lacan demonstrates the
illusory and precarious nature of this Symbolic identity.
Following Saussure (1974), Lacan4
 holds that not only are
language-systems social and external to the individual, they
are also "systems of values maintained by social convention"
(Lyons, 1981: 221). That is, the relationship between the
signified and signifier, which together make up the linguistic
sign, is arbitrary
 (see also Coward et al., 1976; Rose, 1982;
Lacan, 1958a, 1977). Language is conceptualized here, not as
a transparent nomenclature. Rather words are meaningful only
within the structure of a language-system (Lyons, 1981).
Meaning is the product of the semantic relations between words
(Lyons, 1981). It exists not in the word itself but in the
divisions and differences produced within language (see Coward
et al. 1976). And the phallus (which is not the penis it
signifies) is the 'privileged signifier', signifying sexual
difference (Coward et al., 1976, in Sayers, 1982).
In Freudian doctrine the phallus is not a fantasy,
if what is understood by that is an imaginary
effect. Nor is it as such an object (part, internal,
good, bad etc. ...) in so far as this term tends to
accentuate the reality involved in a relationship.
It is even less the organ, penis or clitoris which
it symbolises. ... the phallus is a signifier whose
function in the intrasubjective economy of analysis
' Whilst Lacan adopts the epistemological framework of
Saussurian linguistics he also transposes Saussure's 'fraction
of sign = signified/signifier' (Walkerdine, 1988: 3-4).
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might lift the veil5
 which it served in the
mysteries. (Lacan, 1982a: 79)
For Lacan, then, the phallus, which signifies the effect
of the Symbolic in constituting (gendered) subjectivity,
cannot be simply equated with the penis. Moreover, whilst
Lacanian theory has been accused of phallocentrism (see Rose,
1982) this theory is also an exposure of the 'fraudulent'
status of the phallus (Rose, 1982). That is, whilst language
fixes meaning and constitutes identity, meaning is also
constantly slipping (Rose, 1982) along metaphoric and
metonymic axes. The signified can always become a signifier.
Because meaning is produced only in the relations between
words "(w)e are forced ... to accept the notion of an
incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier"
(Lacan, 1977: 154)
From which we can say that it is in the chain of the
signifier that meaning 'insists' but that none of
its elements 'consists' in the signification of
which it is at the moment capable. (Lacan, 1977:
153)
The meanings of words are uncertain, unfixed because they are
always 'differed' along chains of signifiers (because it is
only in the relations between words that meaning is produced).
In addition, because the signifier 'stands in' for the object,
signification also indicates loss: "language speaks the loss
which lay behind that first moment of symbolization (Rose,
1982: 32). Because the phallus signifies the effect of the
Symbolic, its presence also signifies an absence (Benvenuto
and Kennedy, 1986). The phallus represents 'One-ness'
(Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986: 190). It represents identity and
certainty. But Lacan
Lacan refers the phallus to the function of 'veiling',
indicating that it "covers over the complexity of the child's
early sexual life with a crude opposition in which that very
complexity is refused or repressed. The phallus thus indicates
the reduction of difference to an instance of visible perception,
a seeming value" (Rose, 1982: 42).
91
deconstructs the omnipotent fantasy of the self as
whole and undivided, showing it instead to be
founded in the illusory elision of division - of
inner and outer - at its very inception (Sayers,
1990: 200).
Hence, the phallus also signifies that 'lack in being', the
splitting in which subjectivity is constituted outside of
itself. It signifies both subjectivity and desire which arises
precisely because of the lack or gap in the Symbolic (see
Rose, 1982)
Freud makes it clear that what is at issue for him
(throughout the moment of castration) is the mode of
representation of a lack from which the subject
finds himself suspended in his traumatic relation to
desire: whence the traumatic, unbearable character
of this perception and of the profound fissure in
which it establishes the subject. (Lacan, 1982c:
113)
Thus, the "idealization of separation and the
idealization of the phallus go together" (Benjamin, 1985: 4).
Hence, "the status of the phallus", in signifying the
certainty of identity, "is a fraud" (Rose, 1982: 40): "the
very ideology of oneness and completion" signified by the
phallus denies or "closes off the gap of human desire" also
signified by the phallus (Rose, 1982: 46). And, as Irigaray
(1988: 161) argues,
from the moment that a pole of difference pretends
to decree the Universal, it says that its discourse
is not sexualized. However, there are indications of
sexual difference in this discourse that has
pretensions to the universal.
The concept of the phallus in Lacanian theory indicates,
then, not so much an assertion of unproblematic male privilege
as the problematic, conflictual nature of human subjectivity
and sexuality (Rose, 1982). In short, Lacan de-centres
subjectivity, conceptualizing it as an identification with the
pre-existing position of 'I' within the Symbolic order.
Drawing on structural linguistics, he shows how profoundly
precarious, problematic and fictional that subjectivity and
92
sexuality are. His theory is therefore useful because in
questioning the Symbolic as a "register of absolute fixity" he
thereby questions and deconstructs the category of woman
(Rose, 1983, in Sayers, 1986: 92; see also Frosh, 1994)
Lacan emphasizes, then, that femininity is not a natural
category but a symbolic position. And this re-reading of
femininity also elucidates the particularly problematic nature
of this fictional, Symbolic 'feminine' identity. As noted
above, 'femininity' is conceptualized as a socially,
symbolically constructed (im)position that is negatively
signified in relation to the phallus; as the other, as not-I,
not-One (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986). It is the Other of
identity. But it is not that 'the woman' is outside of the
Symbolic order. Rather 'she' is excluded within it.
Her being not all in the phallic function does not
mean that she is not in it at all. She is in it not
not at all. She is right in it (Lacan, 1982d: 145).
And, as Lacan argues, there is therefore "something
unacceptable" for 'woman' "in the fact of being placed as an
object in a symbolic order to which, at the same time, she is
subjected just as much as the man" (Lacan, in Rose, 1982: 45).
The category of femininity is thus theorized as
unacceptable, at least for women. But it is also
"fundamentally conflictual" because 'woman' is (impossibly)
contained within an exclusion. 'She' stands as an impossible
contradiction - a subject position of the other-of-identity.
That the woman should be inscribed in an order of
exchange of which she is the object, is what makes
for the fundamentally conflictual, and, I would say,
insoluble, character of her position... (Lacan in
Rose, 1982: 45).
Whereas for Riviere (1929) "masquerade ..indicated a failed
femininity", for Lacan "masquerade is the very definition of
'femininity'" because 'woman' is defined in terms of that
which 'she' is not (Rose 1982: 43). Hence, "he woman does not
exist" (Lacan, quoted in Rose 1982: 48). Moreover,
femininity, therefore, indicates 'the fundamental duplicity'
of the Symbolic (Rose, 1982: 42) because it points to the lack
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in the Symbolic, to 'something more', "to a iouissance proper
to her, to this 'her' which does not exist" (see Lacan, 1982d:
145). Hence, as Rose (1982: 44) argues,
The description of feminine sexuality is therefore
an exposure of the terms of its definition, the very
opposite of a demand as to what that sexuality
should be. ... it involves precisely a collapse of
the phallus ... giving the lie, we could say, to the
whole problem outlined.
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory thus elucidates the
profoundly problematic, 'unacceptable' and perhaps subversive
nature of 'femininity' as the negatively signified other
within the Symbolic order. As Sayers (1986: 94) argues,
feminist Lacanians have deconstructed the category of woman.
Problematically, however, it is not clear what relationship
actual women might have to this category of 'woman' nor from
what (symbolic) position women might resist this unacceptable
(im) position.
3.2.4 Other Femininities (for Feminism?)
Freud argued that femininity and hysteria are linked both
historically and psychologically (Mitchell 1984; see also
chapter 6 for a further discussion of hysteria): "'the
feminine' (being a woman in a psychological sense) was in part
a hysterical formation" (Mitchell, 1974: 48). The profoundly
problematic and conflictual nature of 'femininity', theorized
by Freud and Lacan, clearly indicates the difficulties of
female psychosexual development. And the elucidation of the
impossibility and unacceptability of 'femininity' must surely
further our understanding of 'female maladies' (see Showalter,
1987) such as hysteria and, more contemporarily, anorexia
(Malson, 1992). As Mitchell (1984: 308) argues,
Hysteria was, and is - whatever the age and
generational status of the man or woman who
expresses it - the daughter's disease. To 'her'
'femininity' really seems to equal the gap indicated
by castration or, in Joan Riviere's words, it is
enacted as 'a masquerade' to cover it.
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And, as noted above, for Lacan 'masquerade' is the very
definition of femininity, in that it is defined in terms of a
male sign (Rose, 1982). This is not to argue, however, that
women are somehow 'naturally' hysterical or that all (or most)
women come to be hysterical (Malson, 1992). Rather, it is to
suggest that 'the hysterical woman' or 'the anorexic woman' is
"a parody of the core of social values, women's expected
dependency and restricted social role" (Selig 1988: 413, my
emphasis). Similarly, a number of psychoanalytic feminists
have argued that 'the hysteric' can be understood as a quasi-
feminist refusal of patriarchal heterosexuality (see Ramas,
1985), that 'she' makes "permanent war" with the
phallocentrism and patriarchy of the Symbolic order (see
Cixous, in Gallop, 1985: 203). Cixous (Clement and Cixous,
1975), for example, describes Freud's Dora's as "a radiant
example of feminine revolt" (Moi, 1985: 192). Whilst not
denying the rejecting/protesting aspect of hysteria or
anorexia, the location of feminist protest in such
self-destruction is inevitably problematic (see Swartz,
l985a). Moreover, hysteria may be not so much a feminist
political resistance to patriarchy as a dissenting but co-
opted defeat. As Clement (Clement and Cixous, 1975: 287, in
Gallop, 1985: 203) argues, hysteria
introduces dissention, but it in no way makes
anything burst; that does not dis perse the bourgeois
family, which only exists through her dissention,
which only holds together in the possibility or the
reality of its own disturbance, always re-closable,
always re-closed.
That is, whilst 'the hysteric' can be understood as (not)
voicing 'her' dissent in 'her' symptoms, 'she' is always
assimilable within the phallocentric order 'she' contests. The
hysteric (and also 'the anorexic') "both refuses and is
totally entrapped within femininity" (Mitchell, 1984: 290).
And, indeed, this paradoxical entrapment-rejection might in
itself be seen as bound up with the problematic nature of
femininity discussed above.
A related response to the problem of
	 'the
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feminine'/feminist is proposed by Kristeva. She shifts Lacan's
focus on symbolic abstraction to include the semiotics - the
'texture', gestures and rhythms of speech (see Sayers, in
press/b). She argues that women speak and write as
'hysterics', as 'outsiders' of phallocentric discourse (Jones,
1985). Her project of 'semanalysis' thus attends to marginal
and resistant meanings. "A feminist practice" she argues "can
only be ... at odds with what already exists so that we may
say 'that's not it' and 'that's still not it" (Kristeva,
1974, in Jones, 1985: 88). That is, for Eristeva 'woman's'
function (which can also include men) can only be negative,
challenging (Jones, 1985), subverting and re-claiming
(masculine) language as our own (Ussher, 1991).
In contrast with Kristeva, Irigaray argues that women
have their own specificity distinct from men. For her, a
feminist resistance to phallogocentrism must focus on
formulating the specificity of the female body and of the
mother-daughter relationship. In this latter respect her work
converges with that of many non-Lacanian feminists who,
objecting to the phallocentric, father-centredness of Freud's
work, have shifted their focus from the father to the mother
(see Sayers, 1988, 1991, in press/b). Following on from Klein
and later Winnicott, feminists such as Chodorow (1978),
Benjamin (1990) and Orbach (1993) have increasingly focused on
the pre-oedipal mother-child relationship and (following
Winnicott) on the effects of its individual material realities
rather than fantasies6 . As Sayers argues, "(g)iven the value
Winnicott, unlike Freud, attaches to the work of women as
mothers ... it is little surprise that feminists have found
his theories particularly sympathetic" (Sayers, in press/b:
4). Yet it is also paradoxical that this feminist analysis
focuses on "individual issues relating to the mother to the
neglect of others, particularly the father" when feminism has
6 See Sayers (1991, in press/b and 1988) for a fuller
discussion of the shift towards a focus on the mother in feminist
psychoanalysis. See also chapter 2 for a discussion of Orbach's
mother-centred psychoanalytic account of anorexia.
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"repeatedly insisted on the necessity of going beyond the
individual-centredness of psychoanalysis to take account of
the social and patriarchal factors conditioning women's ills
and discontents" (Sayers, 1988: 368-369).
In focusing on the specificity of the female body,
Irigaray's work also converges in part with the much earlier
work of Homey (1926). Homey argued that 'feminine'
psychology does not simply result from penis-envy but, rather,
is "rooted in women's 'specific biological nature" (Homey,
1926: 17, in Sayers, 1982: 130). Yet whilst Homey's attempt
to counter Freud's 'male-bias' is appealing, it has also been
described as essentialist because it posits a 'primary'
natural femininity (see Sayers, 1982; Jones, 1985). Lacan
(1982b: 127) has also asserted that her disputing "the
anatomical priority" of the penis (or clitoris) "in no sense
detracts from Freud's basic thesis on the phallic conditioning
of narcissism in the subject irrespective of its sex".
Like Homey, Irigaray argues for a female psychology
specific to the female rather than the male body (Sayers,
1982; Jones, 1985). As a post-Lacanian, she asserts that
because women are caught up in a phallocentric Symbolic order
they "have had no way of knowing or representing themselves"
(Jones, 1985: 88). Thus she argues that the mother has no
identity as a woman to give to her daughter.
If the mother is the alienator it is because she has
no identity as a woman. And this effectively plunges
the mother and the little girl into the same
nothingness. But the problem is neither to accuse
the mother nor to say that it is the father who
comes to liberate the little girl. The mother has to
find her identity as a woman and from that point,
she would be able to give an identity to her
daughter. But this is the key point to which our
system is most blind. (Irigaray, 1988: 157)
Irigamay (1988: 156) argues that society is built not just on
the Oedipal myth of patricide but primarily on matricide:
"when fathers took the power they had already annihilated the
mother". What is required, she claims, if women are to find
their identity as women, is a return to the specificity of the
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female body, to the 'two lips' of the vulva and to a 'specific
female desire' (Sayers, 1982) of multiple libidinal energies
(Jones, 1985).
Clearly Irigaray's project can be read as essentialist,
as an argument that feminists should fight patriarchy so that
we could express a 'femininity' that is "essentially
constituted in biology" (Sayers, 1982: 131-132). Her
'solution' is bound up with the very system it claims to
undermine (Jones, 1985): "the female body hardly seems the
best site to launch an attack on the forces that have
alienated us from what our sexuality might become" (Jones,
1985: 93). While Cixous' (Clement and Cixous, 1975, in Jones,
1985) description of femininity as flowing from her body, or
Irigaray's celebration of female sexuality as diverse,
diffused, of woman as "infinitely other in herself", as
"temperamental, incomprehensible, perturbed, capricious", "a
little crazy" and incoherent (Irigaray, 1977, in Jones, 1985),
is certainly opposed to phallic identity, it seems to oppose
from that very position in which patriarchal order placed it.
In contrast with this critique, however, Whitford (1989;
see also McNay, 1992) has argued that Irigaray is not
essentialist because her work can also be re-read at the level
of the symbolic rather than at the level of the 'real' body.
Whitford (1989) argues that Irigaray's project is the
formulation of a female symbolic that would allow the mother
to be mother and woman, that would not reduce women to a
maternal function and that would give women a (feminine rather
than phallocentric) identity as women. In this reading,
Irigaray is arguing that women have been left in a state of
'dereliction' not because of women's 'nature' but because they
cannot successfully emerge as subjects within an order that
only signifies the feminine as a negative (Whitford, 1989).
Because the mother-daughter relationship and the female body
remain as yet unsymbolized in their own specificity, women are
hindered from having a (symbolic) identity. The "problem for
women lies" therefore "in the non-s ymbolization of the
relation to the mother and to the mother's body" (Whitford,
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1989: 114). Irigaray, thus, criticizes the partiality of the
symbolic and argues for the formulation of a feminine
imaginary and symbolic based on the constantly touching lips
of the vulva and on the diffused multiplicity of 'female
desire'.
The symbolic that you (Messieurs les psychanalystes)
impose as universal, free of all empirical or
historical contingency, is your imaginary
transformed into an order, a social order.
(Irigaray, 1985: 311-313, in Whitford, 1989: : 118)
To turn the 'body without organs' into a 'cause' of
sexual pleasure, isn't it necessary to have had a
relation to language and to sex - to the organs -
that women have never had (Irigaray, 1977, in
Whitford, 1989: 113).
Hence Irigaray's description (1977) of 'femininity',
Whitford (1989) argues, is not so much a demand for a return
to the 'real' of the female body as an attempt to formulate a
'female imaginary' which could be transformed into a 'female
symbolic' based on the female body.
Whether Irigaray is talking about literal biology or is
using 'the two lips' as an alternative symbolic term is
unclear. However, (and setting aside the question of whether
or not a 'female symbolic' is possible) Irigaray's work still
remains problematic because, like Lacan's, it posits an
homogenized category of 'J woman' and "I wonder ... whether
one libidinal voice, however non-phallocentrically defined,
can speak to the economic and cultural problems of all women"
(Jones, 1985: 96). That is, both Lacan and Irigaray seem
problematically to theorize only one 'woman' (however 'she' is
defined). Black, white, working- and middle-class, feminist
and non-feminist, Western and non-Western women surely cannot
all be adequately accounted for by any single 'monolithic
myth' of femininity (see Jones, 1985). Thus, Wittig (1979, in
Jones, 1985: 95) comments:
It remains.., for us to define our oppression in
materialist terms, to say that women are a class,
which is to say that the category 'woman', as well
as 'man' is a political and economic category, not
an eternal one... Our first task ... is thoroughly
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to dissociate 'women' (the class within which we
fight) and 'woman' the myth. For 'woman', does riot
exist for us; it is only an imaginary formation,
while 'women' is the product of a social
relationship.
That is, a single concept of femininity seems to "flatten out
the lived differences among women" (Jones, 1985: 95). As Rose
(1982: 49-50) notes, "(i)f woman is 'not all', ... then 'she'
can hardly refer to all women." Thus, sayers (1986: 93 & 94)
argues, "'woman' is indeed a sliding signifier, variously
signifying 'daughter', 'lover', 'prostitute', 'Black',
'mother', 'worker', and so on". Lacanian and post-Lacanian
theories often lose sight "of the social realities that go to
make up the category 'woman". And outside of actual social
relations the concept of "woman' becomes an abstraction"
(Eisentein, 1979: 47, in Sayers, 1986: 93). It is therefore
necessary, I would argue, to theorize 'woman' as a
multiplicity of various and often contradictory 'femininities'
(see Riley, 1988; Jardine, 1985; Poovey, 1988), constituted
within actual socio-cultural and linguistic or discursive
practices (Walkerdine, 1993; Wetherell and White, 1992):
'woman' is historically, discursively constructed,
and always relatively to other categories which
themselves change; 'woman' is a volatile
collectivity in which female persons can be very
differently positioned, so that the apparent
continuity of the subject of 'woman' is not to be
relied on; 'woman' is both synchronically and
diachronically erratic as a collectivity. (Riley,
1988: 1-2)
The category of 'woman' fluctuates both culturally and
historically, encompassing a multiplicity of socio-
historically specific 'femininities'. Whilst 'the phallic mode
of identity' (Benjamin, 1985) and the definition of femininity
as the other of identity, the not-all, may be ubiquitous, "the
ways in which it is defined, imposed, accepted, subverted and
defied will vary" (Malson, 1992: 83). Moreover, as Lacan
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argues, the relationship of women to 'woman' is also
uncertain7.
Freud argues that there is no libido other than
masculine. Meaning what? other than that a whole
field, which is hardly negligible is thereby
ignored. This is the field of all those beings who
take on the status of the woman - if, indeed, this
being takes on anything whatsoever of her fate
(Lacan, 1972-3, in Rose, 1982: 27; my emphasis).
Similarly, Riley (1988: 6) argues,
The question of how far any woman can take on the
identity of being a woman in a thoroughgoing manner
recalls the fictive status accorded to sexual
identities by some psychoanalytic thought. How could
someone 'be a woman' through and through, make a
final home in that classification without suffering
claustrophobia?
That is, women have fluctuating relationships with the
already fluctuating category of woman. As will be argued
below, the category of woman might be best theorized as a
'plural collectivity' of often contradictory subject positions
constituted in and by various socio-historically specific
discourses of which the Symbolic is an abstraction. And whilst
gendered subject positions lean on the corpo-reality of the
body, of genital difference, women take up and are taken up by
a multiplicity of different subject positions with "different
densities of sexed being" (Riley, 1988: 6).
3.3 From the Symbolic towards Discourse
Lacan's re-reading of Freud emphasises the central
function of interpretation, of language or the Symbolic order,
in constituting (gendered) subjectivity. And, as noted above,
this emphasis on language makes it possible to read his work
as a non-humanist, de-centring account of subjectivity that
refuses a dichotomization of individual and society. Firstly,
because he theorizes subjectivity as constituted outside of
' C.f. Freud (1925: 342) who argued that in "girls the
motive for the demolition of the Oedipus complex is lacking"
because castration "has already had its effect".
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itself as a symbolic position in language and secondly,
because he thereby shows (gender) identity
	 to	 be
fictional. Adopting Saussurian linguistics as an
epistemological framework he demonstrates the precarious,
uncertain, problematic and fictional nature of subjectivity
and of femininity. He questions "the register of the absolute
fixity ... of the category of woman" (Rose, 1983, in Sayers,
1986: 92). However, in focusing on the abstract concept of the
Symbolic order (c.f. Saussure's lan gue), Lacan's and some
post-Lacanian theories tend to neglect the actualities of
speech (c.f. Saussure's parole), the discourses and discursive
practices in which language and therefore (gendered)
subjectivities are 're-produced' (Henriques et al., 1984; see
Sayers, 1986). As Saussure himself argued, language-systems
are social and material (Lyons, 1981). Language, like any
other social institution, must be put into a social setting so
that it can be understood as "something used daily by all" and
as "constantly ... influenced by all" even though it cannot be
changed by any one individual (Saussure, 1960: 73-74).
Language or discourse cannot exist independently of its daily
re-production and is therefore changeable (Hollway, 1992)8
Hence, language can be understood both as an established
system that pre-exists the individual and as an historically
evolving system that changes because of its continual use
(Cox, 1989; Saussure, 1960).
In a certain sense ... we can speak of both the
immutability and the mutability of the sign ... the
sign is exposed to alteration because it perpetuates
itself. What predominates in all change is the
persistence of the old substance; disregard for the
past is only relative. That is why the principle of
change is based on the principle of continuity.
Regardless of what the forces of change are ... they
always result in a shift in the relationship between
the signified and the signifier. (Saussure, 1960:
74-75)
8 Hence Foucault's genealogies of discourses and discursive
practices stresses discontinuity as much as continuity (Foucault,
1977a, see pp.168-169).
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That is, by locating language within its social context,
Saussure shows it to be socio-historically mutable. Moreover,
attention to the social indicates the necessity of moving from
Lacan's and Saussure's structuralist concept of language or
the symbolic order as a universal totality (see Walkerdine,
1988; Sayers, 1990) towards a post-structuralist concept of
discourses (see Foucault, 1972; Henriques et al., 1984)
characterized by diversity and power-struggle (Fairclough,
1989). As will be argued below, post-structuralism may provide
a more adequate theoretical framework within which to
understand subjectivity and femininity (and therefore
anorexia) as socio-historically located, multiple and shifting
subject positions constituted in discourses and discursive
practices (see Walkerdine, 1986).
3.4 Discourse, Power/Knowledge, Subjectivity and Gender
As Walkerdine (1986: 65) argues, many critiques of
structuralism have stressed that "the social 'totality' is not
a well-fitting and founded structure" and that "the social
domain" may be better understood as "a contradictory nexus of
social practices" (Hirst and Woolley, 1984, in Walkerdine,
1986: 65). Hence, the structuralist conceptions of language or
the Symbolic order as universal totalities might be better
reformulated in terms of a post-structuralist, Foucauldian
theory of discourses and discursive practices. This section
will therefore discuss the contribution of post-structuralist
theory to an understanding of subjectivity, gender, power and
knowledge and consequently to an understanding of anorexia.
The shift from structuralism to post-structuralism clearly
produces some tensions between the works of Foucault and
Lacan. However, I would argue that these theories are
nevertheless epistemologically compatible (see Foucault,
1972). Both adopt Saussurian or post-Saussurian linguistics as
an epistemological or meta-theoretical framework, viewing the
relationship between signifier and signified as arbitrary.
Hence meaning, and therefore knowledge, is constituted within
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language. Both Lacan9
 and Foucault must thus contest the
notion of absolute, objective, empirically verifiable 'truth'.
Further, both refuse an individual-society dichotomy,
theorizing a de-centred, non-humanist subject, constituted
outside of itself in discourse or the symbolic. However, as
Walkerdine (1986: 64-65) notes, Foucault does not (until his
most recent work) address "the problem of subjectivity
directly, but rather skirts around it". And, as will be argued
below, it is important to retain Lacan's theorization of
desire and subjectivity within the post-structuralist
perspective that Foucault provides.
For Foucault (1972) language is not a unitary, trans-
historical totality (Walkerdine, 1988) but rather consists of
a variety of different historically specific discourses; for
example, economic, medical, psychiatric and psychological
discourses. Foucault defines these discourses as regulated
systems of statements (Henriques et al., 1984). However, what
unites a system of statements, what constitutes the unity of
a discourse is always provisional. Whilst discourses are
realized in texts and speech, this realization is always
fragmentary (Parker, 1990b). As Parker (1990b) argues, we only
ever find pieces of discourse. The unity of a discourse cannot
be found in the document or the oeuvre because "(t)he
frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: ... it is always
caught up in a system of references to other books, other
texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network"
(Foucault, 1972: 23). A document only provides "a weak,
accessory unity in relation to the discursive unity of which
it is the support" (Foucault, 1972: 23). Hence, for Foucault,
a discourse is a dispersed system whose hypothesised unity is
always provisional: "we must conceive of discourse as a series
The concept of 'meconnaissance' - misconstruction or
misrecognition - is central to Lacan's thesis in which "knowledge
(connaissance) is inextricably bound up with meconnaissance
(Sheridan, 1977: xi). Further, for Lacan, the symbolic 'stands
in' for 'the real' which itself can only be supposed (Sheridan,
1977: x; see footnote 3).
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of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither
uniform or stable" (Foucault, 1979: 100). The division of
language into discourses
cannot be regarded either as definite or as
absolutely valid; it is no more than an initial
approximation that must allow relations to appear
that may erase the limits of this initial outline.
(Foucault, 1972: 30)
Hence, to identify a discourse "is not to close it upon
itself; it is to leave oneself free to describe the interplay
of relations within and outside it" (Foucault, 1972: 29).
Moreover, the unity of a discourse cannot be based simply
upon the existence of its objects - on the economy, the mind,
madness, sickness or the body, for example - because,
discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects
of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972: 49). For Foucault and
the post-structuralist and discourse-oriented researchers and
theorists that have followed him, discourse is not a
transparent medium which simply describes or reflects some
underlying reality (see e.g. Henriques et al., 1984;
Walkerdine, 1988; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and
White, 1992). Rather, discourses (and discursive practices)
are constitutive of their objects (Foucault, 1972, 1979).
Objects, individuals or experiences are discursively produced
(Harre, 1992) and their meanings are inseparable from the ways
in which they are described (Widdicombe, 1993).
As Hall (1982) notes, this view of language is very
different from the notion of language as reflective.
It implies the active work of selecting and
presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely
the transmitting of an already-existing meaning, but
the more active labour of making
 things mean. (Hall,
1982: 64)
Objects do not exist 'anterior' to discourse, 'waiting' to be
discovered and more or less accurately, objectively described
(Foucault, l977a). Rather a discourse "finds a way of limiting
its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it
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the status of an object - and therefore of making it manifest,
nameable, and describable" (Foucault, 1972: 41). Objects of
social reality
are not 'things' set apart from and independent of
discourse but are realized only in and through the
discursive elements which surround the objects in
question. Things then are made visible and palpable
through the existence of discursive practices, and
so disease and death (for example) are not referents
about which there are discourses but objects
constructed by discourse. (Prior, 1989: 3)
Similarly, discourses produce 'identities', subject
positions, "institutional sites" from which a person can speak
or be addressed (Foucault, 1972: 51; see Henriques et al.,
1984). Discourses do not simply describe individuals. Rather
they offer up a variety of subject positions (see Walkerdine,
1986; Holiway, 1992). Subjectivity does not come from within
but is constituted and re-constituted in texts and talk
(Wetherell and White, 1992). Hence 'identity' can be
conceptualized in terms of a multiplicity of different,
shifting, often contradictory positions (Walkerdine, 1993).
Femininity, for example, can be understood not so much as a
collection of characteristics found within the individual or
as a consistent unitary identity than as an empty category
that takes on a variety of historically contingent shapes
within different discourses (Wetherell, 1986; Wetherell and
White, 1992; Jardine, 1985; Poovey, 1988). For Foucault, then,
subjectivity is not only de-centred as subject position in
discourse (c.f. Lacan); it is also multiple and dispersed.
I do not refer the various enunciative modalities to
the unity of the subject ... instead of referring
back to the synthesis or the unifying function of
subject, the various enunciative modalities manifest
his (sic) dispersion. To the various statuses, the
various sites, the various position that he can
occupy or be given when making a discourse. To the
discontinuity of the planes from which he speaks.
And if these planes are linked by a system of
relations, this system is not established by the
synthetic activity of a consciousness identical with
itself, dumb and anterior to all speech, but by the
specificity of a discursive practice. ... discourse
is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of
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a thinking, knowing speaking subject, but, on the
contrary, a totality in which dispersion of the
subject and his discontinuity with himself may be
determined. (Foucault, 1972: 54-55)
Moreover, Foucault argues that a discourse is not simply
a set of linguistic practices (Prior, 1989). The concept of
discourse includes discursive practices. It is "composed of a
whole assemblage of activities, events, objects, selfings and
epistemological precepts" (Prior, 1989: 3). A discourse is,
then, a practice and discursive relations are neither simply
"internal to discourse" nor "exterior to discourse ... they
are in a sense, at the limit of discourse" (Foucault, 1972:
46). "Of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what
they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It
is this more that renders them irreducible to the language
(langue) and to speech" (Foucault, 1972: 49). That is,
discourses as social practice have powerful, 'real' effects
(Walkerdine, 1986). They regulate and normalize human
behaviours and activities, defining what is normal and
abnormal in various social settings and for various groups of
people (Walkerdine, 1986; Foucault, 1977b, 1979).
Similarly, as practices, discourses are not simply
conditioned by linguistic rules. The coming into existence of,
for example, 'madness' as an object of discourse was 'ruled'
by 'the conditions of possibility' (Woodiwiss, 1990: 63) of a
discourse on madness. Such conditions included its 'surface of
emergence' - the social conditions including the rise of the
bourgeois family and of the medical profession who as "the
authorities of delimitation ... as a body of knowledge and
practice ... became the major authority in society that
delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an
object" (Foucault, 1972: 41-42). Thus discourses as social
practices have 'real' effects (Walkerdine, 1986), legitimating
particular practices, particular forms of authority,
constituting particular 'truths' about 'reality' and
positioning and constituting people as, for example, sane or
insane (Foucault, 1967, 1972, l977b, 1979). "We can thus
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suggest that", in constituting fields of knowledge about the
'truth' and in thereby positioning and regulating people,
discourses "have powerful and 'real' effects, while at the
same time acknowledging that their 'truth' is itself
historically produced within certain specific conditions of
possibility" (Walkerdine, 1986: 64). Hence,
the possibility exists for fiction to function in
truth, for fictional discourse to induce effects of
truth, and for bringing it about that a true
discourse engenders or 'manufactures' something that
does not as yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it.
(Foucault, 1980: 193)
For Foucault, therefore, discourses are about power (see
Walkerdine, 1986; Couzens Hoy, 1986; Foucault, l977b; 1979;
1980): "it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined
together" (Foucault, 1979: 100). In constituting a field of
knowledge, a discourse rules out other truths. "The manifest
discourse ... is really no more than the repressive presence
of what it does not say" (Foucault, 1972: 25). And, as argued
above, discourses have powerful effects in constituting and
regulating subjectivities. The 'sovereign individual', for
example, is "a particular product of historically specific
practices of social regulation" (Henriques et al., 1984: 12;
see also Foucault, l977b). Thus,
we should admit ... that power produces knowledge
(and not simply by encouraging it because it serves
power or by applying it because it is useful); that
power and knowledge directly imply one another; that
there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at
the same time power relations. (Foucault, 1977b: 27)
For Foucault, then, power functions in and through discourse
(and discursive practices). It is conceptualized in terms of
a "micro-physics of power" (Foucault, l977b: 139), as power-
relations which, although unevenly distributed, are everywhere
(Foucault, 1979: 95). Power is "not so much ... a fixed
possession (as in sovereign power), but ... an aspect of the
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very regulative knowledge itself" (Walkerdine, 1986: 65;
Foucault, 1979). Discourses regulate and discipline by
constituting fields of knowledge, instituting truths,
constituting subjectivities in particular ways, positioning
people within discourses and subjecting them to normalizing
judgements (Foucault, 1977b, 1979; Walkerdine, 1988).
However, as Foucault (l977b: 170) argues, this
infinitesimal control is not simply a repression. Rather
"discipline 'makes' individuals".
The individual is no doubt the fictive atom of an
'ideological' representation of society, but he
(sic) is also a reality fabricated by this specific
technology of power that I have called 'discipline'.
We must cease once and for all to describe the
effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes',
it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it
'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it
produces reality, it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge
that may be gained of him belong to this production.
(Foucault, 1977b: 194)
Power/knowledge, therefore, does not simply repress but rather
produces 'the individual' and other objects in particular
ways. Moreover, as Foucault (1979: 96) argues, discourses
produce there own 'plurality of resistances'. Nineteenth
century medical discourse on sexuality, for example, produced
'the homosexual' as perverse but it thereby produced a subject
position from which such pathologization could be resisted
(Foucault, 1979). Hence, "(t)here is not, on the one side, a
discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that
runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks
in the field of force relations" (Foucault, 1979: 101-102). In
short, Foucault (1979: 102) conceptualizes power in terms a
"multiple and mobile field of force relations" functioning in
discourses and discursive practices "wherein far-reaching, but
never completely stable, effects of domination are produced."
Further, the idea of the body is central to Foucault's
theorization of discourse and power/knowledge (McNay, 1992).
He argues that discourses 'discipline' the body through "a
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multiplicity of minor processes of domination" (Foucault,
1977b: 138). Discourses construct the body in particular
ways, "exercising upon it a subtle co-ercion, ... obtaining
holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself -
movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal
power over the active body" (Foucault, 1977b: 137). He
insists, therefore, that the body is an historically and
culturally specific entity, shaped and re-shaped in different
discourses and discursive practices (McNay, 1992; Foucault,
l977a). Hence,
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced
by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a
dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a
substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of
descent, is thus situated within the articulation of
the body and history. Its task is to expose a body
totally imprinted by history and the process of
history's destruction of the body. (Foucault, l977a:
148)
Despite its corpo-reality the body is not "an originating
point nor yet a terminus; it is a result or an effect" (Riley,
1988: 102; Foucault, 1977a). The body is 'always already'
produced within discourse and discursive practices (McNay,
1992). It is not possible to know it outside of discourse,
before it is 'inscribed' within social practices and power-
relations (McNay, 1992). However, discourses do not simply
produce docile useful bodies (see Foucault, 1977b) since as
noted above discourse, power/knowledge, produces its own
'plurality of resistances' (Foucault, 1979). Foucauldian
theory thus provides a radically anti-essentialist account of
the body which "at the same time, does not deny the
materiality of the body" (McNay, 1992). The body as 'always
already' multiply produced in socio-historically specific
discourses which constitute, 'penetrate' and regulate it in
particular ways but which also produce resistances to their
'infinitesimal controls'.
In short, Foucault provides an account of subjectivity
and the body as produced in and regulated by discourses which,
110
I would argue, constitutes a useful framework for feminist
analyses and for the analyses in this thesis for a number of
reasons (see also McNay, 1992; Walkerdine, 1986). Firstly, the
theorization of subjectivity as de-centred, as constituted in
and regulated by socio-historically specific discourses,
enables an analysis of 'femininity' as a 'plural collectivity'
(Riley, 1988; see also Walkerdine, 1986) of historically and
culturally varying subject positions (see Wetherell, 1986)
rather than as an eternal, asocial category (McNay, 1992). In
contrast with psychoanalytic theory, which often lacks
historical specificity (McNay, 1992), post-structuralism
offers a more grounded theory of subjectivity as it is
variously constituted, regulated and resisted.
Secondly, Foucault's theorization of the body is
radically anti-essentialist: the body as 'always already'
constituted in and regulated by discourses and discursive
practices (McNay, 1992). Foucault (1977a) attacks the search
for origins, whether in body or in history, as 'an
epistemologically problematic quest' for ahistorical, asocial
essences (McNay, 1992; see also Riley, 1988). Moreover, he
views the body as a locus at which power relations are
manifest most concretely (Foucault, 1977b; McNay, 1992). His
project thus coincides with that of feminism in its analysis
of the body as a material site of power struggle. For Foucault
(1979), the body and sex are constructs of discourses and
discursive practices which regulate and normalize activities,
subjectivities and sexualities (Foucault, 1979; Walkerdine,
1986). And, as argued above, it is through discourses that
power/knowledge functions (Foucault, l977b; 1979, 1980;
Walkerdine, 1986). Furthermore, because, knowledge is always
bound up with historically specific regimes of power,
Foucauldian theory rejects the distinction between ideology
and science (McNay, 1992). The notion of an empirically
verifiable, objective or absolute truth becomes untenable
because societies produce their own specific, normalizing,
regulating truths (Foucault, 1979; McNay, 1992). Post-
structuralist theory thus enables a feminist questioning of
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those scientific 'truths' which have constituted women as
(biologically) inferior and defective (see Ussher, l992a). And
at the same time it provides a theoretical framework within
which to analyze the 'real' effects of these truths that
'fiction' women in a multiplicity of socio-historically
specific ways (see Walkerdine, 1986, Foucault, 1980).
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to set out the theoretical
framework adopted in this thesis drawing on psychoanalytic and
post-structuralist theories. Specifically, I have argued that
Lacan's re-reading of Freud offers a particularly useful
theory of subjectivity and gender as constituted outside of
itself within the symbolic order. However, as argued above,
Lacanian and some post-Lacanian theory tends to lack the
socio-historical specificity that Foucauldian theory offers
(McNay, 1992). Foucault's post-structuralist concept of
discourse not only allows a more socially grounded analysis of
subjectivity and gender. It also enables a conception of
'woman' as an unstable collectivity of multiple, often
contradictory subject positions in discourse (see Riley, 1988;
Walkerdine, 1986; Wetherell, 1986). In addition, Foucault's
concept of the body as discursively constituted and regulated
is not only anti-essentialist but also acknowledges and
theorizes the corpo-reality of the body. And because power and
knowledge are seen as bound together, functioning in discourse
(Foucault, 1979), Foucauldian theory provides an account of
the body as a site of power struggle as well as a critique of
scientific truths of the female body as inferior and defective
(see Ussher, l992a).
However, as McNay (1992) notes, feminists have been
critical of Foucault's lack of attention to the gendering of
discursive positionings and regulations. Whilst he provides a
detailed theorization of the discursive production of sex and
sexuality and of technologies of sex (1979) he often fails to
attend to how women and men are differently positioned,
disciplined and regulated (McNay, 1992). Thus, I would argue,
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it is important to retain the psychoanalytic, Lacanian
insights into the phallic nature of signification, into the
problematic nature of 'woman' as the negatively signified
other. Moreover, as Walkerdine argues (Henriques et al., 1984)
the theorization of subjectivity as a 'sum total of positions
in discourse' leaves an important area unexplored (Walkerdine,
1986; see also Frosh, 1994). Lacan theorizes the signifier
that by its presence also signifies an absence (Benvenuto and
Kennedy, 1986). Hence, desire is conceptualized as an effect
of the fundamental loss and splitting of signification (Rose,
1982): "it is as a derivation of the signifying chain that the
channel of desire flows" (Lacan, 1958b: 259). Desire is then
intimately bound up with subjectivity since both are effects
of signification. As Bracher (1993: 19) argues,
Insofar as a cultural phenomenon succeeds in
interpellating subjects - that is, in summoning them
to assume a certain subjective (dis)position - it
does do by evoking some form of desire or by
promising satisfaction of some desire.
The psychoanalytic insights into desire, into the
irrational and unconscious nature of identification are
therefore important in understanding the ways in which women
are interpellated (Aithusser, 1977) or taken up by and
positioned in discourses and in understanding our
'investments' in particular subject positions (Hollway, 1992).
Sayers (in press/a), for example, has illustrated how those
unconscious defenses, theorized by psychoanalysis, are
imbricated in maintaining our 'phallic illusions' in identity.
And, as Walkerdine (1990) argues, "woman is fiction, lived as
fact, and imbued with fantasy."
In discussing the theoretical perspective of this thesis
I have attempted to demonstrate how psychoanalytic,
particularly feminist Lacanian theory and post-structuralist
theory will provide a useful framework within which to analyze
'anorexia nervosa' as a multiply produced object of discourse
and as a category that is, I would argue, particularly
relevant to women, to the (discursive) constitution and
regulation of femininities, subjectivities and the female
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body. Importantly, however, whilst drawing on Lacanian as well
as post-structuralist theory, my analyses "shall remain, or
try to remain, at the level of discourse itself" (Foucault,
1972: 48). In analyzing the medical texts in which 'anorexia'
first emerged (study one) and the transcripts of interviews
with women diagnosed as anorexic (study two) it is the texts
themselves rather than the authors of the texts - their
intentions, desires, cognitions or attitudes - that are the
object of analysis. Thus, after having outlined the discourse
analytic approach of this thesis, the following chapters will
explore some of the discourses that converge on the body - in
this case, the female body, the (very) thin body, the
'anorexic' body - to constitute and regulate the body,
subjectivity and femininity in multiple, often contradictory
ways.
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Chapter Four
Methodology and Discourse
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I outlined the theoretical
framework of this thesis, discussing Lacanian and post-
structuralist theorizations of gender and subjectivity and of
discourse and knowledge. In this chapter I shall discuss some
of the implications of this theory for psychological research.
The chapter will begin with a brief review of the critiques of
'mainstream' positivist methodologies made by feminist and
'new paradigm' psychologists. It will then discuss how post-
structuralist theory has further undermined the
epistemological and methodological assumptions that underlie
positivist research. Further, it will be argued that post-
structuralist theory coincides with some of the feminist
critiques of positivism discussed below. The chapter therefore
presents a feminist post-structuralist framework for research
before discussing in chapter 5 the methodology adopted in this
thesis.
4.2 Critiques of Positivism
Since at least the 1930s the hypothetico-deductive or
positivist methodology has been presented as the dominant
paradigm in psychology (Kitzinger, 1987). This approach might
be characterized by its idealization of experimental control
and manipulation of variables and by its concern with the
minutiae of research procedures, with quantification,
measurement and statistical analysis (Henwood and Pidgeon,
1992; Kitzinger, 1987; Harre and Secord, 1972; Tseelon, 1991).
The philosophy of science underpinning this approach is that
of logical positivism, formulated by the Vienna circle in the
early 1920s (Harre and Secord, 1972; see Bechtel (1988) and
Kitzinger (1987) for further discussion of logical
positivism). It assumes an objective knowable reality and is
based on the empiricist epistemology that 'true' knowledge
must be grounded in experience and observation (Harre and
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Secord, 1972; Bechtel, 1988). Objective knowledge, it is
argued, is attainable only by scientific experimentation and
observation which could verify (or falsify) the truth of
logical prepositions (Harre and Secord, 1972; Bechtel, 1988).
By reducing complex concepts to simple logical
functions of simple concepts, related to unambiguous
experimental operations, science, it was thought,
could be built upon a solid foundation of
indisputable facts. (Harre and Secord, 1972: 33)
The critiques of logical positivism by, for example,
Popper, Kuhn, and Quine and the works of Lakatos, Lauden,
Feyerabend and others have also led to the emergence of post-
positivist philosophies of science (Bechtel, 1988; Barker and
Gholson, 1984; Woolgar, 1988; Outhwaite, 1987). Broadly
speaking, however, the positivist view of scientific research
progressively accumulating objective, universally applicable
knowledge, determined by the actual nature of the world,
persists (see Woolgar, 1988; Parker, 1990b). It remains the
dominant paradigm within psychology (Henwood and Pidgeon,
1992). Nevertheless it has received much criticism both within
and outside of psychology (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992; Parker,
1989; see e.g. Harre and Secord, 1972; Kitzinger, 1987; Fee,
1981)
Much of this criticism has come from 'new paradigm'
psychologists such as Harre (1979) and Shotter (1975, 1984;
see Parker, 1990a). Harre and Secord (1972: 28), for example,
argued that the positivist methodology did not automatically
produce reliable, scientific knowledge; that behaviourism, the
epitome of positivist psychology, yielded only an illusion of
objectivity; and that the results of animal and laboratory
experiments, so favoured by positivist psychologists, could
not be generalized to humans in their social contexts.
Positivist social psychology, they argued, was inadequate
because it took no account of the meanings or contexts of
human behaviour nor of human agency or experience.
Consequently 'new paradigm' psychologists adopted ideas and
methodologies, such as ethnoniethodology (Garfinkel, 1967),
role-play analysis, interviewing (see Harre and Secord, 1972)
116
and speech act theory (Austin, 1962), from other disciplines
in an attempt to produce a more person-centred and context-
oriented psychology (Harre and Secord, 1972; see Parker,
1990a).
Feminism has also provided a number of valuable critiques
of the positivist quest for scientific objectivity. As Ussher
(1991: 187) argues, "(t)here are virtually as many different
theories and arguments in the feminist debate as there are
feminists." Given the myriad of feminist perspectives it would
be naive to talk of 'the feminist position' (Ussher, 1991) or
'the feminist critique' of positivism. Rather, there is a
diversity of different feminist critiques and feminist agendas
for research (see Wilkinson, 1986).
Many feminists have argued that whilst science claims to
be objective, value-free and apolitical it is in fact
masculine and androcentric (Fee, 1981; Jordanova, 1989;
Harding, 1987; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989; Bleier, 1984;
Ussher, 1992b; Griffin, 1986). Firstly, the positivist
'scientific' epistemology is based on a liberal ideology which
posits 'rational j' producing objective knowledge of the
natural world through scientific endeavour (Fee, 1981). This
ideology entails the often unstated assumption that the
characteristics of 'rational man' are actually the
characteristics of males (Fee, 1981; Harding, 1987). Thus,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, science has
systematically excluded the possibility that women could be
the 'agents of knowledge' (Harding, 1987: 3; Fee, 1981).
Whereas 'man' is associated with culture, rationality,
knowledge and science, 'woman', as the other of man (see
chapter 3), is associated with nature, superstition, and
emotion (Jordanova, 1989; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1987).
Associated with nature, 'woman' could only be the object, not
the subject, of scientific knowledge (Fee, 1981; Jordanova,
1989; Bleier, 1984).
Secondly, feminists have shown how, within the social
sciences, people are often assumed to be male (Harding, 1987).
'Mainstream' research has thus been termed by some feminists
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as 'the academic male-stream' (Siltanen and Stanworth, 1984)
and as 'men's studies' (Spender, 1980). This androcentrism has
not only excluded many aspects of women' lives from
'legitimate' research (Harding, 1987), it has also resulted in
a 'male-as-norm' principle (Griffin, 1986) which inevitably
marginalizes and pathologizes women. Women are either rendered
invisible or are construed as inferior deviations of men (see
Jordanova, 1989; Harding, 1987; Griffin, 1986). And, as
Griffin (1986) argues, the feminist critique of this 'male-as-
norm' principle is not simply a demand for a more 'balanced'
focus in research since
if you take women seriously, if you make women's
experience the central feature of what you're doing,
then you can't leave the rest undisturbed. (Stanley
and Wise, 1983: 3)
It is not possible to simply add women into a scientific
research program that is already deeply embedded within
patriarchal ideology (see Harding, 1987; Ussher, 1991; Bleier,
1984)
Many feminists (e.g. Ussher, 1991; Sayers, 1982;
Jordanova, 1989; Bleier, 1984; Walkerdine, 1984; 1986) have
also shown how science has been used in the interests of
(white, bourgeois) men by, for example, constructing
masculinity and femininity in particular ways and by
naturalizing these notions (Bleier, 1984; Jordanova, 1989; see
also Ussher 1991; Sayers, 1982; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).
Hence, gender, the sexual division of labour and the sexual
status quo have been constituted as putatively natural facts
rather than as socio-political constructions and practices.
That is, science has played a part in the construction and
regulation of gender and oppressive gender relations (see
Walkerdine, 1986; Foucault, 1979; Ussher, 1991). An allegedly
value-free science has produced supposedly objective evidence
that women are naturally suited (only) to domesticity and
mothering (see Sayers, 1982; Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989;
Jordanova, 1989); that women are less intelligent than men
(see Sayers, 1982; Bleier, 1984), less capable at mathematics
(see Walkerdine, 1986, 1988) and more prone to sickness (see
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Ehrenreich and English, 1974; see also chapter 6) and mental
instability (Ussher, 1991; see also chapter 6). For many
years, feminists have challenged these scientific definitions
of woman (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989: 31) and have sought in
a number of ways (see Ussher, 1991) to produce different, more
positive knowledges of women (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989).
In short, feminists have challenged 'science' by
elucidating the 'masculinity' of its alleged objectivity, by
highlighting its androcentric foci and by demonstrating how
science has often functioned in support of a patriarchal
status quo. Using a variety of epistemologies (Ussher, 1991)
and methodologies (Harding, 1987), feminist researchers have
sought to falsify scientific knowledges of women's alleged
inferiority, to reclaim women's experiences (Stanley and Wise,
1983) and women's voices (Gilligan, 1982) and to deconstruct
scientific accounts of gender (Jordanova, 1989; Gavey, 1989;
Bleier, 1984); to show that "the line between scientific
accounts and science-fictional narratives may be a lot finer
than is usually thought" (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989: 31). As
Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) note, feminist researchers are
increasingly rejecting 'traditional' positivist methodology
for ethical, epistemological and emancipatory reasons (see
also Wilkinson (1986), Kitzinger (1987), Ussher (1989) and
Wetherell and White (1992) for examples of feminist research).
As feminist standpoint theorists argue (see Griffin and
Phoenix, 1994), feminist research should not only be 'woman-
centred' but should also aim to be reflexive and to be
critical of accepted epistemologies and methodologies.
Feminist research should adopt episteinological and
methodological perspectives that are appropriate both to its
research questions and to its emancipatory aims.
4.3 Post-structuralist Theory and Research
Post-structuralist critiques of science share much in
common with aspects of the feminist critiques discussed above
(see Gavey, 1989; Weedon, 1987). Indeed, some feminists
explicitly locate feminism within post-structuralism or post-
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modernism (e.g. Flax, 1987) or argue that post-structuralism
simply reiterates feminism (e.g Bowles, 1984; Burman, 1990;
see Gavey, 1989). Like some feminist critiques, post-
structuralist theory undermines science's claims to
objectivity and asserts that power is inevitably imbricated in
knowledge (see chapter 3).
The post-structuralist critique of science proceeds from
post-Saussurean linguistic theory which problematizes the
relationship between signifier and signified, between language
and reality (see Saussure, 1960; Foucault, 1972; see chapter
3). Language is understood not as a transparent medium through
which we can view the world. It does nbt simply describe
reality more or less objectively. Rather, it is constructive
of reality (Wetherell and White, 1992; Potter and Wetherell,
1987; Parker, 1990b). Discourses "systematically form the
objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972: 49). They
actively construct certain realities in particular ways
(Wetherell and White, 1992). They thereby constitute certain
power-relations and normalize certain forms of social
regulation (Foucault, 1977b, 1979; Couzens Hoy, 1986;
Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989; see chapter 3)
Post-structuralist theory, therefore, radically
undermines the claims that scientific discourses objectively
describe and explain a reality existing anterior to and
independently of discourse (see Foucault, 1972, 1979; Tseelon,
1991; Widdicombe, 1993). It re-casts empirical 'facts' as
theory- and language-dependent contentions (Lawson, 1985) and
'scientific methodology' not as a means of revealing reality
but as a technique of constructing particular realities and
truths (Tseelon, 1991; see also Latour and Woolgar, (1979) and
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) on the social context and discursive
production of scientific knowledge).
There is, therefore, no simple correspondence between
ontology and epistemology (Parker, 1990b), between extra-
discursive reality and our knowledges of the world. As Harre
(1992: 153) argues, the notion that "propositions of
scientific theory are true or false by virtue of the way the
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world is, cannot fruitfully be used to characterize a
defensible realism." This is not to argue, a la Derrida (1976:
158) that "there is nothing outside of the text", that there
is no material reality outside of discourse (see Parker,
1990a; Harre, 1992). Rather, post-structuralist theory
demonstrates the implausibility of 'brute empiricist' claims
"that things with ontological status can be directly known"
(Parker, l990a: 258). That is, post-structuralist theory
disputes the "philosophical concept of Truth which can provide
the ultimate seal for a particular account" (Outhwaite, 1987).
It denies the possibility of objectively knowing a reality
outside of discourse. It does not, however, necessitate
denying the existence of an extra-discursive reality, existing
"independently of the perceptions, actions or whatever of
human subjects" (Woodiwiss, 1990: 25; Burton and Carlen,
1979). As Bhaskar (1978: 250) argues, there are things which
"exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can
only know them under particular descriptions".
(T)he relations between the 'real material' object
and the practices of its production are complex:
there is never a moment of 'reality' which is
comprehensible or possible outside a framework of
discursive practices which render it possible and
transformable. (Walkerdine, 1984: 163)
This thesis adopts, therefore, a 'realist' post-structuralist
stance (see Woodiwiss, 1990). It assumes the existence of a
material, extra-discursive reality whilst maintaining that our
knowledge of 'the real' is always socio-historically
contingent rather than objective or absolute; that knowledge
is always ideological, not because it is biased or distorted
but because it can only ever offers a partial view (Hall,
1982; Tseelon 1991).
Post-structuralist theory thus coincides with feminism in
disputing science's claims to objectivity and in asserting
that power is imbricated in knowledge. It demonstrates that
'scientific' attempts to eliminate the subjective, to guard
against bias and other sources of 'error' do not guarantee a
value-free objectivity (Tseelon, 1991; see also Fee, 1981).
Indeed, the very possibility of absolute truth is rejected
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(Gavey, 1989) as fantasy (Walkerdine and Lucey, 1989). And, in
rejecting the possibility of absolute, universal truth, post-
structuralist theory allows for a plurality of 'truths',
including feminist truths (Gavey, 1989: 462).
However, it also problematizes certain feminist
perspectives such as the 'privileged standpoint' (e.g
Kitzinger, 1986; see Tseelon, 1991; Flax, 1987) and
essentialist feminism (see Sawicki, 1991). In particular, it
problematizes a feminist (or non-feminist) notion of an
authentic feminine or female experience, identity or desire,
repressed by patriarchy (Sawicki, 1991). The feminist research
focus on women's experience (see Harding, 1987; Griffin, 1986;
Stanley and Wise, 1983) and the call for women-centred
research (e.g. Nicolson, 1986) has clearly addressed many of
the problems of 'male-oriented' positivist research discussed
above (see Nicolson, 1986, Griffin, 1986). However, post-
structuralist theory necessitates a re-evaluation of the ways
in which 'women' and 'women's experience(s)' are
conceptualized. Firstly, because it problematizes or
deconstructs the category of 'woman' and, secondly, because it
posits a de-centred subject whose experience is discursively
constituted outside of itself (see chapter 3). Post-
structuralist theory argues that there can be no quasi-natural
feminine/female experience outside of patriarchy or
essentially different from male experience. Rather, women's
(or men's) subjectivities, experiences and desires are 'always
already' constituted in and regulated by discourses and
discursive practices (Riley, 1988; Walkerdine, 1986; Wetherell
and White, 1992; see chapter 3). Thus, I would argue, feminist
post-structuralist research is concerned not with an
exploration or reclamation of an authentic female experience
but with analyzing the ways in which women's subjectivities,
experiences and desires are discursively constituted and
regulated and with elucidating the socio-historical
specificities of gender power/knowledges (see Gavey, 1989;
Bordo, 1990, 1992; see also chapter 3).
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have briefly reviewed the critiques of
'mainstream' positivist methodologies made by feminist and
'new paradigm' psychologists before discussing the
implications of post-structuralist theory for psychological
research. Post-structuralist theory, it was argued, coincides
with some of the feminist critiques discussed above in
disputing science's claims to objectivity and in asserting
that power is imbricated in knowledge. Further it was argued
that post-structuralist theory provides a fruitful framework
within which to re-conceptualize 'women' and 'women's
experiences'. Feminist post-structuralism thus constitutes a
fruitful framework within which to analyze how 'anorexia
nervosa' is and has been discursively constituted and to
explore the ways in which the category of 'woman' has been
imbricated in these discursive constructions.
The critiques discussed in this chapter have also been
accompanied by the development of new, often qualitative
approaches to social and psychological enquiry (Henwood and
Pidgeon, 1992). Amongst these approaches is the discourse
analytic methodology promoted in psychology by, for example,
Potter and Wetherell (1987), Burman and Parker (1993), Holiway
(1989) and Walkerdine (1986, 1988). And it is this methodology
that has been adopted in both the studies of this thesis. In
the following chapter I will therefore discuss this approach
to research, outlining the different forms of discourse
analysis that have been developed within psychology before
discussing the particular approach to discourse analysis
adopted in this thesis.
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Chapter Five
Discourse Anal ysis and a Methodology for Study One
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the critiques of
empiricism that have been posited by 'new paradigm'
psychologists, feminists and post-structuralist theorists. I
argued that feminist critiques of positivism and science
coincide with post-structuralist critiques in disputing
science's claims to objectivity and in asserting that power is
imbricated in the production of knowledges. I further argued
the need for a feminist post-structuralist approach to
research; for research that (a) analyzes the ways in which
women's subjectivities, experiences and desires are
discursively constituted and regulated and that (b) elucidates
the socio-historical specificities of these gender
power/knowledges. In this chapter I shall argue that .,
discourse analytic approach to research constitutes a
particularly useful methodology for feminist post-
structuralist research.
This chapter, therefore, begins with a discussion of
discourse analytic research, outlining the different
approaches to discourse analysis within psychology. It then
sets out the particular form of discourse analysis adopted in
this thesis, discussing the compatibility of this methodology
with the theoretical framework set out in chapter 3. The final
section of this chapter then discusses the way in which this
approach was applied in the first study of this thesis and
sets out the methodological procedure of this study.
5.2 Approaches to Discourse Analysis
The critiques of positivism discussed in chapter 4 have
also been accompanied by the development of new, often
qualitative approaches to social and psychological enquiry
(Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992; Kitzinger, 1987; Harre and Secord,
1972). Amongst these approaches is the discourse analytic
methodology promoted in psychology by, for example, Potter and
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Wetherell (1987), Burman and Parker (1993), Holiway (1989) and
Walkerdine (1986, 1988).
Broadly speaking the discourse analytic approach to
research can be understood as part of a 'turn to language'
within the social sciences (Parker, 1990a). As Wetherell and
Potter (1988: 168) argue, social psychology has traditionally
taken the view "that language acts as a neutral, transparent
medium between the social actor and the world"; that people's
ordinary discourse reflects real and often stable phenomena
and processes such as attitudes, personalities or cognitions
that exist within the individual, independently of language.
Researchers have, therefore, aimed to (objectively) reveal
these phenomena as if they were transparently reflected in the
language through which they are studied.
However, developments in linguistics, literary theory,
philosophy and sociology have shown this view of language to
be implausible (Wetherell and White, 1992; Wetherell and
Potter, 1988; see chapters 3 and 4). Discourse analytic
psychologists have, therefore, drawn on ideas in
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), speech-act theory (Austin,
1962), linguistics, conversation analysis and post-
structuralism to develop alternative conceptualizations of
language and discourse (Wetherell, 1986; Walkerdine, 1986;
Parker, 1990a; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Within discourse
analysis, discourse is viewed as action-oriented and as
constructive of reality (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1991).
"People perform actions of different kinds through their talk
and their writing" (Potter and Wetherell, 1991: 3). They
construct particular versions of reality using particular,
socially available discursive resources (Potter and Wetherell,
1987; Parker, 1990a; see Foucault, 1972). As Hall (1982: 64)
argues, this conceptualization of discourse
is a very different notion from that of reflection.
It implies the active work of selecting and
presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely
the transmitting of an already-existing meaning, but
the more active labour of makin g
 things mean.
Discourse analysts share, then, "a concern with the ways
language produces and constrains meaning, where meaning does
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not reside within individuals' heads, and where social
conditions give rise to the forms of talk availableti (Burman
and Parker, 1993: 3).
There are, however, a number of different approaches to
research covered by the term 'discourse analysis' (Wetherell
and White, 1992; Potter et al., 1990; Potter and Wetherell,
1991; Antaki, 1988) and within these trends 'discourse' itself
is often conceptualized in very different ways (Walkerdine,
1986). Indeed, as Burman and Parker (1993: 3) note,
it is very difficult to speak of 'discourse' or even
'discourse analysis' as a single unitary entity,
since this would blur together approaches
subscribing to specific and different philosophical
frameworks.
These various approaches have been differentiated in a
number of different ways (see, for example, Potter and
Wetherell, 1991; Potter et al., 1990; Wetherell and White,
1992; Antaki, 1988). Potter and Wetherell (1991), for example,
identify at least four different types of work commonly
described as discourse analysis. The first of these has been
strongly influenced by speech-act theory and is primarily
concerned with analysis of conversational exchange in
particular institutional settings. Sinclair and Coulthard
(1975; see also Coulthard and Montgomery, 1981; Flanders
1970), for example, analyzed classroom discourse in terms of
verbal 'acts', similar to grammatical clauses, which could be
combined to form moves such as 'focusing' and 'framing' of
classroom activity.
A second form of 'discourse analysis' identified by
Potter and Wetherell (1991) is characterized by the work of
van Dijk (e.g. van Dijk, 1983; van Dijk and Kintch, 1983) who
conceives of discourse analysis as "part of a more embracing
cognitive and social theory about the rules and strategies
that underlie the production and understanding of (media)
discourse" (van Dijk, 1983: 27). Here, 'discourse analysis' is
concerned with the effects of 'discourse' on cognitive
processes such as understanding and recall. His analysis of
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newspaper articles, for example, was used to develop a
cognitive model of media production, comprehension, and
recall.
Other researchers have used discourse-analytic methods in
a similar way in clinical settings. Hoffman et al. (1986), for
example, have re-conceptualised 'thought disorder' as an
'abnormality of language' and have used 'discourse analysis'
to investigate the apparent incoherence of manic and
schizophrenic speech. Similarly Alverson and Rosenberg (1990)
used a 'discourse-analytic expansion' of 'schizophrenic
speech' to challenge previous conclusions that such speech
exhibited 'cohesive weakness' and was therefore incoherent.
Through attending to the possible functions of the utterances
of schizophrenic patients they argued that schizophrenic
speech is not simply incoherent. Rather, it may be
characterized as violating 'normal' rules of discursive
interaction by, for example, interpreting a would-be request
as a challenge.
These forms of 'discourse analysis' described above share
little in common with the approach adopted in this thesis
beyond a concern with language. They are not opposed to the
conceptualization of language as a transparent medium through
which we can access 'the real world'. They are not
epistemologically compatible with the theoretical framework
discussed in chapter 3. Such approaches to 'discourse
analysis' might be viewed as methodological developments
within empiricist psychology rather than as radical
alternatives to that paradigm. Indeed, the latter two
approaches quite explicitly conceptualize the analysis of
'discourse' as a means of revealing underlying cognitive
processes (see also Potter et al., 1990).
A third type of discourse analysis, identified by Potter
and Wetherell (1991), was that developed within the sociology
of science. This body of research (e.g. Gilbert and Mulkay,
1984; Woolgar, 1988; see also Potter and Wetherell, 1987) is
concerned with analyzing scientists' talk and texts so as to
elucidate the ways in which they produce their actions as
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rational and their findings as factual whilst conversely
others' 'scientific' activities are produced as flawed (see
also Potter et al., 1990; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, 1991).
This approach to discourse analysis is closer to the approach
adopted in this thesis in that it eschews the notion of an
objectively knowable Truth existing anterior to discourse and
is, rather, concerned with an analysis of the ways in which
discourses constitute their objects in particular ways.
However, as will be discussed below, there are also important
differences between this approach and the approach adopted in
this thesis.
A further approach that might be distinguished within
'discourse analysis' is primarily concerned with analyzing
rhetoric, with examining the ways in which particular
discursive resources are deployed in talk and text to produce
particular effects. Rhetorical analysis is not, therefore,
concerned with questions of 'accuracy', of how an account
relates to some putative reality (Potter and Wetherell, 1991).
Rather, its aim is to elucidate how an account is constructed
to successfully compete with other versions of 'reality'
(Billig, 1991). Potter et al. (1991), for example, have
examined the quantification rhetoric used in a recent TV
documentary on cancer and by British cancer charities. They
showed how particular forms of calculation (for example, of
incidence rates, frequencies of different types of cancer and
success rates of treatments) and particular presentation
practices were successfully deployed by different groups to
produce conflicting accounts of the degree of success of
medical research in treating cancers.
Other rhetoric-oriented discourse-analytic studies have
also analyzed media material. Jensen (1987), for example,
analyzed two news programs on US Network TV and demonstrated
how particular linguistic formulations constituted major
socio-econontic developments as attributable to individuals
whilst politics and economics appeared to function in
isolation. Rae and Drury (1993: 329) similarly examined the
"reasoning and rhetoric about economic recession" in a sample
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of British newspapers. They examined the rhetorical devices
deployed to produce 'the economy' as something divorced from
social life and explored the ways in which definitions and
evidence about the recession were differently 'managed',
thereby producing conflicting versions of reality.
A further study that characterizes this approach to
discourse analysis is Potter and Edwards' (1990) analysis of
the rhetorical devices used in a media debate about a lobby
meeting held by Nigel Lawson (the then chancellor of the
exchequer) in 1988 in which he was reported to have floated
the idea of abandoning universal benefits for pensioners, a
claim that Lawson denied. Potter and Edwards showed how
rhetorical devices, such as emphasising consensus, warranted
the factuality of a claim and that similarly such warrants can
be undermined by invoking a rhetoric about collusion.
A similar approach to discourse analysis was adopted by
Widdicombe (1993) who examined "the rhetorical processes of
negotiation and argument" involved in talking about changes in
identity. She analyzed interviews with 'punks' and 'goths' to
examine their accounts of 'becoming' a member of a sub-
culture, focusing on the functions and effects of particular
autobiographical constructions. She identifies some of the
ways in which speakers orientate to and negotiate the problem
of appearing authentic rather than as simply copying others.
Authenticity (in this case, 'appearance as an expression of
true self') is achieved by, for example, claiming to have been
ignorant of similarly dressed people who were only discovered
after a participant's adoption of a particular style.
Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1990) have also shown how members
disparaged particular factions of their sub-culture in order
to present their group in an optimally positive way. Some
members, for example were described as having joined for
shallow reasons in contrast to 'genuine' members.
In short, this approach to discourse analysis is
concerned with explicating the discursive resources deployed
in constructing particular accounts of reality, in, for
example, warranting particular accounts as factual whilst
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undermining alternative versions. As such, these studies
emphasise the constructive nature of discourse; the way in
which discourses and discursive resources do not simply
reflect some reality that exists anterior to discourse but
rather constitute their objects or events in particular ways.
And by focusing on the argumentative aspects of talk and text
they also begin to elucidate the ways in which power is
imbricated in discourse, in fields of knowledge. This approach
shares, therefore, some of the theoretical and methodological
concerns discussed in chapters 3 and 4. It opposes itself to
the empiricist project of objectively revealing a (putative)
reality existing anterior to discourse and is concerned rather
with an explication of the ways in which discourses and
discursive resources constitute their objects within
particular socio-cultural contexts (see e.g. Potter and
Wetherell, 1987). However, as will be discussed below, whilst
the form to discourse analysis adopted in this thesis draws on
this approach, there are also significant differences between
the two approaches.
The form of discourse analysis adopted in this thesis is,
in fact, closest to the fourth approach described by Potter
and Wetherell (1991). This final approach (see also section
5.3 for a further discussion of this approach) is
characterized by the works of, for example, Henriques et al.
(1984), Holiway (1989), Walkerdine (1986, 1988) and Wetherell
(e.g Wetherell and White, 1992). It is concerned with
elucidating the ways in which discourses constitute and
regulate particular (discursive) practices, experiences and
subjectivities; the ways in which discourses constitute
particular knowledges or Truths and thereby regulate our
lives. Unlike those approaches described above, this form of
discourse analysis draws on continental social philosophy and
cultural analysis, most notably on the post-structuralist
theory of Foucault (see also Potter and Wetherell, 1987;
Potter et al., 1990; Parker, 1990a, l990b; see also chapter
3). It can be distinguished from those other approaches by its
more explicitly theorized concern with epistemology and with
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the development of a post-structuralist theoretical framework
for research (see e.g. Parker, 1990a, 1990b). Holiway (1989),
for example, showed how (heterosexual) sexual relationships
are produced by a limited number of discourses such as 'a male
sexual drive discourse', a 'permissive discourse' and a
traditional 'have-hold discourse'. Similarly, Walkerdine
(1986) examined 'everyday social practices' in the family and
the school. She showed how particular discourses defined
'childhood', 'good' teaching and 'good' mothering and how
these definitions constituted "part of a variety of 'regimes
of truth' which have positive and powerful effects in
regulating the modern order". Her study was
concerned with understanding how assumptions about
'good mothers', sensitive teachers' and the 'nature
of the child' operate and have effects in those
domestic and pedagogic practices which make up the
daily lives of many women and children. (It was)
concerned primarily with the relationship between
conceptions of truth, power and the construction of
the subject ... (with exploring) the way in which
post-structuralism may help us to understand the
positioning of girls and women in these practices.
(Walkerdine, 1986: 57)
In short this approach is distinguished by its explicit
concern with post-structuralism; with the ways in which
discourses constitute and regulate knowledges, objects,
practices, subjectivities and experiences; and with
elucidating the socio-historical specificities of these
power/knowledges. And, as noted above, it is this approach to
discourse analysis that has been adopted in the two empirical
studies in this thesis.
The differentiation of these different forms of discourse
analysis is, I would argue, useful in locating 'discourse
analytic' studies within their particular methodological and
theoretical frameworks. This categorization is, however,
provisional in that many studies will draw on more than one of
these approaches. Potter and Wetherell (1991), for example,
characterize their own work as drawing on both the third and
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fourth approaches that they describe. Similarly, Rae and Drury
(1993), whilst concerned with an analysis of rhetoric, also
draw explicitly on Foucauldian theory in their study. And
Widdiconibe's study of the rhetorical resources used in
autobiographical accounts of 'becoming a goth' exhibits a
concern with the discursive production of the subject that is
more often associated with a post-structuralist rather than a
rhetoric-oriented approach.
The distinction between the different forms of discourse
analysis described above is, therefore, often blurred, with
studies drawing on a more than one approach. Indeed, I would
argue that the methodology adopted by, for example, Potter and
Wetherell (1987), Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) and rhetoric-
oriented 'discourse psychologists' is not incompatible with
the theoretical framework of post-structuralism. Both
approaches are premised on a conception of discourses as
'action-oriented' and as constitutive of reality (Potter and
Wetherell, 1987. 1991). Both share "a concern with the ways
language produces and constrains meaning, where meaning does
not reside within individuals' heads, and where social
conditions give rise to the forms of talk available" (Burman
and Parker, 1993: 3). Yet, as the above discussion
illustrates, there are also important differences between
these approaches. Firstly, the approach of, for example,
Wetherell and White (1992) Hollway (1989), Walkerdine (1986,
1988) or Parker (1990a, l990b) might be characterized by its
tendency to be concerned with 'global' analysis (see Wetherell
and White, 1992), with broadly explicating discourses and
discursive resources and analyzing the ways in which they
constitute and regulate their objects. In contrast the
approach of, for example, Potter and Wetherell (1987), Potter
and Edwards (1990) or Widdicoinbe (1993) may be characterized
as 'fine-grained' (Wetherell and White, 1992) in that it
focuses on the more detailed discursive procedures (such as
rhetorical devices) that are deployed in the production of
particular accounts.
Secondly, and more importantly, these approaches differ
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in terms of their theoretical framework. Whilst, the
methodology deployed in 'fine-grained' analyses is not
incompatible with post-structuralism, neither is it explicitly
post-structuralist. It is not, for example, committed to the
use of a Foucauldian conceptualization of 'discourse'. As the
debate between Parker (1990a, 1990b) and Potter et al. (1990)
illustrates, the use of the term 'interpretive repertoires'
rather than 'discourse' indicates subtle but important
distinctions between thew two approaches in terms of the way
in which 'discourse' is conceptualized and in terms of the way
in which post-structuralist theory does or does not inform
analysis.
In short, the term 'discourse analysis' covers a wide
range of approaches to research, some of which have little in
common with the approach adopted in this thesis. The approach
adopted here can be broadly located within those approaches
which (a) eschew any notion of an objectively knowable reality
existing anterior to discourse and (b) are concerned with an
analysis of the ways in which discourses and discursive
resources are constructive, rather than reflective, of their
objects. More specifically it can be characterized as a post-
structuralist form of discourse analysis, concerned primarily
with a 'global' rather than 'fine-grained' analysis of the
discourses and discursive resources deployed in the production
and regulation of 'anorexia', subjectivity and gender.
5.3 Discourse Analysis and Post-structuralism
As noted above, a post-structuralist approach to
discourse analysis has been adopted in both the empirical
studies of this thesis. It aims to follow the works of, for
example, Henriques et al. (1984), Walkerdine (1984, 1986,
1988), Holiway (1989, 1992), Fairciough (1989), Ussher
(l992a), Wetherell (1986; Wetherell and White, 1992), Gavey
(1989) and Bordo (1990, 1992). That is, the methodology
deployed in these studies is developed from the theoretical
framework set out in chapter 3 and draws explicitly on
Foucauldian theory, particularly on Foucault's theoretical
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discussions of discourse and knowledge (1972), power and
regulation (1977b, 1980), and, in the first study, genealogy
(1977a). This approach also draws on Lacanian theory of
subjectivity and gender (see also Holiway, 1992; Bracher,
1993) and on feminist appropriations of these theories (see
chapter 3) in its analysis of discursive constructions and
interpellations of the subject and in its focus on the ways in
which women's bodies, subjectivities, desires and experiences
are discursively constituted and regulated within a
patriarchal context.
This form of discourse analysis is, therefore, committed
to a Foucauldian concept of discourses as socio-historically
located social practices (Parker, l990a) that systematically
constitute and regulate their objects. That is, the meanings
of objects, events, subjectivities or experiences are
inseparable from the ways in which they are constituted in
discourse (Widdicombe, 1993). "Particular regimes of truth,
bodies of knowledge, make possible both what can be said and
what can be done" (Walkerdine, 1984: 154-5). Discourses
construct particular truths, particular realities and
subjectivities and thereby re-produce power relations (Parker,
1990a; Henriques et al., 1984; See also chapter 3). And
discourses constitute subjectivities, interpellating the
speaking (or listening) subject in particular ways (Hollway,
1992; Parker, l990a). This form of discourse analytic research
is concerned, therefore, not with revealing any objectively
knowable reality outside of discourse, but with analyzing
discourses themselves as they are manifest in texts and talk
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Parker, l990a; Burman and Parker,
1993) and in practices and institutions (Henriques et al.,
1984). This approach does not, therefore, reduce the concept
of discourse to that of language. Rather, it elucidates the
inseparability of discourses from their conditions of
emergence and from the institutions and practices of which
they are a part (see Walkerdine, 1984; Foucault, 1972; see
also chapter 3). It seeks to demonstrate how objects,
practices, subjectivities and desires are constituted in and
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regulated by discourses and discursive practices and how the
discursive production of truths can be understood in terms of
a 'micro-physics of power' (Foucault, 1977b: 139; Walkerdine,
1986; see also chapter 3).
In short, drawing in particular on Foucauldian theory,
the form of discourse analysis adopted in this thesis is
consistent with a feminist post-structuralist perspective
(Gavey, 1989: 466) and is compatible with the theoretical
framework discussed in chapter 3. It is a methodology which
enables a critical questioning of the concept of 'anorexia
nervosa'. It facilitates a mode of enquiry that more fully
locates 'anorexia' within its socio-cultural discursive
contexts. It enables an exploration of the discourses in which
anorexia, femininity, subjectivity and the body are
discursively constituted and regulated.
5.4 The Methodology of Study One
5.4.1 Introduction
In the preceding sections of this chapter I have
discussed the discourse analytic approaches to research,
outlining the different forms of discourse analysis that have
developed within psychology and specifying the particular
approach adopted in this thesis. In this final section of this
chapter I shall elaborate further on how this approach has
been applied in Study One.
There are now a number of accounts on 'how to do'
discourse analysis (e.g Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Parker,
1990a). These are, however, much less detailed than, for
example, texts on experimental procedures or statistical
analysis and, moreover, are presented as guidelines rather
than as procedures to be rigidly followed. Whilst the
methodology adopted in this study draws on these approaches it
also draws on the aspects of methodology implicit in many of
the post-structuralist and 'global' approaches to discourse
analysis discussed above. Thus, as noted above, the approach
adopted here is informed by post-structuralist theory. Study
One in particular, also draws on Foucault's (1977a) discussion
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of genealogy. It aims to provide an empirically-grounded
analysis of the emergence of 'anorexia nervosa' as an object
of medical discourse in the late nineteenth century; to
provide a genealogy of 'anorexia nervosa'. This study analyzes
the texts of late nineteenth century medical journal articles
because it is in these texts that 'anorexia nervosa' first
emerged as an object of medical discourse.
As the following two chapters illustrate, it is
particularly important to locate a feminized 'disorder' such
as 'anorexia nervosa' within its socio-historical contexts, to
examine it genealogy in order to better understand the gender-
specificities and socio-historical specificities of the
power/knowledges by which it has been and is constituted and
regulated. By exploring the historical discontinuities, as
well as the continuities, in the category of anorexia, this
genealogy also aims to counter the notion of anorexia as a
trans-historical, 'natural' disease entity (see also p.147).
In analyzing the medical texts in which anorexia was first
constituted I am not attempting to "restore an unbroken
continuity" between past and present, to assess the 'accuracy'
of nineteenth century descriptions, or to retrospectively
establish diagnoses (see Foucault, l977a: 146).
Genealogy ... rejects the metahistorical deployment
of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.
It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'.
(Foucault, 1977a: 140)
My aim here is not to reveal any presumed origin of 'anorexia'
but to demonstrate the discursive nature of anorexia; to
analyze those discourses and discursive practices that, first,
made possible and, second, constituted anorexia as a category
of medical discourse. In analyzing these documents I am
attempting to explicate the discourses in which anorexia
nervosa was first constituted and to explore the ways in which
the body, woman and pathology were articulated in the
nineteenth century.
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5.4.2 The Selection of Documents
There are, however, relatively few nineteenth century
medical journal articles on anorexia. The sample of texts
analyzed was, therefore, as comprehensive as was possible.
Bibliographies of already published histories of anorexia were
searched for references to primary sources. The library
catalogues of the British Library, The Weilcome Library,
Sussex University Library, University College Library, the
University of London Library, and the Sussex General Hospital
Post-graduate Medical Library were also searched for British
articles relating to anorexia between 1855 and 1910. In
addition the index of all volumes of the Lancet between 1855
and 1910 and of the available volumes of the British Medical
Journal from 1889 were searched for articles on or relating to
anorexia. Articles and books on or relating to anorexia
written in Latin were not included. In all, twenty-six medical
articles and letters (listed in appendix 5a) on anorexia or
central to the contemporary debate about anorexia were
included in the primary source sample.
A further twelve articles on hysteria, hysterical
vomiting and food refusal, neuroses of the stomach and gastric
ulcers (listed in appendix 5b) were also included to provide
an illustration of the wider discursive context within which
the papers on anorexia appeared. In contrast with the
selection of articles on 'anorexia', the selection of this
latter group of documents was not comprehensive and was also
less systematic. These texts were found whilst I was searching
through bibliographies of histories of anorexia and hysteria
and through the nineteenth centuries volumes of the Lancet and
the British Medical Journal for articles on anorexia. As the
discussion of Georgian and Victorian medicine (chapter 6)
illustrates numerous articles on hysteria and on nervous
disorders of the stomach were published during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. These documents constitute,
therefore, only a small proportion of the relevant literature.
Whilst the selection of this latter small group of documents
was less systematic than the selection of articles on
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anorexia, their contents did corresponds with the nineteenth
century medical literature described in many feminist and
other histories of medicine. Moreover, they do represent a
sample of texts which correspond with those articles on
anorexia. Eight of these texts appeared in the Lancet (Anon.,
1874; Anon., 1881b; Anon., 1885; Cavafy; 1874; Medley, 1893;
Robinson, 1893; Salter, 1868), the Transactions of the
Clinical Society (Sutherland, 1881) and the Journal of
Psychological Medicine and Mental Patholo gy (Marce, l860b) at
the same time as the articles on anorexia. The remaining three
represent texts that were particularly influencial in late
nineteenth and early twentieth century medical discourse on
'nervous women' (Allbutt, 1913; Charcott, 1889; Weir Mitchell,
1881). These texts thus provide a wider sample of those
medical discourses on 'nervous women', hysteria and nervous
disorders of the stomach which, during the time of their
publication, also converged to produce 'anorexia nervosa' as
an object of medical discourse.
In short, the documents selected from analysis in Study
One consisted of
(a) 26 papers on anorexia. This sample was as
comprehensive as was possible, based on a systematic search of
a variety of sources,
(b) 11 papers on hysteria, hysterical vomiting and food
refusal, neuroses of the stomach and gastric ulcers. This
sample was less systematically selected from a far greater
number of documents and served as an illustration of the wider
discursive context within which the articles on anorexia
appeared.
5.4.3 Analysis
As noted above, a discourse analytic approach, informed
in particular by Foucauldian theory (Foucault, 1972, 1977a;
1979), was used to analyze the documents so as to examine how
anorexia emerged and was constituted as an object of medical
discourse.
The selected articles were first photocopied and read
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repeatedly. During this process of repeated re-readings, notes
were made on the particular themes and discursive
constructions that recurred in the texts; on the variations
and contradictions between particular discursive formulations;
on the particular discursive resources deployed in published
debates; on aspects of the texts that confirmed or
disconfirmed already published literature in this field; and
on particular aspects that resonated with the theoretical
framework set out in chapter 3. Thus, for example, the way in
which these texts constituted femininity as a profoundly
pathological, hysterical category constituted a particular
focus for this study.
A further concern of this analysis was with the
chronology of the articles, with the precise order in which
they appeared and hence with the way in which they related to
each other and thereby inter-textually constituted their
object. This concern is reflected in the structuring of the
analysis (chapter 7) which first examines the initial
emergence of 'anorexia hysterica/nervosa' in the earliest
articles (published in 1873 and 1874) before presenting an
analysis of the later texts (1874-1900); of the ways in which
they consolidated and disputed the nature of this newly
emerged object of medical discourse, its discursive
relationships with contemporary medical debates and, in
particular, its relationships with contemporary discursive
constructions of 'woman'.
After this initial stage of analysis, the articles were
photocopied again and extracts were selected and sorted on the
basis of the first stage of analysis described above. This
process of analysis was not, however, linear. It did not move
neatly from the first to the second stage. The repeated re-
reading and analysis of particular sets of sorted extracts
often resulted in the explication of further aspects of the
texts and a re-ordering of the extracts. This cyclic process
of analysis also involved a returning to the secondary
literature in this field as new, unexpected aspects of the
texts emerged. For instance, one of the dominant but
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unexpected features of these documents was a focus on the
'hypochondriacal' characteristics of anorexia. Hence, it
became necessary to consult further histories of medicine in
an attempt to better understand and locate this nineteenth
century medical concern.
In short the process of analysis of the nineteenth
century medical journal articles was a cyclical process,
drawing on the discourse analytic methodologies described by
Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Parker (l990a) and on the
post-structuralist approach to discourse analysis discussed
above. That is, the analysis developed out of the theoretical
framework set out in chapter 3 and was informed, in
particular, by Foucault's theorization of discourse and
knowledge (1972), power and regulation (1977b, 1980), and
genealogy (1977a).
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a discussion of the discourse
analytic methodology adopted in this thesis. After discussing
the different approaches to discourse analysis, the chapter
set out the particular approach adopted in both Study One and
Study Two. It discusses the compatibility of this methodology
with the theoretical framework set out in chapter 3. Section
5.4 then discusses the way in which this approach was applied
in the first study of this thesis and sets out the
methodological procedure of selection and analysis of the
documents in Study One.
After having presented the methodology of Study One
(Section 5.4) I shall, in chapter 6, examine the discursive
medical and cultural milieu within which 'anorexia nervosa'
was to emerge in the late nineteenth century. Chapter 6 thus
presents a 'surface of emergence' of 'anorexia nervosa' before
chapter 7 analyzes the British nineteenth century medical
journal articles in which anorexia was first constituted as an
object of medical discourse.
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Study One
A Genealogy of 'Anorexia Nervosa':
A Discourse-oriented Analysis of its Emergence
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Chapter Six
Cultural and Medical Contexts
6.1 Introduction
In the preceding two chapters I have discussed the
theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this
thesis. In this chapter and the following chapter I shall
apply this approach to an empirically-grounded analysis of
the emergence of 'anorexia nervosa' as an object of medical
discourse in the late nineteenth century. Chapter six
therefore examines the discursive medical and cultural
milieu in which 'anorexia nervosa' was to emerge as a
medical entity. Chapter seven then analyzes the British
nineteenth century medical journal articles (listed in
appendix 5a; see also appendix 5b) in which 'anorexia' was
first constituted. Thus, after setting out its 'surface of
emergence' (Foucault, 1972), this study seeks to explicate
the particular discourses and discursive resources deployed
in constituting 'anorexia nervosa' and the 'anorexic'
woman.
It is, I have argued (see chapter 5), particularly
important to locate a feminized 'disorder' such as
'anorexia' within its socio-historical context, to examine
its genealogy so as to better understand the gender-
specific power/knowledges (see chapter 3) by which it is
constituted.
Indeed, the socio-historical affinity between
'insanity', sickness and the category of 'woman' has been
explored by numerous feminist authors (e.g. Ussher, 1991;
Nicolson, 1992; Sayers, 1982; Chesler, 1972; Showalter,
1985). This relationship is apparent both in the over-
representation of women of diagnoses and in cultural
representations of insanity and sickness as feminine.
Firstly, more women than men have been diagnosed and
treated for 'mental illness' both in the twentieth century
(see Ussher, 1991: 165; Chesler, 1972; Littlewood and
Lipsedge, 1987) and in the eighteenth and nineteenth
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centuries (Showalter, 1985; Ehrenreich and English, 1974)1.
Secondly, as the other of 'rational man', 'woman' has
often been 'fictioned' as sick (Ussher, 1991; Ehrenreich
and English, 1974), intellectually impaired (sayers, 1982),
as irrational and mad (Ussher, 1991). As Strong (1989: 10)
argues,
The feminine, by virtue of its negative status as
the contranuptual note to a masculine typology,
becomes plural, mobile, deceitful, unreasonable,
and finally mad.
That is, "women and madness share the same territory",
entering "a concentric relationship around a central point
occupied by a fundamentally male normality" (Martin, 1987:
42, quoted by Ussher, 1991: 63). As will be demonstrated
below, this equation of femininity with sickness and
insanity was certainly apparent in the nineteenth century
(see Ussher, 1991; Showalter, 1985; Ehrenreich and English,
1974). It was evident in the cult of 'female invalidism'
(Ehrenreich and English, 1974), in the concepts of
hysteria, neurasthenia, chlorosis (Showalter, 1985; Veith,
1970; Brumberg, 1982; Malson, 1992) and in the
pathologization of the female body (see Sayers, 1982).
Puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and menopause
were considered to be both causes of illness and
pathological in themselves (Strong, 1989; Ussher, 1991;
Ehrenreich and English, 1974; smith-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg, 1973/4). The female reproductive system was thus
alleged to render woman 'a natural invalid' (Livermore,
quoted by Ehrenreich and English, 1974: 25) and, moreover,
to determine feminine nature in general (Ehrenreich and
English, 1974). Whilst "man possesses sexual organs", a
1 Whilst the validity of this claim is generally accepted,
Porter (1987) asserts that prior to the mid-nineteenth century
more men than women were admitted to asylums. Busfield (1994:
259) similarly argues against Showalter, asserting that "whether
we look at the statistics on insanity or at cultural
representations, neither provide evidence of any marked affinity
between women and madness."
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Victorian doctor claimed, "her sexual organs possess woman"
(quoted by Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1987: 301). It was to
the ovaries that woman owed her "artfulness and
dissimulation" but also her "physical perfection ... all
that is great, noble and beautiful, all that is voluptuous,
tender and endearing" (Bliss, 1870, quoted by Ehrenreich
and English, 1974: 30). 'Feminine nature' was thus
considered to be determined by the female reproductive
system and was thereby inextricably linked with sickness
and mental instability. Hence, S.W. Mitchell (1888) claimed
that "the man who does not know sick women does not know
women" (quoted by Veith, 1970: 220).
Whilst medical and cultural discourses about gender
have changed significantly since the nineteenth century,
femininity is still associated with sickness and insanity.
Broverman et al.'s (1970) study of clinicians' concepts of
mental health for women and men, for example, found that
the clinicians' concepts of a healthy, mature man
do not differ significantly from their concept of
a healthy adult. However, the clinicians'
concepts of a mature, healthy woman do differ
significantly from their adult health concepts.
Clinicians are significantly less likely to
attribute traits which characterize healthy
adults to women than they are likely to attribute
these traits to a healthy man. (Broverman et al.,
1970: 5)
Similarly, a recent article on 'somatization disorder'
organized the symptom list of a screening test in such a
way that the following mnemonic could be used:
"somatization disorder besets ladies and vexes physicians"
(Othmer and DeSouza, 1985: 1148). As Showalter (1985: 4)
argues,
while the name of the symbolic female disorder
may change from one historical period to the
next, the gender asymmetry of the
representational tradition remains constant.
In	 short,	 feminist authors have repeatedly
demonstrated the patriarchal politics of medical discourses
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and discursive practices in a variety of historical
periods. This study aims, therefore, to provide a genealogy
of 'anorexia nervosa', to examine the cultural and medical
milieu which led to its emergence and to analyze those
discourses in which it was first constituted as a medical
entity.
In this chapter I shall, therefore, briefly discuss
pre-medical and early medical accounts of women's self-
starvation before providing an historical background of
those aspects of eighteenth and nineteenth century medicine
relevant to a genealogy of anorexia. As will be discussed
below, prior to the sixteenth century self-starvation was
primarily understood within a medieval religious framework
(Bruniberg, 1988; see Morgan, 1977). However, the
Renaissance and Classical Ages saw the ascendency of
science and medicine (Foucault, 1967). Theological
power/knowledge began to be supplemented and then usurped
by scientific knowledge and authority (Ehrenreich and
English, 19742). Hence, self-starvation was increasingly
seen as a medical rather than a religious phenomenon. By
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a
distinct cultural pre-occupation with sickness and
especially with nervous disorders. The concepts of
hypochondria and hysteria became 'institutionally fixed'
and culturally entrenched (Porter and Porter, 1988;
Rousseau, 1991; strong, 1989; Showalter, 1985).
Hypochondria provided an historical and etymological
relationship between nervous and gastric disorders whilst
hysteria epitomized the gendering of nerves and the
cultural construction of 'woman' as pathologically nervous.
And it was within this context that 'anorexia' first
emerged as a distinctly feminine nervous disorder. As will
be argued below it was not so much that 'anorexia nervosa'
was 'discovered' through scientific endeavour (c.f.
Vandereycken and Van Deth, 1989). Rather, its emergence was
2 See also Ussher (1991) for an analysis of this ideological
shift, focusing on understandings of witchcraft and hysteria.
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a discursive event made possible by the gaps j and the
relationships between discourses (see Foucault, l977a).
Anorexia emerged at the interface of medical and cultural
discourses on hypochondria, hysteria and femininity. It was
constituted as a feminine nervous disorder (Lasegue, 1873b)
at a time when 'the nervous woman' was a significant
cultural figure (Ehrenreich and English, 1974) and when
explanations of female nervous debility were shifting (see
Rousseau, 1991; Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4).
Anorexia thus figured as a forum in which to debate and
therefore	 constitute	 and	 re-constitute	 feminine
nervousness.
6.2 Pre-medical Cases of Female Self-starvation
There have been numerous documented cases of
religiously inspired female self-starvation in medieval
Europe (Bruinberg, 1988). The sainted Princess Margaret of
Hungary, for example, fasted until she died in 1271 with a
"poor and wasted body" at the age of 26 (Halmi, 1983: 2).
A thirteenth century Leicester nun's claim to have ingested
nothing but the eucharist for seven years was confirmed
when the Bishop of Lincoln sent 15 clerks to observe her
for 15 days (Strober, 1986). And in the fourteenth century
Liduine of Schiedain was said to have existed on nothing but
"a little piece of apple the size of a holy wafer"
(Strober, 1986: 231). And, in addition to the very well
known case of Caterina Benincasa da Sienna (Catherine of
Sienna) (1347-1380) whose life is documented in detail in
'Holy Anorexia' (Bell, 1985) there are numerous other
documented examples of religiously inspired female self-
starvation: for example, Margery Keinpe, Ida of Louvaine,
Mary of Oignies, Joan the Meatless, Margaret of Cortona
who also "saw the hands of an unchaste priest turn black
when he held the host" and who "when the priest bought an
unconsecrated wafer ... vomited it out" (Bynum, 1987: 229)
and Christina the Astonishing "who gave up food because she
had nothing else to give up for Christ" (Bynum, 1987: 193).
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Several historians of anorexia have asserted that many
such cases can be retrospectively diagnosed as anorexia.
Halmi (1983: 1), for example, argues that "although
anorexia nervosa is regarded as an illness of the twentieth
century, it did, in fact, exist as early as the 13th
century" and that Margaret of Hungary "had a typical
anorectic premorbid personality". Palazzoli (1974: 3-4)
similarly argues that
(i)t is quite possible that cases of anorexia
nervosa have been known since time immemorial; in
any case the history of medical psychology makes
it clear that the disease was not uncommon in the
Middle Ages.
Others (e.g. Habermas, 1989; Bell, 1985; Shorter, 1987;
Toistrup, 1990) are more cautious in their retrospective
diagnoses. Nevertheless, many historians of anorexia (e.g.
Habermas, 1989; Palazzoli, 1974; Tolstrup, 199O) assume
that it is legitimate to apply the current concept of
anorexia, more or less categorically, to a variety of
historical cases of (women's) self-starvation. They thereby
privilege modern medical and psychological knowledges of
anorexia as objective, trans-historical truths (Brumberg,
1988). They assume 'anorexia' to be a trans-historical
medical entity, existing independently of the discourses in
which it is currently constituted and the cultural milieu
in which it is now experienced. As Brumberg (1988: 42)
notes "some medical writers and historians ... would have
us believe that Karen Carpenter and Catherine of Siena
suffered from the same disease."
Yet such retrospective diagnosis is highly problematic
(Shorter, 1987; Brumberg, 1986; Dinicola, 1990). As Bynuni's
(1987; see also Brumberg, 1988) historical analysis of
self-starvation demonstrates, medieval European meanings of
food and fasting were very different from those that are
See also, for example, Waltos (1986) and Bruch (1974) who
describe early medical accounts of self-starvation as
unrecognized cases of anorexia nervosa.
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available today. Famines were still present in Europe and
ascetic world-denial, including fasting, was a common
religious practice. Gunther of Pains (c. 1200), for
example, claimed that
fasting is useful for expelling demons, excluding
evil thoughts, remitting sins, mortifying vices,
giving certain hope of future good and a
foretaste of celestial joys (quoted by Bynum,
1987: 2-3).
Food, particularly the Eucharist, was located within a
religious framework. God and Jesus were frequently
represented as both feeders and food. The eucharist
symbolized union with God through eating and many of the
female fasters ate nothing but the host (Bynum, 1987).
Within medieval Europe fasting was understood not as an
individual pathology but as an instrument of spirituality
(Brumberg, 1986, 198; Bynum, 1987).
There are inevitably similarities between Medieval
descriptions of fasting women and twentieth century
descriptions of anorexia nervosa in terms of the physical
effects of starvation (Bruinberg, 1988; Tolstrup, 1990).
Beyond this, however, the differences are so great as to
make an argument of equivalence between the two phenomena
almost meaningless (Tolstrup, 1990). The differences
between Medieval and contemporary culture indicate that
fasting resulted in very different social consequences and
had very different meanings from contemporary 'anorexia'.
The subject positions of religious female faster and
twentieth century 'anorexic' are very different. As
Brumberg (1986) argues, symptomatic continuities between
self-starvation in Medieval and twentieth century Europe
are not evidence of a continuity of personal experiences or
of social meanings (see also Dinicola, 1990). Nor do they
indicate some trans-historical 'natural' feminine
propensity to eating disorders.
(T)o call Catherine of Sienna an anorectic - that
is, to use a contemporary psychosomatic model to
explain her behaviour - is to distort her
psychological orientation, misread her actions as
she understood them, and misrepresent the context
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in which she lived. (Brumberg, 1986: 97)
Contemporary records construe Catherine of Sienna's fast as
an admirable and holy expression of piety. Her death was
not presented as a regrettable or tragic culmination of a
disease or disorder (Toistrup, 1990).
6.3 Self-starvation in Early Medical Discourse
With the Protestant Reformation, tradition Catholic
practices including harsh asceticism and the worship of
saints were disavowed. Female fasters thus came under
greater scrutiny and suspicion (Brumberg, 1988). However,
cases of female fasting continued to be recorded into the
nineteenth century (see Morgan, 1977). "Scores of young
women ... undertook fasts that were extolled in vernacular
folk literature as proof of divine providence" (Brumberg,
1986, p.96; also Morgan, 1977). Jane Stretton, for example,
was alleged to have fasted for 9 months, Katerine Cooper
for 9 years and Eva Fliegen for 14 years (Brurrtberg, 1986).
Other examples include Jane Balan (c. 1599) "the French
Fasting Girl of Confolens", Martha Taylor (c.1669) "the
Famed Young Derbyshire Damsel" and Ann Moore (c. 1807) "the
Fasting Woman of Tutbury" (Morgan (1977). These women were
alleged to have fasted for considerable periods of time
with little or no food. It was claimed that Martha Taylor,
for example, "existed without any appreciable amount of
food and drink for at least 13 months" (ibid., p.1653) and
that despite diligent observation there was no detection of
fraud. Sarah Jacobs (c. 1873), the famous "Welsh Fasting
Girl", however, deteriorated after 18 days of her 26 month
fast being monitored and died (Morgan, 1977).
These records of 'miraculous maids' and 'fasting
girls' represent an important transition in the history of
women's self-starvation. Whilst they were often recorded
within a religious framework they were also increasingly
being appropriated into the domain of the emerging medical
profession. Thus, during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries 'anorexia mirabilis' became a subject of heated
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debate amongst doctors and civil authorities as well as
clergy. Physicians and magistrates began to be considered
as suitable investigators of claims of miraculous fasting
(Brumberg, 1988). The term 'anorexia mirabilis', coined by
Francois Boisser de Sauvages de la Croix in 1772 (Brumberg,
1988: 194), itself indicates this transitional point from
theological to medical explanations of fasting.
The transition from religious to medical formulations
of self-starvation did not occur instantaneously (see
Brumberg, 1988; see also Foucault, 1967). Yet this juncture
nevertheless marks the beginning of a 'radical
discontinuity' in discursive constructions of self-
starvation. 'Scientific' theories began to displace
theological interpretations (Foucault, 1972; Ehrenreich and
English, 1974; Brumberg, 1988; Palazzoli, 1974). As
Foucault argues, with the ascendency of the medical
profession "(t)he flesh was brought down to the level of
the organism" (1979: 117). By the end of the eighteenth
century "a completely new technology (of sex)", a medical
technology, had emerged which "escaped ecclesiastical
institutions without being truly independent of the
thematics of sin" (Foucault, 1979: 116; Scull, 1983). 'The
workings of the devil' declined as an explanation of
illness although religion still figured in representations
of illness as a penalty for sin and excess or as 'a cross
to bear' (Porter and Porter, 1988: 168-9; see also
Stainbrook, 1965). And as medical interpretations of self-
starvation became detached from previous formulations,
constructions of fasting as miraculous or divine were
increasingly viewed as ideological (see Foucault, 1972).
Hence the scepticism with which doctors often wrote of
'fasting girls' (see Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4;
Morgan, 1977; Brumberg, 1988; Vandereycken and Van Deth,
1989; Vandereycken and Lowenkopt, 1990). Hammond (1879),
for example, in his medical analysis of 'fasting girls',
criticised the religiosity of many early descriptions as
unscientific, claiming that they were probably cases of
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deception, fraud or organic disease (Strober, 1986).
It is this juncture in which self-starvation became a
more medical than religious concern that is often taken as
'the beginning' of the history of anorexia (e.g. Bruch,
1974; Strober, 1986; Palazzoli, 1974; Waltos, 1986). A
number of late seventeenth century accounts of 'wasting'
through lack of appetite have been presented as early
medical descriptions of anorexia nervosa. Strober (1986:
232), for example, quotes a description by the physician
Fabricius in 1611 of a 13 year old girl said to have lived
without food or drink for three years (see also Brumberg,
1988; Dinicola, 1990).
She was of a sad and melancholy countenance; her
body was sufficiently fleshy except only her
belly which was compressed so as that it seemed
to cleave to her back-bone. ... As for excrements
she voided none; and did so abhor all kinds of
food. That when one, who came to see her
privately, put a little sugar in her mouth she
immediately swooned away. But what was most
wonderful was, that this maid walked up and down,
played with other girls, danced and did all other
things that were done by girls of her age;
neither had she any difficulty of breathing,
speaking or crying out. (quoted by Hammond,
1879: 10; also by Strober, 1986: 232)
Although many other contemporaneous cases of self-
starvation were still interpreted religiously (Morgan,
1977; Brumberg, 1988; 1986) this account is recognizably
medical. That Fabricius was a physician and that he
documents the girl's physical condition also guarantees its
medical status. This is clearly an example of early medical
discourse. Yet, contrary to Strober's assertion (1986: 232)
that "the clinical resemblance to true anorexia nervosa is
self-evident", it is not so clearly a description of
anorexia nervosa as it is presented in late twentieth
century medical and psychological literature. Although the
girl's belly is described as very 'compressed' her body,
whatever its weight, was construed as otherwise
"sufficiently fleshy". As with earlier religious accounts
of fasting, and in contrast with modern descriptions of
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anorexia, there is an emphasis on apparently continued
health despite self-starvation (see Bruinberg, 1986). This
"maid" walked, played and danced "and did all other things
that were done by girls of her age". Similarly, "swooning
away" when "a little sugar" is put in the mouth is not
characteristic of current descriptions of anorexia and
there is no mention in the text of the now central
characteristics of fear of fatness or body image distortion
(see APA, 1987; Hughes, 1991).
Other seventeenth century reports that have also been
presented as early medical descriptions of anorexia nervosa
include Hobbes' 'Medical Lectures and Clinical Aphorisms'
(1668), Reynolds' (1669) 'A Discourse on Prodigious
Abstinence' (see Bliss 1982) and Whytt's (1767) discussion
of 'nervous atrophy' (see Dowse, 1881). Most commonly,
however, it is Richard Morton's 'Phthisiologica: or a
treatise of consumption' (1689/1694) that is credited as
the earliest report of anorexia in the medical literature
(Bruch, 1974). Many historians of anorexia describe this as
the first detailed, comprehensive or exact and easily
recognizable description of anorexia nervosa (Tolstrup,
1990; Waltos, 1986; Strober, 1986; Halmi, 1983; Silverman,
1983; Palazzoli, 1974). In 'Phthisiolo gica' Morton
described the cases of several women and one man who were
'wasted' with "nervous atrophy or consumption" 4 . He wrote:
A Nervous Atrophy or Consumption is a wasting of
Body without any remarkable Fever, Cough, or
Shortness of Breath; but it is attended with a
want of Appetite, and a bad digestion, upon which
there follows a Languishing Weakness of Nature,
and a falling away of the Flesh every day more
and more. ... The Causes which dispose the
Patient to this Disease, I have for the most part
observed to be violent Passions of the Mind, the
intemperate drinking of Spirituous Liquors, and
an unwholesome Air, by which it is no wonder if
the Tone of the Nerves, and the Temper of the
Spirits are destroy'd. (quoted by Bliss and
Branch, 9-10)
. See appendix 6 for a lengthier quote.
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Mr. Dukes Daughter in St. Mary Axe, in the Year
1684 and the eighteenth Year of her Age, in the
month of July fell into a total suppression of
her Monthly Courses from a multitude of Cares and
Passions of her Mind, but without any Symptoms of
the Green-Sickness following upon it. From which
time her Appetite began to abate, and her
Digestion to be bad; her flesh also began to be
flaccid and loose, and her looks pale ... I do
not remember that I did ever in all my practice
see one, that was conversant with the Living so
much wasted with the greatest degree of a
Consumption (like a Skeleton only clad with skin)
yet there was no Fever, but on the contrary a
coldness of the whole Body; no cough, or
difficulty with breathing, not an appearance of
any other distemper of the lungs, or any other
entrails (Quoted in Bliss and Branch, 1960: 10-
11; and by Waltos, 1986: 1-2)
In his general description and his account of 'Mr. Duke's
Daughter' Morton categorizes this 'nervous atrophy' as a
form of 'consumption' or 'phthisis', that is, as a
'wasting' disease. It is characterized by a "want of
Appetite", food-aversion, amenorrhea, extreme emaciation
and by an absence of "Fever, Cough, or Shortness of Breath"
or other "distemper". However, it does not follow from
this, as some historians of anorexia have argued (e.g.
Bruch, 1974; Palazzoli, 1974; Strober, 1986) that Morton
had identified a disease in the modern medical sense or
that the 'distemper' he describes is 'anorexia nervosa'.
Georgian conceptualizations of disease were rather
different from modern medical and psychological theories.
As L.P. Hartley argued: "The past is a foreign country;
they do things differently there" (Hartley, 1953: 1, quoted
by Dinicola, 1990: 170)
Pre-modern medicine lacked a systematic nosological
system and theory of disease. Diagnosis depended on
patients' accounts of illness, thus creating an ongoing
dialogue between lay folklore and the 'scientific' theories
of the emerging medical profession (Porter and Porter,
1988). A multiplicity of explanatory models existed. Among
these, the theory of 'humours', a pre-occupation with
'nerves' and 'nervousness', the effects of the imagination
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on the body, the dangers of the environment, and an
holistic concern with 'constitution' predominated (Porter
and Porter, 1988; Rousseau, 1991). For example,
"traditional humoral theory saw temperament, physique and
health all determined by the same fluctuating equilibrium
of internal fluids, spirits, appetites and 'souls" (Porter
and Porter, 1988: 201). Diseases were not understood as
'generic fixed entities' but were frequently explained in
terms of temporary concentrations of humours. Hence one
disease could mutate into another (Porter and Porter,
1988). Any illness could be caused by humours, by the
imagination or by nervousness (Stainbrook 1965). Sickness
was often seen as the sign of a 'vitiated constitution'. It
was deep-seated and however trivial could involve the whole
body and the whole person (Porter and Porter, 1988).
Morton's medical discourse thus differs from modern
medical discourse. In the eighteenth century 'consumption'
or 'phthisis' denoted a state rather than a thing (Porter
and Porter, 1988). Hence, for Morton it was the state of
'wasting' that constituted the disease. His distinction
between 'nervous' and other consumptions is not equivalent,
therefore, to a modern differentiation of TB from 'anorexia
nervosa' (c.f. Bruch, 1974). Moreover, consumption
indicated a 'broken constitution' (Porter and Porter,
1988). Nerves or imagination could play a part in 'organic'
as well as 'nervous' consumption (Haygarth, 1800 in
Stainbrook, 1965; Rousseau, 1991).
Morton attributes the cause of 'nervous atrophy' to
"Violent Passions of the Mind" (as well as alcohol and
"unwholesome Air") which destroy "the Tone of the Nerves",
"the Temper" and "the Spirits". He thus produces a
typically Georgian holistic explanation of disease to which
the modern distinction between psychological and somatic
causation are not applicable. Even until the end of the
nineteenth century 'nervous disorders' referred as much to
physically diseased or inflamed nerve fibres as to
psychopathology (Rousseau, 1991). Dowse (1881: 9), for
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example, wrote of "inflamed, irritated, or softened"
"pneumogastric nerves" causing a lack of hunger. To
describe Morton's account as heralding contemporary
psychosomatic thought (e.g Strober, 1986) is, therefore,
anachronistic since the discourses within which Georgian
physicians construed the relationship between mind and body
differed significantly from those that prevail today (see
Stainbrook, 1965). For them "self and soma (were) at least
synergistically united, if not the same, Their mutual
interplay, through experience, result(ed) in their mutual
transformation" ( Porter and Porter, 1988: 201).
As Dinicola (1990; see also Brumberg, 1988) argues,
the texts of Fabricius (1611/1646), Morton (1689/94), de la
Croix (1772), Whytt (1764), Naudeau (1789) or Willan
(1790), so often presented as more or less definite
descriptions of anorexia nervosa (e.g. Shorter, 1987;
Halmi, 1983; Strober, 1986), are more appropriately
understood as early medical attempts to explain fasting.
Attempts at retrospective diagnosis inevitably deny the
differing cultural significances of self-starvation
(Dinicola, 1990; Brumberg, 1988; 1986) as well as the
considerable differences and discontinuities in medical
'knowledge' (Foucault, l977a). They also gloss over the
substantive differences in descriptions (see Habermas,
1989; Dinicola, 1990). As Russell (1985: 101) argues,
'anorexia nervosa' "has undergone major transformations
over the course of recent decades". Attributing differences
in presented symptomatology to faulty observation and lack
of medical expertise in pre-xnodern physicians (e.g.
Shorter, 1987; Waltos, 1986) is necessarily problematic.
Such explanations privilege current medical and
psychological knowledge as trans-historical truth. They
also presume rather than demonstrate that 'anorexia
nervosa' has always existed as a 'disease entity'
independently of medical knowledge or cultural context.
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6.4 The Surface of Emergence of Anorexia Nervosa
6.4.1 Hypochondria and Nervousness in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries
Explanations of 'wasting', fasting or lack of appetite
continued to appear in medical texts throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with various
explanations. Whytt (1767), for example, a famous 'nerve
doctor' (Rousseau, 1991), attributed food-aversion to
disturbances in the gastric nerves (Dowse, 1881; Palazzoli,
1974; Strober, 1986). Narce (1860a; l860b) wrote of a "very
common" "form of hypochondriacal delirium occurring
consecutive to dyspepsia and characterized by refusal of
food" . Patients were characterized as "young girls ... at
the period of puberty" suffering from "inappetency" and
painful digestion (1860b, quoted in Silverman, 1989: 833).
Mesmer and Naudeau also discussed food-aversion as a
nervous complaint (Strober, 1986). In fact, from the mid-
seventeenth and through the nineteenth century medics paid
great attention to the stomach and its disorders (Porter
and Porter, 1988). Numerous disorders were attributed to
the stomach which was often regarded as "the crucible of
the metabolism", the body being regarded as "a through-put
machine, requiring efficient digestion and speedy waste
disposal" (ibid, p.144; see e.g. Buchan, 1769). Hence,
Thomas Trotter, considered the stomach to be
endued by nature, with the most complex
properties of any of the body, and forming a
centre of sympathy between our corporal and
mental parts, of more exquisite qualifications
than even the brain itself. (Trotter, 1807: 203.
Quoted in Porter and Porter, 1988: 144)
Georgian society described itself as plagued by various
gastro-intestinal disorders such as colic, hysteric colic,
biliousness, 'gouty wind', gastralgia and vomiting (Porter
and Porter, 1988). And these 'horrors of digestion' were
not construed as local disorders but as disorders of the
whole constitution (Porter and Porter, 1988). Cases of
food-aversion or of wasting through "want of appetite" thus
occurred in a context in which disorders of the stomach
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evidently had particular, historically specific cultural
significance. In fact, 'hypochondria' - defined until the
turn of the eighteenth century as a somatic abdominal
disorder accompanied by multiple symptoms moving around the
body - was a deeply enculturated illness (Rousseau, 1991;
Porter and Porter, 1988).
During the Georgian era traditional humoral theory
began to be replaced by a Lockian empiricist theory of the
person "which restated the synthesis of body and
consciousness via the notions of sensations and the nervous
system" (Porter and Porter, 1988: 201; Stainbrook, 1965).
Increasing importance was accorded to 'sensibility' (Porter
and Porter, 1988) and a capacity for 'exquisite feeling',
including suffering, was often viewed as the hallmark of
superior people (Rousseau, 1991; Porter and Porter, 1988;
Scull, 1983). In addition Lockians accorded considerable
importance to the role of the imagination in health (e.g.
Locke, 1965). Mary Wolistonecraft, for example, wrote in
1798 that "a lowness of spirits, which I cannot conquer,
leaves me at the mercy of my imagination" (Wardle, 1979)
whilst the physician, John Moore wrote of epidemics of
'imaginary complaints' (Hunter and Macalpine, 1963).
Nervous delicacy, hypersensitivity and pain constituted a
particular socio-cultural identity (Porter and Porter,
1988; Rousseau, 1991).
This nervous delicacy, especially common in women but
also existing in men (Scull, 1983), was epitomized in the
figure of 'the hypochondriac' (Porter and Porter, 1988).
Hypochondria, or the grand 'English malady' (Cheyne, 1733;
see Scull, 1983), became increasingly defined by the
multiple secondary symptoms of the body rather than somatic
abdominal disorder. It became a protean 'malade imaginaire'
(Jackson, 1986; Fischer-Hontherger, 1972) and a fashionable
disease (Adaire, 1790; Hunter and Macalpine, 1963;
Rousseau, 1976; Rousseau, 1991). As Porter and Porter
(1988: 209) argue:
This 'coming-out' of the hypochondriacs as a
cultural type marks an important moment. It
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signals a stage in medicine itself, with lay
desires generating a medical consumerism integral
to the wider development of market society. But
it also had deeper cultural affinities. Polite
society encouraged individualism. People in the
fast lane were expected to be different, special,
interesting, prima-dona-ish, albeit within the
permitted degrees of conventional polish.
Sickliness provided social alibis while
suffering purchased the right to be different, to
be oneself. Pain commanded a certain social
bargaining power.
That is, hypochondria, and more generally 'nerves', formed
an integral part of Georgian society - economically,
politically, culturally and medically. As Rousseau (1991:
42) argues, it is not so much that scientific progress
produced a cultural concern with nerves but rather that "a
cultural myth engulfed medical theory itself, privileging
the nerves and exalting them as never before." Nervousness
produced an enormous economy in terms of 'quack' and
'medical' treatments, Spa town industries and doctors' fees
(Rousseau, 1991). Nerves, as the mark of superior people
(Porter and Porter, 1988; Scull, 1983), segregated social
ranks anew and constituted an integral part of the
development of bourgeois individualism (Rousseau, 1991).
The concept of nerves was so deeply enculturated in
Georgian society that it was 'metaphorized' to describe the
social body (e.g. Lowde, 1694) and social commentators like
Samuel Johnson sought to define a 'nervous style' of
literature (Rousseau, 1991). Henry Mackenzie's claim that
"this is an Age of Sensibility" (quoted in Rousseau, 1991:
40) and Jane Austen's depiction of 'Sense and Sensibility'
(1811) both illustrate the deeply enculturated nature of
'nerves'.
This is not to argue that there was a universal
sympathy for hypochondriacs. There is evidence of
stigmatizing and ridicule as well as romanticizing sympathy
and individualizing connotations ( Porter and Porter, 1988).
What is important, however, in terms of a genealogy of
'anorexia' is that 'nervous disorder', epitomized by
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'hypochondria', was a	 profoundly significant cultural
concept.
Inevitably theories of nerves did not remain static
through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Rousseau,
1991). However, as Rousseau (1991) demonstrates, medical
concern with hypochondria, already institutionally fixed
throughout Europe by the eighteenth century, continued to
grow throughout the nineteenth century. As late as 1893 Sir
William Gull is attributed with describing the stomach as
"a mad organ" (Robinson, 1893: 1381). In addition, reports
of 'hysterical vomiting' were common (e.g. Robinson, 1893;
anon., 188lb; Sutherland, 1881; Salter, 1868) and at least
some cases of gastric ulcer continued to be construed as
nervous. At a meeting of the London Medical Society in 1885
'nervous gastralgia', 'hysteric apepsia' and 'apepsia
nervosa' were all included in a discussion of gastric
ulcers (anon., 1885). At the same meeting Dr. Stretch Dowse
asserted that
the sensory side of the nervous system in some
cases of gastric ulcer was in an abortive state
it was an example of nervous dystrophy.
(anon., 1885: 1049).
Thus, 'nervousness' and particularly 'hypochondria' -
historically associated with gastric disorder and
increasingly viewed as 'nervous' - were highly significant
concepts of the surface of emergence (see Foucault, 1972)
or cultural and discursive context in which 'anorexia
nervosa' would emerge as a distinct disease entity.
6.4.2 Gendered Nerves and Hysteria in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries
A second facet of eighteenth and nineteenth century
medical culture that is relevant to a genealogy of anorexia
is the way in which nerves were gendered so that
nervousness was increasingly feminized (Rousseau, 1991). As
many feminist authors (e.g. Ussher, 1991; Nicolson, 1992;
Sayers, 1982; Chesler, 1972; Ehrenreich and English, 1974;
see also pp.127-129) have demonstrated, 'femininity' has
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been historically associated with both madness and physical
illness in terms of both prevalence and cultural
representation. 'Nerves' had been gendered throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Dover, 1732, cited in
Rousseau 1991; Hall, 1827; Tracy, 1860, cited in Smith-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4). And hysteria, unlike
other nervous diseases, epitomized feminine nervousness
(Showalter, 1985). Hypochondria and hysteria were often
considered as brother and sister disorders (Porter and
Porter, 1988; Rousseau, 1991). And like 'hypochondria',
'hysteria' - as well as 'vapours', 'spleen' and
'biliousness' - constituted an integral part of the
fashionable language of 'nervous disease' (Rousseau, 1976;
Scull, 1983)
Since Egyptian (Strong, 1989) and Greek (Shafter.
1989; Veith, 1970; Ussher, 1991) antiquity hysteria had
been defined as an authentic somatic disease of women in
which the 'wandering womb' rose up, affecting various parts
of the body and finally constricting the throat in 'globus
hystericus' (Porter and Porter, 1988; see also Veith, 1970;
Micale, 1990; Bernheimer and Kahane, 1985). Hysteria was
thus constituted as a fundamentally gendered disorder
(Showalter, 1985). By the eighteenth century, however, the
term was breaking from its etymological origins and
increasingly denoted "the volatile physical symptoms
associated with hypersensitivity" (Porter and Porter, 1988:
209). Morton Prince (1895), for example, concurring with
French Psychiatry, argued that "it is evident that we must
look for the origins of hysteria in the brain or mind
itself and not in irritations from distant parts" (quoted
by Stainbrook, 1965: 13).
One consequence of this development was that men as
well as women might be diagnosed hysterical (e.g. Cavafy,
1874; see also Porter and Porter, 1988). Nevertheless,
'hysteria' continued to be viewed as a 'quintessentially
female malady' (Showalter, 1985; tissher, 1991; Veith, 1970;
Sayers, 1982). This was partly because, as late nineteenth
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century medical debate demonstrates, the dissociation of
'hysteria' from 'uterine irritation' was not entirely
decisive. Many medics continued to attribute all manner of
illness in women to 'disease of the womb'. Dr. M.E. Dirix
(1869), for example, asserted that
women are treated for diseases of the stomach,
liver, kidney, heart, lung etc., yet in most
instances, these diseases will be found, on due
investigation, to be no disease at all, but
merely the symptoms of one disease, namely, a
disease of the womb. (quoted by Ehrenreich and
English, 1974: 29-30)
Thus, de Berdt Hovell, campaigning against the continued
use of the term 'hysteria', berated other medics for their
adherence "to the Addisonian heresy of uterine irritation
in connection with the hysteric hypothesis" (1888: 597) and
questioned the grounds on which "examining the patient with
the speculum" was still "gravely advocated in all cases of
hysteria" (1873: 873). The historical connection between
hysteria and the womb thus continued to have some influence
on medical conceptualizations of women. And even as this
influence diminished hysteria remained a 'female malady'
since women were assumed to have more delicate and
sensitive nerves than men and to therefore be more prone to
nervous disorder (e.g. Dover, 1732; Hall, 1827: Wilks,
1888). Women's 'nerves' were
smaller and of a more delicate structure. They
are endowed with greater sensibility, and, of
course, are liable to more frequent and stronger
impressions from external agents or mental
influences. (Tracy, 1860: xv; quoted in Smith-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4: 334)
Paradoxically this theory which disputed the
etymological, exclusive femininity of hysteria succeeded in
increasing the hysterization of 'woman'. Woman's entire
nervous system rather than one organ was pathologized. As
Foucault argues (1979: 104, emphasis added) the new medical
'technologies' that began to emerge in the eighteenth
century hysterized the female body so that it was
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thoroughly saturated with sexualit y ; whereby it
was integrated into the sphere of medical
practices, by reason of a pathology intrinsic to
it; whereby finally, it was placed in organic
communication with the social body.
In addition, during the nineteenth century mental and
'moral' factors began to be viewed as causes of hysteria
and nervous disorder (Rousseau, 1991; Stainbrook, 1965). It
had been theorized that hysteria resulted from bodily
conditions such as 'taught' or disordered nerves. This
concept of 'taught nerves' was then metaphorized to signify
a pathologized mentality. Hence, nineteenth century medics
increasingly explained hysteria as a consequence of mental
weakness, of suppressed feelings, especially of sexual
desire, as evidenced in psychoanalytic theory of hysteria
(e.g. Freud and Breuer, 1895; see Rousseau, 1991).
Whether because 'she' was dominated by her
reproductive organs, because 'her' nervous system was so
delicate, or because 'she' suppressed her feelings and was
mentally weak, 'woman' was construed as especially prone to
nervous disorders, particularly hysteria (Showalter, 1985;
Strong, 1989).
The nervous or hysterical woman was not the only
conceptualization of 'woman'. Indeed working-class and
immigrant women were frequently excluded from 'nervous
femininity'. Whereas upper- and middle-class women were
allegedly invalids, working class and immigrant women were
considered capable of enduring severe deprivation and
continual hard work without ill effects (Ehrenreich and
English, 1974; Veith, 1970). In addition, social reformers
such as Mary Wolistonecraft or J.S. Mill presented
alternative images of women (see Showalter, 1985). And
women physicians like Mary Livermore argued against "the
monstrous assumption that woman is a natural invalid"
(quoted by Ehrenreich and English, 1974: 25; Smith-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4) as others disputed the
reality of nervousness more generally (Porter and Porter,
1988)
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Nevertheless 'the hysteric' was a deeply enculturated
figure (Rousseau, 1991), particularly during the late
nineteenth century, 'the golden age of hysteria'
(Showalter, 1985: 129). The concept of hysteria was
thoroughly imbricated in the theoretical divergence of the
genders over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(Rousseau, 1991) and in the Victorian pre-occupation with
and regulation of sex and sexuality (Foucault, 1979). For
example, along with neurasthenia, chiorosis and other
female nervous disorders, hysteria was constituted as a
cultural bar to education and suffrage for women (Sayers,
1982; Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4). 	 "Grant
suffrage to women", one Massechusetts legislator claimed
and you will have to build insane asylums in
every county, and establish divorce courts in
every town. Women are too nervous and hysterical
to enter politics. (quoted in Ehrenreich and
English, 1974: 22)
Similarly, the establishment of the first colleges for
women precipitated numerous warnings of the injurious
effects education would have on the female reproductive
system (Sayers, 1982; Theriot, 1988; Ehrenreich and
English, 1974). Herbert Spencer (1896), for example,
declared that
the deficiency of reproductive power (of upper
class women) may be reasonably attributed to the
overtaxing of their brains - an overtaxing which
produces serious reactions on the physique
(and) ... is not shown only by the greater
frequency of absolute sterility; nor is it shown
only in the earlier cessation of childbearing;
but it is also shown in the very frequent
inability of such women to suckle their infants.
(quoted by sayers, 1982: 8)
Medical discourse on hysteria, in continual dialogue
with popular culture, thus played a very considerable part
in the regulation of gender (Foucault, 1979), in the 'cult
of female invalidism' and the fashionability of female
debility (Douglas-Wood, 1973), in determining women's
'proper' social role (see Sayers, 1982; Smith-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg, 1973/4) and, indeed, in constituting the
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category of 'woman' in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries (see Sayers, 1982; Foucault, 1979; Veith, 1970;
Theriot, 1988).
In short, the cultural and medical milieu in which
'anorexia nervosa' was to emerge in the late nineteenth
century was one that was pre-occupied with sickness and
especially with nervous disorders. Hypochondria and
hysteria were dominant concepts, 'institutionally fixed'
and culturally entrenched (Porter and Porter, 1988;
Rousseau, 1991; Showalter, 1985). In the prevailing
'nervous mythology' hypochondria provided an historical and
etymological relationship between nervous and gastric
disorders whilst hysteria epitomized the gendering of
nerves and the cultural construction of 'woman' as
pathologically nervous.
6.4.3 A Convergence of the Medical Discourses on Hysteria
and Hypochondria
As both 'hysteria' and 'hypochondria' became
progressively detached from their etymological roots the
two concepts appeared to converge. Both concepts
increasingly denoted general and protean nervous disorder
associated with hypersensitivity (see Rousseau, 1991;
Porter and Porter, 1988; Stainbrook, 1965). And nervous
disorder became increasingly feminized to the extent that
some physicians claimed they were entirely limited to women
(e.g Raulin, 1758; see Rousseau, 1991). In addition,
gastric disorders, including lack of appetite (e.g. Gull,
1874; Marce, 1860a/b; see Silverman, 1989), constituted
common symptoms of nervousness and nervous disorder (e.g.
anon., 1885) in both medical and cultural discourses. Jane
Austen's portrayal of Marianne in 'Sense and Sensibility'
(1811) illustrates both the cultural entrenchment of
feminine nervousness and the intimate relationship between
nervousness and the stomach.
She was awake the whole night, and she wept the
greatest part of it. She got up with a headache,
was unable to talk, and unwilling to take any
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nourishment; giving pain every moment to her
mother and sisters, and forbidding all attempts
at consolation from either. Her sensibility was
potent enough! (Austen, 1811: 69)
Elinor ... returned to Marianne, whom she reached
just in time to prevent her from falling on the
floor, faint and giddy from a long want of proper
rest and food; for it was many days since she had
had any appetite, and many nights since she had
really slept; and now ... the consequence of all
this was felt in an aching head, a weakened
stomach, and a general nervous faintness. (ibid.,
p.154)
The extent of convergence of hypochondria and hysteria
was also evident in the interchangeability of the two terms
(e.g Marce, 1860b) and in constructions of gastric symptoms
such as vomiting, gastralgia, haematemes, constipation and
diarrhoea, as hysterical (e.g. Salter, 1868; Lasegue,
1873b; Robinson, 1893; anon, 1881; Sutherland, 1881).
Louis-Victor Marce's account of "a form of hypochondriacal
delirium occurring consecutive to dyspepsia, and
characterized by refusal of food" (1860b; see Silverman
1989) similarly produced a discursive convergence of mental
weakness, 'nervous femininity', 'hysteria', 'hypochondria'
and gastric disorder. Marce (1860b) presented "inappetency"
as a common nervous symptom.
the majority of hysterical and nervous sufferers
make themselves remarkable for the slenderness of
their diet, by their liking for indigestible
food, and their antipathy for bread, meat, and
strengthening dishes. (quoted in Silverman, 1989:
834)
He described two "very common" varieties of hypochondriacal
dyspepsia - "inappetency" and painful digestion - which
occurred even though "The stomach digests perfectly what is
committed to it" (ibid., p.833) and "was perfectly
uninjured" (ibid., p.834).
Deeply impressed, whether by the absence of
appetite or by the uneasiness caused by
digestion, these patients arrive at a delirious
conviction that they cannot or ought not to eat.
In one word, the gastric nervous disorder becomes
cerebro-nervous. (ibid., p.833)
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This hypochondriacal disorder thus encompasses both nervous
dyspepsia and a more mental nervous disorder. The
sufferers, presented as "young girls ... at the period of
puberty" (ibid., p.833) are described as mentally weak
throughout the paper. 'They' are "predisposed to insanity
from hereditary antecedents and (are) rendered still more
impressionable by that profound nervous disturbance which
accompanies the establishment of the menstrual functions"
(ibid., p.833). 'They' are in "a state of partial delirium"
and their "intellectual energy" and "affective sentiments"
are debilitated (ibid., p.833). Without relinquishing the
classical connection between female reproductive functions
and hysteria/nervousness, Marce consolidates the femininity
of this nervous disorder by constructing an emotionally and
mentally weak woman as the sufferer. And, like other
physicians of the nineteenth century (see Ehrenreich and
English, 1974; Ussher, 1991), in constructing a mentally
weak female patient Marce simultaneously produces the
necessity of "moral ascendency" over 'her' (Silverman,
1989: 834).
Marce's account (l860b) is interesting because the
discursive construction of the 'hypochondriacal' disorder,
the patient and the treatment is remarkably similar to the
constructions of 'hysterical anorexia' and 'anorexia
nervosa' presented by Lasegue (1873b) and Gull (1874). But
it also important because it evidences a discursive
convergence of nervousness, hypochondria and hysteria in
which the nervous gastric disorders of 'inappetency' and
gastralgia became distinctly feminized.
6.5 Conclusion
By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries self-
starvation had become a medical rather than a religious
phenomenon. The medical discourse within which 'anorexia
nervosa' was to emerge differed significantly from
contemporary medical discourse. Georgian and Victorian
society evidenced a preoccupation with nerves and
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nervousness, epitomized in the concepts of hypochondria and
hysteria. Hypochondria, which had previously denoted
gastric disorder, was increasingly associated with
nervousness. The concept of hysteria also referred
increasingly to disorders of the nervous system rather than
to 'diseases of the womb'. Nevertheless, it remained a
"quintessentially female malady" (Showalter, 1985) and was,
in fact, thoroughly imbricated in the theoretical
divergence of the genders over the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (Rousseau, 1991), in the feminization
of nerves (Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4) and in
the discursive production of 'the nervous woman' (Foucault,
1979). In short, Georgian and Victorian medical discourse,
in continual dialogue with the wider culture, constituted
the body as nervous; the concept of 'hypochondria' provided
an historical association between nervousness and the
stomach whilst 'hysteria' epitomized the feminization of
nervousness. Nervousness, gastric disorder, hypochondria,
hysteria and pathologized femininity were the intimately
related and culturally entrenched concepts that were to
converge in the medical formulation of 'anorexia nervosa'.
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Chapter Seven
Discourse and the Emergence of 'Anorexia Nervosa'
in the Nineteenth Century.
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed those aspects of
eighteenth and nineteenth century medical discourse that may
be considered pertinent to a genealogy of 'anorexia nervosa'.
In this chapter I have analyzed the texts of the nineteenth
century medical journal articles in which 'anorexia' first
emerged as a distinct medical entity.
I chose to analyze these texts, to produce a genealogy of
'anorexia' firstly because, as noted above (p.13), I was
inspired by the feminist psychoanalytic work on the primarily
nineteenth century 'disorder' of hysteria. I wanted,
therefore, to examine how 'anorexia' emerged in 'the golden
age of hysteria' (Showalter, 1985: 129), to explore its
relationship to that category and to the category of 'woman'
as it was constituted in the nineteenth century. By locating
anorexia in its shifting socio-historical contexts, I also
wanted to counter the notion of anorexia as a trans-
historical, 'natural' disease entity (see also p.132). That
is, I wanted to explore the historical discontinuities, as
well as continuities, in the category of anorexia. Thirdly, I
wanted to demonstrate the discursive nature of anorexia; to
analyze those discourses and discursive practices that, first,
made possible, and, second, constituted anorexia as a category
of medical discourse.
Hence, this genealogy of anorexia nervosa shall "remain,
or try to remain, at the level of discourse itself" (Foucault,
1972: 48); to look at the documents themselves rather than
'see' beyond them (see Foucault, 1972: 7). As argued above
(see chapter 5), in analyzing the medical texts (listed in
appendix 5a; see also appendix 5b) in which anorexia was first
constituted I am not attempting to "restore an unbroken
continuity" between past and present, to assess the 'accuracy'
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of nineteenth century descriptions, or retrospectively
establish diagnoses (see Foucault, 1977a: 146).
Genealogy ... rejects the inetahistorical deployment
of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.
It opposes itself to the search for 'origins'.
(Foucault, 1977a:l40)
In analyzing these documents I am attempting to explicate the
discourses in which anorexia nervosa was first constituted, to
explore the ways in which the body, woman and pathology were
articulated in the nineteenth century. As noted above (see
chapter 5), a discourse analytic approach, informed in
particular by Foucauldian theory (Foucault, 1972, l977a;
1979), was used to analyze the texts so as to examine how
anorexia was first constituted and then consoloidated as an
object of medical discourse.
7.2 Interpreting Nineteenth Century Texts on Anorexia Nervosa
The term 'anorexia nervosa' was first used by the eminent
(Vandereycken and Van Deth, 1989) and fashionable (Talbott,
1970) physician Sir William Withey Gull in 1874. However, what
was agreed to be the same condition (Gull, 1874; anon., 1873b;
Dowse, 1881) originally had several aliases - 'hysterical
anorexia' (Lasegue, l873b; Gull, 1874), 'hysteric apepsia'
(Gull, 1868) and 'apepsia hysterica' (Gull, 1874). The medical
texts in which 'anorexia nervosa' was first constituted began
with an article, 'De l'anorexie hysterique', by the French
professor of medicine, Charles Lasegue (1873a). An eight-line
summary of this "able memoir" was then published as a 'Foreign
Gleaning' in the Lancet under the title 'Hysteric Anorexia'
(anon., July 12, 1873a). A month later Gull presented a paper
"on Anorexia Hysterica (Apepsia Hysterica)" at a meeting of
the "Clinical Society" in which he claimed that he and Lasegue
had "the same malady in mind" (Gull, 1874: 25) but that he had
been the first to describe it with the term 'hysteric apepsia'
in 1868. His paper was summarized in the Medical Times and
Gazette (anon., 1873b) and presented in full in the
Transactions of the Clinical Society (Gull, 1874) under the
title "Anorexia nervosa (Apepsia Hysterica, Anorexia
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Hysterica)". Reports of 'nervous' self-starvation continued to
appear with different diagnoses (Toistrup, 1990) such as
hysteria (e.g. Sutherland, 1881), chiorosis (e.g. Allbutt,
1905; see Brumberg, 1982; Tolstrup, 1990; Parry-Jones, 1985),
sitomania (Chipley, 1859; see Vandereycken and Lowenkopt,
1990) or neurasthenia (Weir Mitchell, 1877; see also Playfair,
1888; Charcot, 1889). However, the term 'anorexia nervosa'
became increasingly established through the late nineteenth
century. Dowse's report of "A Case of Anorexia Nervosa"
(1881), for example, gave no introduction to the disorder,
suggesting that readers were at least assumed to be familiar
with the term. Reports of meetings of the 'Clinical Society of
London' (anon., 188la) and the 'Medical Society of London'
(anon., 1885) also evidence this familiarity. A further
article, "Anorexia Nervosa" (Gull, 1888) began a flurry of
papers on the subject (e.g. Editorial, 1888; de Berdt lIovell,
l888a; 1888b; Mackenzie, 1888; Wilks, 1888; Edge, 1888). And
by the 1890s articles on 'anorexia nervosa' appeared fairly
regularly, although not commonly, in the medical press (e.g.
Collins, 1894; Marshall, 1895; anon, l895a; anon., l895b;
Taylor, 1904).
The almost synchronous publications of Gull (1874) and
Lasegue (1873a/b) and the coining of the term 'anorexia
nervosa' (Gull 1874) is frequently taken as a beginning of the
history of anorexia (e.g. Vandereycken and Lowenkpoft, 1990)
or as the moment in which it was 'recognized' as "a modern
clinical entity with distinct morbid and pathological
features" (Palazzoli, 1974: 3; Halini, 1983; Waltos, 1986;
Strober, 1986; Toistrup, 1990). It is often presented as a
'discovery', 'identification' or 'recognition' made possible
by scientific progress (e.g. Tolstrup, 1990; Vandereycken and
Lowenkopt, 1990; Waltos, 1986; Bliss, 1982). However, whilst
this moment is undoubtedly significant its interpretation as
a 'discovery' is highly problematic (see also Brumberg, 1986;
Dinicola, 1990; Foucault, 1972).
To view Gull's and Lasegue's publications as discoveries
of a modern eating disorder is to privilege today's medical
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and psychological discourse as trans-historical truth and to
assume that 'anorexia nervosa' is a 'natural' trans-historical
clinical entity which pre-existed its discursive constructions
in the medical literature. Yet as Foucault (1972: 45) argues:
the object does not await in limbo the order that
will free it and enable it to become embodies in a
visible and prolix objectivity; it does not pre-
exist itself, held back by some obstacle at the
first edge of light. It exists under the positive
conditions of a complex group of relations.
The object 'anorexia nervosa' did not exist independently of
medical discourse, 'waiting' to be revealed by scientific
progress. Gull's and Lasegue's papers did not simply describe
something - 'anorexia nervosa' - that was beyond or anterior
to them. Rather, discourses constitute the objects of which
they speak (Foucault, 1972; see also chapter 3). 'Anorexia
nervosa' was constituted through the medical discourses and
discursive practices that defined and treated it.
In these fields of initial differentiation, in the
distances, the discontinuities, and the thresholds
that appear within it, psychiatric discourse finds
a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is
talking about, of giving it the status of object -
and therefore making it manifest, nameable, and
describable. (Foucault, 1972: 41)
And, as the discussion of eighteenth and nineteenth
century medicine (chapter 6) indicates, discourses constitute
and sustain material discursive practices (Foucault, 1972,
1977a). Medical discourse was itself a practice which had
already legitimated the expanding medical profession,
supported and constituted its authority, its 'fields of
knowledge', its material practices and regulatory procedures
(Foucault, 1972; 1979). And in continual dialogue with popular
culture (Porter and Porter, 1988) it had already constituted
"an Age of Sensibility" (Mackenzie, quoted in Rousseau, 1991:
40) and 'a golden age of hysteria' (Showalter, 1985) in which
the medical truths about 'nerves' and nervous disorder were
institutionally established (Rousseau, 1991; Porter and
Porter, 1988) and in which 'woman' denoted a pathologically
nervous or hysterical category (see pp.142-145; see also
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pp.178-181 and 187-189).
Moreover, as Foucault (1977a: 147; see also Riley, 1988;
McNay, 1992) argues history or 'descent' "attaches itself to
the body (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.200)". Discourses and
discursive practices are 'inscribed' in the body.
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced
by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a
dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a
substantial unity) and a volume in perpetual
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of
descent, is thus situated within the articulation of
the body and history. Its task is to expose a body
totally imprinted by history and the process of
history's destruction of the body. (Foucault, l977a:
148)
That is, the body is not a stable, trans-historical, pre-
discursive entity that is only described in different ways.
Rather, discourses and discursive practices penetrate and
mould the body (Foucault, l977a; 1979; Riley, 1988). As the
discussion in chapter 6 indicates, Georgian and Victorian
medical discourses made the body 'nervous' and made 'nerves'
gendered. Thus, the late nineteenth century medical discourse
in which 'anorexia nervosa' emerged did not simply describe a
'reality' that existed independently beyond it. Rather, this
discourse, in dialogue with the wider culture, was 'inscribed'
on the (female) body that could be diagnosed as anorexic. The
body - whether masculine or feminine, hysterical, nervous,
hypochondriacal or anorexic - is historically mutable; it is
'always already' inside culture (Riley, 1988). The diagnosed
body cannot be easily distinguished from the discourses that
speak of it.
Thus, to talk of 'anorexia nervosa' as a discursive
object rather than as a 'thing' anterior to discourse is not
to relegate it to a non-material realm of words or ideas.
Rather it is to more fully locate 'anorexia nervosa' in its
cultural and corporeal context (c.f. Bruinberg, 1986). As
Dinicola (1990: 174) argues "(t)he more seriously we take a
contextual view of human experience, the more context is taken
as fundamental in constructing the illness, rather than as
mere 'cultural dressing'."
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7.3 The Discursive Construction of 'Hysterical Anorexia'
As noted above, what was considered to be "the same
malady" (Gull, 1874: 25) was first reported under the title
'De l'anorexie hysterique' (Lasegue, 1873a, April) in the
French journal 'Archives Generales de Medicine'. The Lancet's
summary of this paper (anon., l873a) gave it the title
'Hysteric Anorexia' again denoting that 'the malady' was
hysterical (see also Vandereycken and Lowenkopt, 1990).
The author describes various symptoms of the
disease, based upon observation of eight cases. Dr.
Lassegue (sic), in concluding, insists on the
important part played in certain forms of hysteria
by the mental disposition of the patient, and on the
intimate relation between hysteria and hypochondria.
(anon., 1873a: 49)
'Hysteric anorexia' was thus presented as a form of
hysteria in which "the mental disposition of the patient"
played an important part. That 'the disease' was hysterical
immediately signified that it was a 'feminine' disorder whilst
the reference to patients' "mental disposition" was typical of
the increasing concern with the role of mental or 'moral'
factors in nervous disorders (see Rousseau, 1991; Stainbrook,
1965). Significantly, 'hysteric anorexia' was also construed
as intimately related to hypochondria, thus suggesting a
convergence of two culturally entrenched concepts in this
disorder.
This convergence of hysteria and hypochondria, of
feminine nervousness and nervous gastric disorder, was again
apparent in the abridged translation of Lasegue's article
which appeared in the Medical Times and Gazette two months
later (Lasegue, 1873b). Here 'hysterical anorexia' was
presented as a form of "hysteria of the gastric centre" and
was located amongst the "numerous" "disturbances of the
digestive organs which supervene during the course of
hysteria" (ibid., p.265). Such disturbances included
"incoercible vomiting, ... gastric pains, haematemes,
constipations or diarrhoes , ... (and) the curious perversions
of appetite, examples of which superabound in almost
innumerable varieties" (ibid., p.265). 'Hysterical anorexia'
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was itself described as a "splanchnic neurosis" (ibid., p.266)
and as a peculiar "dyspepsia" (p.368) involving "sensations,
which in more than one particular resemble the impressions of
hypochondriacs" (ibid., p.367). The text thus suggests a
convergence of hypochondriacal and hysterical symptoms such
that the two disorders were presented as intimately related
and nervous gastric symptoms were construed here as symptoms
of hysteria.
'Hysterical anorexia' was construed as a distinct
"symptomatic complexus" of "gastric hysteria" because of the
"sufficient frequency" of its "constant" symptoms - hysterical
"gastric pains", a "repugnance" for food and a "suppression of
appetite" without "stomachal lesion" or impaired "intestinal
functions" (ibid., p.265-266). However, whilst the link with
hypochondria was explicit, the predominant emphasis throughout
the article was on the hysterical nature of 'hysterical
anorexia'. The paper opens by justifying itself, presenting it
as part of a wider project to understand hysteria.
In my opinion we shall never succeed in composing
the hysterical affections but by the separate study
of each symptomatic group. After this preliminary
analytic labour, we may collect the fragments, and
from them reproduce the whole disease. ... The
object of this memoir is to make known one of the
forms of hysteria of the gastric centre which is of
sufficient frequency for its description not to be,
as too readily happens, the artificial
generalization of a particular case. (ibid., p.265)
'Hysterical anorexia' was construed as worthy of
attention not so much because it was itself important as
because it was a "symptomatic group" of "sufficient frequency"
to warrant its description as part of an attempt to understand
hysteria as a whole. And throughout the article the
'hysterical' nature of the condition was repeatedly asserted.
The "point of departure" of 'hysterical anorexia' is
presented as "gastric pain" which "varies in intensity from a
confused sense of pressure to a kind of stomachal cramp,
accompanied by fainting, pallor, sweats, or even shivering
Food induces them, and they do not occur except after meals"
(ibid., p.266). This 'gastralgia' was attributed to "reflex
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causes", to "only the reflex impression of a perversion of the
central nervous system" associated with "certain cerebral
conditions" (ibid., p.266). The construction is typical of
medical discourse on hysteria. Noticeably it evidences the
break with traditional theory on hysteria, locating the cause
in nerve reflexes and the central nervous system rather than
the womb. And in common with other French medics (see
Stainbrook, 1965), Lasegue attributes an important
aetiological role to "cerebral conditions" or "mental
perversions" (ibid., p.266).
The hysterical nature of 'hysterical anorexia' is again
asserted in discussing the patient's reaction to her
hysterical gastralgia. Like other gastralgia-sufferers, "The
patient thinks to herself that the best remedy for this
indefinite and painful uneasiness will be to diminish her
food". However, unlike these others she does not "become
assured that such relative inanition is not only profitless
but aggravates his condition" (ibid., p.265).
With the hysterical things take another course.
Gradually she reduces her food, furnishing pretexts
sometimes in a headache, sometimes in temporary
distaste, and sometimes in the fear of a recurrence
of pain after eating. At the end of some weeks there
is no longer a supposed temporary repugnance, but a
refusal of food that may be indefinitely prolonged.
The disease is now declared and so surely will it
pursue its course that it becomes easy to
prognosticate the future. (ibid., p.265)
Thus, both the cause of the gastric pain and the
patient's reaction to this pain are construed as typically
hysterical. Other aspects of the illness are similarly
construed as hysterical. For example, Lasegue reports that
"The repugnance for food continues slowly progressive" but
that for "weeks or months" the patients health does not appear
to suffer and "There is no emaciation" despite the lack of
food (ibid., p.266). This is explained as typically
hysterical.
The power of resistance of the general health in the
hysterical is too well known for astonishment being
excited at seeing them support without injury a
systematic inanition to which robust women could not
be exposed with impunity. (ibid., p.266)
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What had once been construed as a miraculous ability to
exist without food was now explained as typical of 'the
hysteric's' resilient constitution. The formulation also
suggests that whilst 'the hysteric' was by definition ill she
was also more healthy than other women. 'Hysterical anorexia'
is thus implicitly constructed, as hypochondria also was
(Porter and Porter, 1988), as a 'malade iniaginaire'. However,
it is not only the patient's resistance but also her eventual
'inanition' that is presented as hysterical. "In the end the
tolerance of the economy, marvellous as it is, becomes
exhausted, and the disease enters upon its third stage."
(ibid., p.368). This 'stage' is characterized by a variety of
new symptoms including "emaciation", "inanition" or
"cachexia", "obstinate constipation", "anaemic cardio-vascular
souffle" and "neuralgias" (ibid., p.368). However, the first
mentioned of these symptoms is amenorrhea. "Menstruation,
which up to then has been insufficient and irregular, now
ceases" (ibid., p.368). Menstrual irregularities, a pre-
occupation of nineteenth century medics (Porter and Porter,
1988) and a standard symptom of hysteria (Ussher, 1991;
Showalter, 1985; see also Ehrenreich and English, 1974;
Sayers, 1982; Veith, 1970) again confirmed the 'hysterical
nature' of this "morbid condition".
Similarly, the patient's resistance to her family's
attempts - "entreaties and menaces" - to make her eat was also
presented as hysterical. The "excess" of her family's
"insistence begets an excess of resistance" on her part. Her
"obstinacy of the hysterical" is construed as the
manifestation of "a well known law conformable to the
experience of all" (ibid., p.266). And this 'hysterical'
relationship between patient and family is also extended to
represent a general mutual influence.
The anorexia gradually becomes the sole subject of
preoccupation and conversation. The patient thus
gets surrounded by a kind of atmosphere from which
there is no escape during the entire day. ... Now
there is another most positive law that hysteria is
subject to the influence of the surrounding medium,
and that the disease becomes developed and condensed
so much the more as the circle within which revolve
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the ideas and sentiments of the patient becomes more
narrowed. (ibid., p.367)
This passage articulates a particular concern with the
relationship between the emerging bourgeois family and
hysteria. Its medicalization of the family can be seen as part
of a wider strategy in which "an entire medico-sexual regime
took hold of the family milieu" (Foucault, 1979: 42; see also
Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg (1973/4) and sayers (1982) on
medical pre-occupations with women's reproductive capacities).
As bourgeois family-relationships intensified the family
became "an agency for control" and was also subject to medical
regulation (Foucault, 1979: 120; smith-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg, 1973/4). This strategy included the medicalization
and attempted eradication of childhood masturbation, the
psychiatrization of 'peripheral' (i.e. non-reproductive)
sexuality, the pathologization of birth-control, the medical
interventions in determining women's 'proper' role and the
hysterization of women's bodies (Foucault, 1979; Smith-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4; Sayers, 1982 Veith, 1970;
Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Weeks, 1989; Showalter, 1985).
Thus,
it was in the 'bourgeois' family that the sexuality
of children and adolescents was first problematized
and feminine sexuality medicalized; it was the first
to be alerted to the potential pathology of sex, the
urgent need to keep it under close watch and to
devise a rational technology of correction. It was
this family that first became the locus for the
psychiatrization of sex. ... It is worth remembering
that the first figure to be invested by the
deployment of sexuality, one of the first to be
'sexualized', was the 'idle' woman. She inhabited
the outer edges of the 'world', in which she always
had to appear as a value, and of the family, where
she was assigned a new destiny charged with conjugal
and parental obligations. Thus there emerged the
'nervous' woman, the woman afflicted with 'vapors';
in this figure, the hysterization of woman found its
anchorage point. (Foucault, 1979: 120-121)
By implicating the family in the patient's hysteria
Lasegue simultaneously asserts the hysterical nature of
'hysterical anorexia', the "moral element" of hysteria and the
necessity for medical intervention in the family.
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It must not cause surprise to find me always placing
in parallel the morbid condition of the hysterical
subject and the preoccupations of those who surround
her. These two circumstances are intimately
connected, and we should acquire an erroneous idea
of the disease by confining ourselves to an
examination of the patient. Whenever a moral element
intervenes in a disease, as here it does without any
doubt, the moral medium amidst which the patient
lives exercises an influence which it would be
equally regrettable to overlook or misunderstand.
(Lasegue, 1873b: 368)
'The bourgeois family' is thus constructed as potentially
pathological and its intimacies are thoroughly medicalized. It
is construed as a prime site for medical intervention, for
regulating both the individual and the social body (Foucault,
1979; Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4) and it is
profoundly imbricated in "the hysterization of woman". In
firmly locating "the hysterical subject" within the family
Lasegue thus asserts a medical authority over the family at
the same time as consolidating the 'moral' nature of hysteria
and the hysterical status of the patient.
In short, hysterical anorexia was discursively
constructed as a form of gastric hysteria, intimately related
to hypochondria. Its hysterical nature, however, was
paramount. 'Hysterical anorexia' was constituted as a distinct
'symptomatic group' by its symptoms of hysterical gastralgia,
a suppressed appetite, food-aversion and eventually emaciation
and inanition. Yet 'On Hysterical Anorexia' was not so much
the differentiation of a distinct disorder as a catalogue of
the ways in which this 'symptomatic complexus' was in every
respect hysterical.
7.4 Constructing the Subject of Hysterical Anorexia
Lasegue's paper articulates contemporary medical truths
about the nature of the body and hysteria. The body is
essentially 'nervous' and the stomach is particularly prone to
nervous disorders which themselves are caused by "cerebro-
spinal diseases" and "mental perversions". And as it
constructs a 'nervous' body and an hysterical disorder it also
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constructs a sexualized body and an hysterical female patient.
As noted above, nineteenth century medical discourse construed
nerves as gendered (Rousseau, 1991; Smith-Rosenberg and
Rosenberg, 1973/4). Hysteria epitomized this gendering (see
pp.142-145 and 160-164). It was feminized either through the
classical theory of 'uterine irritation' or more frequently in
the nineteenth century through the theory that women's nerves
were more delicate and therefore more prone to disorder than
men's (Dover, 1732; cited in Rousseau, 1991; Hall, 1827;
Tracy, 1860; cited in Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1973/4).
Throughout 'On Hysterical Anorexia' the patient is
consistently presented as female. Of the eight cases on which
the paper was based all were women (Lasegue, l873b: 368) and
in discursively constructing the patient gender is paramount.
However, Lasegue's paper goes beyond a technical feminization
of the patient. It evidences a dialogue between medical
discourse and the wider culture to produce a 'densely'
gendered patient (see Riley, 1988). The discursive
construction of 'woman' is at once medical and social. The
typical patient is presented as
A young girl, between fifteen and twenty years of
age, suffer(ing) from some emotion which she avows
or conceals. Generally it relates to some real or
imaginary marriage project, to a violence done to
some sympathy, or to some more or less conscient
desire. (Lasegue, l873b: 265)
This passage draws on a particular cultural 'knowledge' of
women to present "a young girl" as emotional and at least
potentially hysterical. Lasegue does not differentiate this
typical patient from other young women. Rather, 'her'
hysterical tendencies are 'explained' precisely by her gender.
The passage can thus be read as a dialogue between medical and
non-medical discourses, producing a particular, but
unremarkable, construction of 'woman-as-pathological'. And, as
numerous authors have demonstrated (e.g. Ehrenreich and
English, 1974; Showalter, 1985; Micale, 1990; Theriot, 1988;
Veith, 1970) this pathologized 'woman' constituted a dominant
cultural and medical figure.
Having thus pathologized this unremarkable 'woman'
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Lasegue elaborates to construe 'her' as child-like and
mentally weak. Although aged between fifteen and twenty
(ibid., p.265) or eighteen and thirty-two (ibid., p.368), the
patients are presented as 'young girls' who resist all
attempts to make them eat because
A single concession would transfer them from the
position of patient to that of capricious children;
and to this concession, in part from instinct and in
part from obstinacy, they will never consent.
(ibid., p.266)
The patient is thus construed as "in part" an obstinate
"capricious" child. But 'she' is also mentally and morally
weak and therefore not responsible for her actions.
The fault does not altogether lie in a pathological
vitiation of disposition. Under the influence of
sensations, which in more than one particular
resemble the impressions of hypochondriacs and the
delirious ideas of the insane, the hysterical
constantly find themselves unable to resist this
domination (of illness and surroundings) by a
voluntary effort. (ibid., p.367)
The 'hysterical' woman is thus presented as so mentally
weak as to be incapable of conscious, voluntary control of her
symptoms. Moreover, this mental weakness or 'perversion' is
central to her diagnosis. She develops "that mental
perversion, which by itself is almost characteristic, and
which justifies the name which I have proposed for want of a
better - hysterical anorexia" (ibid., p.266). And "...in fact
the whole disease is summed up in this intellectual
perversion" (ibid., p.368).
In short, Lasegue's 'typical patient' is thoroughly
gendered. 'She' is produced as a woman who is at once
unremarkable pathological, characterized as emotional,
childishly capricious and mentally perverse. Like other works
on hysteria (see p.160), 'On Hysterical Anorexia' discursively
produces a gendered disorder and a pathologized woman. And in
producing 'woman' as the other of adult (masculine)
rationality the paper simultaneously produces the necessity of
"moral treatment" (ibid., p.266) and of asserting a medical
"authority" (ibid., p.368) over the patient.
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7.5 The Nosology of 'Anorexia Nervosa' and the Politics of
'Discovery'
As noted above, Lasegue's article was shortly succeeded
by Gull's paper, 'Anorexia Hysterica (Apepsia Hysterica)',
read at the October meeting of the 'Clinical Society' in 1873
(anon., 1873b) and published as 'Anorexia Nervosa (Apepsia
Hysterica, Anorexia Hysterica)' in 1874 (Gull, 1874). As the
aliases of the titles indicate, there was a nosological
contention which was both medical and political. In contrast
with Lasegue, Gull did not construe his paper as an attempt
to understand hysteria through understanding one of its
'symptomatic groups'. Rather, he presented this condition as
"a peculiar form of disease" (Gull, 1874: 22) which he claimed
he was the first to describe. His rather spurious claim (see
Decourt, 1954; Brumberg, 1988; Vandereycken and Van Deth,
1989) rests on a passing reference to 'hysteric apepsia' made
in a wide-ranging 'Address in Medicine' in 18681.
In the diagnosis of abdominal disease, we want an
increase in the number of our more cardinal facts;
At present our diagnosis is mostly one of
inference, from our knowledge of the liability of
the several organs to particular lesions; thus we
avoid the error of supposing the presence of
mesenteric disease in young women emaciated to the
last degree through hysteric apepsia by our
knowledge of the latter affection, and by the
absence of tubercular disease elsewhere. (Gull,
1868: 175)
'Hysteric apepsia' was thus presented in Gull's 'Address'
to illustrate the inferential nature of diagnosis. It is only
in 1873 (see anon, 1873b) that the passage is reconstructed as
a	 'discovery'	 of	 'apepsia	 hysterica/anorexia
hysterica/anorexia nervosa' that preceded Lasegue's.
Significantly, however, the passage suggests a common
knowledge of "young women emaciated to the last degree through
hysteric apepsia". 'Hysteric apepsia' is presented as already
. See Vandereycken and Van Deth (1989) for a fuller
nalysis of Gull's claims to priority over Lasegue and of the
Dolitics of the issue.
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part of "our knowledge". Like Lasegue (l873b; see also Porter
and Porter, 1988), Gull (1868) construes hysterical gastric
disorder as a familiar occurrence.
Gull's reconstituting this passage (anon., 1873b; Gull,
1874) as a discovery is also significant as a professional-
political strategy. It indicates a prestige in the
'discovery'. In fact, Gull's 'Address' (1868) continues to be
credited as a description of 'anorexia nervosa' (e.g.
Toistrup, 1990; Waltos, 1986) and Gull is frequently given
priority over Lasegue, at least in the English literature (see
Vandereycken and Van Deth, 1989). As Bruch (1974: 213) notes,
the reference to his 'Address' "is almost obligatory to ensure
him priority". More immediately, medical publications
functioned as commercial advertisements for physicians
(Rousseau, 1991) and Gull's claim to discovery may therefore
have been economically as well as professionally advantageous.
More importantly, the prestige of 'discovery' suggests a
wider strategic importance in constituting 'anorexia nervosa'
as an object of medical discourse. As Foucault argues, "no one
is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in it, since
it always occurs in the interstices" of discourse (1977a:
150). It is not that either Gull or Lasegue discovered
'anorexia nervosa' through individual scientific endeavour
(c.f. Vandereycken and Van Deth, 1989). Rather, 'discovery',
or the emergence of an object, is a discursive event made
possible by the gaps j and the relationships between
discourses. Anorexia emerged at the interface of medical
discourses on hysteria and on nervous gastric disorders. It
was constituted as a feminine nervous disorder (Lasegue,
1873b) at a time when 'the nervous woman' was a significant
cultural figure (Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Showalter,
1985) and when explanations of female nervous debility were
shifting (see Rousseau, 1991; Smith-Rosenberg and Rosenberg,
1973/4). Anorexia could thus figure as a forum in which to
debate and therefore constitute and re-constitute feminine
nervousness.
Gull's initial term 'hysteric apepsia' denoted an
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inability to digest food caused by a peripheral (stomach)
disorder of hysterical origins (anon., 1873b; Gull, 1874; see
also Dinicola, 1990; Palazzoli, 1974). In 1873 "the word
anorexia had been preferred to that of a pepsia, as more fairly
expressing the facts, since what food is taken, except in the
extreme stages of the disease, is well digested" (anon.,
1873b: 534). Like Lasegue (1873b), Gull construed 'anorexia
hysterica' as a "want of appetite ... due to a morbid state"
(anon, 1873b: 534). And like Lasegue he also categorized it as
hysterical without implying uterine causation.
He (Gull) had not observed in the special cases in
question any gastric disorder to which the want of
appetite could be referred. He believed that the
origin was central not peripheral. ... We might call
the state hysterical without committing ourselves to
the strict etymological value of the word, or
maintaining that the subjects of anorexia hysterica
had any of the common symptoms of hysteria proper.
(anon, 1873b: 534)
Anorexia hysterica was thus differentiated from "hysteria
proper" since its cause was attributed to the central nervous
system rather than the uterus. As noted above this nineteenth
century shift in constructing hysteria meant that it was no
longer essentially, etymologically feminine and could
therefore occur in men as well as women. This is presented by
Gull (1874) as the reason for re-naming 'anorexia hysterica'
as 'anorexia nervosa'.
I prefer, however, the more general term 'nervosa',
since the disease occurs in males as well as
females, and is probably rather central than
peripheral. (Gull, 1874: 25-26)
The standard nineteenth century causal explanation of hysteria
provided by Lasegue (1873b) was thus maintained whilst the
name was changed. This change both consolidated Gull's claims
on the disorder but it also emphasised that 'anorexia nervosa'
was not exclusively, etymologically feminine. Nevertheless, it
remained markedly feminine.
The subjects of this affection are mostly of the
female sex, and chiefly between the ages of 16 and
23. (Gull, 1874: 22)
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7.6 consolidating 'The Nervous Woman'
Like Lasegue, Gull (1874) asserted an absence of organic
disease and the ineffectiveness of medical treatments except
"warmth and a steady supply of food and stimulants" (ibid.,
p.25).
Various remedies were prescribed ... but no
perceptible effect followed there administration.
It will be observed that all the conditions in
this case were negative, and may be explained by the
anorexia which led to starvation, and a depression
of all the vital functions; viz., amenorrhea, slow
pulse, slow breathing. (ibid., p.23)
The patients' physical condition was presented as "one of
simple starvation" (ibid., p.22) caused by a "nervous" (ibid.,
p.23) or "morbid mental state" (ibid., p.25). 'Anorexia
nervosa' was thus constructed as a nervous disorder. And
whilst it was no longer construed as hysterical, both the
disorder and the patient remained profoundly gendered. Like
Lasegue (1873b), Gull consistently presented his patients -
Misses A, B and C - as female. And whilst "the disease occurs
in males as well as females" (ibid., p.25-26) the construction
of nervous pathology centred upon a construction of femininity
that was cultural as well as medical.
That mental states may destroy appetite is
notorious, and it will be admitted that young women
at the ages named are specially obnoxious to mental
perversity. (ibid., p.25)
Thus, 'anorexia nervosa' was caused by "mental
perversity" which was simply a characteristic of young women.
The passage feminizes this nervous disorder by deploying a
discursive construction of 'woman' as "specially obnoxious to
mental perversity". As in 'On Hysterical Anorexia', patients
are not differentiated from other young women but are
pathologized precisely by their gender. 'They' are
pathologically nervous with 'peevish tempers' and feelings of
jealousy (ibid., p.23), "wilful patients ... persons of
unsound mind ... Mind weakened. Temper obstinate" (ibid.,
p.26).
Interestingly,	 Gull is often praised for his
understanding of "the essential psychogenic element" of
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anorexia" (Tolstrup, 1990: 2) and its "emotional etiology"
(Waltos, 1986: 3). Historians of anorexia (e.g. Strober 1986;
Morgan, 1977; Bruch, 1974) have even discussed the above
passage without commenting on the discursive construction of
'woman'. Strober (1986: 234), for example, commends it for
noting the "characteristic onset during adolescence,
preponderance on females, and significant psychological
component". Clearly there is some continuity of this
nineteenth century construction of pathologized femininity
into the late twentieth century.
In constructing a nervous female patient of weak mind and
pathological obstinacy, Gull, like Lasegue, simultaneously
produced the necessity of asserting a medical authority in
this distinctly gendered doctor-patient relationship. Hence,
"The inclination of the patient must in no way be consulted"
(ibid., p.24) and the "restless activity referred to is also
to be controlled" (ibid., p.25).
I have remarked above that these wilful patients are
often allowed to drift their own way into a state of
extreme exhaustion, when it might have been
prevented by placing them under different moral
conditions. The treatment required is obviously that
fitted for persons of unsound mind. The patients
should be fed at regular intervals, and surrounded
by persons who would have moral control over them;
relations and friends being generally the worst
attendants. (ibid., p.26)
Gull diverges here from Lasegue about when medical
intervention should commence. Whereas Lasegue (l873b: 368)
asserted that it was futile to intervene until "the hysterical
subject has been constituted really a sick person", Gull
insisted on immediate intervention. However, both converge on
the need for 'moral' treatment, for control over the mentally
and morally weak, feminine patient.
In short both texts converge in constructing 'anorexia
hysterica/nervosa' as a feminine nervous disorder
characterized by gastralgia (Lasegue, l873b; Gull, 1868; Quain
in anon, 1873b), a repugnance for food (Lasegue, 1873b; Quain
in anon., 1873b), a lack of appetite and consequently
emaciation and inanition (Lasegue, l873b; anon., 1873b; Gull,
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1874). And whether 'hysterical' or 'nervous' the subject of
'anorexia hysterica/nervosa' was constituted as an archetypal
nineteenth century 'nervous woman'.
7.7 The Ensuing Debate: 1874-1900.
7.7.1 consolidating Anorexia as an Object of Medical Discourse
The debate that followed the publication of Lasegue's and
Gull's seminal papers was significant in consolidating
'anorexia nervosa' as a legitimate object of medical
discourse. In the discussion of Gull's presentation at the
'Clinical Society' (reported in anon., l873b) Doctors Quain,
Greenhow, Carter, Thompson, Smith and Edis all confirmed the
reality of "the form of disease described by Sir William Gull"
(ibid., p, 535). Seven years later Dr. Dowse's report of a
case of "Anorexia Nervosa" (Dowse, 1881; anon, 1881a), and his
discussion of those cases reported by doctors Gull, Fenwick,
Winslow, Wilks and Johnson, further reified this newly emerged
diagnostic entity in the contemporary medical discourse 2 . A
further case of "Anorexia Nervosa" published by Gull in 1888
prompted a flurry of debate in the medical press which again
consolidated the legitimacy of 'anorexia nervosa' as an object
of medical discourse. Between March 17th (Gull, 1888) and May
19th (Garry, 1888), three case reports (Gull, 1888; Mackenzie,
1888; Edge, 1888), one note (Playfair, 1888), six letters (de
Berdt Hovell, 1888a; l888b; Wilks, 1888; Myrtle, 1888; Adams,
1888; Garry, 1888) and one editorial (1888) on 'anorexia
nervosa' appeared in the Lancet (see also Silverman, 1988;
Tolstrup, 1990). And by the 189 Os articles on 'anorexia
nervosa' appeared fairly regularly in the medical press (e.g.
Collins, 1894; Marshall, 1895; anon, l895a; anon, 1895b;
Taylor, 1904)
This public debate reified 'anorexia nervosa' as a
distinct disease entity by fixing it as a legitimate object of
2• See e.g. Potter and Edwards (1990) who discuss 'consensus
warranting' as a rhetorical resource for producing an account as
'factual'. That is, the 'factuality' of an account may be
increased by its being consensually agreed upon.
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medical discourse and by constituting it as a familiar or even
common disorder among women (e.g. anon, 1873b; Dowse, 1881;
Williams in anon., 1881a; Playfair, 1888; Myrtle, 1888). But
the debate was also significant in shaping and consolidating
the construction of its particular characteristics and causes,
and in elucidating the nuances and ideological connotations of
its construction.
7.7.2 Confirming Femininity and Symptomatology
One point of consensus in this sometimes vociferous
debate (see also Silverman, 1988) was the femininity of
'anorexia nervosa'. With the exceptions of Fenwick's "young
man of 19 years" (see Dowse, 1881: 9) and Drummond's
"neurotic young man of 25" (anon., 1896: 7; anon., ].895b: 987)
all the reported cases were female. Although younger cases
were reported (e.g. Collins, 1894; Marshall, 1895) the typical
patients were young women. And this gendering of 'anorexia
nervosa' was repeatedly stressed.
The patients are generally young girls from fourteen
and upwards, though we have known a striking case at
a much earlier age. (Editorial, 1888: 584; also
quoted in anon., l895a: 31)
the subjects of this affection are mostly of the
female sex, although it may occasionally by found in
males, and Dr. Fenwick states that it is much more
common among the wealthier classes. (Dowse, 1881:9)3
There was also a general consensus on the symptomatology
of 'anorexia nervosa'. Like Gull (1874; anon., 1873b) and
Lasegue (1873b) the participants in this debate characterized
anorexia nervosa by aversion to food, gastric pains, loss of
appetite and subsequently emaciation and other symptoms of
starvation.
She was quite willing to do all she could for her
benefit, but food she would not take. At last she
became so exhausted that she was more or less
. See Ehrenreich and English (1974) and Veith (1970) for
liscussions of femininity as a class-specific concept.
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unconscious ... She then more resembled a dried
mummy than a living being. (Quain, in anon., 1873b:
535)
The patient ... began early February, without
apparent cause, to evince a repugnance to food; and
soon afterwards declined to take any whatever,
except half a cup of tea or coffee. ... She was then
extremely emaciated. (Gull, 1888: 516-7)
The great feature of the case is anorexia leading to
extreme emaciation, with slow pulse, subnormal
temperature and very few respirations. (Editorial,
1888: 584)
I elicited that originally, on account of pain, she
had been taking insufficient food until she had
really starved herself into her present condition.
Her abdomen was retracted, and the bowels
constipated ... the catamenia had always been
irregular and scanty, and had been absent since
August. ... She stated that food, even in small
quantity, caused her a feeling of fullness and pain
in the stomach. (Mackenzie, 1888: 614)
Anorexia nervosa was consistently constituted as a
disorder characterized by loss of appetite due to "a
repugnance to food" and/or stomach pains associated with
eating. The subsequent lack of food then resulted in
emaciation, exhaustion, amenorrhea, constipation, and slow
pulse and respiration. These physical symptoms were construed
as effects of starvation and it was repeatedly asserted that
there was no organic disease to which the disorder could be
attributed.
On a most careful search through the body not a
particle of disease of any kind was found, the
intestine was healthy throughout. (Wilks, in Dowse,
1881: 9)
There is an entire absence of sign or symptom of
tubercular or other organic disease. (Editorial,
1888: 584)
The girl was carefully examined, but no thoracic or
abdominal disease could be detected. (Edge, 1888:
818)
Careful examination failed to reveal any signs of
disease in the chest, abdomen, and fundi.
(Mackenzie, 1888: 613)
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On examination she was found to be extremely
emaciated , but there were no signs of organic
disease. (Marshall, 1895)
Both the absence of organic disease and the frequently
reported 'restlessness' of the patients (e.g. lasegue, 1873;
Gull, 1874; 1888; Editorial, 1888; Edge, 1888; Playfair, 1888;
anon., 1895a; Marshall, 1985) were presented as indications of
the 'nervous' nature of the anorexia. However, the nature of
this 'nervousness' was a subject of contentious debate.
7.7.3 The Politics of Nerves: Debating the Causes,
Classification and Treatment
As noted above, both Lasegue (1873b) and Gull (anon.,
1873b; 1874) had asserted that 'anorexia hysterica/nervosa'
was, in part, caused by "a perversion of the central nervous
system" (Lasegue, 1873b: 266). Several authors developed this
construction to produce anorexia as "a distinct form of
disease, having its seat in nerves of the stomach" (Myrtle,
1888: 899) or "a functional neurosis" caused by "a profound
alteration of the nervous system" (Playfair, 1888: 817). Dowse
(1881: 9), for example, produced a rather technical
construction of 'anorexia' as a disease of the pneumogastric
nerve (see also Editorial, 1888).
I do not think sufficient attention has been paid to
the microscopical examination of the nervous system,
and particularly of the medula oblongata, and
although I consider the term 'anorexia nervosa' very
appropriate, yet I cannot help thinking that in many
of these cases there is some functional derangement
of the pneumogastric nerve, such in fact as may
warrant the use of the term 'pneumogastric neurose'
(sic), but I cannot lay stress upon this point from
any other than clinical observation, and a few rare
instances where the pneumogastric nerve upon post-
mortem examination has been found diseased.
'Anorexia nervosa' was thus construed to be the result of
diseased nerves. But, as noted above, it was also associated
with "certain cerebral conditions" (Lasegue, 1873b: 266) and
many texts emphasised psychological as well as physiological
causation (e.g. Gull, 1888; Dowse, 1881; Playfair, 1888; de
Berdt Hovell, 1873; 1888a; 1888b). Physiological and
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psychological explanations were not mutually exclusive and
often merged. Playfair (1888: 817-818), for example,
attributed "so-called anorexia nervosa" to "this age of
culture, over-strain , and pressure" and "moral causes" as
well as an altered nervous system. In addition, he wrote that
he had
seen many instances in young girls which have
followed severe study for some higher examinations
for women now such much in vogue. Other common
causes of an analogous kind are domestic
bereavement, money losses, disappointments in love,
strain of over-athletic work ... (Playfair: 1888:
818)
His explanation is typical of contemporary medical theorizing
on the consequences of allowing women an education (see
Sayers, 1982; see pp.163-4). But it also illustrates a
combination of a 'scientific' medical discourse on nerves with
more psychological and context-oriented discourses about the
effects of the social and domestic environment upon
'mentality'. Authors argued over whether 'anorexia' was
hysterical (see de Berdt Hovell, 1873; 1888a; 1888b),
neurasthenic (see Playfair, 1888; Myrtle, 1888) or nervous
(see e.g. Gull, 1874; Mackenzie, 1888). What varied, however,
were not so much the explanations of physical causations as
the constructions of the patient's mental and 'moral' state
and consequently of the treatments that she required or
deserved.
Many of the texts consolidated the initial construction
of 'anorexia nervosa' (Lasegue, 1873; anon., 1873b; Gull,
1874) as a "mental perversion", presenting the patient as
mentally weak, childish and obstinate.
Dr. Symes Thompson said it was difficult to draw the
line between such cases and real insanity. (anon.,
1873b: 535)
This story ... is an illustration of most of these
cases, perversions of the 'ego' being the cause and
determining the course of the malady. (Gull, 1888:
517; see also Editorial, 1888)
She would cry at the slightest opposition to her
wishes, and often without any apparent reason. Being
a delicate child, she had always been treated with
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more indulgence than the rest of the family. She
had, in fact, been allowed to do nearly as she
liked; and in her sullen fits at this time she would
never speak to her mother except in tones of the
greatest insolence. She grew from bad to worse; and
in February last she went thirteen days without
taking anything besides a little water - at least
not to anybody's knowledge. (Dowse, 1881: 96-97)
The child was reported to be very deceitful and
intensely selfish; she took no notice of other
children in the ward; was self-absorbed. very vain,
and "told long stories of other people who had been
ill just like her and what terrible things had
happened to them". (Collins, 1894: 202)
She was rather affected in her manner and at times
almost childish in her conversation. ... the patient
was the only girl out of six children, and the
spoilt child of the family. (anon., 1985 31)
She had a wild, hysterical appearance ... (Marshall,
1895: 149)
The subject of 'anorexia nervosa' was thus produced as
perverse, mentally weak, irrational, obstinate and childish,
even as deceitful, selfish, vain and spoilt. 'She' was, as
Marshall's comment (1895; see also Edge, 1888) indicates,
still 'hysterical'. And, as noted above, in construing the
patient as the other of rational masculinity, these texts
simultaneously constructed a justification for asserting
medical authority and force.
Dr. Williams asked, inasmuch as the mental rather
than the bodily condition seemed at fault, would not
forcible feeding do good? ... She refused food and
no amount of coaxing could get her to take it. They
used beef-tea enemata for a time, and in a short
time she began to improve and left quite well.
(anon., 1873b: 535)
she became stupid, and everything had to be
administered to her forcibly (Edge, 1888: 818).
The cure consists of three things - rest, warmth and
the regular and frequent introduction of food, in
utter disregard of the anorexia of the patient.
(Editorial, 1888: 584)
She was ordered milk and beef-tea, eggs, pudding,
and brandy mixture at regular intervals, with
instructions that if the food was not taken each
time it was to be administered by the stomach-pump
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or enema. (Mackenzie, 1888: 614)
Many of the late nineteenth century texts advocated
force-feeding and/or enemas as a cure for anorexia (see also
Dowse, 1881; Garry, 1888). But medical authority also extended
to 'moral control'. Gull and Lasegue had already asserted the
necessity of 'moral treatment' of anorexia, "fitted for
persons of unsound mind" (Gull, 1874: 26), of intervening in
"the moral medium amidst which the patient lives" (Lasegue,
1873b: 368) and "placing them under different moral
conditions" (Gull, 1874: 26). Many physicians similarly
advocated asserting moral authority. Patients were often
removed from their families (Carry, 1888) and hospitalized
(e.g. Mackenzie, 1888; Edge, 1888; Collins 1894; Marshall
1895) or 'isolated' (Playfair, 1888) to this end.
they must be removed entirely from their usual
domestic surroundings, involving, as these almost
always do, much that is unwholesome for the patient,
and tending directly to foster that which Sir
William calls "the perversion of the
Absolute rest, massage, and the abundant over-
feeding ... are no doubt valuable adjuncts in the
case, but without isolation they will almost
certainly fail. (Playfair, 1888: 818)
As the girl was under no control whatever at home I
advised her parents to allow her to come into the
Cottage Hospital on the distinct understanding and
promise that whatever treatment was thought
necessary should be carried out. (anon., l895a: 31)
It is ever to be borne in mind that the disease is
moral as well as physical; and so must also be the
treatment (de Berdt Hovell, 1873: 873)
The treatment advocated for 'anorexics' (e.g. Playfair,
1988) was very similar to the 'moral treatment of 'bed rest'
frequently prescribed for many female nervous disorders such
as neurasthenia and hysteria (Mitchell; 1877; Charcot, 1889;
see also Ussher, 1991; Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Theriot,
1988) and dramatically described by Charlotte Perkins Gilman
(1892) in 'The Yellow Wallpaper'. The more explicitly hostile
and punitive aspects of the prescribed treatments can also be
viewed within the context of 'cures' such as bleeding the
genitals and breasts, clitoridectomies and ovariotomies
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commonly advocated for other female nervous disorders, for
hysteria in particular (see Ehrenreich and English, 1974;
Showalter, 1985; Ussher, 1989; Weeks, 1989).
Nineteenth century medical discourse thus constructed the
'subject of anorexia nervosa' as a mentally weak and
childishly obstinate women requiring forced feeding and/or
moral control. Descriptions of the patient as wilful,
obstinate or deceitful also indicate a moralistic theme in
which the patient was construed as a "hardened neurotic
sinner" (Playfair, 1888: 818) and in which treatment therefore
involved punishment (see e.g. Edge, 1888; see also Morgan,
1977). This punitive aspect is particularly explicit in
arguments against isolation. Myrtle (1888: 899), for example,
agreed
with Dr. Playfair that for the "hardened neurotic
sinner" removal from the usual and, above all,
unwholesome domestic surroundings is essential; but
the subject of nervous dyspepsia is more sinned
against than sinning and can be cured without
imprisonment.
His text makes explicit the punitive aspects of isolation. And
at the same time it also reconstructs the patient as a victim
rather than a perpetrator of sin, Similarly, De Berdt Hovell,
in his campaign against "the pernicious doctrines" on hysteria
(1873: 873; see also Silverman, 1988), also emphasised the
moralistic and punitive theme that prevailed in medical
discourse on hysterical or nervous disorders including
'anorexia nervosa'. He described the practice of removing
patients from their families to "so-called hysterical home(s)"
as ineffective and humiliating (l888b: 949), arguing that "the
doctor has become vindictive, and desired to punish the
patient ... our province is to heal and not to judge" (1873:
873; see also Morgan, 1977).
As de Berdt Hovell's polemics illustrate, the majority of
texts construed anorexia nervosa, like other nervous or
hysterical disorders (see Strong, 1989; Showalter, 1985; see
also pp.160-163), as simultaneously real and fictitious. There
were neurological explanations of anorexia nervosa but the
patient was also construed as wilful, obstinate and mentally
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perverse, implying that 'she' had purposely made herself ill.
Anorexia nervosa, like hysteria and hypochondria, was
implicitly construed as a 'inalade imaginaire' (see Porter and
Porter, 1988; c.f. Lasegue, 1873; anon., 1873a).
One main difference between the hypothesis of
hysteria and that of neurosis is that the first is
apt to regard complaints as unreal and fictitious,
the result of wilfulness and obstinacy and the
aforesaid moral obliquity in various forms; while
the second deals with facts instead of imputing
motives. The hysterical doctrine is positively
mischievous; ... it cannot possibly treat with
judgement a disease which it considers to be unreal.
(de Berdt Hovell, 1873: 873)
De Berdt Hovell's presented his articles as attacks on
the "really absurd and objectionable nomenclature" of
'hysterical anorexia' (1873: 874) and the "illogical" theory
of "Uterine Irritation" (1873: 873; see also Silverman, 1988).
However, his construction of anorexia nervosa as the result of
a perturbed nervous system (1888b: 949) coincided
substantively with those of his opponents. The majority of
texts combined both the 'hypothesis of neurosis' and the
'hysterical doctrine' to produce anorexia nervosa as
simultaneously a real neurological disorder a fictitious
result of young women's obstinate irrationality. They thus
produced a 'nervous woman' who was both scientifically
pathologized and viewed as morally culpable for her own
pathology.
In countering 'the hysterical hypothesis', de Berdt
Hovell repeatedly asserted that it was the doctors' rather
than the patients' egos that were perverted.
it is not an unfair inference that "the perversion
of which Sir W. Gull attributed to the
patient, may perhaps with greater force be applied
to the profession" (de Berdt Hovell, 1888a: 597)
The subjects of anorexia nervosa, he argued, were neither
'mentally perverse' nor intellectually impaired (see also de
Berdt Hovell, 1888a; l888b; Mackenzie, 1888).
It appears to occur in patients whose physical or
moral power, or both, are depressed, although the
intellect is not necessarily disordered. (de Berdt
Hovell, 1873: 873)
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'They' were not merely wilful or "craving for sympathy" (1873;
1888b) but were physically and emotionally or 'morally'
weakened. "The complaints of such patients" he asserted were
"often better founded than they appear to be ... 'They speak
truth who breathe their words in pain" (de Berdt Hovell,
1873: 874). De Berdt Hovell thus presented an alternative
construction of 'anorexia nervosa' and its subjects which
highlighted the tensions of most other texts. If the 'disease'
was real - the result of "nerve shock ... attended by loss of
moral as well as physical power" (de Berdt Hovell, l889b: 949)
- then it could not logically be dismissed as the product of
obstinate, irrational femininity.
De Berdt Hovell certainly produced a more sympathetic,
less moralistic construction of 'the nervous woman',
advocating encouragement and kindness: "treat the patient
firmly if you will, but kindly and reasonably; meet
disappointment with cheerfulness, irresolution with
encouragement ..." (1873: 873). Nevertheless, 'woman' remained
the pathologized other of rational masculinity. 'She' did not
deserve blame and punishment but her "loss of moral power"
resulted in a "loss of moral control or ... temper" (1873:
874) and "implies disability and more or less incapacity of
action" (1888b: 949). "craving for sympathy" was re-
constructed as a "want of help" for these 'powerless' and
'helpless' creatures (see de Berdt Hovell, 1873: 873). The
subject of anorexia nervosa thus remained distinctly
'feminine' and a pathologized 'femininity' was precisely the
explanation of the disorder.
Those most liable to it are obviously the feeble and
sensitive, in contradistinction to the strong and
unfeeling. (ibid., 873)
Whilst de Berdt Hovell's construction of 'the patient' is
'kinder' than, for example, Gull's (1874; 1888) or Playfair's
(1888), his texts nevertheless produce a similarly
pathologized 'woman' in need of (masculine) medical
assistance.
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7.8 Conclusion to Study One
This study has examined the medical texts in which
anorexia first emerged and was then consolidated as an object
of medical discourse. I have aimed to explicate the medical
and cultural discourses deployed in these texts and to thereby
demonstrate that 'anorexia' was not so much discovered through
scientific endeavour as discursively constituted in the gaps
in and the relationships between pre-existing medical and
cultural discourses (see Foucault, 1977a). Anorexia nervosa
was constituted at a point of convergence between medical
discourses on hysteria, hypochondria and nervous disorders. It
was produced as a nervous disorder characterized by loss of
appetite due to gastric pain or aversion to food, resulting in
emaciation and other symptoms of starvation.
Its discursive construction was also inextricable from
the culturally significant figure of 'the nervous woman'
(Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Showalter, 1985). And as a
feminine nervous disorder (Lasegue, 1873b) 'anorexia' re-
produced this 'nervous woman' as the 'natural' object of
medical discourse and practice. The typical patient was
consistently represented as female (although male and child
cases were occasionally reported). This gendering of
'anorexia' involved both the feminization of the patient and
the pathologization of 'woman' in general. 'Femininity'
figured as a causal explanation. And, in combining
neurological explanations with this pathologized femininity,
many texts produced 'anorexia nervosa' as simultaneously a
real and fictitious illness. The subject of anorexia nervosa
had a disordered nervous system but, being feminine, 'she' was
also irrationally, pathologically, obstinate and mentally
perverse and therefore culpable for her own illness.
Throughout the debate 'femininity' and 'pathology' were merged
to produce a profoundly gender subject whose intrinsic nature
requires the existence of (masculine) medical authority.
As noted above, many histories of anorexia present it as
a trans-historical and objectively knowable disease entity
(e.gHalmi, 1983; Selvini-Palazzoli, 1974; Habermas, 1989). In
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contrast, this study has attempted to demonstrate the
discursive nature of and the socio-historical and gender
specificities of 'anorexia'.
7.9 From Nineteenth Century Medical Texts to Twentieth Century
Women's Talk
Study One presented an analysis of the nineteenth century
medical journal articles in which anorexia nervosa first
emerged as an object of medical discourse. One logical
progression for further empirical research in this thesis
would be an analysis of the later medical and psychology texts
on anorexia nervosa, following the genealogy of anorexia up to
the present day.
This would have involved an exploration of the way in
which twentieth century texts have intermittently constituted
'anorexia nervosa' as a psychosomatic, psychological or
organic disorder (see Brumberg, 1986). It would have involved
an analysis of the ways in which these discursive
constructions were related to developments in medical research
and in theories of human development and to the fluctuating
prevalence of diagnoses of anorexia (see Brumberg, 1986).
Briefly, this research could have focused firstly on the
traditional psychoanalytic work of the early twentieth century
in which the relationship between eating and sexuality was
emphasised (see Brumberg, 1986; Bruch, 1974). In general,
psychoanalytic texts constituted anorexia nervosa as a
neurotic defense against sexual trauma, as a manifestation of
'poor heterosexual adjustment' (Bruxnberg, 1986: 102).
Secondly, the study could have examined how, during the l920s
and '30s, explanations of anorexia as an endocrinal
dysfunction came to predominate (Bruch, 1974). Following the
German endocrinologist, Simmonds, self-starvation was
increasingly diagnosed as Slinmonds' disease (Simmonds, 1914;
see Brumberg, 1986; Tolstrup, 1990). That is, self-starvation,
emaciation and other symptoms of 'anorexia nervosa' such as
hair-loss, low blood pressure and amenorrhea, were attributed
to atrophy of the anterior lobe of the pituitary gland
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(Brumberg, 1986). As the discussion of bio-medical research in
chapter 2 illustrates, anorexia continues to be associated
with endocrinal dysfunction of the HPA-axis and such
continuities could have been explored. This research project
could then have explored how psychological and psychosomatic
explanations of anorexia nervosa re-emerged during the 1940s
(Tolstrup, 1990) so that during the late twentieth century a
plethora of different medical and psychological explanatory
models co-exist (see chapter 2).
By focusing in this way on a genealogy of anorexia
nervosa, my empirical research could have also taken a broader
perspective. It could have, for example, incorporated an
analysis of treatment regimes; examining, in relation to the
theoretical explanations, the developments in these discursive
practices from the nineteenth century treatments discussed
above to the treatments with pituitary extracts associated
with Simmonds' disease (see Brumberg, 1986) to the medical,
behavioural, cognitive, psychological and psychodynamic
treatments deployed today (see Tolstrup, 1990; see e.g. Martin
(1985) for a review of different theoretical and treatment
approaches). Such a project could also have widened its scope
to include a more thorough exploration of how the evolution of
the bourgeois family has been imbricated in the genealogy of
'anorexia' (see Brumberg, 1986). It could have also analyzed
the wider socio-political contexts more thoroughly. It could,
for example, have explored a genealogy of anorexia in relation
to the feminist movements of the late nineteenth century and
late twentieth century as well as continuing the analysis of
'anorexia nervosa' in relation to contemporary discursive
constructions of femininity.
This would have clearly constituted a worthwhile research
programme. However, there are also several reasons for
choosing instead to analyze the talk of women who have been
diagnosed as anorexic in the late twentieth century (see Study
Two).
Firstly, an analysis of contemporary medical and
psychology texts on anorexia would have involved considerable
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overlap with the literature review presented in chapter 2.
This review presents a number of detailed criticisms of
current research and theory in this field. A discourse-
oriented analysis of this literature would provide further
useful insights into contemporary medical and psychological
discursive constructions of anorexia. However, because the
critiques presented in chapter 2 are detailed and based on a
close reading of a considerable number of texts, it was felt
that further research for this thesis might be more fruitfully
focused elsewhere. Secondly, there are already feminist
critiques of contemporary treatments (e.g. Hepworth, 1991;
Jarman and Walsh, 1995) of eating disorders. There was,
therefore, considerable potential for overlap. Hence, the
research project outlined above may not have made an original
contribution to knowledges of 'anorexia' whereas a detailed
post-structuralist analysis of the discourses deployed by
women diagnosed as anorexic has not as yet been conducted.
Thirdly, I also felt that it was particularly important
to analyze what women diagnosed as anorexic had to say rather
than focusing exclusively on medical and psychological
discourses. Such an analysis should, I would argue, be
prioritized, firstly, because it begins to provide a rare
space in which 'the voices' of women diagnosed as anorexic can
be heard. In this sense, one of the aims of Study Two is to
contribute towards the 'empowerment' of women (see Widdicombe,
1993). However, as Widdicombe (1993; 109-110; see also Marks,
1993) argues, there is also
a certain irony in this approach and its objectives.
In an important sense the participants themselves
are irrelevant because it is the language they speak
that is the site of investigation. I have taken
apart what was said, subjected it to detailed
examination, justified doing so with reference to
often dense theoretical arguments, and presented it
to a select audience ... Moreover, there is a danger
that analytic 'expertise' merely replaces scientific
expertise as the means of distancing researcher and
researched. It is therefore questionable whether the
'democratic' underpinnings of this approach can ever
be fully realized in practice.
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Despite these unresolved problems (see also chapter 5) I would
argue that the analytic prioritization of 'the voices' of
women rather than (masculine) 'experts' is nevertheless a
worthwhile objective.
Finally, and most importantly, the aims of this thesis
are (a) to demonstrate that 'anorexia nervosa' is a
discursively constituted category rather than a 'natural'
clinical entity; (b) to explicate those discourses in which
anorexia is constituted and regulated, to demonstrate the
socio-historical specificities of those discourses and to
explore how anorexia is discursively constituted; and (c) to
elucidate, in particular, the ways in which particular socio-
historically specific constructions of femininity are
imbricated in discursive constructions of anorexia, to analyze
those discourses by which women are constituted and regulated
as 'anorexics'.
Clearly, it is not possible to retrieve 'the voices' of
women diagnosed as anorexic in the nineteenth century.
However, by analysing the nineteenth century medical texts
within which anorexia first emerged (Study One) and then
analysing those discourses and discursive resources used by
women diagnosed as anorexic today (Study Two) it was felt that
the aims outlined above would be achieved. By analysing the
discourses within which 'anorexia nervosa' first emerged and
by elucidating the social conditions of possibility of that
emergence Study One demonstrates how anorexia was constituted
in the gaps in and the relationships between already-existing
socio-historically specific medical and cultural discourses.
It shows how the category of 'anorexia nervosa' was
discursively constituted and illustrates how particular socio-
historically specific constructions of 'woman' were imbricated
in this process. The juxtaposing of an analysis of late
nineteenth century medical texts (Study One) with an analysis
of late twentieth century women's talk (Study Two) further
einphasises the socio-historical specificities of discursive
constructions of 'anorexia' and of the discursive
constructions of the 'feniininities' that are imbricated
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therein.
Study One is intended, therefore, to provide a
genealogical background to an analysis of the talk of women
who have been diagnosed as anorexic in the late twentieth
century. The analysis of these women's talk will elucidate
those discourses and discursive resources that women
themselves deploy in constituting themselves as 'anorexics',,
as 'women' and as 'individuals'. It will illustrate how women
in late twentieth century Western society are interpellated
and regulated by particular discourses and discursive
practices; how particular discourses converge upon the female
body, constituting and regulating it in particular socio-
historically specific ways.
The medical and cultural discourses in which 'anorexia'
emerged in the nineteenth century are very different from the
discourses of the late twentieth century in which 'anorexia'
is now constituted. However, whilst there are clear
discontinuities, there are also continuities in these
discourses (see Foucault, 1972), particularly in the
discursive construction of 'woman' at the interf ace of medical
and cultural discourses (see Ussher, 1991). As will be
discussed in the second study of this thesis (patriarchal)
constructions of femininity are still profoundly imbricated in
the discursive construction of 'anorexia'.
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Study Two
A Discourse Anal ytic Study of Interviews
with Women Diagnosed as Anorexic
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Chapter Eight
The Thin/Anorexic Body
and the Discursive Production of Gender
8.1 Introduction to Study Two
In the first study of this thesis I analyzed the
nineteenth century medical journal articles within which
'anorexia nervosa' was first constituted as an object of
medical discourse. I attempted to demonstrate the discursive
nature of anorexia, to explore how it was discursively
constituted and to elucidate the tensions contained within its
construction. The study also aimed to show how the
construction of anorexia nervosa as a medical entity was
inextricably imbricated with a soda-historically specific
construction of woman as pathologically nervous and in need of
medical (masculine) authority. It thereby countered the notion
that the term 'anorexia nervosa' transparently and objectively
reflects a trans-historical disease entity by demonstrating
the socio-historical specificity of the discourses and
discursive practices within which it was constituted as a
fundamentally gendered category.
There are, then, clearly discontinuities as well as
continuities between nineteenth and late twentieth century
constructions of anorexia nervosa. However, the fact that many
more women than men are diagnosed as anorexic (see p.16)
strongly suggests that it is still constituted as a 'feminine'
disorder. Indeed, as will be discussed below, a variety of
(ideological) discursive constructions of femininity continue
to be imbricated in discursive constructions of anorexia and
of the very thin/anorexic body (see also Malson and Ussher,
1994a, 1994b; Malson, in press). This second study aims,
therefore, to explore (a) how anorexia is currently
constructed and deployed as a discursive category and (b) how
these constructions lean on and interact with contemporary
discursive constructions of femininity.
This chapter begins, therefore, by setting out the
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methology of Study Two, discussing the women who participated
in this interview-based study, the interview process, the
process of analyzing the interview transcripts and of
selecting the discourses and discursive resources to be
discussed. The second half of this chapter then presents an
analysis of discursive constructions of the fat and the thin
body, focusing on the ways in which the body is differnetly
gendered within different discourses. The following four
chapters then present further analyses of the discourses and
discursive resources that converge on the thin, anorexic
(female) body, constituting and regulating it in a
multiplicity of socio-historically specific ways.
8.2 The Methodology of Study Two
8.2.1 The Participants
The study is based on interviews with 23 women, 21 of
whom were diagnosed as anorexic and 2 of whom were self-
diagnosed. The women were all aged 17 years or over, the
oldest (Barbara) being in her late forties. Most were in their
early twenties. Except for one Turkish woman (Layla), one
Asian British woman (Michelle), one British woman with parents
of East European origin and one white American woman (Zoe) all
participants were white British and tended to be of 'middle
class' backgrounds from the South East of England. The
participants were contacted through a variety of sources1,
through psychiatrists and self-help groups, through
advertisements for participants in the MIND newsletter 'Open
Mind', the 'Women's Page' of the Guardian, a local newspaper
and through posters in eating disorder clinics and university
common rooms. (The text of the poster is provided in appendix
Ba.) The size of the sample was limited by the difficulty of
recruiting participants. Many psychiatrists and other
1 Particular thanks to Philip Bacon of the Promis Recovery
entre, Professor Wakeling of the Royal Free Hospital, to Dr.
tonehill of the Charter Nightingale Hospital and to Mr. and Mrs.
hort, the contacts for a self-help group in the South East.
articular thanks also to all the women who participated in the
tudy.
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clinicians who were approached declined to participate in the
study and many others were not seeing 'suitable' clients
during the study. In addition, a number of those women with
whom I was put in contact also declined to participate as they
felt unable to discuss their experiences of 'anorexia' with
me. Of those women that did participate 3 were NHS out-
patients contacted through psychiatrists; 1 was an in-patient
contacted through psychiatrists working in an NHS hospital
with a specialist eating disorders unit; 4 were contacted
through a private in-patient clinic specializing in
addictions; 4 through a private hospital with a specialist
eating disorders unit; 3 through a self-help group; 6 through
posters in university common rooms; 1 through an advertisement
in Open Mind and 1 through a personal contact. The majority
(19) of the women were, therefore, in treatment or attending
a self-help group at the time of the interview.
8.2.2 The Interview Process
The interviews were conducted in a variety of settings;
in hospitals and clinics, at university sites, self-help group
sites and in participants' homes. Sixteen of the interviews
were conducted on a one-to-one basis, two involved two
participants and one was a group interview with three
participants. These arrangements were determined by
institutional context and participants' and my own
convenience. The interviews were semi-structured and loosely
followed an interview schedule (see appendix 8b). The women
were asked about their experiences of and ideas about
'anorexia' and 'femininity'. However, following Marshall and
Wetherell (1989), the emphasis was on maintaining an informal,
conversational style. I also wanted to discuss issues that the
women considered important as well as covering my own agenda.
Where possible a copy of the interview schedule was sent
to participants beforehand and before starting each interview
I gave a brief explanation of the study and assured
participants of the confidentiality of the interviews. (All
names and identifying details have been changed.) I also
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reminded the women that they could terminate the interview at
any point and that they need not answer any questions they
chose not to. It was very probable that distressing issues
would be covered and although I did not ask any direct
questions about past traumas several of the women disclosed
particularly disturbing experiences. It was, therefore,
particularly important to remind women at certain times during
the interviews that they could terminate the interview or not
answer questions if they wished.
In keeping with the feminist post-structuralist
perspective adopted in this thesis (see chapter 3), the
interviews were ii viewed as a means of eliciting 'facts'
about 'anorexia' in an 'objective' and impersonal situation
(see Griffin and Phoenix, 1994). Rather, they were social and
emotional interactive processes (see Griffin and Phoenix,
1994) in which the women and I explored their experiences of
and ideas about 'anorexia', 'femininity' and subjectivity, in
which my own subject positions both as interviewer and as a
thin woman were also significant.
Each interview lasted between 20 minutes and 2 hours,
most lasting about one hour. Conducting these interviews was
often an intense and emotional experience and was sometimes
distressing both for myself and, I think, for the
interviewees. It was also a very rewarding experience and I am
very grateful to the women for their contributions to this
study. Throughout the interviews I attempted to engage
emotionally with the women rather than keep a distance. Thus,
I sometimes contributed some of my own experiences and
opinions to the discussion where I felt it was appropriate or
supportive to do so. By participating in the discussion I was
also attempting to reduce any differences in power that may
have resulted from perceptions of myself as an anonymous
observer who might make 'scientific', clinical judgeinents
about the women. I also felt that such power inequalities were
further minimized by my being a thin woman of a similar age to
most of the participants. Clearly this also had some influence
on the interview process, on the issues that the women were
206
willing to discuss and on the discourses and discursive
resources that the women deployed in the discussion. Similarly
my own subjectivities effected the interview process as well
as the ways in which I later analyzed the interview
transcripts. The discourses by which I am interpellated have
inevitably conditioned and delimited my readings of these
texts.
It might be argued that the study is partial since it is
based on only a small sample of women who were interviewed in
a variety of locations and whose talk may have been influenced
by myself. However, such objections about reliability and
validity are misplaced (see Widdicombe, 1993) since the study
is not concerned with identifying underlying causes of
'anorexia' nor with attributing these women with particular
psychological characteristics and presenting these as
universal characteristics of 'anorexic' women. Rather, it aims
to explore those discourses and discursive resources deployed
in accounts about anorexia, femininity, subjectivity and the
body. The interviews might be viewed as situations in which
discursive resources and practices are elicited rather than
created (Widdicombe, 1993).
8.2.3 The Analysis of the Transcripts and the Selection of
Discourses
All the interviews were audio-taped and transcribed
verbatim. Following Marshall and Wetherell (1989) the
transcription convention (see appendix 8c) stresses
readability rather than the detailing of speech features such
as intonation or lengths of pauses or overlaps (see also
Potter and Wetherell, 1987) since these were not considered in
the analyses. The transcripts were then analyzed using a
discourse analytic methodology. The women I interviewed were
also sent copies of the transcripts and invited to comment on
them although none did.
As discussed in chapter 5, the post-structuralist
approach to discourse analysis adopted in this thesis draws on
that set out by Potter and Wetherell (1987). More
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specifically, it is an approach informed by Foucauldian and
Lacanian theory and follows the works of, for example,
Wetherell (1986; Marshall and Wetherell, 1989; Wetherell and
White, 1992), Walkerdine (1984, 1986), Holiway (1989) and
Bordo (1990, 1992).
The analyses are, then, based on repeated readings and
questionings of the transcripts (see Rae and Drury, 1993;
Widdicombe, 1993), informed by post-structuralist and Lacanian
psychoanalytic theories. The process of analysis in Study Two
was therefore similar to that of Study One (see chapter 5).
During the initial process of repeated and close reading
of all of the transcripts, notes were made on recurrent and/or
striking themes and discursive formulations in the texts; on
variations within and between transcripts; on aspects of the
transcripts that related to the literature on anorexia; and on
those aspects that resonated with the theoretical framework
set out in chapter 3.
On the basis of these notes a list of pertinent themes
was compiled and selected extracts were then copied and sorted
on this basis. At this stage the themes chosen were very
broad. Hence, this first attempt to select and order extracts
resulted in the sets of extracts being of an unmanagable size.
Consequently, I returned to the transcripts, casually
selecting two transcripts and subjecting them to a more
detailed analysis. This involved making descriptive and
analytic notes on each line of the transcripts. This enabled
me to produce more specific criteria on which to select
particular extracts. Hence, after this second stage of
reading, all the transcripts were re-read and the relevant
extracts were sorted into various groupings. Particular groups
of extracts were then re-read in order that emergent themes,
particular discourses and discursive formulations could be
explicated and analyzed.
As with Study One, however, the process of analysis was
not linear but cyclical. During the process of repeatedly re-
reading and analyzing extracts further aspects of the
transcripts emerged. Re-reading the texts often resulted in
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the perception of new and different relationships between
themes, discourses and discursive formulations. This in turn
resulted in a returning to the transcripts as a whole, to the
selection of further transcripts to be analyzed line by line
and to a re-organization of extracts. The process of writing
up the analyses was similarly combined with further
explorations of the texts and often resulted in further re-
reading and analysis (see also Potter and Wetherell, 1987).
The analytic process also involved a returning to the
theoretical texts (as discussed in chapter 3) and to the
existing literature on anorexia (see chapter 2) which again
often resulted in further analysis. Particular aspects of the
transcripts resonated with, for example, Foucault's
theorization of discipline or Lacan's theorization of 'woman'.
And a return to these texts elucidated further ways in which
the transcripts could be analyzed in relation to the
theoretical framework of this thesis or to the existing
literature on anorexia.
The selection of extracts presented in this study and the
discourses and discursive resources that have been analyzed in
Study Two is the result therefore of a dynamic, cyclical
process of analysis, based on repeated and close readings of
the transcripts. The discourses and discursive resources
discussed in this and the following four chapters emerged,
therefore, from the transcripts themselves. It is important to
note, however, that this process of reading, selection and
analysis was informed by the theoretical framework discussed
in chapter 3 and by the already existing literature on
anorexia. That is, the transcripts were read and analyzed
through a post-structuralist perspective; through Foucault's
theorization of discourse and knowledge (1972), power and
regulation (1977b, 1980); through a post-structuralist
theorization of subjectivity; through a Lacanian theorization
of gender and subjectivity (see chapter 3); through feminist
appropriations of Foucault (e.g. McNay, 1992) and Lacan (e.g.
Grosz, 1990; Mitchell and Rose, 1982); and through the
feminist and non-feminist literature on anorexia.
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The interviews with the women diagnosed (or self-
diagnosed) as anorexic were often, as noted above, quite
intense. Consequently the transcripts tended to be very
'dense' as well as lengthy. The analysis of the transcripts
is, therefore, far from exhaustive. Certain aspects of the
transcripts and foci of analysis were necessarily prioritized.
As the above discussion (pp.197-201) indicates, the aim of
this study is to elucidate those discourses and discursive
resources that these women deploy in constituting themselves
as 'anorexics', as 'women' and as 'individuals'. It aims to
explicate the particular discourses and discursive practices
that interpellate women in late twentieth century Western
society and that converge upon the (thin, anorexic) female
body constituting and regulate it in particular socio-
historically specific ways. The analyses presented here focus,
therefore, on an explication of these discourses and
discursive resources. They are not concerned with the
interview process itself, with analyzing the discursive
dynamics between myself and the interviewees, with rhetorical
devices deployed during the interview. That is, Study Two
presents a series of 'global' rather than 'fine grained'
analyses.
In short, the process of analyzing the interview
transcripts was a dynamic, cyclical process based on repeated
re-readings of the texts and informed by post-structuralist
and Lacanian theory. The process of selecting extracts to be
analyzed was therefore quite complex, being based on (a)
issues, discourses and discursive formulations that
predominated in the transcripts or that were particularly
striking, (b) variations within and between transcripts, (c)
aspects of the transcripts that related to the existing
literature on anorexia and (d) those aspects that resonated
with the theoretical framework set out in chapter 3.
In the remainder of this chapter and in the four chapters
that follow I have, therefore, presented an explication of the
discourses and discursive resources deployed in accounts about
anorexia, femininity, subjectivity and the body. In the
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following sections of this chapter I will explore how the
thin/anorexic body is discursively constituted by different
discourses, focusing on the ways in which that body may be
differently gendered. That is, I will argue, the thin/anorexic
body sustains a multiplicity of often contradictory meanings.
It sustains different densities of gender (see Riley, 1988),
signifying a variety of feminine and non-feminine
subj ectivities.
8.3 Analysis: Construing the Fat and the Thin Body
As noted above (p.15), a severe reduction in body-weight,
a pursuit of thinness, and a fear of being fat are now
considered to be central diagnostic criteria of anorexia
nervosa. And as several authors (e.g. Woolf, 1990) have
documented, one of the most prominent ways in which the body,
particularly the female body, is discursively constructed and
regulated in contemporary Western culture is through the
social significations accorded to body weight and shape.
Numerous studies have shown that negative constructions of
fatness and an accompanying desire for a thinner body are not
restricted to those diagnosed with eating disorders (see
pp.55-56 and 65-67) Rather, fat and thin bodies are saturated
with cultural meanings. As Wetherell and White's discourse-
analytic study (1992) of young women's talk about eating,
dieting and body image demonstrates, fat and thin bodies are
frequently construed within cultural narratives that imbue
these bodies with particular personological and moral values.
Amongst the discourses identified in the young women's talk
Wetherell and White describe a "personological discourse of
fatness and thinness" in which a fat self was constructed as
unattractive and shameful and was associated with introversion
and lack of self-esteem. Conversely a thin self was seen as
highly desirable and was associated with extraversion, self -
confidence, and happiness. Within this discourse, then, weight
loss was described as an accomplishment and as a sign of
personal control. Inevitably this discourse could also be
identified in the transcripts of the interviews with anorexic
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women in the present study and constituted a large part of the
texts. As the following extracts illustrate, both fat and thin
bodies signify a variety of personal characteristics2.
(Enina, p.13)
Ema: Welt it's just, it's just my fat. /H: right! You know I just hate it. I can't stress enough /14:
right/ how much I hate It. There's not a day goes by and I don't wake up first thing in the morning and
C.) and just hate it.
(Layta, p.7)
Layta: I thought if I Lost some weight I wouLd Look much nicer and attractive /11: right! C.) arid then
I would be more happier /H: right/ because then I would have confidence in myself. C.) I I would be able
to do things I've C.) never dreamed of doing because /H: nm! I was ashamed of the way I Look and of the
way L /K: right/ C.) aLL together. /H: nin/ So I thought if I could change the way I Look 1 might
be better able to C.) do things that I want to 1K: right! and I'm afraid to do.
H: So it would make you feel freer in a sense?
Layla: And happier.
(Jane!SimonelLynn, p.lEi)
Jane: So I just wanted to get rid of all this weight an' 1K: right/ C.) it made me feel I was better
cos there was less fat /H: emil as if there was Less /K: nin/ bad.
(Jackie, p.5)
H: Mm yeah what about tin fatness or a more curvy figure. I mean are there, is there anything that you
particularly associate with that? C.)
Jackie: (Laughing) gLuttony (Laughter) you know, that sounds awfuL uh (laughter)
(Teresa, p.5)
Teresa: There's something about being anorexic can be powerfuL. 1K: right! Urn, passivity is linked in
my mind to being fat arid to being indulgent, /H: right/ to being out of control. /14: mn, yeah!
(Tricia, pp.6-7)
H: Was tin I mean what at the time did tin being fat mean C.) to you? Why was It something that you didn't
want?
Tricia: I s'pose for me it was (.) I felt being ctunsy and being ugLy, /14: right! C.) being out of
control, C.) 1K: rrrn/ but I think uh as far as a woman goes, being C.) sexually so desirable by men and
not being able to say no.
H: Right fatness meant that? (.)
Tricia: Yes, /H: oh right/ much more open to sexual to sexual advances from men C.) /14: right/ 	 C.)
because of course being a woman one's not allowed to say no.
H: Right (short Laugh) yeah.=
=Tricia And also maybe it C.) more of a link with my mother which I IH: rmi/ particularly wanted to dis'
I mean not that my mother was fat /K: right/ but it's just the image of being a mother.
These extracts illustrate how discursive constructions of
'the fat body' may be strongly negative. And this negativity
is produced in a variety of ways. 'The fat body' is ugly,
unattractive, disgusting, passive, shameful, bad and hated. It
is a sign of gluttony, excess, sexual availability, and
motherliness. The 'fat self' is unhappy, lacking in control
and self-confidence. 'Fat' seems to be a 'metaphor without
2 Ironically, given the emphasis on talk and text in this
:hesis, the extracts from the interview transcripts are printed
n a small font. Because I have quoted extensively from the
:ranscripts, the use of a small font became necessary so as to
tvoid the thesis being impracticably large.
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brakes' 3 . Thus, I would argue, this "personological discourse
of fatness and thinness" can be understood as the effect of an
intersection and entanglement of various themes 'borrowed'
from a number of different discourses, an effect of which is
to consolidate and re-consolidate the disciplinary power of
discursive constructions (see chapter 3) of the thin/anorexic
body.
8.4 Gendering the Thin/Anorexic Body
8.4.1 Fat is ugly - Thin is Beautiful
One of the ways in which the idealization of thinness and
negativity of fatness is produced in these texts, and also in
the wider social sphere, is through the construction of fat as
ugly and thin as beautiful. The fat body is despised as
unattractive and conversely the thin body represents
perfection and beauty.
(Eniaa, p.3)
Enina: I mean I can't bear it and especially when I see somebody who reaLty doesn't have to pay very nuch
attention to what they eat. /H: nin/ You know and they're stiLL so sLim and they're end they're so
beautifuL.
(Wendy, p.6)
Wendy: you know all, the best people were sort of Like (indicates a thin body shape with hands) you know
/H: and rich/. Exactly (Laughing) and I never achieved that.
(Zoe, p.6)
Zoe: WeLL I thinks ads Like told me you know Like: okay, being thin was Like beautifuL, or sLim. And
when I looked at aLl the pictures of myseLf when I was an adolescent I was realLy thin. And you know,
so I thought: oh okay I was beautifuL and thin then. Like what happened to me.
(Layta, p.5)
Layla: But generation C.) is now becoming more similar to a European kind of /H: right/ views. So
in my generation there is an enhasis on slinsiess but not not as much as in C.) in this, you have C.)
/H: right/ in this country or in another European country /H: sin! but stiLL being sLim is meant to be
uh ideal /H: right nin/ in the culture that I take care of /H: real that I'm C.) you know part of, yeah.
The idealization of the slim body, the construction of
fat-as-ugly and thin-as-beauty is so dominant and normalized
that it often appears to be an unquestionable prescription of
some law of natural aesthetics; that fat j ugly and thin j
beautiful. Yet as numerous authors (e.g. Orbach, 1993) have
noted, prescriptions about what constitutes a beautiful body
have fluctuated from the Rubinesque to 'the beanpole'. Beauty
a phrase of Roland Barthes used by Jardine (1985) in her
liscussion of femininity.
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then is a concept whose specific expression differs both
historically and culturally (Malson, 1992). And more
importantly perhaps, as several of the women commented, these
aesthetics normative values have regulated the female much
more than the male body (Woolf, 1990; Orbach, 1993).
(Barbara/Olivia, p.5)
Barbara: (If) men have a bit of a beer paunch, on the whoLe their tess, it's not so bad to to be fat
as a man. It's more accepted.
(Cathy, p.11)
Cathy: Urn (.) weLL they, It seems to me that the bigger the better if you know what I mean /H: m
right/. With men it's Like uhm C.) to me it's Like they don't depend on their appearance to succeed.
1K: right/ It depends on their or whatever and (.) if they succeed I mean it, to me, It seems to me that
a Lot of men take the attitude of: weLL if I've got money I can Look the way I Like because women can
1K: nail are going to come fLocking round me anyway.
(Laura/Penny, p.5)
Laura: The ideal men don't have to necessarily be attractive to women /H: no/=
=Penny: Exactly, it's okay for men to be a bit overweight /K: nin/, you know it's okay for men, That's
aLlowed. (...) get, men get, (Laughing) I don't mean to generalize, but men do get away with a hell of
a Lot more when it comes to you know what you have to Look Like.
These extracts construe men as exempt from prescriptions of
physical perfection. Masculine ideals are neither defined
through the male body nor are they dependent on women's
validation. It is women's, but not men's, moral duty to attain
a beautiful, i.e. thin/slim, body (see Ferguson, 1983). This
is not to argue that men in their totality g exempt from any
prescriptions of physical perfection or concerns about others'
opinions of their bodies. Nevertheless, I would argue that the
discursive construction of 'men' articulated here forms a
significant part of the plural collectivity of 'men'. And, as
Woolf (1990) amongst others has argued, one of the most
dominant ways in which femininity, rather than masculinity, is
currently regulated is through standards of physical
perfection, through slimness. This gender asymmetry is evident
both in construing men as exempt from this disciplinary
discourse and in directly equating femininity with thinness,
in defining female beauty and (heterosexual) attractiveness in
terms of a thin body. Thus, for example, Zoe contrasts herself
with her 'gorgeous' room mates. Men, she says, ignored her
because she was fat. Emma and Wendy also produce similar
constructions of fat as ugly and thin as beautiful and
heterosexually attractive.
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(Zoe, p.8)
be: Like I felt Like us guys didn't like me or guys never paid any attention to me as such as they did
to Like my room mates who were Like 9orgeous. And I, and I just feLt ignored, Like no, Like they didn't
Look at me because I was fat. (...] So that's what I was deaLing with.
(Enina, p.1)
Ema: And if I feeL fat and ugly 1K: nin/ then that's why I'm faiLing in the reLationship. And if I
wasn't fat and ugLy then there wouldn't be a problem
(Wendy, p.11)
Wendy: It was aLL tied up with the image that it was good to be slim and you'd attract the boys If you
were slim
One dominant meaning of feminine beauty, then, is being
heterosexually attractive, the object of a male desire. And
this meaning is, I would argue, firmly embedded within a
romantic cultural narrative in which the beautiful woman gets
a perfect life and lives happily ever after.
(Cathy, pp.9-10)
Cathy: There is an awfuL Lot more pressure on women to Look a certain way 1K: right! us I mean for
heaven sakes It seems to me that you know things Like the media 1K: ,m,I they seem to connote that (.)
us (.) that if you're slim then you're successfuL, you're intelligent, beautiful, you get the man of
your dreams /H: right!, dream chiLdren, dream house, money whatever. And I think there's an awfuL Lot
of pressure /H: nlii/ whereas with men it's Less pressurized
(be, p.4)
H: Like personaLity characteristics or I mean do you think it's portraying anything other than sLimness
to you or?
=Zoe: Yeah, oh sure. It seems Like yeah they're (modeLs) beautiful. There's no doubt they have the
perfect lives Like, you know everything's cool, Like great, Like what more couLd you ask for, that sort
of thing.
H: Right, uh so the kind of happy-ever-after scenario with the
=Zoe: Yeah, right, yeah,
This narrative which structures numerous fairy-tales and
romantic fictions4 constructs a beautiful (thin/slim) heroine
who will, after some trials and tribulations, be rewarded with
"the man of (her) dreams [...) dream children, dream house,
money whatever". "Like what more could you ask for". Thus,
physical beauty does not simply connote heterosexual
attractiveness since it thereby represents the passport to a
'perfect' life. As Wetherell (1991: 2) has argued, romantic
discourse "presents an image of redemption, of salvation and
rescue through the gaze of the Other. Usually, but not
necessarily this is presented as a heterosexual passion."
. See also Adams (1986) who describes children's fairy
stories as 'conspiring' to regulate the readers' subjectivity
md emotions within particular cultural frameworks. Such texts,
e argues, (1986: 4) "conspire with language to direct readings
qhich are appropriate to the culture". See also Wetherell (1991)
or a discussion of romantic discourse. See also Coward (1984).
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Within romantic discourse a beautiful slim body is necessary
to attract a man who will 'rescue' the woman, providing her
with a perfect life and happiness. And women are required to
be the 'perfect' shape to fit into this romantic and
patriarchal story, to take up the feminine position within
this narrative discourse.
In short, romantic discourse idealizes the thin female
body, equating thinness with female beauty and defining female
beauty in terms of heterosexual attractiveness. Hence, the
thin/anorexic body was construed as 'romantically' feminine,
a means of achieving 'redemption' and a perfect life through
a heterosexual passion.
8.4.2 The Petite Woman
Within romantic discourse 'the thin body' signifies a
'traditional' heterosexual femininity. And as several authors
(e.g. Wetherell, 1986) have noted, femininity is associated
with a variety of psychological as well as physical
characteristics. Femininity and masculinity are frequently
conceptualized as fixed, categorically different sets of
individual traits (Wetherell, 1986). Thus, for example,
Big boys are made of - independence, aggression,
competitiveness, leadership, task orientation,
outward orientation, assertiveness ... Big girls are
made of - dependence, passivity, fragility, low pain
tolerance, non-aggression, non-competitiveness,
inner orientation, interpersonal orientation,
empathy, sensitivity, nurturance ... (Bardwick
(1971) quoted by Wetherell, 1986: 79)
Rosenkrantz et al.'s Sex-role Stereotype Questionnaire (see
Broverman et al., 1970) re-produces a similar image of
femininity, including items such as 'very dependent', 'very
passive', 'very submissive', 'very subjective', 'very
emotional', very illogical', 'very quiet', 'very strong need
for security', 'very excitable in a minor crisis', 'not at all
aggressive', 'not at all competitive', 'not at all self-
confident', and 'not at all adventurous' on their 'feminine
pole'. These 'traditional' feminine characteristics are, I
would argue, precisely those required of the woman in the
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romantic narrative. Indeed, dependency and passivity are
central features of the romantic femininity since 'woman's'
self-validation and redemption is achieved here only through
the intervention of 'man'. Such characteristics are, I would
argue, also signified by the thin/anorexic body as it is
constructed within romantic discourse. In the extracts below,
for example, 'anorexia' and the thin body are produced as
signifiers of a child-like, meek, delicate femininity.
(Lynn/Jane/Simone, pp.1-2)
Lynn: I wanted to Look Like a 12 year old 1K: right/ You know, and I I mean I did took Like a 12 year
oLd. I had no chest (...]
=Jane: And buying chiLdren's clothes, it made you feeL you were reaLLy successful /Simone: yeah, qulte/
(Laughter) oh god yeah. (Laughter)
Lynn: And petite and feminine, (Jane: yeah! you know reaLly delicate. It made you feel Like that. IN:
right/ Instead of when being overweight I always felt cLunsy an' /N: yeah! and useLess.
(Teresa, p.7)
Teresa: WeLL it's (anorexia) feminine because you're, you're childish IN: right!. You're not, you're
not a grown up woman /K: mn!. So yes it's, there is a big issue about taking responsibiLity.
(ELaine, p.5)
ELaine: Urn C..) well I s'pose I I would think of it (a slim female body) as being meek (.) IN: right!
and child-Like. IN: ma! I mean when I think of Kate Moss, for instance, who's always portrayed as, who's
aLways said to be the waif, the child-waif /K: yeah/ kind of and that's exactLy how she comes across.
In these extracts thinness signifies a delicate, meek,
child-like femininity rather than a grown up, responsible
womanhood. The extreme thinness of many women diagnosed as
anorexic may make this signification more accessible since
breasts and hips are reduced in size and menstruation often
ceases. Indeed, anorexia has been interpreted as a retreat
from adulthood (Plaut and Hutchinson, 1986; Crisp, 1970). And
it has been similarly portrayed in the popular media as a
trivial affliction of childish and vain girls. Roy
Hattersley's discussion of eating disorders in The Guardian
(1993), for example, suggested that "it is in the hope of
looking like (top models) that girls refuse to eat their rice
pudding." The phrase is, I would argue, reminiscent of A.A.
Milne's (1924: 48-51) poem 'Rice Pudding' in which a little
girl refuses to eat her pudding despite being "perfectly
well". It thus creates an image of 'anorexic' women as
childishly petulant; an image which parallels nineteenth
century descriptions and treatments of 'hysterical' women (see
Gilman, 1892; see also chapters 6 and 7). And, as Orbach
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(1993: 4) argues, "once seen as a child, the anorectic woman
becomes much less of a threat"; her symptoms and opinions
become discountable because, like her, they are immature.
However, as Elaine's description of Kate Moss indicates,
images of childish and child-like women are also idealized and
constructions of 'child-waifs' abound in the fashion media.
Recent images of Madonna, Naomi Campbell and Courtney Love
dressed up as sexualized little girls demonstrate the
prevalence of cultural figures of infantilized femininity.
Such constructions emphasise a profound contradiction between
constructions of 'woman' as adult and 'woman' as
heterosexually attractive, child-like, dependent and passive.
Yet, as argued above, 'traditional' femininity is often
presented in terms of these latter characteristics and is
therefore, at least implicitly, produced as inferior to
masculinity. In the extracts below, this feminine inferiority
or subservience is also signified by the thin/anorexic body,
particularly by its smallness.
(Penny/Laura p.2)
Penny: Urn, I think the appearance, the appearance matters to me a Lot us C.) I don't reaLLy know in what
way. It's just that I was totaLLy, I think I aLways found that to Look feminine you have to be a size
eight and then you know, /K: mat just Like the kind of society aLways kind of dictates it to me. I think
femininity is not, you know, bigger than size eight or ten.
(Sirnone/LynntJane, p.2)
Sirnone: (to Lynn) Cos as you said I aLways feLt . j as weLL. I aLways feLt much bigger than anybody eLse
and wanted to be smaLLer than, than men and feeL Like a subservient, Stupid LittLe girL (Laughter) or
whatever. I aLways wanted to be fragiLe and it's, it was rather a nice feeLing /H: nni/ C.) for a whiLe.
(Handy, p.10)
H: Do you think it's anything about being femaLe or, or not that there's that feeLing to want to sort
of fade away?
Handy: Urn I think uhr again from a sort of viewpoint of un how society is rather than my own personaL
/H: mt view, yeah. I think It has because there is this ui image of us being smaLLer /H: right/ in
every way /H: mat and being the, the second cLass citizen to the maLe IN: right/. So I think that
probabLy, possibLy is, is a factor. /K: right,' But there is this, this image that women are somehow Less
inç,ortant and are behind, physicaLLy, /H: yeah,' behind, you know, the maLe.
In these extracts femininity is defined by size, by not being
"bigger than size eight or ten" and size itself signifies the
inferior status of women that is implied in constructions of
femininity as child-like. An important meaning of thinness is,
therefore, not only beauty but smallness. It signifies a
delicate fragile 'petite' femininity, a woman as a diminutive
of man.
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(Ema, p.5)
Enna: I just do feeL Like this big, monstrous size /H: nm right/ and I want to be a LittLe, LittLe, you
know sytph-Like size. /H: right, rrin/ C.) I don't know why though. It's just the, yeah the weight, just
fragiLity just reaLLy comes into it /H: right/ but I don't know why. I don't know why I think of it Like
that.
'The thin body' can, therefore, be understood as
culturally over-determined in its signification of feminine
'perfection' since it is not only 'beautiful', it is also
small, petite, diminutive, inferior. 'The thin body' is a site
at which feminine beauty converges with smallness. As Lacan,
like Derrida, insists, "no word is free of Inetaphoricity"
(Sarup, 1988: 12). The signified is always commutable, always
becomes itself a signifier5 . In being small 'the thin body'
again becomes a trope, signifying the fragility and delicacy
of "petite", "syiph-like" femininity. 'The thin woman' is not
only beautiful but in being 'petite' 'she' is also dainty
(Concise OED, 1990), fragile and delicate but also "of lesser
importance" (Concise OED, 1990). The thin body thus signifies
several aspects of a femininity that are simultaneously
idealized and belittled. The ambivalence entailed in the term
'petite' parallels, I would argue, a social ambivalence
towards a 'femininity' that is indicated by the smallness of
'the thin body'.
Moreover, as a diminutive object, this 'woman' might also
be understood as an analogue of grammatical diminutives. Like
a pet name, 'woman' is an abbreviation, cut short, lacking.
She is 'castrated', and has meaning only in relation to the
proper term/phallus/man from which 'she' is derived. 'The
petite woman' is therefore, an exemplary of 'the woman' of
psychoanalytic theory (see chapter 3) in which 'femininity'
emerges as a lack, defined negatively in relation to a
masculine signifier - the phallus - and who is therefore
'castrated', cut short like a diminutive. As Freud's
theorization of psychosexual development makes clear, size (of
the penis versus the clitoris) is of central importance in the
Squire (1983: 49) similarly argues that for Lacan "tropic
relations of unconscious signifiers must continue indefinitely
tnd never be completely tied down" since such relations are
irounded in the Symbolic in an absent, unidentifiable signified.
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determination of sexual identity within patriarchal society.
It is because of the 'stunted', diminutive clitoris, that the
girl develops penis-envy, turns in anger from her mother to
her father and eventually accepts her own inferiority; that is
she adopts the 'feminine' position. It is smallness that
defines 'woman' as both 'properly' feminine and as inferior
within the patriarchal or Symbolic order (see chapter 3).
If during the phallic phase she tries to get
pleasure like a boy by the manual stimulation of her
genitals, it often happens that she fails to obtain
sufficient satisfaction and extends her judgement of
inferiority from her stunted penis to her whole
self.(Freud, 1940, quoted in Nagera, 1969: 144)
In relation to the phallus woman's gender is assigned on the
basis of her 'castration', her 'stunted penis' whose smallness
symbolizes her inferiority. Whilst Freud asserts that the
clitoris is inferior because it supposedly affords less
pleasure, the passage also suggests a symbolic significance of
size, which I would argue is repeated in discursive
constructions of the thin body as a signifier of a
'traditional' femininity that is simultaneously idealized and
denigrated.
8.4.3 Anorexia: A Convergence of Femininity and Sickness
The dependency, fragility and inferiority of 'the petite
woman' are, I would argue, further consolidated by
constructions of the thin/anorexic body as sick. The location
of 'anorexia nervosa' within medical discourse (see chapters
2 and 7) is clearly central to constructions of anorexia as a
pathology. And, indeed, terms such as 'slimmers' disease'
indicate the widespread conceptualization of anorexia as an
illness. Within the interview transcripts the inedicalization
and pathologization of 'anorexia' was both resisted and
accepted (see pp.293-95). The transcripts contained
constructions of anorexia as an illness and some women also
described the physical damage to their bodies that had
resulted from prolonged self-starvation. In the extract below,
however, this pathologization is explicitly gendered. The
construction of the thin body as feminine, 'petite', fragile
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and inferior, is extended so that the thin body also signifies
a sick body.
(ELaine, p.6)
Elaine: Well that's how it s' C.) seems to come across sometimes in the media which annoys me a Lot /H:
m/ because it's such a dangerous illness. And people realty nuck around with It a lot. /H: right nln/
It's it seems to be the big thing the that that a pop star can say: weLl I was anorexic ten years ago.
It's Like /H: right am! poor you kind of thing 1K: nmn/ C.) or something Like that. I'm not exactly sure
what they want, they want to be seen as having had this illness 1K: right! for some reason. I don't
understand it.
H: Mm yeah C.) yeah it's almost like it adds to their status in some ways /Etaine: mI sometimes isn't
it.
Elaine: And it was the same with Mandy Smith C.) that she C.) I mean she was shown to be so frail and
like she was gettin9 very 1(1. IH: nui/ I mean I I think through aLL that, I think her problem was
anorexia or whatever but there's this whole /H: nmn/ glamorous thing about (.) you know C.) 1K: thisl
this poor yeah IH: yeah/ poor ill creature /H: nmnl C.) seems so glamorous to the world for some reason.
C.) !H: yeah/ And it was the same with Princess Diana. Everybody wanted to know about C.) /H: nin/ this
poor C.) creature.
In her account of the media coverage of eating disorders,
Elaine describes an image of 'the sickly anorexic' as
glamorous, as an identity for pop stars. Nandy Smith is
described as "very ill", as pitiful: "it's like [...] poor you
kind of thing" whilst Princess Diana is described as "this
poor (.) creature". Yet they are simultaneously glamorous and
remain feminine. This convergence of 'femininity' and
sickness, epitomised by the Nineteenth century cult of female
invalidism (see chapter 6), may appear to be of little
relevance in the late twentieth century. Yet 'anorexia', I
would argue, appears to be a site at which it re-emerges. In
the construction of Mandy Smith or Princess Diana as
simultaneously "poor ill creature(s)" and "glamorous",
'sickness' and 'femininity' become entangled in a morbid
spectacle that "(e)verybody wanted to know about". These women
"want to be seen as having had this illness". The entanglement
of femininity and sickness in this construction of 'the thin
body' is, I would argue, consolidated by its similarities with
the fragile and delicate 'woman' of romantic discourse and in
turn reaffirms both the femininity and the inferiority of this
petite 'woman'. 'The thin body' in signifying 'femininity',
fragility, and sickness, can thus be 'read' as a point at
which quasi-medical and medical discourses converge with
romantic discourse to consolidate 'femininity' as at once
'ideal' and pathologized, as 'properly' inferior (c.f.
chapters 6 and 7).
These readings of the transcripts might be interpreted as
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an endorsement of Boskind-Lodahi's (1976) description of
'anorexic' women as having never questioned 'traditional'
femininity and as devoting their lives to fulfilling this
feminine role in which self-validation is achieved through
male approval of the beautiful (female) body. However, as
noted above, discourses do not simply reflect people's
attitudes and beliefs but, rather, construct and regulate
their objects in particular ways. Moreover, as will be argued
below, the transcripts did not consist of only one discourse
but, rather, evidenced a number of different discourses which
construct the thin/anorexic body in a variety conflicting as
well as converging ways. That is, even within one transcript
the thin/anorexic body may be very differently produced by the
different discourses that are deployed. For instance, as well
as signifying a 'traditional' or romantic femininity it may
also signify more quasi-feminist or non-feminine
subjectivities. There is a multiplicity of converging and
diverging meanings of the thin (or fat) body produced within
a complex entanglement of discourses.
8.4.4 'Be More Beautiful': A Discourse from Women's Magazines
One discourse that both converges and diverges from
romantic discourse in its construction of the thin body is a
'be more beautiful' discourse promulgated in women's magazines
(see Ferguson, 1983). As Ferguson (1983: 59) argues "physical
beauty is presented" in women's magazines "less as an
aspirational ideal, more as a holy commandment. There is
reassurance: salvation can be achieved from a state of non-
beauty" through ritualistically following "the 'step-by-step'
instructions, the day-to-day diets" for beautification.
This 'be more beautiful' discourse converges with
romantic discourse in their mutual themes of salvation or
rescue as well as in their emphasis on female beauty. In the
'be more beautiful' discourse, however, the beautiful thin
body is not construed as a requirement for attracting a man
who will save the woman. Rather, it j the state of salvation,
achieved through the woman's efforts rather than through male
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intervention. Thus, whilst retaining a romantic theme of
salvation, this discourse displaces the masculine position by
constructing a more self-possessed 'woman': the woman is
beautiful for herself and her beauty her salvation. As
Ferguson (1983) notes, women's magazines contain surprisingly
few references to the 'benefits' of female beautification in
attracting and holding a male's attention.
The absence of men from this discourse does not, however,
necessarily signify their lack of importance here. It might,
instead, suggest "an implicit and latent meaning so powerful
that it does not require explicit and manifest statement"
(Ferguson, 1983: 60). It might not need to be said that
women's beautification is for men. However, the absence of men
from this discourse also "emphasises the extent to which
physical appearance is made integral to a woman's self-concept
and her femininity as such - narcissism is an explicit norm
within these pages" (Ferguson, 1983: 60; see also Coward,
1984). Thus, as noted above, this discourse might be
understood as producing a more self-possessed woman who is
beautiful 'for herself' rather than for an other and for whom
the pursuit of thinness/beauty is a form of self-care. Hence,
(OLivia/Barbara, p.6)
OLivia: If you're fat then oh it's a sign of Letting go, not Looking after yourseLf.
In short, this 'be more beautiful' discourse converges
with the romantic discourse discussed above in its emphasis on
feminine beauty and its idealization of thinness and its theme
of salvation through the female body. They thereby consolidate
an idealization of thinness. Yet the two discourses also
construes the thin/anorexic body quite differently. Whilst, it
signifies a 'traditional' femininity in romantic discourse, in
the 'be more beautiful' discourse it signifies a more self-
possessed, narcissistic 'woman' who can look after herself and
be beautiful 'for herself'. Whilst this latter 'reading' of
'the thin body' can not entirely escape patriarchally imposed
meanings, it does suggest the possibility that 'the thin body'
sustains a variety of meanings, not all of which conform to
patriarchally defined ideals of 'femininity. The disciplinary
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power of discursive constructions of the body as fat or thin
is produced through the entanglement of different discourses
through which the multiple meanings of the fat or thin body
continually slip. And it is within this entanglement and
slipping of significations of 'the body' and 'the woman' that
alternative and often contradictory meanings are consolidated.
8.5 A Struggle Over Meanings
As noted above, fat and thin bodies sustain a variety of
meanings so the transcripts can be understood as sites of
struggle over the meanings of the body and over the forms of
subjectivity that that body signifies. In the extract below
Michelle articulates such a struggle over some of the
entangled meanings of thinness and femininity focusing on a
super-model who she has discussed with her parents.
(MicheLLe, pp.3-4)
MicheLLe: Urn C.) I I remember having Lots of chats about her Ca super-model) with my dad C.) and my mun
and everything C.) and us my dad was saying: oh she's alright but you know she's she's terribly thin.
/H: right hut You know: I hate hate women that Look so thin an' C.) IN: ,rin/ you know she shouLd, she
doesn't reaLLy Look Like a woman an' hu (.) /N: (Laughing) right/ But I ac*nit I didn't reaLLy agree with
him and I don't think C.) if there were ever any women in the room C.) when C.) he was saying this I
don't think they wouLd either. IN: right! But IN: rrin/ C.) he just said () he preferred to see women
that Looked Like women, women IN: right/ woman-shaped.
H: Right so more (coughs) more curvy and just /MichelLe: yeah/ (.) bigger. C.)
Michelle: But I didn't think so. I thought that she was C.) realty perfect IN: right/ But maybe C.) sort
of a tong you know C.) that C.) Length of time ago, maybe I wouLd've thought that she was a bit thin
but C.) IN: mI (Laughing) not now. (Laughter)
H: Mm was there anything other than the th' her thinness that you aónired? (.)
MicheLLe: Urn I just thought she Looked beautiful generaLly IN: right/ us C.) And C.) that I mean I I
knew quite a Lot about her personaLity. I thought she was a nice person. She was very C.) she was very
how I thought C.) at the time I thought women should be. She was C.) she was quite quiet really and us
(.) (Laughing) you know she behaved herself. (laughter) Yeah she was very us (.) 1 don't know how to
put it realLy C.) us. She was kind of dignified realLy IH: right! and us C.) you know if she did
interviews or something she wouLd (.) she'd never say anything embarrassing or she just seemed generaLLy
nice C.) /H: right! I think yeah IN: m/ I could be like her. (Laughter)
In this extract Michelle describes the model as "really
perfect". She was "thin", "beautiful", "a nice person", "quite
quiet really", "she behaved herself" and was "dignified".
Ostensibly she is a manifestation of the feminine position
signified in the reading of the thin body above. Yet
Michelle's account of her father's contribution to the
discussion suggest a different reading. In contrast to her
admiration 'he' says "Oh she's alright but you know she's
she's terribly thin." "I hate hate women that look so thin
(...] you know she should, she doesn't really look like a
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woman." "{H)e just said (.) he preferred to see women that
looked like women, [...] woman-shaped."
Whereas Michelle describes this model as a perfect (thin)
woman, her father argues that she does not even look like a
woman because she is "terribly thin". She is therefore not
"woman-shaped". Thus, Michelle's account of this discussion
introduces a signification of thinness as not-woman. Fat, not
thin is feminine; a construction which directly opposes the
equation of thinness and feminine perfection discussed above.
The difference between Michelle's and her father's opinions is
emphasised and explicitly gendered by Michelle's comment that
it is not only herself that would disagree with her father. If
there were ever any women in the room they would also disagree
with him. Thus, I would argue, in this extract Michelle not
only introduces the possibility that 'thinness' may signify
'non-woman' as well as 'perfect woman'. By juxtaposing this
'male'-voiced possibility with her own description of the
model she also alters the meaning of her construction of the
thin body. Her definition of the thin body as feminine
perfection involves a conflict with 'male' opinion rather than
a desiring of 'male' approval.
The above extract illustrates, therefore, a discursive
struggle over the meaning of 'the thin body' where the
dependence on male approval connoted by 'the thin body' in
romantic discourse is resisted. Such struggles and resistances
were frequently apparent in the interview transcripts
employing a variety of discursive resources. In the extract
below, for example, Zoe einphasises the possible power that a
woman might gain in relation to men by being attractive.
(Zoe, p.6)
Zoe: If you're unattractive men aren't going to Listen to you but if you are attractive then men are
going to want something eLse from you so they're more apt to Listen to you Ill: right/. So therefore you
can have, you, Like It's a way of Like wieLding power.
Michelle produced a slippage in the meaning of 'the thin body'
through a rhetorical juxtapositioning of interpretations, re-
producing the perfection of 'the thin body' in an opposition
to male approval. Zoe however has re-produced the importance
to women of male approval whilst still altering the meaning of
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'the thin body'. Although 'the thin body' is construed as
heterosexually attractive, and male approval as important,
this male approval is valued not simply because it is
necessary for self-validation but because it confers power:
"it's a way of wielding power". Thus whilst this construction
remains entrenched within romantic discourse, it nevertheless
construes the thin bodied woman as powerful rather than
powerless.
There is, then, no one meaning of the thin (or the fat)
body. As Bordo (1990) has argued the thin body sustains
multiple and often conflicting, mutually deconstructing
meanings. Thus, for example, whilst 'the thin body' may
connote feminine fragility, defencelessness, and lack of power
(Bordo, 1990) ('ideal' characteristics for a heroine of a
heterosexual romantic discourse), it can also symbolize "a new
freedom, a casting off of the encumbrance of domestic
reproductive femininity" (Bordo, 1990: 86). 'The thin body'
may be construed both as the body of the romantic heroine and
of the 'liberated' woman. It may also, simultaneously, signify
a rejection of femininity and/or a quest for un-gendered
subj ectivities.
8.6 Differing with Gender
8.6.1 Construing the Thin Body as Boyish
Why can't a woman be more like a man?
(My Fair Lady)
As argued above talk about 'the thin body' can be viewed
as a site of struggle over its multiplicity of meanings. It
can, for example, be 'read' as signifying non-woman as well as
'perfect femininity'. It resists as well as it embodies
patriarchal gender identities. And one way in which the
femininity of 'the thin body' is most clearly resisted is in
its discursive construction as boyish.
This quasi-feminist signification of the boyish body
ideal has also been paralleled in some modernist elements of
women's fashion. As Evans and Thornton (1991: 50) argue, a
fashion item "negotiates the terms of sexual difference and
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constructs the feminine ... (T)he work actively negotiates
difference and generates meaning." That is, like a body,
fashion is located in a significatory system in which its
meanings are produced and re-produced. The 1920s work of
Chanel, for example, adopted the "restrictions of masculine
dress ... to signify control" (ibid., 50) as women's power-
dressing did in the 1980s. In contrast, for example, to
Schiaparelli's work of the 1930s whose "excess and folly",
"decorative, superfluous, and non-functional" flowing dresses
were an "appropriation of female masquerade" the clean,
straight lines of Chanel's suits represented an "appropriation
of masculine power". Her functionalist and anti-decorative
rhetoric "indicate a cultural rejection of the feminine in
favour of an exclusively masculine model of power" (ibid.,
50)
Like women's 'masculine' clothing, the thin body may also
signify 'cultural rejection of the feminine'. It may be
construed as boyish. And, in appropriating the masculine, the
thin 'boyish' body disrupts the gendering of the female body.
It signifies masculine power and control. It resists a
patriarchally imposed 'feminine' identity and can thus be
'read' as signifying a quasi-feminist, 'liberated'
subjectivity of the late twentieth century (Bordo, 1990).
However, I would argue that this discursive construction of
the thin body as boyish is also highly ambiguous. In the
extracts below, for example, the thin body is produced as
boyish but these constructions seems far from liberatory.
(ELaine, p.4)
ELaine: Uh C.) weLL women are aLways so C.) portrayed so petite Like C.) not not even Like girLs.
They're portrayed Like LittLe boys. C.) 1K: right/ Men are aLways Like this muscuLar, 1K: rrinl big,
aLmost, aLmost to make C.) one protective over the other /H: right C.) ma! sometimes. /ll: yeah/ C.) But
women are aLways kind of shown to be thin and sLim and taLL.
(Layta, p.11)
Layta: I remember the times when I was ten or C.) tweLve kiLos Less than I am now and there were times
when I feLt fat /H: right/ C.) or when I Look back that body just Looks sick to me C.) but C.) I was
so desperate or not desperate but so crazy that I Loved that body 1K: right! that I thought it was nice
and attractive and I couLd easiLy offer it to men I Like IN: right! and now that seems that I have
to question how the heLL couLd they sLeep with me 1K: right! C.) cos it was obviousLy a body of a boy
IN: nm! and it was sick.
Construing the thin body as boyish may signify a
liberation from oppressive patriarchal gender (iin)positions.
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Yet it also resonates with the construction of the thin body
as child-like, as powerless, dependent and femininely fragile.
This resonance between constructions of 'the thin body' as
boyish and as child-like is particularly apparent in Elaine's
account in which women, even if boyish, are construed as
"little", "petite", and defenceless in contrast to men who are
"big", "muscular", and "protective". The primary signification
is that the body is little and child-like and then it is
differently gendered. Patriarchal gender relations remain in
tact. Moreover, the construction of women's bodies as boyish
is articulated as an imposition rather than as a liberation.
This is how women are "portrayed", not how they are. In
Layla's account, the 'boyishly' thin body is again negatively
construed. She articulates two contrasting descriptions of her
'boyish' body - as "nice and attractive" and as "sick". There
is an ambiguity in this passage about what it is that is
described as sick. Her body may be construed as 'sick' both
because it is physically emaciated and because it is
"obviously a body of a boy" and is, therefore, not 'properly'
gendered. This latter reading is further emphasised by her
questioning "how the hell (men) could sleep with (her)",
suggesting an implicit, heterosexist construction of her
relationships with men as not 'properly' heterosexual since
her body contradicted her 'proper' gender identity. Whilst not
wishing to deny the more liberatory meanings of the boyishly
thin body, the extracts above do indicate some of the
difficulties and ambiguities of this discursive construction.
As argued above, the thin/anorexic body may signify both
femininity and a 'boyish' non-femininity. It is, therefore,
doubly gendered, and might be understood as signifying a bi-
sexual gender-identity. And if bisexuality figures as "the
sign of that precariousness" of subjectivity (Rose, 1982: 29),
then the discursive construction of 'the thin (woman's) body'
as boyish is inevitably ambiguous. It involves a precarious
balancing between significations of masculine power and petite
femininity. The meaning of this doubly or bi-sexually gendered
body is then endlessly differed back and forth between these
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two significations (see chapter 3). It refuses to "line up on
one or other side of the divide" of gender difference (Rose,
1982: 42). It refuses the (illusory) possibility of stable
(gender) identity by refusing closure and difference (see
Wetherell, 1991).
Yet whilst the subject position(s) signified by 'the
'boyishly' thin body is undoubtedly precarious it might also
be understood again as subversive precisely because it exposes
the illusory, fictional nature of identity as a point of
permanent closure and difference (see Wetherell, 1991). As
Lacan argues, within the Symbolic order "sexual difference is
a legislative divide which creates and reproduces its
categories" in relation to the phallus (Rose, 1982: 41). The
'boyishly' thin female body is, I would argue, subversive in
that it signifies a differing with this difference. It
signifies a subject position which resonates with 'the woman'
described by Lacan since similarly "there is for her something
unacceptable" about an order which produces difference in
relation to the phallus. The "character of her position
(is) ... fundamentally conflictual, and I would say,
insoluble" (Lacan, quoted by Rose, 1982: 45). Like 't4ie
woman', the discursive construction of the thin female body as
boyish is profoundly conflictual and impossible. It unsettles
the very notion of categorical difference and unitary, stable
identity (see also chapter 3).
The theme of masquerade produces further resonances
between the subjectivity signified by the boyishly thin body
and the category of 'woman', theorized by Lacan. Discursive
constructions of the thin/anorexic female body as boyish
produces that body as something that it is not, as a
masquerade. Women are "portrayed like little boys" (emphasis
added). And "for Lacan, masquerade is the very definition of
'femininity' precisely because it is constructed with
reference to a male sign" (Rose, 1982: 43). Joan Riviere's
(1929) similarly described the "failed femininity" of the
hysteric as a masquerade. "To 'her' 'femininity' really seems
to equal the gap indicated by castration ... it is enacted as
229
'a masquerade' to cover it" (Mitchell, 1984: 308). And if, as
Freud argues, "the feminine ... was in part a hysterical
formation" (Mitchell, 1974: 48) then femininity and masquerade
are again equated. Thus I would argue, the 'boyishly' thin
female body, like Chanel's 'masculine' clothes, collapse into
the very category that it rejects. Whilst the two
significations of 'the thin body' - romantic femininity and
boyishness - do appear directly contradictory they are also
simultaneously (and impossibly) compatible.
8.6.2 Bloody Women: Discourses of Femininity and the
Amenorrhea-ic Body
In the extracts discussed above the thin/anorexic body is
construed as boyish, as non-feminine. This discursive
construction of the thin/anorexic body as non-feminine is
further consolidated in constructions of the body as
amenorrhea-ic. In the following analysis (see also Malson and
Ussher, l994b) I shall examine how menstruation is
discursively construed as a signifier of a 'biologically
labile woman' (see Ussher, 1991) and how the amenorrhea-ic
body is therefore produced as an evasion of this femininity.
As Halmi and Falk (1983; see also p.15) note, most
researchers consider amenorrhea to be "a major diagnostic
symptom of anorexia nervosa" and there has been much research
into its possible causes. As noted above (see pp.25-26)
amenorrhea is frequently considered as a biological matter.
Yet as several authors (e.g. Ussher, 1991; Millett, 1971) have
shown, menstruation (and therefore its absence) is a socially
embedded phenomenon surrounded by 'superstitions', rituals and
taboos. Menstruation and amenorrhea are located within sets of
discursive (and material) practices through which they acquire
particular meanings. 'The menstruating woman' has often been
figured as incapacitated, dangerous and dirty (Ussher, 1991).
'She' has been barred from religious and sexual activity, from
preparing food and from sleeping in the family home (Ussher,
1991). Leviticus (16: 19-33), for example, claims that
if a woman have an issue,	 her issue in her flesh
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be blood, she shall be put apart seven days: and
whosoever toucheth her shall be unclean until the
even. And every thing that she lieth upon
everything also that she sitteth upon shall be
unclean. ... And if a man lie with her at all he
shall be unclean seven days ... and the priest shall
make atonement for her before the LORD for the
issues of her uncleanness.
The recent controversy over television advertisements for
sanitary products suggests that constructions of menstruation
as a shameful 'curse' are still deeply entrenched in society.
The medical concept of PMS can similarly be viewed as re-
producing an image of a debilitated and often dangerous,
biologically labile woman governed by her menstrual cycle.
Despite the lack of satisfactory supporting evidence, 'PMS'
has lent scientific authority to the notion that women are
rendered unreliable, debilitated, accident-prone, mentally
unstable, violent and dangerous (Ussher, 1989, 1991; Parlee,
1974, 1989; Laws, 1985) and that woman's supposed inferiority
is rooted in her body: "the notion of menstrual lability is a
fiction linked to a fantasy, seen as a fact" (Ussher, 1991).
As Ussher (1991: 22) argues,
Whether menstruation is deemed to be woman's relic
of Eve - the punishment for the Fall - or merely a
biological phenomenon which is inherently
debilitating, the taboo ensures that, within
patriarchal culture, menstruation is conceived as
a curse .... Our blood marks us as Other - as we
bleed we fail, we fall.
The menstruating woman has, then, been negatively construed as
dirty and dangerous within a variety of socio-cultural
contexts. And the amenorrhea-ic body is inevitably construed
in relation to those discourses and discursive practices that
surround menstruation.
8.6.3 Discursive Constructions of Menstruation and Amenorrhea
Within the interview transcripts, constructions of
menstruation were most frequently negative. One way in which
this negativity was achieved was through accounts of
menstruation as painful or inconvenient.
(OLivia/Barbara, p.11)
OLivia: And un C.) it was Like one Less weight factor (...] agony and just pain and stuff.
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(Denise. p.4)
Denise: I mean practicalLy I always thought: Goodness, what about periods. They're, they're a pain.
(Nicki, p.1)
Nicki: It was the periods that really jolted me and made me angry.
H: Was there any particuLar reason why they made you feeL Like that?
Nicki: Cos of the nature of them, IN: nin/ cos they were annoying.
The negativity of periods is produced in these extracts
as a practical, factual matter. It is 'the nature of them'
that they are 'annoying' and painful. Yet, whilst menstruation
may be experienced as painful and inconvenient, experience is
'always already' located within a particular discursive
context that produces menstruation as a negative event. As
Parker (1992: 29-30; see also Riley, 1988) argues "it is not
possible to obtain knowledge about things with only an
ontological status ... without a pre-existing array of
knowledges (and techniques)." The body is only known and
experienced through its articulation in its cultural,
historical contexts (Foucault, 1977a; Riley, 1988).
Within the transcripts menstruation was also construed
negatively as a signifier of femininity. Menarche represented
an endpoint of childhood and a beginning of an unwanted
womanhood. Amenorrhea was thus construed positively as a
rejection of this adult femininity.
(Nicki, p.1)
Nicki: It was Like uh when Like when my periods started and that was when 1 first sort of you know
realised that I was becoming a woman. /K: right/ And I can remember being really angry. /H: inn! And it
was more, it was very specific. C...] I just wanted to be
	 again.
(Elaine, p.7)
Elaine: What what they would be trying to do through their anorexia?
H: Yeah. C.)
Elaine: A Lot of things. 1K: nin/ They'd be isoLating themseLves. They'd be (.) stopping their periods
and not being a woman anymore. (.) 1K: right/ They'd be C.) avoiding emotions. C.) /H: mini ALL kinds
of things like that /K: mn/ in that range.
(Cathy, pp.7-B)
Cathy: And un (.) I suppose when I started my periods, I mean I don't have periods anymore, 1K: right!
I haven't had for years. But when I started un C.) I felt angry and I wanted to be a boy.
In these extracts menstruation is construed both as a
source of anger and as a signifier of an adult femininity, of
'becoming a woman'. Amenorrhea as a symptom of anorexia thus
acquired the positive connotations of "not being a woman any
more", of escaping the femininity signified by menstruation,
of being "young again". Thus, the amenorrhea-ic body, like the
'boyishly' thin body, is discursively constituted as non-
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feminine.
Anorexia has also been interpreted as a psycho-biological
retreat into childhood (Hsu, 1984; Crisp, 1970; 1980) and a
refusal to be an adult woman (Plaut and Hutchinson, 1986).
Goodsitt (1985), for example, describes anorexia as a
symptomatic manifestation of a failure to accept female
psycho-sexual maturity. "Pubertal body changes panic her
because they mean becoming a self-sufficient adult woman"
(Goodsitt, 1985: 75). However, this interpretation is not only
problematic (see also p.217), it is also simplistic. It
involves an assumption that adult femininity is an
unproblematic, unitary category, that a refusal of the
femininity signified by menstruation is a refusal of
femininity per Se. Yet, as argued in chapter 3, femininity
might be better understood as a plural collectivity of often
contradictory representations. Menstruation may signify a
particular femininity that differs from other femininities
produced in different discourses. It may not signify 'a self-
sufficient adult' womanhood.
In Elaine's extract above, amenorrhea is associated not
simply with a refusal of womanhood but also with "avoiding
emotions" and "all kinds of things like that". The extract
suggests, therefore, a stereotypical association between
femininity and emotionality (see Bern, 1974; Broverman et al.,
1970; Nicolson, 1992). In the extract below this association
is again apparent but there are also other attributes
associated with the particular discursive construction of
femininity that is signified by the menstruating body.
(Teresa, pp.4-5)
Teresa: It (anorexia) was about not having feeLings, not having periods, not being C.) 1K: hail
emotionaL, not being vuLnerable. IH: right/ I mean vulnerability is just the one thing I couLdn't
afford. 1K: right/ And urn, aLthough I'm sure in a Lot of ways I was vulnerabLe but I mean it 1K: yeah/
un and I was very asexual. I mean I'd sleep around but I didn't have orgasms.
Menstruation is associated here with emotionality, sexuality,
vulnerability, danger and lack of control. The extract re-
produces a socially prevalent, polyvalent figure of the
'biologically labile' woman. That is, menstruation is
constructed in this extract as a signifier of a particular
femininity and amenorrhea as a symptom of anorexia is
construed as a refusal of this specific version of 'woman'
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rather than of femininity per se.
8.6.4 The Amenorrhea-ic Body and a Discourse of Cartesian
Dualism
In the extracts above the menstruating body is produced
as a signifier of a particular 'biologically labile'
femininity that is emotional, sexual, vulnerable and
dangerous. This femininity is also firmly located in the
female (menstruating) body. The very thin, amenorrhea-ic body
is construed, then, as a rejection of this particular
femininity. It is both physically and discursively dissociated
from the menstruating body and from the subjectivity that that
body signifies. In the extract below this dissociation is
particularly apparent.
p.1
Nicki: It was very specific. It was invoLved with my periods starting arid I hated them /K: right/ and
I was very annoyed and I sort of saw my body as separate thing, Like it wasn't me 1K: right!. It was
a separate thing and I was very angry 1K: right nyn/ and I wanted to sort of distant myseLf from It.
(...] It felt, weLl it felt scary IN: ,mn/ cos it feLt Like I wasn't secure (...] all of a sudden it was
doing something that was out of my control 1K: m right! and I saw it as being not me /H: am! and I
couldn't relate to it and I wanted to sort of get rid of it.
The menstruating body is construed here as uncontrolled and
dangerous, as 'scary' and as a source of insecurity. The
negative attributes signified by menstruation are firmly
located in the body which is then presented as alien to the
self. "It was a separate thing [...] it was doing something
out of my control [...] and I saw it as being not me [...]
and I couldn't relate to it". The extract draws, I would
argue, on a discourse of Cartesian dualism in which mind and
body are bifurcated. Subjectivity is constituted as a
dissembodied mind/self, dissociated from the body which is
produced as lacking in control and as alien and threatening to
the mind/self (see Bordo, 1992):
the body is the locus of all that threatens our
attempts at control. It overtakes, it overwhelms, it
erupts and disrupts. (Bordo, 1992: 94)
This discourse of Cartesian dualism constructs the body
as unruly and threatening and, at the same time, constructs a
disembodied subjectivity of mind/self. It bifurcates mind and
body,	 producing an identity dissociated from the
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(menstruating) body. Hence, the 'biologically labile'
femininity signified by and located in the menstruating body
is construed as other of the self. Amenorrhea might thus be
read as a physical and discursive consolidation of this
dissociation.
Bruch (1978) has commented that many women diagnosed as
anorexic talk of two 'warring' selves - one spiritual,
intellectual, strong-willed and 'male' and the other bodily,
uncontrollable, impure, weak-willed and 'female' (see also
Bruch, 1982; Palazzoli, 1974; Minuchin et al., 1978). This
aspect of anorexia might fruitfully be understood not so much
as an individual pathology than as the interpellation of the
subject by a socially pervasive discourse of Cartesian
dualism. Discourses of mind/body dualism have a long history
in the traditions of Christian asceticism and stoicism
(Foucault, 1988). They are also manifested in a variety of
contemporary cultural representations of the body, for
example, in the division between mental and physical illness
(Turner, 1987); in the images of bulging, unruly fat promoted
by the diet industry (Bordo, 1990, 1992) and in the horror
film genre's concern with the alien, eruptive and disruptive
body (Bordo, 1990). They set up an antagonism between mind and
body which informs a variety of cultural practices such as
dieting and exercise as well as self-starvation and purging
(Bordo, 1990; 1992), ideals of being without a body (Chernin,
1981; Bordo, 1990) and the constructions, articulated above,
of the (menstruating) body as alien and threatening.
The above extracts deploy, then, a discourse of Cartesian
dualism to construct a disembodied mind/self that transcends
the femininity signified by the menstruating body. Yet, as
indicated above (see Bruch, 1978), this mind/body duality is
also distinctly, systematically gendered. 'Woman' has
frequently been made to signify otherness (Mitchell and Rose,
1982) and bodily-ness (Crowley and Himineiweit, 1992),
particularly the sexualized body (see de Beauvoir, 1953;
Ussher, 1992a, Nicolson, 1992; Foucault, 1979), the
pathologized, defective and disruptive body (see Ussher, 1991;
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Showalter, 1985, Foucault, 1979) and the excluded body (see
Sayers, 1982; Marshall and Wetherell, 1989). And dualist
discourse re-articulates these patriarchal dichotomies that
equate woman with the body, with weakness, irrationality and
lack of control and man with the mind, with rationality,
strength and control. That is, the body of dualist discourse
is frequently figured as a feminine body. It is homologous
with constructions of the menstruating body articulated above.
In short, the discourse of Cartesian dualism, evidenced
in the extracts above, interpellates the subject as a
disembodied mind/self dissociated from the biologically labile
femininity signified by menstruation. But it simultaneously
consolidates the discursive construction of the (feminine,
menstruating) body as eruptive, threatening and alien to the
self. Ironically, menstruation can be seen as signifying both
the uncontrollability of the biologically labile woman' and
the self-division produced by dualist discourse. Like eating
and purging, menstruation transgresses the body's boundaries
and can be read as a metaphor both of uncontrolled bodily
eruption and of a disrupted self. Within a discourse of
Cartesian dualism, the very thin, amenorrhea-ic body, like the
'boyishly' thin body, is construed as non-feminine. It
signifies a dissociation both from this uncontrolled and
threatening body and from the 'biologically labile' feminine
subjectivity that that body signifies.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter has aimed to explore how the thin/anorexic
body is differently constituted by different discourses, to
show that that body sustains a multiplicity of often
contradictory meanings. Yet these discourses also converge, in
their idealization of the thin body. The analysis has focused,
however, on the ways in which, within different discourses,
this body signifies a diversity of differently gendered
subjectivities. Within romantic discourse, for example, the
thin/anorexic body is constituted as feminine and
heterosexually attractive, a signification which is
236
consolidated by constructions of the thin/anorexic body as
child-like, as small and petite, as fragile and as sick. Yet
this body is also construed as 'boyishly' thin, as non-
feminine. And this alternative representation is consolidated
in dualistic constructions of the amenorrhea-ic body as a
rejection of a bodily, 'biologically labile' femininity. These
discourses produce the thin, anorexic and amenorrhea-ic body
in very different ways. They locate it within different
power/knowledge relations (Foucault, 1979). As Foucault
(1977b: 27) argues:
power and knowledge directly imply one another;
there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at
the same time power relations.
It is "in discourse that power and knowledge are joined
together" (Foucault, 1979: 100). And it through discourses
that power permeates the body, it movements, it routines, its
sensations, its sexuality, its meanings (Foucault, l977b;
1979). The interview transcripts can be understood, therefore,
as sites of struggle over the multiplicity of meanings of the
body and over the differently gendered subjectivities that the
body signifies. They can be read as sites at which different
discourses converge upon the thin/anorexic body producing and
regulating it in a variety of ways.
237
Chapter Nine
Subjectivity and Embodiment in a
Discourse of Cartesian Dualism
9.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the analysis focused on the ways
in which the thin/anorexic body was differently gendered by
different discourses deployed in the interview transcripts.
The analysis illustrated how the thin/anorexic body sustains
a variety of often contradictory meanings and thus signifies
a number of different subjectivities. One of the discourses
that was explicated in this analysis was a discourse of
Cartesian dualism which produced the body as uncontrolled and
as threatening and alien to the disseinbodied subject position
of mind/self. This chapter extends the analysis of this
discourse. It examines how the thin/anorexic body is
constituted as a controlled body, exploring how issues of
control, subjectivity and embodiment are discursively
constructed.
9.2 The Discursive Production of Control
Several authors (e.g. Bruch, 1978; Palazzoli, 1974; see
Dittmar and Bates, 1987) have argued that anorexia is a
response to feeling out of control, that it is an attempt to
assert control by controlling the body. Bruch (1974), for
example, has argued that 'anorexics' seek control over their
bodies because they have been denied a sense of independence
and autonomy in their lives. This theme of control was also
prominent in the interview transcripts.
(Wendy, p.6)
H: Urn, what was it that made you feet that being thinner was was better? Was there something that say
being thin meant to you?
Wendy: Yes it made me feet successfuL, as if 1 was kind of (.) 1 don't know, in controL.
(Hicki, pp.2-3)
Nicki: There are a Lot of characteristics that I adnire Like being sLim IH: nail un just personaLity
features as weLL Like being strong /K: right!. Like we've just had a Lecture on physicaL attractiveness
IN: oh right?! and how people who are more attractive are rated as being more successfuL and /H: yeah/
and you know. /K: Irin/ It's the kind of idea of being in control of your Life and doing aLL your work
and sticking to deadLines and !H: m/ you know 1K: being collçetent/ sort of perfection, yeah the
perfection ideaL. IN: yeah!
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(Zoe, pp.8-9)
Zoe: Yeah and so I think, yeah I mean, they (men) Like, everyone makes you feel totaLLy guilty. I feLt
Like such a Loser because I feLt Like I couldn't controL my weight because I was overweight. 1K: right/
So there must be something wrong with me because you know: oh weLL, I didn't have enough self-controL.
And that was Like a bad, Like that gave me Like a Lower seLf-image. 1K: m/ So I was Like out to prove
everyone wrong. And no and I was Like: weLL I can't stand having peopLe think C.) that /H: right/ that
I'm not' You know what I mean? IN: yeah/ That part of my Life is out of controL. So I Like (Laughing)
went to the extreme uh other end, I guess.
The constructions of thinness evidenced here is very
different from its construction in, for example, a romantic
discourse where it signifies feminine beauty. Nevertheless, it
converges with those constructions discussed in chapter 8 in
that thinness is again construed as an ideal. In these
extracts, however, the thin/anorexic body is construed as a
controlled body. It is associated with strength, success and
perfection. It is part of "the perfection ideal" of "being in
control of your life and doing all your work and sticking to
deadlines". The thin woman is perfect because she is in
control. Conversely, fatness is construed as "bad" or "wrong"
because it indicates a lack of control: "I felt like such a
loser because I felt like I couldn't control my wei ght because
I was overweight. [...] So there must be something wrong with
me [...] I didn't have enough self-control."
Significantly, this construction of the thin/anorexic
body as a controlled body undermines alternative constructions
of anorexia as a vain and trivial pursuit of beauty (see
pp.291). A pursuit of thinness is construed here not simply as
a concern with appearance. It is also about the 'more serious'
matter of control.
The discursive construction of the thin body as
controlled can also be read as consolidating and developing
the connotations of self-care and independence that it has
within the 'be more beautiful' discourse discussed above in
which the woman is beautiful 'for herself'. Here the
thin/anorexic body signifies a woman's taking control of her
body and her life. The thin body is produced as a signifier of
a 'woman' who is in control. And this quasi-feminist 'woman'
is perhaps most clearly reified in images of 'the career
woman'
(Denise, p.2)
Denise: WeLL when I C.) I sort of un think of the future and how I'd, how I'd like to be /H: irin/ I don't
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think there's a particuLar person. I can't say you know: I want to be Like her. /H: rlght/ Urn but I
s'pose I sort of C.) I have the C.) the usuaL oLd un advert (Laughing) stereo' stereotype of a C.) of
a perfect woman, Un sort of C.) I s'pose a career woman /H: inn! because I'd Like to have a career. Ill:
mini So I s'pose that entaiLs again confidence, IN: yeah! sort of nice appearance, smart Looking, In
controL, iN: m/ confident.
As in the extracts discussed in chapter 8, the thin body
again signifies a 'perfect woman'. In these extracts, however,
the 'perfect woman' is not passive and dependent as 'she' is
in romantic discourse. Rather, 'she' is career-oriented,
smart, confident and in control. Significantly, the positive
value of being in control, like being thin, is articulated
(and read) as a self-evident truth. It does not seem necessary
to explain why control or thinness are good, nor why a thin
body should signify being in control of one's life.
9.3 A Controlled Body - A Controlled Life.
One way in which the thin body is construed as controlled
is in terms of it being the result of dietary-restraint. And
there are numerous examples in the transcripts in which
dieting and weight loss are constructed in these terms.
(MicheLLe, p.7)
MicheLLe: Urn and there are so many things in magazines (.) un about C.) diets you know how /H: right!
how you should make an effort with yourseLf, you shouLd be realLy tough /H: m/ and C.) /H: right! un
you know after Christmas the first thing you've got to do is go on this diet to get back (Laughing) some
of your IN: (Laughing) right/ seLf-controL or whatever.
(Jackie, p.10)
Jackie: I achieve aLso control IN: min/ definitely cos IN: right! you know no none of my, however much
peopLe try and make you eat no-one can (.) !H: right! you know controL 	 I mean it's sh' it's
doing what I want.
In these extracts dieting or not eating is construed as a
means of achieving control. You "go on this diet to get back
some of your [...] self-control". The thin body is valued
here not so much for its beauty as for its being the product,
the proof, of self-control. Yet many of the extracts also
evidenced a theme of restricted control. Food and body weight
are presented as the only arenas in which control is possible.
(Cathy, p.6)
H: What is it that's you're, you're eating habits and what have you help you to cope with? C.)
Cathy: With feeLing down and also I mean the classicaL thing, in controL. I mean if I know that uhm,
if I can, at Least it's something I can keep control of.
(Denise, p.9)
Denise: I didn't Like myself so, I saw myseLf as a faiLure, can't do anything right. IN: right/ And in
in a way (Laughing) that Losing weight or having troubLes around food was sort of saying: weLL I can
do this. /H: right/ You know: I'm in control of this.
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(Penny/Laura, p.5)
Penny: I didn't want to Lose, I thought I was fat. I needed to Lose weight more. Nothing was ever good
enough. Every haLf a stone I Lost I wanted to Lose another one /H: irm/ And I keep saying 'no I'LL stop
when I get to six stone, you know. It carried on so you know, it just took a snow balL and 1 couLdn't
Let go cos I wanted /14: m/ that controL that I thought I didn't have over my life.
The defiance of taking control and "doing what I want"
is immediately undercut by the construction of food and body
weight/shape as perhaps the only aspects of life where control
is possible. In signifying control, the 'boyishly'
thin/anorexic body may connote a "new freedom" from female
dependence and domesticity (see Bordo, 1990). Yet that control
is restricted to the traditional arena of female domesticity,
to food and the body (see Bynum, 1987; Brumberg, 1988).
Despite this theme of restricted control, the
thin/anorexic body simultaneously signifies a control beyond
the body and food. 'The controlled body' becomes a metonyin of
a controlled life. In the two extracts below controlling one's
eating, and therefore body shape/weight, quite explicitly
signify this total control.
(Nicki, p.5)
Nicki: If us if I'm feeLing that everything's getting on top of me /H:nin/ Like I was In my room Last
night and it was a tip and I was tired and I've got aLt these deadLines and I hadn't done the work.
/H: right/ So I hadn't done the work and aLso I'd had a row with someone and I just feLt sort of out
of controL /14: right/ and everything and then the thought of being hungry feLt so nice /14: right ,mn/
cos it'd mean, I mean if Like if I Lost weight then everything e(se'd be soLved as weLL Ill: right! cos
I'd be in control.
(Lynn/Jane/Simone, p.l2)
H: What did it mean to you that you, you didn't want to associate with, C.) us that you didn't want to
be calLed anorexic? What was (.) kind of negative about it?
Lynn: PeopLe'd probably think you're mad and /14: right! you know, yeah people think you're a bit mental
or something you know /14: right ma! I thought: no I'ni not. I'm just, I'm just thin. /H: (coughs)/ And
I'm, I'm not mentaL you know. /14: sin yeah! I'm in, you know, I'm in control with everything.
In Nicki's account of the previous evening she describes
everything as getting on top of her. There is nothing that she
is in control of. The description of her room as "a tip" works
as a metaphor for the rest of her life at that moment which
seems overwhelmingly cluttered with problems. She is tired,
she hadn't done her work, she isn't going to meet the
deadlines she has been set and she has just had a row with
someone. In contrast "the thought of being hungry felt so
nice". The 'solution' is simple: "if (she) lost weight then
everything else'd be solved as well [...) cos (she)'d be in
control." That is, losing weight signifies not just weight-
control but also total control.
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9.4 Control and a Discourse of Cartesian Dualism
In the extracts discussed above the thin/anorexic body is
produced not so much as a beautiful, feminine body than as a
controlled body. It signifies a control over one's life as
well as one's body. And, as noted above (p.239), both the
virtue of control and the construction of the thin/anorexic
body as a controlled body are presented as self-evident truths
(see also Edwards and Potter (1992) for a discussion of
'commonplaces' in discourse). These naturalized significations
are, I would argue, embeddedness in a culturally dominant
discourse of Cartesian dualism. That is, the (over) valuing of
control and the equation of control with thinness cannot be
adeqately be understood in terms of individual pathology.
Rather, the thin/anorexic body is produced as a controlled
body within a discourse of Cartesian dualism which also
idealizes control. As Bordo (1992) argues, this is a hegemonic
discourse in which themes of control converge on the body.
As discussed in the analysis of the menstruating body,
this discourse produces human existence as essentially
dichotomized into the spiritual or mental and the physical.
Whilst the mind is privileged, the body is constructed as
alien, as an enemy that confines and distracts the self and
impedes reason. It thus threatens our attempts at control and
must itself be controlled (Bordo, 1990).
The hegemony of this discourse of Cartesian dualism is
apparent in a variety of cultural practices. It has, for
example, long been manifest in much Christian literature (See
Martin et al., 1988; de Beauvoir, 1953). It's central themes
of mind divided from body and of 'the body' as potentially
eruptive and disruptive are also apparent in medical discourse
(Turner, 1987). And as Turner (1987: 2) notes "(t)he division
between physical and mental illness corresponds to a cultural
division between mind and body.tl. Dualistic themes of concern
1 The medical construction of 'the anorexic body' as sick
is, however, very different from its construction within the
dualistic discourse deployed by the women interviewed where the
thin/anorexic body signifies control.
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about managing the alien, disruptive and eruptive body are
also evidenced in popular culture, in, for example, films such
as 'Alien', 'A Teenage Werewolf in London' and 'The Thing'
(Bordo, 1990). A discourse of Cartesian dualism similarly
informs popular narratives, such as 'Flashdance' and 'Rocky',
where people succeed in life through persistent control and
mastery of the body (Bordo, 1990). It is evidenced not only in
the prevalence of eating disorders and dieting, but also, for
example, in recent cultural preoccupations with health and
exercise (Bordo, 1990). As Bordo (1992: 97-98) argues, whilst
exercise and good nutrition are, no doubt, beneficial, there
is
a subjective stance, increasingly more prominent
over the last five years, which, although
preoccupied with the body and deriving narcissistic
enjoyment from its appearance, takes little pleasure
in the experience of embodiment. Rather, the
fundamental identification is with mind (or will),
ideals of spiritual perfection, fantasies of
absolute control.
One of the most dramatic aspects of this dualistic theme is
the fantasy of dictating one's own body shape; "the thrill of
being in total charge of the shape of one's body" (Rosen,
1983: 61, quoted in Bordo, 1990: 98), a fantasy that manifests
itself not only in anorexia and in dieting but also in
normal/obsessive exercise and body building, in the fantasies
of halting the ageing process and dictating body shape that
pervade numerous advertisements for cosmetics and cosmetic
surgery (Bordo, 1990).
9.5 A Dualistic Construction of Eating
It is, then, within the socio-cultural context of this
discourse of Cartesian dualism that the body is construed as
alien and in need of control and that the thin/anorexic body
is constructed as a controlled body. The thin/anorexic body is
construed as a proof of self-control and metonymically
signifies an absolute will and a total control over one's
life. This discourse of Cartesian dualism was also apparent in
the interview transcripts. In the extracts below, for example,
eating is constructed in strongly dualistic terms, as a bodily
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desire that is therefore alien and threatens self-control.
(Erana, p.7)
Erana: You know everything that you're forbidden to have and you have to eat it all at once. iN: right!
You can't say: well no. Have this today and this tomorrow. It doesn't, you know you can't do it=
=14: Right, it just doesn't work Like that, yeah
•=Enina: Yeah and it's just the franticness that I hate /N: inn! because you do. In a way it feeLs Like
it's not me. It feels it takes over. /14: inn! It's not me saying: oh, you know do It. /14: right! It's
something coepletely C.) something coepletely dissociated from me IN: right/ that just kicks in and
says: yeah, do it you know. But I'm not thinking about it at alL. !H: right/ I have to clear up the mess
once I've done it and sort out you know what's been going on /H: riin/ because I haven't been there all
the time that that's all been happening.
H: It's Like going into automatic pilot /Enina: yeah! or
Enina: which is what I reaLly hate /14: yeah/ because you can feet it coming and I can feeL it you know.
/H: nrn/ And I try and stop it from happening but then without even thinking about it I find myself In
the kitchen and it's going /H: irin/ you know. And once it's started you can't stop IN: right! because
it's as if you know that it's in fact it's a lot easier to make yourself sick when you've eaten vast
amounts than it is when you've only eaten a littLe bit. !H: yeah! So it's much better to just Let it
run it's whole course and get it out of your system /H: win! than to stop it half way through and then
worry about not being able to get it aLl out again /14: yeah! which just sounds so crazy. I can't believe
I do it.
(Zoe, pp.9-lO)
Zoe: But us (.) then like towards the end it sometimes, in the middLe of the night I would like wake
up. !H: m/ And I would be so hungry and I'd have a spLitting headache and I felt like my senses were
just like really like wacko. /H: m/ Like I wouLd just wake up and I would be Like so aLert and I
couldn't sLeep, /H: right! Like I didn't sleep very much or you know. Yeah and like those times it,
sometimes I would like be awake at about, and I wouLd just run into the Like kitchen and Like four
o'clock in the morning, like have a bowl of cereal, Like two muffins and like toast, like and would eat
so much and then £ couldn't like, I felt Like I hod eaten half of it before I'd even realised what 1
was doing. You know /H: inn! and I was Like, you know, this is so weird.
H: It's sort of like, like it's somebody eLse doing it almost=
Zoe: Yeah, yeah or it was my body was just eating it before my mind could IN: could think about it!
was awake enough to stop it from doing it. /H: right! And that's when I started reaLizing that maybe
(.) like maybe I needed help, you know or maybe I like, felt like, a bit like I was something, Like I
was out of control (ike weight-wise.
H: Right so it was the kind of like binging in the night rather than the=
=Zoe: Yeah so then I would wake up but, but when by the time I woke up the next day I'd be like: wait
a minute. I can't believe I (reaLly did that Last night). So then I wouldn't eat like a whole day. !H:
right! C.) Yeah but that was like right, like when my friends, Like that's when like I started Like
feeling maybe. (.) I, I started feeling like food was trying to control my life and I wanted to break
away from it because that's all I could think about twenty-four hours a day and I couLdn't concentrate
on anything else.
The subjective experience of eating is constructed here within
a discourse of Cartesian dualism. Mind and body are
dichotomized and eating is construed as a bodily desire and,
therefore, as entirely alien. Thus, "my body was just eating
before my mind could (
... J was awake enough to stop it from
doing it." "In a way it feels like it's not me. It feels j
takes over. [...] It's not me saying: oh, you know do it.
(...] It's something completely (.) something completely
dissociated from me [...] that just kicks in and says: yeah,
do it you know. But I'm not thinking about it at all." Eating
is thus produced as an activity that belongs to the body
rather than the self/mind. It is therefore alien and something
to which the self/mind is opposed. One "tr(ies) to stop it
from happening" but "it takes over" when the mind/self is too
sleepy or is "not thinking", when the self/mind is not
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vigilantly in control of the body and its desires. The
relationship between the self/mind and the alienated body is
produced as a conflict.
This discourse also produces a fragmentated subjectivity,
an alienation of the experience of eating from 'the self'.
Emma, for example, describes how "(she has)n't been there all
the time that that's all been happening". She was temporarily
absent from her own activity. Significantly, this alien,
eating body is constructed not only as alien, as out of 'the
self's' control but also as uncontrollable. Eating is not only
an occasion when the body, something that is "not me", "takes
over" and triumphs in the conflict between mind/self and body.
'The eating body' is simultaneously a manifestation of
"franticness". It makes a mess. "Once its started you can't
stop". Thus, like 'the menstruating body, 'the eating body' is
constructed as Other and as "the locus of all that threatens
our attempts at control. It overtakes, it overwhelms, it
erupts and disrupts" (Bordo, 1992: 94).
In short, the deployment of a discourse of Cartesian
dualism involves then the construction of 'eating' as a bodily
desire and therefore as alien to the mind/self. And
characteristically of dualist discourse this (eating) body is
construed in an opposition to the mind/self as frantic and
uncontrolled. Eating can thus be understood as threatening to
'the self' both because its discursive construction is located
within a discourse which fragments subjectivity into mind and
body and because within this discourse it is construed as an
occasion in which the uncontrollable, messy, frantic body
triumphs over the mind/self, in which self(-control) is lost.
Moreover, eating, like menstruation (see pp.220-245), can be
seen as a metaphor for the transgression of the self's
boundaries, representing ambiguity of internal/external,
me/not divides and thus the dissolution of the self.
9.6 Dualistic Constructions of Food
9.6.1 Food as Temptation
It is within this discursive context that I would argue
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one might better understand the importance of 'the thin body'
as a signifier of control and the constructions articulated by
Emma and Zoe above of 'food' as something that one must get
out of one's body or that is "trying to control (one's)
life". In the extracts below 'food' is simultaneously wanted
and forbidden. Within this dualistic discourse it is an object
of bodily desire and is therefore a temptation which threatens
the self's control.
(LayLa, p.10)
H: What did what did tin food mean to you? Did=
=LayLa: jjj Wherr! /H: uh/ C.)
	
/H: right/ I Loved food. I Loved food C.) but that meant C.) fat
belLies, /H: m/ (.) fat Legs, fat bottom, ugLiness, C.) unaesthetic, /H: right/ dangerous.
(Zoe, p.9)
Zoe: Like food was Like, I used to, Like I wouLd love, Like if I feLt bad I realise I'd Love to just
go eat because you couLd do that by yourseLf. I mean it's not Like you needed anyone eLse to do it with
you. /H: right/ You know so that used to make me feel better. /H: right/ But then I saw food, yeah,
food's my enemy and I Like hated it. /H: right/ I mean, you know what I mean?
(Lynn/Jane/Simone, p.17)
Lynn: Used to think it was something irfl and disgusting. /H: mii/
Jane: And I'd feel a failure /H: yeah/ if I gave in an' (inaud.)
Simone: There was also that littLe part that reaLty wanted it as weLl /Jane: yeah/ wasn't there. LittLe
part that and then you'd be so cross with yourself for feeling that /Jane: m/ and actually thinking:
(Laughing) God that would be quite nice actuaLLy.
Food is "quite nice", "wanted", "liked" and "loved". But it
is also "dirty and disgusting", "dangerous", an "enemy",
"scary" and "hated". There is an enormous tension in this
discursive construction of 'food' — a "love-hate
relationship". It is wanted but it is also the cause of "fat
bellies [...] fat legs, fat bottom, ugliness". However, 'food'
is construed negatively not simply as a cause of fatness. In
the extract below food is also construed as poisonous and
life-threatening. It is constructed as an object of temptation
in the struggle of the self/mind/will against the body.
(Penny/Laura, p.11)
Penny: In the beginning the food, it was a Love-hate relationship /H: right/ tin really, more hate. It
just, it was just that I was interested in everything you know, food magazines, TV, anything. Ill: rni/
A discussion with food you'd guarantee I'd be on it, in on it. Diets. It was aLL, so food became the
centre of my Life. First thing, wake up, what do I think of? Food. /H: ,rin/ Food, food, food. But then
almost towards, you know as it progressed food became almost poison to me. I thought I'd be poisoning
/H: right/ my system if I was going to aLLow myself to have anything. (...]
Laura: I think it's because I knew I Liked the taste /H: right/ that I, that I was frightened that I,
you know I knew I liked the taste of it. I wouLdn't, it just became, I didn't want to Let myself Like
It if you see what I mean. (...1
Penny: I didn't see the food as life sustaining. I saw it as life-threatening /Laura: threatening/.
'Food' assumes an enormous importance in this extract. It
"became the centre of (Penny's) life". The extremity of its
negative construction as a life-threatening poison is, I would
argue, indicative of its construction within a discourse of
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Cartesian dualism in which food is the temptation of a bodily
desire which threatens the control of the mind/self. Food is,
therefore, necessarily construed in terms of a love-hate
relationship since it is at once desired, tempting and also
forbidden, bad, and a threat to one's attempts at control and
therefore to the integrity of the self/mind.
9.6.2 Food as a Metaphor for Dependence
The tension in the dualistic construction of 'food' as
temptation is, I would argue, further increased by a
suppressed, barely manifest construction of "food as life
sustaining". Food is not only both loved and hated it is also
both necessary and dangerous.
(Nicki, p.7)
Nicki: I know 1 I know that you have to eat to Live but un C.) when at the time It seemed Like an awfuL
thing to do /H: rml/ and re' Like disgusting thing to do.
In being actually necessary food/'food' indicates a dependency
which, I would argue, can function as a metaphor for other
forms of dependence, for example, social dependence on the
mother or on a man, relationships that may be both wanted and
threatening and that are frequently discursively constructed
as necessary and/or dangerous. In figuring as a metaphor for
dependence on men this construction of 'food' again resonates
with the romantic discourse discussed above. It also brings to
mind a 'standard' psychoanalytic interpretation of anorexia as
a fear of (oral) impregnation (see p.49). The discursive
construction of food as both life-sustaining and life-
threatening is, I would argue, reminiscent of adages such as
'Can't live with them. Can't live without them'. Food refusal
might, then, be read as a resistance to constructions of 'the
self' as (femininely) dependent.
As a metaphor for dependence on the mother 'food' might
also be read as a reference to the mother-daughter
relationship. As discussed in chapter 2, numerous authors have
attempted to imbricate the 'anorexogenic' mother in the
daughter's 'anorexia'. Bruch (1973), for example, argues that
disturbances in the early mother-child feeding relationship
are central in its aetiology. Whilst I have argued that such
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attempts at identifying a universal aetiology are profoundly
problematic (see also Malson, 1992) I would suggest that the
prominence of 'the mother' in much of the literature on
anorexia indicates the cultural significance of discourses
which construct 'the mother' as a provider of food, as almost
wholly responsible for her children's welfare, and as
potentially dangerous (in this case to her daughter). It also
indicates the cultural importance of 'the mother', and hence
the mother, in the constituting of our identities as
daughters, as women. It is significant, then, that Bruch
(1973) further argues that disturbances in this mother-child
relationship result in a curtailed development of
individuation, in a lack of sense of autonomy in the child, in
"dif fuse ego-boundaries" . And as argued above, 'eating' may
itself signify a transgressing of the self's boundaries and an
ambiguity in the me/not me divide.
9.6.3 Construing Food as Fearful
Within a discourse of Cartesian dualism food is
constructed as an object of temptation. It is both loved and
hated, a tension which is further increased when 'food' is
also deployed as a metaphor for dependence, that is, as both
necessary and threatening. In the extracts below this
construction of 'food' as fearful is very apparent.
(MichelLe, pp.14-15)
Michelle: Urn C.) it's nice to have (.) control over what you're doing /H: rn'n/ and therefore what you're
not doing. 1K: ,rnn/ Urn C.) it's like j' it's good to do whatever you want to do /H: m/ and not C.)
(laughing) be forced /N: (laughing) right/ into everything. /H: yeah/ Uun C.) now that I know the
calorie value of everything it's sort of makes things (Laughing) very scary. /H: right/ A cream cakes
1K: (coughs)/ a cream cake can be really threatening and frightening C...] I know how many calories are
in that cake C.) just by Looking at it C.) /H: right/ Um C.) also I know that food's got a Lot of power
over me because if I start C.) if I start eating and sort of C.) if I don't have that control then I
could quite easily C.) blow it. C.) That's a day's dieting gone.
(Jackie, p.11)
Jackie: Yeah every I mean when I came in here food, even Literally an orange (.) /H: right/ I
couldn't eat C.) anything. I mean even I was C.) could hardly even drink. I was so terrified of the fact
that I would put on weight (laughing) if I had any /N: right nin/ C.) anything in me. (.) IN: yeah/ I
think before I was like that as well, IN: rrin/ I mean terrif', I mean before I wouLd eat fruit C.) I
wouldn't eat vegetables because I was too scared of them.
(Cathy, pp.13-14)
Cathy: You'lL find that I never say f double o d uh. There are certain words IN: right/ that are just
taboo. uhm such as e a t i n g as well. I wouldn't say that to save my life. Uhm.
K: What is it that you dislike about all those words?=
=Cathy: Cos they connote nice things. And the whole process is horrible. I don't like having, I took
at these things (indicates the ribena carton she is holding) as being poison and I don't want poison
in my body and I want to be cleansed inside. Even if I have water 1 get really paranoid, you know.
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IIn these extracts the discursive construction of 'food' as
temptation, as simultaneously "nice" and "horrible", is still
apparent but it is predominantly construed as "frightening",
as having "a lot of power over " and as threatening to one's
attempts at control. 'It' is scary, "poison" and "suspect".
Even the words 'food' and 'eating' are taboo. Cathy "wouldn't
say that to save (her) life".
Such formulations might be described as manifestations of
individual pathology, for example, of 'dysfunctional beliefs'
or faulty cognitions (see pp.35-41). Yet the construction of
'food' - "cream cakes", "vegetables", "even [...) water" - as
a profoundly threatening temptation is homologous with more
mundane formulations of food as, for example, 'naughty but
nice'. Cathy's refusal to say the words 'food' or 'eating'
might similarly be described as obsessional (see e.g. Ilolden,
1990), as evidence of individual pathology. However, I would
argue that the construction of 'food' as scary, powerful,
poison, and taboo, whilst extreme, may be better understood in
its cultural and discursive context rather than as evidence of
individual pathology. For example, Cathy's spelling out of
these taboo words evokes a number of analogous cultural
phenomena such as cultural or religious prohibitions against
the use of particular words such as sexual words or God's
name; situations where adults spell out words to prevent
children from understanding 'forbidden' subjects; or Oscar
Wilde's reference to "the love that dare not speak its name".
Each of these examples involves objects or desires that are
simultaneously forbidden or fearful and also wanted. That is,
like 'food', the object whose name is taboo is construed as
tempting and threatening. It is controlled through a
prohibition against naming it. A refusal to say the words
'food' or eating' might, therefore, be understood as a
deployment of a particular cultural, discursive practice in a
further attempt to control one's body and food, to control the
temptation that threatens the integrity of the mind/self.
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9.7 Dualistic Constructions of Body Fat
9.7.1 Alien Fat
The discursive construction of 'the thin body' as a
controlled body can thus be understood as an element of a
dualistic discourse in which 'food' is constructed as
temptation and 'eating' as a bodily desire and thereby as
alien and threatening to self-control. Within this discourse
'the body' is both a counterpoint to and a metaphor for the
mind. Thinness signifies the mind's triumph over the body and
its desires (see Bordo, 1992). It signifies control and
therefore the integrity of 'the self'. In contrast, fatness is
construed negatively as it is in the extracts below where the
dualistic theme of the alienated body is explicitly centred on
fat. That is, 'fat' comes to signify the body. It is flesh,
both "the human body and its physical or sensual nature as
opposed to the soul or spirit" and also "excess weight; fat"
(Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus, 1987; Collins English
Dictionary, 1986).
(Enna, p.6)
Eima: I don't want to be sort of aesthetically beautiful. 1K: rin/ I want to Lose the fat. /K: right/
And that's the only way that I ever look at it. I don't think to myself: right if I could get rid of
the fat then, you know, people would Look at me in the street, then everybody would find me more
attractive. /14: irvn/ It's just I C.) I hate it. I hate it being in me and it feels compLetely aLien /14:
right/ and I just want it away. You know. I want it off. /H: right! But I don't realty know C.) what
it is, the goaL of it at the end of it /H: ITJU/ you know. Because I'm not going to be able to change me
intrinsically and I can't change my face which is what's on show most the time anyway. 1K: yeah! It's
just, it's just the fat. I just hate it. It just doesn't feeL like it should be part of me /H: m/ you
know. It feels all wrong. /44: yeahl And I feel to a certain extent that something I did a few years ago
has forced it to be there and now I've got to force it to go away again 1K: right/ you know.
(MichelLe, p.18)
Michelle: So women just get more and more uncomfortable with themselves cos they're , as they get older
they're getting more and more fat /14: yeah/ Laid down and everything.
One of the dominant features of these extracts is that
'fat' is construed both as bad and as "completely alien". It
is a hated enemy, something to be got rid of: "I just wanted
it away. I want it fi". And it is also a cause of
ontological anxiety and estrangement of 'the self' from the
body. Emma, for example, describes fat as something that "just
doesn't feel like it should be part of (her)". Like the
menstruating body (see pp.220-236), fatness is produced as
other of the self. That Emma's desire "to lose the fat" is
constructed within a dualistic discourse is further reinforced
by her refusal here of other possible interpretations. She
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does not want to lose the fat so that she would be
"aesthetically beautiful", so that "everybody would find (her)
more attractive". Yet she can not produce an alternative
motivation. She does not "know [...) the goal of it at the
end of it". "(T)o lose the fat" appears to be a goal in and of
itself. Noticeably, however, Emma concludes that maybe the fat
is "forced to be there" because of something she has done in
the past and that she must therefore "force it to go away
again". This statement, I would argue, evokes a sense of
penitence, a struggle against evil/fat in which the fat was
forced on her as a form of punishment for which she must make
amends by losing it. Losing fat then is constructed as a means
of self-salvation. This construction resonates with the themes
of salvation and rescue of romantic discourse. But it also
deploys a moralistic theme of punishment and atonement. The
state of 'the body' is both a counterpoint to and a metaphor
for the state of the mind/soul. The body/fat is an enemy to
'the self'. It must be controlled and reduced. But it also
symbolizes 'the self'. Fat signifies that 'the self' is bodily
rather than controlled and 'spiritual'. Hence, getting rid of
fat is construed as a quasi-spiritual struggle against the
body2.
9.7.2 Fat is a Moral Issue
Within this discourse of Cartesian dualism 'the body',
and specifically 'fat' as a signifier of bodilyness, is
constructed as other of the mind/self and as alien, eruptive,
excessive and disgusting. And, as argued above, the struggle
2• If the past event to which Emma refers, physically cause
her to gain weight then the delay in its effects seems
inexplicable. When asked what this event might have been she
replied "1 don't know. I don't know whether it's a change in
eating behaviour or what it was [...) or whether just you know
hitting a certain age changed my metabolism." Both the vagueness
surrounding the nature of this past transgression and the
reference to "hitting a certain age" suggest that the
transgression may have been becoming a woman. Orbach (1993: 44)
has similarly argued that "Since women must not eat they know not
how to eat or what they wish to eat. They live in the shadow of
Eve. They have all sinned."
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against the body/fat may be constructed as a moral or
spiritual struggle. In the extracts below, this moralistic
theme is particularly apparent.
(Nicki, p.7)
Nicki: It's just the whoLe seLf, my whoLe self-Like-worth was based on how smaLL I was /H: right/ and
each pound like increasing was Like I was worse /H: right/. And it's that important.
H: Mm, is there some, was there something that you could say why it was that, that each pound made you
feeL worse?
Nicki: I s'pose it was more of me Living in the worLd, or more of my body /H: rm/.
(Jane/Lynn/Simone, p.16)
Jane: So I just wanted to get rid of aLL this weight an' /H: right/ C.) It made me feet I was better
cos there was Less fat /H: nmI/ as if there was Less /H: nin/ bad. /H: ma nin/ And then once a nurse,!
was in hospitaL I went down to three stone twelve C.) and she stood me in front of this fuLL Length
mirror and said: Look at you, for goodness sake. You know and I stood there and said: but I've got to
Lose another stone cos Look at aLL the fat and the eviL in my eyes. She sort of Like: What. (Laughs)
She didn't quite know what to say /H: ,rm/ and I mean I was reaLLy serious /H: mini. I just wanted to get
down to Like a stone or something. C...] And also un (.) I used to (Laughing) hate myseLf. I used to
think I was reaLly bad and eviL person. And I thought the more weight I Lost the more eviL I could get
rid of so /H: right/ the better pers' C.) the better a person I'd be. /H: m/ So I just wanted to get
rid of aLL this weight an' IN: right/ C.) it made me feeL I was better cos there was Less fat /H: nin/
as if there was Less /H: m/ bad.
In these extracts fat is quite dramatically constructed as
morally bad. Its negativity resonates with the numerous other
negative discursive construction of 'fat' in the various
discourses that converge on the body, consolidating and re-
consolidating 'the fat body' as a negative term. For Nicki
"each pound increasing was like (she) was worse." Her whole
self-worth was based on there being less of her body, less
fat, living in the world. Similarly Jane described wanting "to
get rid of all this weight" despite being so thin because she
"thought the more weight (she) lost the more evil (she) could
get rid of". "{I)t made (her) feel better cos there was less
fat [...] as if there was less bad." Fat/flesh/body is
construed as morally bad. Within this discourse losing weight
has little to do with becoming more physically attractive.
Rather it is constructed as an attempt to increase one's self-
worth, to become a better person by reducing one's body as
much as possible. However emaciated one may be there is still
a desire to lose more weight. The 'ideal' body here is a non-
body (see also Bordo, 1990) rather than a physically beautiful
body.
To construe one's whole self-worth in terms of how small
one is, on "each pound", to so explicitly construe fat as
morally bad or even evil might be interpreted as "a 'side
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show' experience", separating the 'normal' audience from those
on view" (see Bordo, 1990: 85). Yet, I would argue that the
discursive construction explicated here of 'fat' as alien and
as morally bad (and therefore of the 'fat' person as bad) is
a cultural discursive construction rather than an individual
aberration. That is, 'fat' is produced here as a signifier of
bodilyness and this dualistic construction of fat/flesh/body
as other of the self/soul and as morally corrupt is also
manifest in a variety of cultural contexts. Turner (1987: 26),
for example, notes that:
within medical discourse the body still has an
ambiguous location despite the secularization of
medical viewpoints. While obesity is stigmatized in
popular culture (Cahnman, 1968) it is also the case
that in the 1950s obesity was increasingly defined
as a medical problem ... While the current medical
view is less dogmatic about the negative effects of
obesity, especially in relation to stress and heart
disease, there is still a widespread moral
condemnation of obesity as indicative of an absence
of personal control.
As argued above, a discourse of Cartesian dualism informs a
variety of cultural, discursive practices such as medicine and
cultural preoccupations with health and exercise and other
contemporary forms of body management. This discourse has also
quite clearly informed various 'technologies of the self' (see
Foucault, 1988) from pagan and early Christian practices to
the present which, as Foucault argues (1988: 17), have
been diffused across Western culture through
numerous channels and integrated with various types
of attitudes and experiences so that it is difficult
to isolate and separate it from our own spontaneous
experiences.
That is, this discourse of Cartesian dualism, explicated
above, has long been embedded in a variety of cultural
practices and 'technologies of the self'.
The construction of 'fat as morally bad, as corrupt and
corrupting can be found in, for example, Christian doctrine.
In 'The Book of St. Thomas' Jesus claims that "(t)hose who
have not received the revealed doctrine are ignorant and,
thus, renounced. Their soul has been corrupted by the body and
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by the world" (from Martin, 1988: 56). Similarly St. Paul
states: "(i)n the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are
gathered together, and my spirit with the power of our Lord
Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one (a sinner) unto Satan for
the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in
the day of the Lord Jesus." (1 Cor. 5: 4-5) "Meat for the
belly, and the belly for meat: but God shall destroy both it
and them" (1 Cor: 6: 13). The apparently extreme construction
of fat/flesh/body discussed above can, therefore, be
culturally located.
In particular I would argue that this aspect of the
dualistic construction of 'fat' can be traced to the
technology of Christian asceticism with its "theme of the
renunciation of the flesh" (see Foucault, 1988: 17). And these
traces of Christian asceticism are also evidenced in the
discursive construction of 'control' itself, that is, in the
construction of 'control' as denial rather than as just
conscious and deliberate self-determination 3 . Controlling
one's food is about resisting temptation, denying the body and
its desires and "never, never allowing myself to [...] to have
any of it". 'Controlled' eating is about not eating or, at
least, eating very little. This construction of 'control' as
a denial of the body and its desires is, I would argue,
prevalent not only in the interview transcripts but also in
society's disciplinary discourses about the management of body
weight, shape and food. It precludes, for example, the
possibility of describing a fat body as controlled however
consciously or determinedly that fatness is acquired or
maintained. It refuses the possibility that eating a lot could
be anything other than a lack of control. A discourse of
Cartesian dualism, informed by a Christian asceticism, is, I
would argue, so prevalent that now:
Food for literally millions of women - and here I
wish to stress that, horrifying as it is to confront
. Christian asceticism is also still evidenced in religious
practices. A devout Christian student recently died whilst
fasting in an attempt to grow nearer to God (South Today News,
BBC1, 6.3Opm, 21.10.93).
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this reality, I do mean millions of women — is ,
combat zone, a source of incredible tension, the
object of the most fevered desire, the engenderer of
tremendous fear, and the recipient of a medley of
projections centring round notions of good and bad.
(Orbach, 1993: 43, my emphasis)
Chernin (1981) also describes as 'a cultural norm' the unease
and hatred that many women feel towards their bodies. She
reports, for example, that 190 of the 500 participants of a
recent survey replied that 'getting fat' was what they feared
most in the world (see also pp.55-71) whilst Ferguson (1983:
68-70) in her study of women's magazines between 1949 and 1974
found that
'self-control' was the most frequent and visible
value held up to females ... Towards the self it was
associated with beauty admonitions against 'letting
yourself go' — putting on weight or looking a mess,
or sexual commandments 'not to let yourself go'.
The constructions of 'fat' as morally bad and of weight
reduction as a quasi-spiritual struggle against the body are
also evidenced in the jingoistic phrases used by the diet
industry such as 'fight the flab', 'burning off' calories or
fat, and 'fatbuster' diets (see Bordo, 1990) and in the
widespread moral condemnation of fat as a signifier of lack of
personal control (Turner, 1987). The construction of 'fat' as
a negative term is a cultural commonplace, evidenced in a
variety of discourses. That 'it' is repeatedly re-produced as
bad in different discourses not only consolidates its
negativity. It also allows its construction as morally bad to
appear mundane.
(Zoe p.12)
Zoe: Like if you're, if you're not super-slim you're not as good a person as someone who is.
(ALison, p.?)
Alison: It's not easy you know Ill: right/ (.) with food and things an' (.) when you've been on a diet
an' you've been sort of strict with yourseLf and you (.) you've been good to Lose the weight C.) you
you feel guilty because you C.) it's sort of been sort of hard work and then C.) to have something you
know (.) sort of sort of high in calories would be Like us C.) sort of like us (.) a defeat for like
your diet sort of thing.
In contrast with some of the extracts discussed above,
these extracts appear unremarkable. "(I)f you're not super-
slim you're not as good a person as someone who is". It is
"good" to be "strict with yourself" and "to lose the weight".
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"(Y)ou feel guilty" if you break your diet. Such formulations
may appear more familiar, more 'normal', but I would argue
that they nevertheless articulate the same moral theme
identified in the more dramatic ascetic, construction of 'fat'
as morally bad.
9.8 The 'Ideal' of the Non-body
The discursive construction of 'fat' as morally bad can,
then, be culturally located in a discourse of Cartesian
dualism and in a tradition of Christian asceticism. The
dualistic construction of fat/flesh/body as morally corrupt
and corrupting and the Christian ascetic theme of 'the
renunciation of the flesh' result in the 'ideal' of a non-
body. This ideal is evident both in the interview transcripts
and in a variety of cultural contexts. As Bordo (1990: 89-90)
notes:
the construction of the body as an alien attacker,
threatening to erupt in an unsightly display of
bulging flesh is a ubiquitous cultural image. Until
the last decade excess weight was the target of most
ads for diet products: today, one is more likely to
find the enemy constructed as bulge, fat or "flab".
"Now" (a typical ad runs) ... Have a nice shape with
no tummy." To achieve such results (often envisioned
as the absolute eradication of the body: e.g. "no
tummy") a violent assault on the enemy is usually
required.
(Layta, pp.5-6)
H: What did sLinress mean to you when you started to become anorexic? C.)
LayLa: Uh (short Laugh) un C.) first of ML C.) having no tumiies or no great bottoms /K: nyu and having
nice C.) thighs, thin (.) thighs.
(Tricia, p.8)
Tricia: Except for C.) I mean I'm stiLL trying to sort of get myseLf reaLty down here but uh IH: right/
I mean at one time I remember feeLing C.) I was so up reaLLy out of my body /K: nri/ that I remember sort
of C.) looking in a mirror and being actuaLLy surprised that I saw a form in the mirror 1K: right/ and
not just a nothingness.
(Jane, p.16)
Jane: I went down to three stone twelve (...] I mean I was reaLLy serious 1K: lrni/. I just wanted to get
down to Like a stone or something.
Here the ideal is not merely a thin body but "no
tummies", "no great bottoms"; not just a reduction but an
eradication of the body. Hence however emaciated one might be
there is still a desire to lose more weight, "to get down to
like a stone or something". The 'ideal' body becomes an
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impossibility since it is a non-body, a predicament expressed
by Ellen West who wrote: "I must now be able to look at my
ideal, this ideal of being thin, of being without a body and
to realize: 'It is a fiction" (quoted by Chernin, 1981: 20).
Noticeably, however, there is a slippage between 'thinness'
and no body. In Layla's extract, for example, 'jj tummies' is
interchangable with 'thin thighs'. That is, the impossible,
the non-body, is signified by the possible, the thin/anorexic
body. Whereas the fat body signifies bodilyness, the very
thin/anorexic body signifies a non-body. As a signifier of
control 'the thin/anorexic body' is similarly produced as
representing a triumph of the self/mind over the body.
Moreover, whilst fat is a material, bodily substance, thin is
not. Getting thinner involves a literal dematerialization of
the body. This discursive construction of the thin body as a
signifier of a non-body might also be read in parallel with
psychoanalytic interpretations of 'anorexia' as an attempt to
reduce the body to a phallic symbol (Sayers, in press/a, in
press/b). The discursive construction of the thin/anorexic
body as a phallic symbol rather than as a body converges with
both the dualistic construction of the non-body discussed
above and with constructions of the thin/anorexic body as non-
feminine or masculine. Its construction as a phallic symbol
also consolidates the power signified by the thin/anorexic
body in the discourse of Cartesian dualism.
9.9 The Thin/Anorexic Body as Powerful
The discursive construction of the thin/anorexic body
both as a controlled body and as a signifier of an 'ideal'
non-body can be located then within a discourse of Cartesian
dualism in which the body represents both a counterpoint to
and a metaphor for the mind, spirit, or will (see Bordo,
1990). Within this discourse food is constructed as bodily
temptation and 'eating' is thus construed as an alien activity
which threatens 'the self's' control and hence the integrity
of the self/mind. It represents a triumph of an
uncontrollable, frantic body, over the mind/self. This
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discourse thus divides subjectivity into mind and body and the
hated uncontrollability of this body is focused on fat which
metonymically signifies flesh and the body. Yet whilst this
discourse produces a divided subjectivity it also firmly
consolidates a positive construction of the thin/anorexic body
as a controlled body and as a signifier of power.
(Elaine, p.8)
Elaine: When I actualLy started to to starve it wasn't because I wanted to diet. It was because I wanted
to starve. C.) /K: nin/ And I don't know when I started getting on the scaLes aLl the time but C.) 1K:
right/ Losing weight suddenly became a C.) I suppose a powerfuL thing you know Like C.) /K: right/ I
reaLLy Liked it. It made me feel good.
(Teresa, p.5)
Teresa: There's something about being anorexic can be powerfuL. 1K: right! Urn, passivity is linked in
my mind to being fat and to being indulgent, /H: right! to being out of controL. 1K: m, yeah! C.) And
I remember I used to Long for food. I used to realty tong but I wouldn't Let myseLf have It. 1K: nai/
I'd be very weak.
(Nicki, p.5)
Nicki: If I didn't have it (anorexia), if I wasn't thin /H: imil then I wouLdn't have an Identity. I'd
just be this big bad blob.
H: Righ' m. What sort of identity did you feel it was or it is or whatever?
Nicki: It was un it was very powerfuL. /K: m/ It made me feel good and in controL.
(Lynn/Simone/Jane, p.21)
Lynn: I wanted to go on and (inaud) IN: right/ and never Look back. 1...] 1 thought: No, I've got this
far, go on. 1K: m C.) yeah/ So I just kept on, going Like from strength to strength.
In these extracts the fat body represents alien,
uncontrollable bodilyness, "passivity", "indulgence", failure,
and "being a big bad blob". In contrast "(t)here's something
about being anorexic that can be powerful." "(I)t was very
powerful. (...] It made me feel good and in control"; "losing
weight suddenly became a (.) I suppose a powerful thing". The
thin/anorexic body is positively construed as signifying power
and control, a construction which converges with readings of
'the anorexic body' as a phallic symbol (see p.257). Here, the
thin/anorexic body is proof of denial of the body and its
desires and it thus signifies the mind/self's control,
strength and integrity. 'It' is an affirmation of 'the self'.
As Bynum (1987 :216) notes from the medieval 'Sayings of the
Fathers': "(a)s the body waxes fat, the soul grows thin; and
as the body grows thin, the soul by so much waxes fat" 4 . The
' Whilst not wishing to suggest that the ascetic fasting of
aedieval female saints can be retrospectively diagnosed as
r anorexia nervosa' (see chapter 6) I would argue that dualistic
liscourse represents a site of convergence between the two
henomena (see also Bordo, 1990).
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power of the (very) thin/anorexic body, as it is constructed
within dualist discourse is specifically located in the mind
or will rather than the body. The thinner the body, the
stronger the soul/mind/self. Thus, despite being "very weak"
Teresa is still "powerful" because she can deny the body. She
can maintain a thin/anorexic body that signifies a non-body.
In this respect the dualist discourse identified in the
interview transcripts differs significantly from the
technology of Christian asceticism and, I would argue, more
closely resembles a Stoic technology of the self (see
Foucault, 1988; Martin, 1988). That is,
in Christianity asceticism always refers to a
certain renunciation of the self and of reality
because most of the time your self is a part of that
reality you have to renounce in order to get access
to another level of reality (Foucault, 1988: 43)
The renunciation of the flesh and
(p)enitence of sin doesn't have as its target the
establishment of an identity but serves instead to
mark the refusal of the self ... Self-revelation is
at the same time self-destruction" (Foucault, 1988:43)5.
In contrast with this ascetic theme of self-renunciation,
the extracts above present the thin/anorexic body as a
signifier of a powerful identity. Whereas the fat body
signifies a lack of identity, being a "big bad blob", the
thin/anorexic body signifies a powerful identity: "it was very
powerful. [...] It made me feel good and in control." Starving
and being thin are constructed here as providing identity.
They are self-productive rather than self-destructive.
Thus, whilst the dualistic discourse identified in the
interviews evidences traces of Christian asceticism it is not
synonymous with an ascetic technology of the self. In its
construction of the thin/anorexic body as a signifier of a
powerful identity this discourse evidences traces of Stoicism
. The meaning of self-destruction is not, however, absent
:om constructions of the thin/anorexic body and is discussed in
iapters 11 and 12.
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in which "practices of abstinence ... establish and test the
independence of the individual with regard to the external
world" (Foucault, 1988: 37). This discourse interpellates the
(thin/anorexic) abstinent subject as powerful, strong-willed,
controlling and independent.
Thinness is then culturally over-determined as a positive
term. Within the different discourses that converge on the
body it is, for example, produced as beautiful and feminine
but also, conflictingly, as powerful, controlling, and
independent. Within both the romantic and the dualistic
discourses the thin body is positively construed yet these
discourses produce the body very differently. In addition, in
romantic discourse the thin/anorexic body signifies a feminine
subjectivity that is defined in terms of the (beautiful) body.
In a discourse of Cartesian dualism, however, it signifies a
subjectivity in antithesis to the body. This subjectivity is,
at least ostensibly, genderless since the thin/anorexic body
signifies a mind/self that in controlling/denying the body and
its desires, is not bodily. In signifying a transcendence of
the body it may also signify a transcendence of femininity, as
the extract below (which immediately precedes Teresa's extract
above) illustrates.
(Teresa, p.5)
Teresa: It was something to do with not, not being in my body.
H: Right, Like being ethereaL in some respects?
Teresa: Yes, being C.) transcending, /H: nin/ transcending my position, my sexuaLity /H: nin/ cos my
sexuaLity was vuLnerabLe.
H: Was it anything sort of particuLar about the P the idea of femaLe sexuaLity that (inaud.)?
Teresa: Urn C.) weLL passivity /H: m/ again. /14: right/ There's something about being anorexic can be
powerfuL.
In this extract the powerful, independent 'self'
signified by the thin/anorexic body is constructed as
transcending the body and therefore (feminine) gender. It can
therefore be read as a rebellion against (patriarchally
defined) femininity (see also Orbach, 1993), a reading that is
consolidated by the construction of 'the anorexic body' as
'too thin' to be attractive and as a parody of contemporary
prescriptions of 'feminine beauty' (see Selig, 1988). More
specifically I would argue that the taking up of the subject
position signified by the (very) thin body in dualist
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discourse could be read as a refusal of gendered identity. As
Riley (1988: 103) argues "the body is only periodically lived
and treated as sexed"; there are different 'densities' of
gender. Similarly, Lacan (1972-3, quoted by Rose, 1982: 27)
questions whether 'woman' "takes on anything whatsoever of her
fate". The production of the thin/anorexic body in dualist
discourse provides, I would argue, a subject position that, at
least ostensibly, transcends the problems of gender and hence
of 'feminine' identity.
The question of how far anyone can take on the
identity of being a woman in a thoroughgoing manner
recalls the fictive status accorded to sexual
identities by some psychoanalytic thought. How could
someone 'be a woman' through and through, make a
final home in that classification without suffering
claustrophobia" (Riley, 1988: 6).
The interpellation of the very thin 'self' in this discourse
constitutes 'the self' as powerful, strong, and independent.
In signifying a dissembodied subjectivity, the thin/anorexic
body thereby signifies a genderless 'self'. In transcending
the body this 'self' also transcends gender and hence
'femininity'.
In short, discourse of Cartesian dualism appears to
provide an escape from the problem of embodiment and from the
claustrophobia of femininity indicated by Riley, from the
limitations and vulnerabilities of 'femininity'. It
constitutes subjectivity not only as powerful, independent and
controlling but also as disembodied and hence genderless. Yet
these problems of embodiment and femininity are precisely
constituted in this discourse. It is this discourse which
interpellates the subject as fundamentally divided into mind
and body and which predicates the integrity of 'the self' on
the denial of the body. It is in this discourse that the
"ideal of being thin, of being without a body" (Ellen West,
quoted by Chernin, 1981: 20) is re-produced. And, as will be
argued below, it is in this that the problem of feminine
subjectivity is further compounded.
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9.10 Excessive 'Woman' and 'The Body' of Dualistic Discourse
As argued above, 'the self' of dualist discourse appears
gender-neutral and the subject position indicated by the
thin/anorexic body, in signifying a non-body, a transcendence
of 'the body', may also signify a transcendence of gender.
Nevertheless I would argue that gender is profoundly
iiubricated in this ostensibly genderless discourse.
Firstly, a discourse of Cartesian dualism re-produces
patriarchal dichotomies of male/female, mind/body,
controlling/uncontrollable, good/bad. It reproduces the
subject/other, I/not-I divide that structures gender identity
within the Symbolic order (see chapter 3). Secondly, within
this dichotomization 'woman' signifies bodilyness:
when woman is given over to man ... he demands that
she represent the flesh purely for its own sake. Her
body is ... a thing sunk in its own immanence" (cle
Beauvoir, 1953: 189).
And, thirdly, the alien, uncontrollable, corrupt and
corrupting 'body' of dualist discourse is a 'body' that has
frequently figured as a 'feminine body' in a variety of
discourses. For instance, 'the biologically labile woman' that
may be signified by menstruation (see pp.220-236) is construed
as alien and uncontrollable. Havlelock Ellis's (1897, cited in
Ussher, 1991: 19) similarly described "woman" as "a temple
built over a sewer" whilst Baudelaire (quoted by Ussher, 1991:
19) wrote that he often thought "of the female organ as a
dirty thing or as a wound, ... dangerous in itself like all
bloody, mucous, contaminated things" and described "woman (as)
that obscene and infected horror." In misogynistic discourses
"women are objectified, associated with danger and temptation,
with impurity, with an uncontrollable sexuality" (Ussher,
1991: 21). That is, these discourses produce 'woman' as bodily
and 'her' body is constructed as homologous with 'the body' of
dualistic discourse.
This construction of 'the female body' as defective,
uncontrollable and dangerous is, I would argue, deeply
embedded in a variety of discourses and cultural practices. It
is, for example, evident in the nineteenth century
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construction of 'the female invalid' (see chapter 6) and is
currently reified in the medical concepts of PMS, PND, and
menopausal syndrome where 'woman's' 'raging hormones' are
construed as a cause of madness (Ussher, 1991; see also
Foucault, 1979). These constructions of 'the female body' as
defective and disruptive have served to 'justify'
constructions of 'woman' as Other, as hysterical, mad, weak,
dangerous, and incapable, as bodily, psychologically, and
morally inferior (Ussher, 1991; Showalter, 1985). 'It' has
served to exclude women from education and politics
(Ehrenreich and English, 1974; Sayers, 1982), and career
development (Marshall and Wetherell, 1989) whilst
simultaneously naturalizing these exclusions (see Marshall and
Wetherell, 1989).
The discursive relationship between 'woman', 'the female
body' and 'the body' of dualistic discourse has, I would
argue, a long genealogy evident, for example, in the misogyny
of Christian doctrine where "It is good for a man not to touch
a woman" (1 Cor. 7: 1) and where marriage is valued only in
that it prevents fornication: "But if they cannot contain, let
them marry: for it is better to marry than to burn" (1 Cor. 7:
9). In the anti-sex dictums of The Church it is most
frequently 'woman' who is constructed as morally and bodily
polluted and polluting. Thus, "the cycle of fleshly life
derives finally from intimacy with women and polluted
intercourse" (Bk Th 144.9f, 139.8-10, quoted by Martin, 1988:
56). Similarly, de Beauvoir (1953: 197), in her discussion of
cultural Myths, describes 'woman' as:
the siren whose song lures sailors upon the rocks;
she is Circe, who changes her lovers into beasts,
the undine who draws fishermen into the depths of
pools. The man captivated by her charms no longer
has will-power, enterprise, future; he is no longer
a citizen, but mere flesh enslaved to its desires,
cut off from the community, bound to the moment,
tossed passively back and forth between torture and
pleasure.
Thus, not only has 'woman' signified 'the body' but also
'the female body' has often been constructed as alien,
uncontrollable, and dangerous. 'It' is a source of temptation
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that is both corrupt and corrupting. Like 'the body' of
dualistic discourse, 'the female body' is constructed as Other
and as "the locus of all that threatens our attempts at
control. It overtakes, it overwhelms, it erupts and disrupts"
(see Bordo, 1992: 94). Thus, where dualistic discourse
converges with misogynistic discourses they become enmeshed,
consolidating and re-consolidating a construction of 'woman'
as bodily, uncontrollable, disruptive, and polluted, as Other.
9.11 Conclusion
In short, a discourse of Cartesian dualism constitutes
the body as threatening, eruptive and alien to the mind/self.
And in constituting the body as uncontrolled it produces the
necessity for controlling/denying the body. Within this
discourse the thin/anorexic body is constituted as a
controlled body and as the signifier of a powerful,
disembodied subjectivity. And, in transcending the body, this
subjectivity also appears to transcend gender. Yet, as noted
above, the body of dualistic discourse is also figured as a
female body. The deployment of a discourse of Cartesian
dualism consolidates the negative figure of 'woman' as bodily,
alien and dangerous.
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Chapter Ten
A Discourse of Cartesian Dualism
and the Discursive Production of 'Woman' as Excess
10.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I explored a discourse of
Cartesian dualism, examining the way in which it constitutes
subjectivity and the problem of embodiment. This discourse
produces the thin/anorexic body very differently from the way
in which it is constituted in, for example, romantic
discourse. Here, the thin/anorexic body is produced as a
controlled body and as the signifier of a powerful,
disembodied and ostensibly genderless subjectivity. It
signifies a subjectivity dissociated from the alien, eruptive
body of dualistic discourse. Yet, as indicated above, this
alien, eruptive and threatening body is also often figured as
a female body. That is, a discourse of Cartesian dualism
consolidates constructions of 'woman' as bodily, as other and
as dangerous. In this chapter I further explore the way in
which gender is imbricated in this discourse.
The following analysis examines how 'woman' is
discursively constituted as bodily and as excess, as a site in
which the negatively construed body of dualistic discourse is
figured as a female body. This chapter thus examines two
figures, 'the mother' and 'the sexual woman', illustrating how
these two figures of femininity may be produced as exemplars
of 'woman as excess'. The discursive construction of 'woman as
excess' is then discussed in relation to Lacan's theorization
of 'te woman' and of feminine iouissance. The final section
of this chapter extends the analysis of dualistic
constructions of fat as morally bad and as a signifier of the
body. Within a discourse of Cartesian dualism, it will be
argued, fat signifies both the excesses of the body and the
femininity of the body. The fat body is discursively
constructed as a signifier of 'the mother', of 'the sexual
woman' and of 'woman as excess'. It is a site at which
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gender becomes imbricated in this discourse of Cartesian
dualism.
10.2 Woman as Excess and the Discursive Production of the
Mother
As numerous authors have noted, 'the mother' is a
profoundly significant element of a variety of different
discourses (see Hirsch, 1989). 'She' figures, for example, in
medical, religious, psychological, and political discourses.
'The mother', we are repeatedly told, is responsible for the
physical, psychological and moral well-being of her child
(e.g. Bowlby, 1969; 1973), of her family (see Bemis, 1983).
Consequently 'she' is also held responsible for the 'moral
fabric' of society (see Mccoldrick et al., 1989b). 'Her'
cultural significance can not be over-estimated. 'The mother'
is held up as a 'natural destiny' of women and revered in
images of the madonna and in the traditionalist discourse of
family values. Yet 'she' is also reviled as the domineering or
rejecting mother, as the 'schizophrenogenic' or 'anorexogenic'
mother (see Caplan and Hall-McCorquodale, 1985, Caplan 1990;
Yager, 1982), as the 'irresponsible' single mother and in
numerous mother-in-law jokes.
The discursive construction of 'the mother' is,
therefore, not unitary but is, rather, dichotomized into
'good' and 'bad' representations (c.f. Klein, 1968), the
nurturing mother and the abandoning or punishing mother, 'the
Good Mother' and 'the Deadly Mother' (Neumann, 1984: 322; see
also Ussher, 1991: 199). As a mother, woman is:
pressed into the dual role of indispensable quasi-
human supporter and deadly quasi-human enemy of the
human self. She will be seen as naturally fit to
nurture other people's individuality; as the born
audience in whose awareness other people's
subjective existence can be mirrored; as the being
so peculiarly needed to confirm other people's
worth, power, significance that if she fails to
render them this service she is a monster,
anomalous, and useless. And at the same time she
will also be seen as the one who will not let other
people be, the one who beckons her loved ones back
from selfhood, who wants to engulf, dissolve, drown,
suffocate them as autonomous people." (Dinnerstein,
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I1987: 111-112)
Women are interpellated as 'mothers' by the discourses and
discursive practices which construct and discipline
'motherhood'. And as de Beauvoir (1953: 70; see also Daley,
1984) argues "(t)here is no figurative image of woman which
does not call up at once its opposite." 'Woman' is a 'carnal
scapegoat-idol' (Dinnerstein, 1987: 124). "The Mother dooms
her son to death in giving him life ... Thus what man
cherishes and detests first of all in woman - loved one or
mother - is the fixed image of his animal destiny; it is the
life that is necessary to his existence but that condemns him
to the finite and to death. From the day of his birth man
begins to die: this is the truth incarnate in the mother" (de
Beauvoir, 1953: 204 & 197-198).
Discursive constructions of 'the mother' can be
understood as centred on 'the body' and as dichotomized into
good or bad representations. 'The mother' is discursively
produced as 'the maternal body', as a source of life and
(psychological and physical) death. 'The mother' both nurtures
and engulfs others' individuality. 'She' is both necessary and
threatening to identity. Thus, I would argue, constructions of
'the mother' can be understood as referring to problems of
subjectivity and to 'the problematic of embodiment' (see
Turner, 1987: 19) articulated in dualist discourse. In the
extract below these themes of excessive bodilyness and lack of
subjectivity are apparent in the discursive construction of
'the mother'
(Teresa, p.?)
Teresa: And we did, I did quite a Lot of work on that in my therapy about (.) being abLe to sort of,
wanting this very tin autonomous power /H: ma! and quite a maLe power /H: right/ but not being abLe to
C.) to do it /H: right/. So I mean for me there is this sort of, there is this terribLe (.) fear, anger
of femininity in terms of passivity /H: right, ma, right/. You know, kind of images of the kind of, the
mother figure as this sort of cow-Like uninteLLigent person that Like, that just feeds 1K: lIeu. You know
the tin figure out of the BeLL Jar Donna Conway /H: I don't, no!. But it's there. I mean SyLvia PLath's
just very tin C.) I mean awfuL about her. She paints this awfuL picture of this very uninteLLigent
working cLass American mother who just feeds the kids on ice-creams, and ice-cream and marsh-maL Lows
cos that, just has them Like one after the other Like this 1K: nin/. She presents her as this cow without
a /H: mn/ without a brain IH: mn/ whose just massiveLy fat and unattractive. IN: nrij'. Her, her whoLe
tin motive In Life Is just to have, mindLessLy have more chiLdren and breed more /H: right!, more and
more and more. And not have any Life of her own. ALL that is just Like devoted to caring for other
peopLe !H: nint'. And that is I s'pose an image of horror for me
In this extract 'the mother' is constructed as feminine and
passive. 'She' is neither malicious nor socio-politically
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powerful. Nevertheless 'she' is produced as "an image of
horror". And this horror is constructed as an excessive,
uncontrolled, and engulfing bodilyness and as a lack of
individuality. Teresa constructs "the mother figure" as "cow-
like", "unintelligent" and "awful". 'She' is a "cow without a
brain". 'She' is "massively fat" and "mindless". This "image
of horror" leans on dualist discourse in its re-production of
the mind/body dichotomy. 'The mother' is constructed as
entirely bodily rather than spiritual, wilful, or intelligent:
she is "mindless".
This 'maternal body', like 'the body' of dualist
discourse, is construed as the antithesis of the
mind/will/spirit. It is animal-like - "cow-like" -
uncontrolled, and excessive. 'Its' lack of control, 'its'
excess is emphasised by the description of 'the mother' as
"massively fat". 'She' has an excess of excess flesh.
Moreover, 'the mother' has children "one after the other".
'She' "breed(s) more, [...] more and more and more." 'Her'
mindless fecundity again signifies uncontrollable bodilyness
and excess. This excess is also evident in the construction of
the maternal role. 'She' "just feeds her kids on ices-creams,
and ice-cream and marshmallows", comfort foods that are also
'bad' foods which will engulf her children in the same
amorphous massive fatness that engulfs her. And just as she
engulfs her children so 'she' too is engulfed by the maternal
role. 'She' does "not have any life of her own". She is
selflessly devoted to caring for others. 'She' just "breeds"
and "feeds the kids". There is nothing else to her but
motherhood and as a mother 'she' is constructed as bodily and
therefore as uncontrollable, excessive, engulfing, mind-less
and self-less, as lacking in subjectivity.
'The body' of dualist discourse may then be figured as
'the maternal body'. Hence the dualistic denial and rejection
of 'the body' might also be read as a denial and rejection of
'the mother' and perhaps thereby of the mother. Following a
number of interpretations of anorexia nervosa as a retreat
from adulthood or from adult femininity (see chapter 2). Bordo
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(1992) has argued that anorexia may be interpreted as a fear
of 'a certain archetypal image of the female' and of 'the
traditional female domestic role' which, I would argue, may be
figured as 'the mother'. The metaphorical rejection of 'the
mother' through the dualistic rejection of 'the body' may
therefore be consolidated in a rejection of 'the traditional
female domestic role' embodied by the mother, a rejection
symbolized by "today's boyish body ideals" (Bordo, 1990: 86).
In the extracts below 'the mother' is explicitly constructed
in terms of this traditional female role.
(RacheL, pp.3-4)
Rachel: I found it (sociology) very interesting but I think it did confuse some of my views on, you know
when I was at home, Dad reads his paper, Gavin comes in, Mum cooks the meal, I just used to come In do
my homework, have the meal and I didn't think anything of it. 1K: ,wn/ And all of a sudden you started
realising that hang on, Muii is working her guts off here. Dad's just sitting there reading his paper,
Gavin's expecting, well what's you know the first they come say when they come through the door is
what's for dinner tonight. /N: mini And it was you know that's when it started driving me. /H: sin, right/
And I used to try and help Mum, and /H: mini and get really mad at the men and hate them for it and C.)
that /H: yeah/ that was another contributing factor. /K: right/ Yeah. It's a lot of things all come
together at the wrong time.
(Olivia/Barbara, p.3)
Olivia: I never did any cooking but I'd always hang around the kitchen when she (her mother) was baking
a cake or whatever and I'd always have the spoon. And uh when she did make cakes my sister and I'd be
the first ones to finish it all and everyone else would conplain L...] See my role model was you know
seeing my mother in the kitchen cooking, thinking, yeah this is what I was going to be. (...] my mother
was very much set in her old fashioned ways. You marry then have sex then have children. And I was
raised in a society where it was cool to lose your virginity as early as possible and er so I was in
conflict because I was going to a Western school with Western kids and I'd come home to (Eastern
European) parents where it was very restrictive in views of women and how they behave around men.
Absolutely, you know, the role of the woman. (...] So the emphasis was definitely on that /H: uhm/. And
what was difficult to cope with because even to this day I find it difficult. I find I want a marriage
with kids but I want my independence and a career.
In these extracts 'the mother' is primarily constructed
in terms of a 'traditional female domestic role'. Rachel, for
example, provides an account of her mother as soley
responsible for providing the family's dinner every night. The
drudgery and hard work involved in this role is emphasised by
the contrast between her mother "workin g her guts off" and the
two males in the family who lust sit reading the paper and
expect to be provided for. Noticeably Rachel at first appears
to be absent from this scenario. She "didn't think anything of
it" and she was elsewhere doing her homework. But she
describes how after having started a sociology course she
questioned this familial status quo and became angry. She
constructs this as a gender issue, siding with her mother by
helping her in her domestic role whilst "get(ting) really mad
at the men and hate(ing) them for it". Rachel's re-construing
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of this not uncommon gendered division of labour in her family
might therefore be read as an anger at 'the traditional female
domestic role' embodied by her mother. But it simultaneously
involves an identification of herself as a woman with her
mother. This identification is, I would argue, apparent not
only in Rachel's helping with the domestic chores but also in
the explicit construction of this re-construing as a
"contributing factor" to her 'anorexia' and in her description
of her mother as "working her guts off". That is, Rachel's
thin, 'anorexic' body might be read as a metaphorical
identification with her mother since, like her mother, she has
worked and starved her guts off. This imbrication of the
mother in her 'anorexia' is further consolidated by the focus
on her mother as a provider of food. As argued above, food may
in part be read as a metaphor for dependence on the mother.
Food refusal might thus be interpreted as a refusal of 'the
mother' or 'the traditional female domestic role' and
simultaneously as a location of the self in relation to this
domestic female realm of food. In the extract below Layla
gives an account of her relationship to her mother in which
issues of identity and separation are constructed around food.
(LayLa, pp.9 & 10-11)
LayLa: You can compLetely C.) change the way the reality works IN: rr,n/ or C.) 'specialLy about the
relationships because 'specially with the parents /K: rrin/ becomes a pull-push game. C.) IN: right/ You
push them towards yourself so they respond by coming towards you and then they, and then you push them
back because C.) 1K: nIn/ you don't, they don't give the, give you the response C.) 1K: right, the/
because the response is not only feeding. C.) 1K: right ma! C.) After C.) ten (family therapy) sessions
with my mother 1 realized that, ten or I don't uh quite remember /H: right/ I realized that it was not
me, it was not she, who wanted to Live with me /H: right/ to share my life with her Life but it was me
/H: right/ trying to drag her into my Life, to take out, to give me a shoulder or a hand to share my
problems. /H: right/ But for the last C.) six years 1 believed that she was killing me C.) by asking
me to help her C.) and I believed in it so strongly that 1 caine to hate her /H: right/ because she was
not allowing me to Live my life IN: right/ C.) 1 mean can you see what I mean IN: ma yes uh/ It
completely changes the reality IN: right/ and you believe in it so much /N: nial that you can not accept
it. (...]
H: Yeah C.) m did you feel it (food) was in any way tin tied up with your relationship with your nun,
your=
=Layla: Never IH: no! never, oh of course (Laughs) food was in the centre of our of my reLationship
to my nun IN: luau but in a different way. IN: right! She all the time forced C.) me to eat. /H: nail Even
when I moved out to a flat of my own she used to bring food IN: right/ which I only to uh binging and
vomiting. 1K: right! (.) So of course that that was a big part of the relationship but iN: right/ I
didn't see it in the same way as I can see it now IH: right rr,n/ that by refusing to eat the food I was
sort of trying to pull herself towards me C.) /K: right/ but it's only I can see it now. /H: am right/
Until now it has always been a mechanism when I refused to eat but didn't, couldn't understand the
consequences /H: right/ of refusing /K: haul the food she gives me. IN: right nail And sort of I was
accusing her that she was worried about me. 1 said: Oh you don't have to be worried about me. You just
look, take care of your own life. IN: nail (.) And I couldn't see that what I meant C.) was not in
harmony with what I have been	 IN: right/ Of course she would naturally be worried. 1K: rlght(.)
nai/ And I was accusing her because she, the way she was unhappy was making me unhappy.
Layla's account of her relationship with her parents,
particularly with her mother, illustrate both the complexity
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and the constructed nature of mother-daughter relationships.
That is, like Rachel's account, Layla's also involves a re-
construing of the relationship in which the meanings of
various activities are called into question and re-negotiated.
And again the account involves issues of separation and
identification. Is her mother trying to live her life for her
and/or is she refusing to separate from her mother?
Significantly Layla construes the former construction of their
relationship as a belief that her mother was trying to kill
her, a construal which, I would argue, leans on the discursive
construction of the deadly, engulfing, 'Bad Mother' discussed
above (pp.266-7). The account might, therefore, be read in
relation to Klein's theorization of the child's ambivalence
towards the mother, of the splitting of the maternal object
into the good breast and the bad breast (see Klein, 1934; see
also Sayers, 1986). Significantly also food is construed as
central to this relationship. The 'traditional domestic female
role' of 'the mother as provider of food is emphasised. "She
all the time forced (.) me to eat (...] Even when I moved out
to a flat of my own she used to bring food [...] which I only
to uh binging and vomiting." Food is construed as the means by
which the mother intervenes in Layla's life. 'It' becomes an
arena in which the relationship is played out. Layla
constructs her food refusal as a rejection of her mother, "a
push mechanism" but 'it' is also a means of dragging her
mother into her life because "(o)f course she would naturally
be worried". Layla's food refusal and her "binging and
vomiting" of her mother's food can thus be read as a metaphor
for the ambivalences in this relationship. The account also
firmly imbricates the mother in Layla's construction of her
self and locates both this 'self' and 'the mother' in the
'traditional domestic female' realm of food and eating.
The construction of the mother as an embodiment of 'the
traditional domestic female', as the provider of food, thus
consolidates the imbrication of 'the mother' and thereby the
mother in anorexia. That is, 'the body' of dualist discourse
may figure as 'the maternal body' so that the renunciation of
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'the body' may also be read as an identification of one's body
with 'the maternal body' and simultaneously a rejection of
that body. And where 'the mother' is constructed as an
embodiment of 'the traditional domestic female', as a provider
of food, this identification/rejection is compounded. Food
refusal, as a denial of the body, may be read as a denial or
rejection of 'the mother' and/or as an anger about the
domestic 'role' 'she' embodies. The relationship to/with 'the
mother' is played out metaphorically in the relationship -
refusal, binging, vomiting - to food, thus returning the
daughter to the rejected domestic realm since, like 'the
mother', her identity is constructed in relation to this
domestic realm of the body, food, and eating.
Palazzoli (1974; see also Garfinkel and Garner, 1982) has
argued that "the anorexic incorporates the feared maternal
object in order to control it" and that she sees her body as
"the maternal object from which the ego wishes to separate
itself at all costs" (Palazzoli, 1974: 90). As Garfinkel and
Garner (1982) note, the concept of a mother who rewards
compliance, who is over-protective, and who is incapable of
allowing her child to separate, is central to Palazzoli's
theory of anorexia. As noted in chapter 2, numerous authors
have also imbricated the mother in theories of anorexia,
citing mothers' 'weight deviations' (Kalucy et al., 1977),
past 'anorexia-like syndromes' (e.g. Hsu, Harding and
Hartshorn, 1980), various psychosomatic and psychological
illnesses (e.g. Garfinkel and Garner, 1982) and maladaptive
attitudes (e.g. Palazzoli, 1974) as contributing aetiological
factors. Whilst references to 'the anorexogenic mother' have
become less common in recent clinical and academic literature
on anorexia (Yager, 1982) the mother remains profoundly
imbricated in many theories of its aetiology (Bemis, 1983).
More sympathetically, feminist theorists (e.g. Chodorow,
1978; Dinnerstein, 1987; Benjamin, 1990; see also Sayers,
1991) too have focused on the role of the mother in women's
distress. Drawing on the work of Winnicott, Orbach (1979), for
example, argues that patriarchal society socializes mothers
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into sacrificing their needs to those of others so that they
become alienated from what they themselves want. Consequently
they may fail to be 'good enough' mothers as they are unable
to respond 'appropriately' to their babies' needs. Orbach
(1979; see also Eichenbaum and Orbach, 1983) argues that this
infantile experience characterizes all female development
because, being the same biological sex, the mother identifies
the daughter and her needs with her own neglected needs as a
woman. Within this framework anorexia (and other eating
disorders) has been interpreted as a result of deprivations by
the mother (e.g. Dana, 1987; Orbach and Eichenbaum, 1993).
Thus, it is argued:
the anorexic persists in hating her hunger just as
her mother did ... the bulimic binges only to out
what she eats so much does she hate herself as her
mother did for being so needy. Likewise the
compulsive eater stuffs herself with anything and
everything in ignorance of what she wants so much
has she become alienated from her needs as a result
of her mother's alienation from her own needs as a
woman (cited in Sayers, in press/b: 6)
I would argue, however, that the 'pathogenic' role
allotted to the mother most noticeably in some family and
psychodynamic theories (see Sayers, 1988) can be understood to
be as much a consequence of patriarchal discursive
constructions of 'the mother' as of any characteristics of
individual mothers. This is not to deny any influence of
mothers on their daughters (or Sons). Rather it is an
insistence that the importance attributed to the mother's
'failings' by many psychological theories rests on the
patriarchal dichotomy of the indispensable, impossibly 'Good
Mother' and 'her' 'failed' obverse, the dangerous,
'anorexogenic', 'Bad Mother' discussed above. Lacan (1982e:
90) similarly criticizes Melanie Klein, arguing that she
persistently fails "to acknowledge that the oedipal fantasies
which she locates in the maternal body originate from the
reality presupposed by the Name of the father." As Irigaray
(1988: 156) argues, Western culture is built on matricide:
"when fathers took the power they had already annihilated the
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mothert. This symbolic murder of 'the mother' represents the
patriarchal annihilation of her (desiring) subjectivity. 'The
mother', and therefore also the daughter, has 'no identity as
a woman'. Thus:
the problem is neither to accuse the mother nor to
say it is the father who comes to liberate the
little girl. The mother has to find her identity as
a woman and from that point she would be able to
give an identity to her daughter. But this is the
key point to which our system is most blind.
(Irigaray, 1988: 157)
That is, it is the patriarchal fictioning of woman/mother as
'castrated', negatively signified, as not-I, not all, that
annihilates both mother and daughter. Similarly Sayers (in
press/b: 1 & 3) writes that
It is now twenty years since Juliet Mitchell first
emphasized, in 'Psychoanalysis and Feminism', the
continuing importance of Freud's account of the
unconscious ramifications of patriarchy. It's
fantasies still abound - not least in today's
backlash against feminism ... What, however has
present day psychoanalysis to say of the harm done
by such fantasies and their symbolization? Precious
little. Save for a few notable exceptions (see e.g.
McDougall, 1978, 1989; Kirschner, 1992; Schachter,
1993; Mann, 1993), psychoanalysis, at least its
clinical practice, has virtually forgotten Freud's
observations about the ill-effects of patriarchal
fantasy. Instead it focuses on the mother...
In short, both the perceived failings of the mother and
the 'pathogenic' role allotted to her in clinical and academic
theories can be read as manifestations of the damage of
patriarchal fantasies and their symbolization (see Sayers, in
press/b). As argued above the negatively (patriarchally)
constructed 'mother' represents a site at which gender is
inibricated in dualist discourse. 'The mother' can thus be
viewed as an exemplar of the construction of 'woman' as bodily
(see de Beauvoir, 1953). And 'the maternal body' can be read
as homologous with 'the body' of dualist discourse, as
uncontrollable, engulfing, dangerous and as an antithesis to
the mind/self. 'She' is discursively iinbricated in her
daughter's 'anorexic'/dualistic rejection of 'the body', an
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entanglement that is consolidated by the construction of 'the
mother' as an embodiment of 'the traditional female domestic
role'.
10.3 The Excesses of the Sexual Woman
A second discursive construction through which gender is
imbricated in dualist discourse is 'the sexual woman'. As
argued above (see pp.262-264), constructions of 'the sexual
woman' as temptation, as morally and bodily polluted and
polluting, as alien and dangerous, have long been evident in
numerous discourses, for example, in Christian doctrines (see
Martin, 1988), in medical discourse (see Foucault 1979;
Ussher, 1991) and in cultural myths (de Beauvoir, 1953).
Whilst the heterosexually attractive 'woman' of romantic
discourse is construed as a 'feminine ideal' (see chapter 8)
'the sexual woman' may also be produced as 'her' obverse. "The
Great Whore of Babylon" (see Neumann, 1984: 81), 'the
nymphomaniac', 'the feinme fatale' and 'the man-eater' are
culturally prevalent images of 'the sexual woman' as
excessively bodily, uncontrollable, overwhelming, and
dangerous (see tJssher, 1991; Foucault, 1979). And, like 'the
mother', 'the sexual woman', 'the lover' signifies an alliance
between 'woman' and (physical and psychological) death; "the
dreadful bride whose skeleton is revealed under her sweet,
mendacious flesh" (de Beauvoir, 1953: 197-198; see also
Bronfen, 1992). In that 'she' is constructed as a signifier of
'the body', as an antithesis of the mind/self, 'the sexual
woman', like 'the mother', is also represented as antithesis
and threat to subjectivity. Hence, as noted above, "(t)he man
captivated by her charms no longer has will-power, enterprise,
future; he is no longer a citizen, but mere flesh enslaved to
its desires, cut off from the community, bound to the moment"
(de Beauvoir, 1953: 197).
In the previous analysis of this discourse of Cartesian
dualism it was argued that 'fat' was constructed as a
signifier of 'the body'. Similarly, in Teresa's extract above
the uncontrollable, engulfing, excess, and bodilyness of 'the
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mother' is in part signified by 'her' massive fatness. And
despite the fact that the heterosexually attractive 'woman' is
ubiquitously represented as thin or slim I would argue that
the negatively constructed 'sexual woman', like 'the mother',
may also be signified by 'fat'.
(Layla, pp.5-6)
H: what did sliniiess mean to you when you started to become anorexic? C.)
LayLa: Uh (short Laugh) un C.) first of all C.) having no turinies or no great C.) bottoms /H: rmV and
having nice C.) thighs, thin C.) thighs=
=H: right so so that's=
=Layla: Now basically it's it's related to C.) uhr around sexuaL organs /H: right! that I recently came
to realize /14: right! no turinies, no big bottoms (.) and thin thighs.
(Teresa, p.6)
Teresa: I think there was a big issues for me around being sexual C.) cos my sister wasn't sexual; she
was mad. She was sexual, weLl she was sexual in a really awfuL way !H: right! and C.) un, and quite
overweight /14: rwn/ and C.) so for me being anorexia, being anorexic and being quite promiscuous was
almost tin, I think the sexuality was in rebellion /H: right!. But it was also a sexuality that was
completely in my control /14: right/ because I slept around with peopLe but I never, emotionally /14:
right! kind of, let it touch me. It was a rebellion, a rebellious thing.
(Tricia, pp.6-7)
H: Was tin I mean what at the time did tin being fat mean C.) to you? Why was it something that you didn't
want?
Tricia: I s'pose for me it was C.) I felt being clunsy and being ugly, /H: right/ (.) being out of
control, C.) /H: nin/ but I think uh as far as a woman goes, being C.) sexually so desirable by men and
not being able to say no.
H: Right fatness meant that? C.)
Tricia: Yes, /14: oh right! nuch more open to sexual to sexual advances from men C.) /14: right/ but C.)
because of course being a woman one's not allowed to say no.
H: Right (short laugh) yeah.=
=Tricia: And also maybe it C.) more of a Link with my mother which I /14: inn! particularly wanted to dis'
1 mean not that my mother was fat /H: right! but it's just the image of being a mother.
In the extracts above 'the sexual woman', like 'the mother',
is constructed as uncontrollable. Indeed, in Tricia's extract
both the mother and the sexual woman are signified by the fat
body. Here 'the sexual woman' is construed as "out of
control". And Teresa's comparison of 'her' own sexuality,
construed as unemotional and "completely in (her) control",
with the "awful" sexuality of 'her sister' again indicates a
construction of 'the sexual woman' as uncontrollable.
Significantly,	 as Tricia notes, the association of
uncontrollability with 'feminine' sexuality can be understood
as profoundly patriarchal, not merely because it constructs
'woman' as bodily and lacking (in control) but also because
patriarchy dictates that men rather than women control:
"because of course being a woman one's not allowed to say no."
One of the major signifiers of this uncontrollability,
bodilyness, and excess of 'the sexual woman' is body fat.
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Tricia, for example, constructs 'fat' as a signifier of both
'the sexual woman' and 'the mother'. Similarly, Teresa
associates "awful" 'feminine sexuality' with fat: "she was
sexual in a really awful way [...] and quite overweight". And
Layla constructs "slimness" as signifying a rejection of the
sexual. Thus, whilst 'the thin body' is culturally over-
determined as a signifier of 'perfect femininity' and
constructed as heterosexually attractive, as it is, for
example, in romantic discourse, 'the sexual woman', like 'the
mother', is signified by 'fat'.
(Layta, p.13)
LayLa: Men are meant to be strong and nw.jscLy /H: right/ whereas nice women Is meant to be sLim /H: yeah/
at Least I mean in the culture that, in the Western cuLture /H: yeah/ Lets say.
Following the numerous interpretations of anorexia as a
retreat from adulthood or from adult femininity ( see chapter
2), Bruch (1978: 73, cited in Bordo 1992: 96) has asserted
that "the avoidance of any sexual encounter, a shrinking from
all bodily contact" is a typically 'anorexic' characteristic.
In the extracts above the women interviewed have not construed
themselves as sexually abstinent. They do, however, construe
'themselves' as dissociated from a figure of an uncontrolled,
dangerous 'sexual woman' whose sexuality is signified by fat.
Yet construing this 'sexual woman' as fearful is not, I would
argue, peculiar to women diagnosed as anorexic. As argued
above images of 'the sexual woman' as feared, as
uncontrollable, as polluted and polluting, have long
proliferated in society in a variety of discourses. The
dissociation of 'the self' from these hegemonic images of 'the
sexual woman' and the rejection of a 'bodily sexuality' should
be viewed as a part of the effects of those discourses in
which these images are produced.
Moreover, the relationships between sexuality, food and
eating are also discursively constructed. This symbolization
of sexuality in terms of food and eating is, I would argue,
apparent in references to 'consuming passions', or to women as
sweet foods, for example as 'honey' or 'sugar', resonating
with the construction of 'woman' as a commodity to be
consumed, thus producing 'feminine sexuality' as something
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vulnerable (see Ussher, 1994)1. The cultural significance of
such symbolizations is demonstrated by, for example, the
popularity of "Like Water for Chocolate" (Esquivel, 1993) - a
"worldwide bestseller - now a major film" according to the
cover - in which a woman communicates erotically with her
forbidden lover through the food she cooks for him and in
which the minutely detailed recipes function as a central
element in this romantic narrative. Recently renewed interest
in vampire films such as Coppola's 'Dracula' and novels such
as Anne Rice's 'Vampire Chronicles' (e.g. 1988) may be
interpreted in terms of a cultural preoccupation with
symbolizing an uncontrolled and dangerous sexuality as food
and eating (see also Bordo, 1990). Thus, as Bordo (1990: 101)
argues:
The exploration of contemporary slenderness as a
metaphor for the correct management of desire
becomes more adequate when we confront the fact that
hunger has always been a potent cultural metaphor
for female sexuality, power, and desire - from the
blood-craving Kali ... to the language of
insatiability and voraciousness that mark fifteenth
century discourse on witches, to the 'Man Eater' of
contemporary rock lyrics: "Oh, oh, here she comes,
watch out boy, she'll chew you up".
In short, the control, denial, and rejection of 'the
body' discussed above is reinforced by a convergence of gender
with a discourse of Cartesian dualism. Where 'the body' of
dualistic discourse is figured as a 'feminine body', as the
body of 'the mother' or 'the sexual woman' female speakers may
be more strongly interpellated by these discursive
constellations, construing their/our bodies as alien,
. The figure of the vulnerable sexual woman as a food-like
ommodity is, I would argue, exemplified in a bizzare incident,
locumented in "Witness: Excuse me for living" (Channel 4, 9.00pm,
^1.11.93). Issei Sagawa a Japanese student in Paris killed,
3.isrnembered and ate a Dutch woman who was significantly mis-
identified as his 'girlfriend' (Guardian Guide, 20.11.93: 16).
'rench courts declared the man insane, dropped prosecution and
ifter 3 years returned him to Japan where he was released after
i year and has since become a media celebrity, "lionised by the
Tapanese avante-garde". He wanted to know how the flesh of a
eautifu1 white woman would taste (Guardian Guide, 20.11.93: 16).
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dangerous, and in need of constraint. The discursive
construction of 'fat' as a signifier of bodily excess, of
'feminine sexuality' as uncontrollable and dangerous and the
symbolization of that sexuality in terms of food and eating
can thus be understood as consolidating and re-consolidating
the discursively produced 'need' to achieve total control of
'the body' and its desires, to transcend that body through
food-refusal.
Thus, I would argue that negative constructions of both
'the mother' and 'the sexual woman' can be read as exemplars
of the construction of 'woman' as bodily and excessive. 'They'
represent sites at which gender is imbricated in the discourse
of Cartesian dualism, where 'the body' of dualistic discourse
is figured as a 'feminine body'. That is, these 'feminine
bodies' are produced as homologous with 'the body' of
dualistic discourse as alien, dangerous, disruptive,
uncontrollable and as an antithesis and threat to the
mind/self. And, like 'the body' of dualistic discourse 'they'
are signified by 'fat'.
10.4 The Discursive Production of Fat as Excess
As the above analysis indicates, 'fat' constitutes a
significant element of the discourse of Cartesian dualism
identified in the interviews. That is, 'it' signifies 'the
body' and its negativity. Fat also signifies 'the feminine
body' in its convergance with 'the body' of dualistic
discourse as alien, engulfing, uncontrollable, and excessive
(see also Caskey, 1989). In the extracts below the discursive
construction of 'fat' as a signifier of uncontrollable excess
is particularly apparent.
(Enma, p.5)
Ermna: Even just getting it into sentences just sounds weird. It's cos it's all, a Lot of it's cos it's
sort of done, I think of it a Lot in imagery reaLLy /H: right/. And I just do feel Like this big1
monstrous size /H: ma right/ and I want to be a LittLe, LittLe, you know syLph-Like size.
(Zoe, p.11)
Zoe: I usuaUy eat no, I eat no fat Like, /H: right/ you know, nothing, Like no butter. I don't eat
anything with oil, at aLL. I never used to /H: m/ and here (at university) I just felt Like: Wow, this
is going to be impossibLe you know because, but I've just had to like deal with it. But the thing is
what actualLy, what so surprised is I've just been eating normaLLy or Like eating at (a student
residence) (...] And I thought I was going to gain Like tweLve zilLion pounds C...] like I've gained
weight since I've been here definiteLy, but Like not forty pounds. /H: right/ You know, Look 1 stiLL
fit (Laughing) into my jeans C.) which is good.
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'Fat' is construed here not just as excess flesh (see pp.229)
but also as monstrous, excessive and uncontrollable. This, I
would argue, is particularly apparent in the articulation of
a fear that the (bodily) desire to eat is limitless and that
if the mind/self loosens its vigilant control the body will
erupt and become a vast mass of fat: "like twelve zillion
pounds". In a magazine interview 'Sarah' similarly
articulates a fear that if she were to start eating she
wouldn't stop, that her body would balloon uncontrollably.
At first you think you are in control - that's what
makes refusing food so appealing. But it soon
controls you. I'm afraid that if I start to eat I
won't stop. I'm afraid I'll end up like one of
those people who has to book two aeroplane seats
because they are fat. (Hughes, 1993: 36)
Statements such as these might be interpreted as evidence of
individual pathology, as dysfunctional delusions about the
body. They are also consistent with some of the theories of
restrained eating which suggest that hunger and satiety
boundaries are disturbed by dieting (see pp.55-65). However,
they can also be viewed as consistent with a discourse of
Cartesian dualism which, as argued above, is manifested in a
variety of cultural practices of body management including
medicine (see Turner, 1987). That is, I would argue, the
construction of the body/flesh/fat as antithetical to the
mind/self, as overwhelming, excessive and uncontrollable, as
liable to "erupt in an unsightly display of bulging flesh"
(Bordo 1992: 89) if not vigilantly controlled, can be read as
a central element of dualist discourse rather than as an
individual delusion.
10.5 Fat and the Excess of 'he Woman'
The discursive construction of 'fat' as excess
represents, I would argue, a site at which gender is
imbricated in dualist discourse. That is, 'fat' not only
signifies the negatively construed 'mother' and/or 'sexual
woman'. The construction of 'fat' as excess also resonates
with constructions of 'woman' as excess.
Lacan argues that the phallus "covers over the complexity
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of the child's early sexual life with a crude opposition in
which that very complexity is refused or repressed" (Rose,
1982: 42) and that within the Symbolic order 'woman' is
negatively signified in relation to the phallus (see chapter
3). Hence 'she' is the Other, the not-I, the not all
(Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986; Lacan, 1982d: 144). 'She' is
excluded by "the nature of words" (Lacan, l982d: 144).
However, "her being not all in the phallic function does not
mean that she is not in it at all. She is in it not not at
all. She is right in it" (ibid., p.145). Hence, "Th. woman can
only be written with crossed through" (ibid., p.144) so
that "e woman does not exist" (Lacan, quoted in Mitchell,
1982: 48). That is, 'woman' is constructed as Other yet 'she'
is not excluded from the Symbolic order but rather is excluded
within it. And in being "in it not at all" 'woman' is not
only "right in it. (But) there is something more. ... There is
a iouissance ... a iouissance of the body which is ... beyond
the phallus." (Lacan, l982d: 145). This 'iouissance' refers to
"an area of excess (it is 'too much') ... to something more
than pleasure that can easily tip into its opposite" (Rose,
1982: 34).
Lacan argues, then, that because of 'woman's'
fundamentally conflictual subject position within the Symbolic
order ('her' being not all) 'she' therefore has a privileged
relation to that which exceeds the Symbolic order; in relation
to the phallic function 'she' has a supplementary iouissance.
'She' signifies something that is "beyond the phallus" and
thus indicates the fraudulent status of the phallus (see Rose,
1982). That is, the iouissance of 'woman' indicates the gap
between the signifier and signified (see also Saussure, 1974)
that Lacan describes in his theorizations of desire 2
 and
2 Following Freud's assertion of "the possibility that
3omething in the nature of the sexual instinct itself is
infavourable to the realization of complete satisfaction" (1912,
uoted by Rose, 1982: 322), Lacan (1982a) argues that the
satisfaction of desire is impossible because symbolization starts
iith loss. Words need only be spoken when the first object is
Lost. They 'stand in' for objects (Rose, 1982) and thus indicate
bhe absence of the signified objects. Hence demand always "bears
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identity3 . 'She' indicates the lack in the Symbolic. Hence,
as Rose (1982: 44) argues, 'feminine sexuality is ... an
exposure of the terms of its definition ... it involves
precisely a collapse of the phallus into the real" (see also
chapter 3).
Lacanian theory thus presents 'woman' as a subject
position within the Symbolic order but also as exceeding that
order. 'Her' iouissance, "a iouissance of the body", signifies
something beyond the Symbolic. Thus, in relation to the
phallus, 'ie woman' is constructed as a signifier of excess.
As Bronf en (1992: 70, my emphasis) argues,
Woman is culturally constructed as other to man and
as the uncanny site where two opposing values
collapse into one, including the ambivalent fact
that she serves to articulate that which is exterior
to a culture as well as that interiority which is
repressed, rejected, or foreclosed. Furthermore,
Woman functions duplicitly not only owing to her
contradictory semantic encoding but also because,
like death, she is at once assigned to the realm of
culture's mythic image repertoire, to rhetorics and
textuality and to the non-semiotic real, to natural
materiality. She is the site of mediation between
having recourse to the sheer facticity of the body
a translation of the body into a sign from which
it is missing.
This excess signified by 'woman' has been celebrated, for
example, in the work of Irigaray's theorization of feminine
sexuality as multiple, diverse, and diffused, as "infinitely
n something other than the satisfaction which it calls for.
hat is thus alienated in need constitutes a Iirverdrangung
(primal repression) because it cannot, by definition, be
rticulated in demand. But it reappears in a residue which then
Dresents itself in man as desire" (Lacan, 1982a: 80). "Thus
lesire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand
or love, but the difference resulting from the subtraction of
bhe first from the second, the very phenomenon of their
splitting" (Lacan, 1982a: 81; see also chapter 3).
Lacan insists that 'wholeness' and complete, assured
ender identities are fantasies (Rose, 1982) because identity is
ased on alienation, division and loss; on the infants mis-
tecognition of itself in its mirror-image (Lacan, 1949) and in
the subject's "location in an order outside itself" as the pre-
existing 'I' of the Symbolic order (Rose, 1982: 31; see also
chapter 3).
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other in herself" (1977, quoted by Jones, 1985) as well as in
some radical feminist theories. Daly (1984: 3), for example,
describes women's "Pure Lust" as:
the high humour, hope, and cosmic accord/harmony of
those women who chose to escape, to follow our
hearts' deepest desire and bound out of the State of
Bondage, Wanderlusting and Wonderlusting with the
elements, connecting with the auras of animals and
plants, moving in planetary communion with the
farthest stars, This lust is in essence astral. It
is pure Passion: unadulterated absolute, simple
sheer striving for abundance of be-ing. It is
unlimited, unliniiting desire/fire.
De Beauvoir (1953: 204) also describes a cultural myth of
'woman' as "like man (in that) she is endowed with mind and
spirit, but she belongs to Nature, the infinite current of
life flows through her; she appears, therefore, as a mediatrix
between the individual and the cosmos." Frequently, however,
constructions of 'woman' as a signifier of excess are not so
much celebrated as reviled as they are in the negative
constructions of 'the mother' and 'the sexual woman' discussed
above. And this denigration is also apparent, I would argue,
in constructions of the 'fat' female body as animal like.
(Envna, p.5)
Erna: It's just the whoLe thing. Maybe it's just fragiLity. I don't know /H: right/ and just to feet
Like a great Luiiering C.) oaf you know, this great, /H: right/ I just feet Like a great whaLe
sometimes, you know /H: right/ this great bigthing.
(OLivia/Barbara, p.2)
OLivia: And I I puLLed a Lot of, I remember catting her (her sister) a fat cow, she was fat, cos I knew
that wouLd reaLty hurt her.
(MichelLe, p.14)
MicheLLe: I didn't want her to see me Looking Like this so C.) I didn't go in /H: nin/ (.) whereas C.)
I wouLdn't Look quite so ashamed of peopLe seeing me or () /H: right/ or thinking: Oh god I must be
making a reaLty terribLe inpression. They must be thinking I'm such a fat C.) pig (Laughing) sitting
there.
In these extracts the construing of the fat (female) body as
animal-like is very obviously negative and associated with
shame. It also produces this 'body' as closer to nature, as in
excess of the social. As Ussher (1991: 49) argues, negative
representations of female sexuality are frequently linked to
women's alleged weakness and closeness to animals. The
constructions of the 'fat' woman as "a fat pig", "a fat cow",
"a great whale" or "a lumbering elephant" consolidates the
negativity of constructions of 'woman' as bodily, natural and
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therefore in excess and of 'the (feminine/dualistic) body' as
an antithesis to the mind. The fictive nature of this
construction is, I would argue, highlighted by recent cultural
shifts in the ways that 'the female body' is 'described', in
the preference for ever-thinner, firmer bodies (Bordo, 1992;
Garfinkel and Garner, 1982; see also chapter 2). Bordo (1990;
1992: 91), for example, notes that 'attractive' women's bodies
in 1970s films are now frequently described as flabby and that
Marilyn Monroe, previously adored as 'femininity incarnate'
was recently described by a student as 'a cow'. "Is this", she
asks,
merely a change in what size hips, breasts, and
waists are considered attractive, or has the very
idea of incarnate femaleness come to have a
different meaning, different associations, the
capacity to stir up different fantasies and images
for the culture of the 1980s?
Have the cultural significations of the fat/voluptuous female
body changed in the post-1960s, post-feminist era in which
Chernin (1981), amongst others, argues 'the tyranny of
slenderness' has become more powerful.
Whilst the two negative constructions of 'woman' - as
'the sexual woman' and as 'the mother' - may represent
"extreme cultural expressions of woman-as-too-much" the
construction of 'woman' as excess is also more widespread (see
Bordo, 1992: 103). It is evidenced in constructions of woman
as talking 'too much' and having "too much emotion, too much
need, (being) too loud and demanding" (see Bordo, 1992: 103).
'Women' take up 'too much' space, are "too much there" (Bordo,
1992: 103). This construction of 'woman' as 'too much', as
excess was also apparent in the interview transcripts.
(Teresa. p.7)
Teresa: 1 couldn't make my sentences make sense. Urn that aLso happened when I started to do English.
/K: oh right! It was aLmost Like everything was very co,ressed. Urn, it would almost go in graninar
because there would be too much C.) 1K: right/ too much there.
(Ermna, p.5)
Enina: Even just getting it into sentences just sounds weird. It's cos it's aLL, a Lot of it's cos It's
sort of done, I think of it a Lot in imagery really. /H: right! And I just do feeL Like this big,
monstrous size 1K: m right! and I want to be a Little, LittLe, you know syLph-Like size (...3 1 don't
know why I think of it Like that.
(Nicki, p.4)
K: Do you think it's particularly difficult for for women in this society to, I don't know, to C.) to
be?
Nicki: Yeah yeah. I think it is. It's hard to explain why but there's so much pressure coming from
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everywhere. 1K: right riin/ I've thought of this before but I can't get the words into my mind. I think
there is. I mean if you Look at generaL situations men aLways seem to be on top.
(Nicki, pp.6-7)
H: Yeah is there anything that you, I don't know, that the concept of being anorexic means do you think
to you?
Nicki: It's reaLLy hard. It means so nuch that it's hard to find words. (...] Like because you're Like
torn between eating and not wanting to eat 1K: right/ so it's just, it's just Like, it's just Like
hiding. /K: right! It's Like something to hide behind (...1 My mind keeps going bLank.
In the extracts above these women construct themselves as
in excess. There is 'too much' to express in words (see also
Olsen, 1978). 'They' are, in Lacan's terms, in excess of the
Symbolic. And this 'excess' is explicitly associated with the
problematic of 'feminine' identity. Teresa, for example,
associates her 'excess' with a "terrible (.) fear, anger of
femininity in terms of passivity" and with wanting an
autonomous 'male' power whilst Nicki juxtaposes an
articulation of the difficulty/impossibility of expressing the
problematic of 'woman' with a construction of 'men' as always
seeming "to be on top".
The lack in the Symbolic and the problematic of
'feminine' identity (see Rose, 1982) are thus discursively
constructed as an excess in 'woman'. And as Emma's extract
illustrates this 'feminine' excess may be signified by 'fat'
which, as argued above, itself signifies excess. In this
extract Emma first articulates the difficulty/impossibility of
expressing herself in words because she thinks "a lot in
imagery", i.e. beyond the Symbolic (see Mitchell and Rose,
1982). She discursively constructs herself as in excess of
words and immediately re-articulates this excess
metaphorically as a problem with fat. Her excess is re-
constructed in terms of feeling "like this big, monstrous
size" instead of being "a little, little, you know sylph-like
size". Her 'ideal' here is a contained, small femininity
rather than an excessive (big, monstrous, fat) 'femininity'.
Significantly this concept of excess also figures in
constructions both in the interview transcripts and in the
media of the 'anorexic' self as sick, as having gone 'too
far'.
In short, the construction of 'fat' as excess functions
as a metaphor for the excess of 'woman' who, as Lacan argues,
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being produced in relation to the phallus, is within but in
excess of the Symbolic order. 'She' has a "jouissance proper
to her't
 (Lacan, 1982d: 145). This signification of 'fat', I
would argue, may shed further light on the concept of 'body
image distortion' (see pp.42-44). As Bordo (1990: 88 & 90)
argues, current prescriptions concerning body management focus
not only on fat but also on the 'ideal' of a
tighter, smoother, more 'contained' body profile.
Areas that are soft, loose or 'wiggly' are
unacceptable, even on extremely thin bodies.
Cellulite management, like liposuction, has nothing
to do with weight loss, and everything to do with
the quest for firm body margins."
That is, the production of 'firm body margins' symbolizes a
control, a containing of bodily excess which in turn is
signified by fat. Bordo (1990) cites the practice of
liposuction, an advertisement for an exercise machine which
reads "If I didn't work out, I might still be thin. But I'd be
real wiggly", and the theme of eruptive bodies evidenced in
horror films, as examples of this culturally prevalent
dualistic concern with containing the excessive, eruptive
'body'. The much-documented anorexic symptom of body image
distortion - the description of an emaciated body as fat -
might thus be considered not so much as an individual
delusional misperception than as an articulation of this
dualist and gender-bound concern with containing an excessive
and eruptive (female) 'body', symbolized not just by thinness
but also by the acquisition of 'firm body margins'. And, as
Bordo (1990: 90) argues, without body-building it is virtually
impossible to attain a completely taut "flab-less, excess-less
body unless one trims very near to the bone" which is perhaps
why so many women now exercise so fanatically.
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that a discourse of
Cartesian dualism represents a significant element of the
interview transcripts. This discourse constitutes the body and
its desires as alien, as uncontrollable, excessive and as an
antithesis and a threat to the mind/self. Within this
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discourse 'the thin body' signifies a control/denial of 'the
body' which in turn metonymically signifies control of the
mind/self and of life in general. Eating is construed as
a bodily, alien activity to be avoided The construction of a
positive 'self' within this discourse requires, therefore, 'a
renunciation of the flesh', a control, denial and rejection of
the negatively construed body.
Bruch (1982: 1532) has similarly argued that 'the
anorexic's' experience of her body is disturbed, that 'she'
does not trust or accurately identify her own sensations and
feelings, that 'she' identifies with her skeletal appearance
and fails to experience her body as her own. Rather, she
argues, it is experienced as "something extraneous, separate
from their psychological self". Similarly Palazzoli (1974: 74)
describes 'the anorexic's' belief that "every victory over the
flesh is a sign of greater control over one's biological
impulses". Such descriptions appear to parallel the above
analysis. Yet, I would argue, to describe "not owning the body
and its sensations" as a "basic delusion" typical of all
eating disorders (Bruch, 1973: 50) is misleading. It not only
homogenizes 'anorexia'. It also presents this construction of
'the body' as an individual, pathological 'delusion' rather
than as a culturally sanctioned element of a dualistic
discourse that informs a variety of cultural practices.
The discourse of Cartesian dualism, discussed above, also
constitutes the subject as fundamentally divided. But it also
constructs a powerful, strong-willed and independent
subjectivity, signified by the (very) thin/anorexic body,
which is. And in signifying 'the non-body' the thin/anorexic
body also appears to transcend gender. It seems to offer an
escape from the limitations of prescribed 'femininity'.
However, I have further argued that the construction of
'fat' as a signifier of excess represents a point at which
gender is iinbricated in dualist discourse since it resonates
with constructions of 'woman' as excess, a construction which
is exemplified in negative constructions of 'the mother' and
'the sexual woman'. That is, 'the body' of dualistic discourse
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may be figured as a 'feminine' body and hence the control,
denial, and rejection of that 'body' might be read as a
control, denial, and rejection of the 'feminine' body, of 'the
mother', of 'the sexual woman', of 'woman' as excess.
Moreover, this interface between gender and the dualist
discourse further consolidates the construction of the
thin/anorexic body and of food refusal as 'ideals' through the
relationships between 'the mother' and 'the sexual woman' to
food.
In short, a discourse of Cartesian dualism appears to
provide a positive subjectivity which transcends gender
through the transcendence of 'the body'. Yet this discourse
simultaneously consolidates and re-consolidates constructions
of 'woman' as bodily, as alien/Other, uncontrollable, as
dangerous and in 'need' of restraint. The deployment of this
discourse compounds the female speaker's difficulties in
producing a positive, feminine subjectivity.
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Chapter Eleven
Anorexia and Identity:
The Discursive Production of the Self
11.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters I have explicated some of the
discourses and discursive elements deployed in the
constructions of 'anorexia', 'femininity' and 'the body'. I
have aimed to demonstrate that both within and across
interview transcripts a variety of entangled discourses
produce these discursive objects in different ways. That is,
the meanings of these objects differ between discourses and
whilst some meanings are mutually consolidating others are
conflictual. The thin/anorexic body may, for example, be
construed as heterosexually attractive, as a signifier of a
patriarchally defined feminine position. This signification
may be consolidated by constructions of 'the thin body' as
small, child-like, or ill. However, the thin/anorexic body may
also be constructed as boyishly thin, signifying a rejection
of 'traditional (domestic) femininity'. Or it may be produced
as a controlled body, signifying a powerful and disembodied
subjectivity. That is, the thin body sustains a multiplicity
of meanings and may signify a variety of, often conflicting,
subjectivities. The management of the thin/anorexic body and
the discursive struggle over its meanings can thus be
understood as a management of identity. The production and
maintenance of the thin/anorexia body through dieting, self-
starvation and/or purging can be viewed as facilitating
interpellation in certain subject positions and as resistance
to others.
Yet whilst self-starvation or dieting may be interpreted
positively as a technique of self-production it also involves
elements of self-punishment and self-destruction. And it is
these mutually conflicting themes - self-production and self-
destruction - that will be explored in this and the following
chapter. Chapter 11, therefore, examines a diversity of
discursive constructions of anorexia itself, analyzing the
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different discursive relationships of 'the self' to this
shifting category. It then explores how anorexia is
constructed both as an identity and as a lack of identity and
examines how a 'discourse of individualism' is deployed in the
transcripts.
11.2 Anorexia as a Disputed Category
The thin/anorexic body is, as argued above, constructed
within the transcripts in a variety of ways. Similarly, the
concept of 'anorexia' itself sustains a multiplicity of
meanings within different discourses. It may, for instance, be
represented as an illness, as an extreme diet, as self-
starvation, as a coping mechanism, as a means of achieving a
positively construed identity (see chapter 9), or as a form of
self-punishment (see below). The discourses within which these
various meanings are produced each interpellate the subject in
different ways and, as the extracts below illustrate, some of
these subject positions may be resisted and rejected.
(Denise, p.8)
Denise: I would definitely not call myself anorexic. /H: right/ Yes I Lost a lot of weight but (.) I
didn't, /H: it's uni/ I wouldn't put it down to anything to do with anorexia. /H: n right/ So when
people say to me: Oh you're anorexic, or, you're in the anorexic unit, /H: right/ it just makes my back
prickle. I hate it. /H: mu right/ I really do. I think it's uhh (.) in a way it's because even in
mind, even though I've been with people who who are, who would call themselves anorexics, /H: imi/ still
in my mind is the old stereotype of C.) what the media portray as (.) as anorexic, /H: right/ sort of
un seLf-inflicted, spoilt brat, /H: right/ seLfish, un (.) unnecessary. You know: Well why can't you
just eat, /H: right m/ things like that. Urn C.) and other people sort of see it as pathetic and that
/H: right/ and so it just, it really does make my my back prickle.
(Tricia, p.6)
H: Yeah I mean when when you think of the Label anorexia C.) what what do you think about? C.)
Tricia: I s'pose I I still feel C.) some of the projections onto me C.) from society C.) /H: right] and
it's correlated with the professional view. (...J I was continually Labelled when I was out of C.) you
know Like home as well /H: right/ C.) and treated Like a specimen. (...] I feel that eating distress
is something that a normal C.) majorit', I would say I'm afraid the majority of women go through at some
period of their lives IH: right yeah/ C.) un far more frequently than actually /H: m/ comes to light.
/H: right/ And it'sj	 a pathological state /H: right/ and I don't feel that anorexiaJ . a pathological
state.
(Laura/Penny, p.8)
Laura: I mean now, now I know about it (anorexia), it makes, un I wish there was more sort of, not
education about it but it's not a slimer's disease. It's not just you know, IH: yeah/ it doesn't have,
it doesn't always start out as a diet. Well it often does but it's not just vanity. /H: right/ It's not
just girls who want to be you know particularly thin. /H: right/ You know, it's not a vain thing.
(Nicki, p.8)
Nicki: They (doctors) think it's to do with vanity and the media /H: right/ but it's so n&ich more deeper
than that. /H: right (inaud.)/ Like it's called the slinmier's disease which is a load of rubbish anyway.
/H: yeah, yeah it's a/ But I think the media often portray it as being a good thing like you know: She's
anorexic. And people admire her 'cos they think: Oh she's in control, she's thin.
The extracts above contain a number of different
constructions of 'anorexia', all of which are produced as
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others' constructions and all of which are rejected and/or
disputed. Denise, for example, completely distances herself
from 'anorexia' which she construes, in accord with a media
stereotype, as selfish, self-inflicted, unnecessary and
pathetic. She is similarly reluctant to identify other women
in the Eating Disorders Unit as anorexic: her statement that
they anorexic is repaired to one in which they "would call
themselves anorexics". Tricia also refuses the term 'anorexia'
which she locates within a medical discourse that positions
her as a pathological 'specimen'. In contrast to this
pathologizing discourse she re-constructs her experience in
terms of a more normalizing concept of 'eating distress' (see
Pembroke, 1993). In Laura's and Nicki's extracts 'anorexia' is
again constructed differently, in this case as a 'slimmer's
disease'. This latter construction produces 'anorexia' as a
trivial issue about dieting, vanity, and the media 1 . In
contrast, Laura and Nicki construe 'it' as something more than
this, as a 'deeper' issue.
These extracts thus demonstrate a discursive struggle
over interpretations of 'the self' and of 'anorexia'. The
constructions of 'anorexia' as 'selfish' and 'pathetic', as a
pathology, or as a 'slimmer's disease' are presented as
others' constructions and are rejected and/or disputed. They
are potential 'anorexic' identities that are resisted. In
other extracts, however, whilst 'anorexia' is constructed as
separate from the self, the self is also implicitly construed
as anorexic.
(Penny/Laura, p.10)
Penny: So Long I've Lied to myself and denied everything to protect the anorexia /H: right/ so you just
have to be honest and sharing.
(Erena, p.12)
Ermra: I hate it (anorexia) in myself because I wouldn't have that wilt power if I couldn't associate
it to something Like this. /H: right/ It's not strength in me. It's notmy own strength realty. It's
artificial strength that I'm calLing in from somewhere eLse to try and do it for me.
(Layla, p.11)
Layta: I used to think when I first came to realize how strongly it was Living in me I thought peopLe
used to describe it as a friend or as /H: m/ an enemy (.) but I realized that (.) it's a creature C.)
getting hoLd of my body to survive in the body. And it gets hold of my brain as welL /H: right! in a
. In Nicki's extract the media is also implicitly construed
as particularly problematic. It both trivializes and admires
'anorexia'.
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way that my brain can not work property and can not see the things where normal peopLe see. /H: nln/ Even
my eyes are distorted.
(Laura/Penny p.10-li)
Laura: I found a sort of friend which was my anorexia reaLty. (...1 When you're anorexic you tend to
you know reaLty isolate yourseLf and become realty Lonely. /H: m/ Out also I used it to sort of fiLl
up my LoneLiness. It just fed on me being reaLLy Lonely.
In these extracts the construction of 'anorexia' again
varies. But in contrast to the previous group of extracts the
self is implicitly produced as anorexic. Nevertheless, a
dissociation between 'the self' and 'anorexia' remains.
'Anorexia' is constructed here as "a friend", "an enemy", or
"a creature (.) getting hold of my body to survive in the
body". 'It' is an entity to which one is somehow related but
which is simultaneously separate from the self. " fed on me
being really lonely"; " was living in "; "
	 gets hold of
brain" (emphasis added). 'It' provides an artificial
strength from elsewhere. 'It' is protected by Penny lying to
herself. Thus, whilst 'the self' is construed as 'anorexic',
'anorexia' is construed as an entity that is ng the self.
The discursive relationship evidenced here between 'self'
and 'anorexia' parallels, I would argue, a bio-medical model
of illness in which disease invades and affects the body but
is not considered as part of the person: a patient rather
than j, an illness. This discursive relationship is, I would
argue, supported by parasitic images of 'anorexia' as "a
creature" surviving within the body2
 or as something that "fed
on (Laura) being really lonely". The use of such imagery also
emphasises the construed autonomy of 'anorexia' within this
discursive relationship. That is, 'anorexia' is constructed as
something that is separate from the self but which can affect
the self - distort one's perception, for example - against
one's will. It is, therefore, a representation that converges
with a dualistic construction of 'the body' as something alien
to the mind/self and that threatens to overpower 'the self'
by, for example, compelling one to eat (see chapter 9).
2• This construction of 'anorexia' as a creature surviving
in the body might also be interpreted as an image of pregnancy
relating to the psychoanalytic interpretations of anorexia as a
fear of oral impregnation (see p.49).
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11.3 Anorexia, Resistance and Identity
There is, then, a multiplicity of contending
constructions of 'anorexia'. And the relationship of the
subject to this shifting category also varies both within and
across transcripts. 'Anorexia' may, for example, be construed
as something entirely dissociated from the self or as
something that 'invades' and affects the self but that is
simultaneously separate from the self or, as argued below, it
may be construed as an identity. And whilst 'anorexia' is
construed negatively in many of the above extracts it may also
be constructed more positively, for example, as a label that
signifies positive attributes in the self.
(Olivia/Barbara, pp.9-10)
H: Do you remember how you feLt when you, when you were first diagnosed as anorexic?
Olivia: Happy.
H: So it's quite a C.) label like (that you're) attached to?
Olivia: I liked it C.) because it really made me feel like I had a sense of control over my Life and
my eating which was aLways a problem for me. And I was skinny and I Loved that so imich 1K: nin/ being
skinny C...] I loved C.) I Loved the sensation of the bones. That's what I liked feeling, the bones.
I Like feeling the bones coining (through). I Liked feeling slim. (inaud.) And I I had every intention
of staying anorexic.
(Cathy, p.5)
Cathy: This is probably going to sound very crude but un on many occasions I'd actually said: I wish
I was (anorexic), because then I'd know that I was slim.
(Jackie, p.9)
Jackie: I mean when I'm un (.) when I'm in an anorexic state it means success. C.) ill: right/ I really
do get a feeling of achievement from what I'm doing to myself.(...]
H: What is it that you feel you're achieving?
Jackie: Well in some ways it's being different from other people. (.) /H: right ,mi/ It's you know it's
something that was my, this is what I find quite difficult now. It's something that's my own.
H: Right (.) m yeah C.)
Jackie: I achieve aLso control /K: m/ definiteLy cos /K: right/ you know no none of my (.) however nuch
people try and make you eat no-one can C.) /H: right/ you know control that. I mean it's sh' it's me
doing what I want.
Whilst Olivia, Cathy, and Jackie articulate different
relationships to 'anorexia' each constructs 'it' here as a
positive term. 'It' signifies success and achievement, that
one is sufficiently skinny or slim, that one is in control. To
be 'anorexic' connotes that one has at least some desired
attributes. In Jackie's extract 'anorexia' is, in addition,
construed as a way of differentiating herself from others.
'It' makes her different and thus, I would argue, provides her
with an identity. In this context the 'control' achieved
through 'anorexia' also functions to produce her identity. She
is the subject as well as the object of control: "it'sme
doing what I want." Anorexia is discursively produced as
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"something that's (her) own", 	 control and	 property
that marks identity. There is, therefore, a further
convergence with dualist discourse where the thin/anorexic
body is construed as a controlled/denied body that signifies
a powerful, independent identity.
The construction of 'anorexia' as "my own", as a
possession might also be read in the context of the doctor-
patient power relationship since 'anorexia' is presented here
as Jackie's property rather than as an illness to be
controlled and cured by the medical profession. This
construction confers on her greater rights over 'her anorexia'
than would be the case within a medical discourse. In the
extract below Lynn's articulation of 'anorexia' as something
that is hers is explicitly located within this context of
medical power-relations.
CLynn/Simone/Jane, p.13)
Lynn: Yeah I did Like it. In the end I did Like the LabeL. I thought that's something that's me, that's
mine. /H: right rriu/ You know and I haven't got anything eLse /H: right/ so that's the one thing I have
got and but /H: (coughs)/ I was Like frightened of people trying to feed me up /H: nail you know. Like
doctors wouLd give me a sheet of paper saying: eat aLL this. An' you know an' I thought /H: yeah/
they're going to take over /H: yeah/ and be more powerfuL than me. And I just wanted to run away arid
/H: mI not Let anyone take it away from me, /H: right/ sort of protect it and Look after it as if it
was mine.
Here the doctor-patient relationship is presented as a
contest for control over the anorexia. Lynn's construction of
'anorexia' as her possession thus functions to position her as
'its' owner, a more powerful subject position than that of a
patient whose illness is under the remit of the medical
profession. And, as in Jackie's extract above, this
construction simultaneously functions to mark her identity:
"that's something that's me, that's mine." 'Anorexia' is both
her possession and her identity. And the construction of
'anorexia' as an identity, as a possession that marks one's
identity or as a means of producing identity was often evident
in the transcripts.
(Nicki, p.5)
H: So how how did it feeL when when you went for help and they said: this is, you have anorexia or
butimia or?
Nicki: I thought they're probabLy right. /H: m/ But at the same time they were Looking at it as being
such a probLem. IN: right/ And I thought: weLL it isn't reaLly a problem for me. It's a way of Life.
IN: right/ And it was Like, weLL it was Like me. It's Like it was a way to have an identity.
(Nicki, p.7)
Nicki: WeLL the society sees fat people as being bad and thin people as being good but I think that in
anorexic's it's so much deeper. It's Like the eating disorder's based on the whole seLf.
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(Tricia, p.6)
Tricia: 1 don't feeL that anorexia is a pathoLogical state. 1K: right/ I mean my feeLing is that it's
it's a desperate search to find one's own identity 1K: right/ to put it in a nutsheLL.
(Tricia, p.12)
Tricia: I think that it was something about being C.) trying to be acknowLedged as someone speciaL.
(Jane/Simone/Lynn, p.13)
Jane: It (anorexia) was Like the one thing in my Life, the part that I couLd controL and that was mine.
/K: mel And it was Like a security to me. 1K: mel I didn't think I'd be able to Live without it /K: irin/
if any one took it away.
These extracts could again be read in terms of their
rhetorical	 functions,	 as resistances to particular
constructions of 'anorexia'. That is, 'anorexia' is
constructed here as something that "isn't really a problem",
a pathology, or a superficial issue. Rather, 'it' is, in
opposition, "a way of life", a valued possession, "a
security", and a "deeper" issue "based on the whole self".
The extracts can therefore be read inter-textually as
discursive resistances, as instances in which 'the self' and
'anorexia' are produced in ways that resist potential
pathologizing or trivializing constructions. And, whilst there
is a diversity in these oppositional constructions, they also
converge on the issue of identity. That is, 'anorexia' is
construed as a possession that marks one's identity or as "a
desperate search to find one's own identity". 'It' is
something "that's mine", "something that's me".
11.4 Anorexia, Identity and Lack
'Anorexia' may, then, be positively construed as an
identity, as "me". 'It' is a way of marking, finding, or
having an identity. It is itself constituted as an identity.
Yet whilst the above extracts produce both 'the self' and
'anorexia' positively they also indicate a concomitant
negative construction of 'the self' as otherwise lacking an
identity. Hence, Jane describes how she "didn't think {she)'d
be able to live without it". That is, the construction of
'anorexia' as providing an identity for the self suggests, not
only that 'the self' therefore has an (anorexic) identity, but
also conversely that 'the self' may be otherwise lacking in
identity. And in many extracts this obverse construction of
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'the self' was also apparent.
(Tricia, pp.13-14)
Tricia: And the physician there refused to Listen to aLl my bantering on about food or anything Like
that. (...] And it was as if he he said well you know: Yeah okay I don't want to hear about your
anorexia. I want to hear about . And I started thinking: But I am the the anorexia. /H: nm! This is
my Identity. C...] It had actuaLLy become my identity. /H: am (.) yeah! and I think that's that's a
probLem with it. /14: emil I think it becomes C.) can become an aLL-consuning identity.
H: Right C.) that that you feet you're you're nothing else outside of it?
R: Nothing eLse but anorexia. That /H: yeah/ that's my name C.) you know. /14: right C.) yeah! And then
it's very hard to get out of !H: emil because C.) it's Like if I give up that name what else is there.
!H: right/ I'm stiLL this this sheLl inside.
(Nicki, pp.5-6)
Nicki: It's Like it was a way to have an identity. /H: right! And I didn't care if peopLe saw it as bad
cos it was how I was. /H: right! And if it, if I didn't have it, if I wasn't thin /11: ann! then I
wouldn't have an identity. I'd just be this big bad bLob. C...] it was my thing. /14: right! Before I'd
felt just like nothing. /14: m! Now I had something to focus on and something to be.
(Nicki, p.11)
Nicki: I think it was Like, it C.) anorexia had become me and when I put on weight it was like I'd Lost
the ability and I'd Lost my identity.
(RacheL, p.6)
Rachel: This was just the way I reacted to being Lost and not seeing any way out.
(Lynn)'Jane!Simone, p.18)
Lynn: I feel a stronger character !H: ran! now than I was then (when she was anorexic). Didn't feel I
had a character at all /H: right! then, I was just Like a sheLl C.) /14: m/ but now I'm a more deeper
person. /H: right! And I you know hope peopLe get to know me for what I am now /14: right! deep down than
what they see.
These extracts again evidence a very psychologically-
oriented understanding of 'anorexia'. 'Anorexia' is again
constructed as an identity. "I am the the anorexia [..] This
is my identity". For Tricia "(t)hat's (her) name" and for
Nicki anorexia "was a way to have an identity". 'It' was
"something to be"; "anorexia had become me". 'Anorexia' is
construed here as providing an identity, as being or
constituting one's identity. However, the extracts also
evidence a construction of 'the self' as lacking in identity.
If it were not for anorexia one would be identity-less. Hence
Tricia was "(n)othing else but anorexia" and both she and Lynn
describe themselves as "shells", connoting an empty, identity-
less void. Lynn "didn't feel (she) had a character at all".
Similarly Nicki argues that without anorexia she had "felt
just like nothing" and that if she "didn't have it, if (she)
wasn't thin [...) then (she) wouldn't have an identity.
(She)'d just be a big bad blob." She would be amorphous and
lacking in identity. In these extracts, therefore, 'the self'
is constructed as simultaneously having an ("all consuming")
identity as 'anorexic' and obversely as otherwise lacking an
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identity. 'Anorexia' is "something to be" but without it one
is "nothing", a "shell".
In the construction of (anorexic) identity explicated
above two metaphors of identity are deployed. The first is
illustrated by Nicki's comment that if she were not
thin/anorexic she would just be a "big bad blob" with no
identity. In her statement 'the thin/anorexic body' signifies
an identity; it is "something to be" and this is counterposed
with being a "big bad blob" implying that 'the fat body'
signifies a lack of or in identity. The production of this
dichotomy - thin/fat, identity/lack of identity - leans, I
would argue, on a construction of 'fat' as amorphous and
loosely defined flesh whose softness and fluidity blurs the
defining borders of the body and submerges the boundary
between the self and the outside world 3 . This construction
thus converges with and consolidates the negativity of many
other constructions of 'the fat body'. Here, to be fat
signifies a lack of definition of the self, a lack of
identity, that one is merely an amorphous "blob" whereas to be
thin/anorexic signifies that one has an identity, a
construction which converges with other positive constructions
of 'the thin body', perhaps in particular with the dualistic
construction of the thin/anorexic body as a signifier of a
powerful and independent identity.
The second metaphor deployed in these extracts is again
a spatial metaphor and is apparent in Tricia's description of
herself as a "shell inside"; in Lynn's construction of herself
as a "deeper person now and in her "hope (that) people get to
know (her) for what (she is) now (...] deep down than what
they see" (emphasis added). This spacial metaphor of selfhood
is also evident in extracts where (others') constructions of
anorexia as superficial and vain are opposed by constructions
of 'anorexia' as a dee per issue. These statements deploy a
. As noted in chapter 9, a discursive relationship between
body boundaries and identity is also evidenced in some
constructions of eating as an activity which threatens the
integrity of the self by transgressing its physical boundaries.
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topographical metaphor of identity that extends the spatial
aspect of conceptions of the individual-society relationship
as an internal/external dichotomy. 'The individual' is
construed in terms of spatial levels from his/her superficial
(and often more socially malleable) aspects to her deepest,
most profound, and perhaps essential, characteristics which
may not be immediately visible to others.
11.5 Woman, Identity and Lack
The use of the two spatial metaphors of identity
discussed above is, I would argue, quite common in both
academic and popular discourses concerning identity. The
topographical metaphor, for example, is apparent in
psychological concepts such as 'internalization' and 'core
personality'. Furthermore, these metaphors also interface with
'feminine' identity in particular ways. For example, where the
construction of 'femininity' as appearance (see chapter 8)
converges with the topographical metaphor of identity a
profound tension emerges between the superficiality of
femininity and the deep internality of identity. 'Feminine
identity' becomes superficial and issues of women's identity
discursively slip from profundity into trivialized
constructions about appearance and vanity 6 . That is, I would
argue, 'femininity' (as an appearance) is construed as the
other of identity, an opposition which is also apparent in the
transcripts.
(Lyon/Jane/Simone, pp.4 & 6)
H: Did you have us particuLar ideas of an ideaL woman or us C.) or a particuLar person that you knew
or in the media or what have you that you acinired as a woman and thought: I want to be Like that or:
I want to have that characteristic or?
Lynn: Yeah I did. I wanted, I always acni red Ma', uh Maria Hetvyn, is it?
H: Oh right, yeah I know, with the hair.=
=Lynn: Cos there was a picture at the heaLth cLub and I used Look at it. I'd think: Oh she's so
attractive. I wish I couLd Look Like that.
(. . .1
Lynn: I've got no desire to Look Like Marie HeLvyn. I I'm more interested in deveLoping myseLf. /H:
right/ I want the in' the inner me rather than a picture of someone an' aiming for that. /H: right/
That's what I'm doing at the moment is developing myseLf.
. The problem of this slippage can bee seen in the
liscursive resistance to the construction of anorexia as a
'slimmer's disease' with its implication that it is a superficial
issue of feminine vanity rather than a more serious, 'deeper'
issue of identity.
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(OLivia/Barbara, p.11)
H: Corning back to what you were saying about stopping your periods, do you think there was anything eLse
about us being anorexic that you were us trying to reject about being female?
OLivia: Urn C.) me, I wouLd say yes C.) us I'm a woman of confLicts (...] by the time I became anorexic
I got fed up of the way, how I felt, how I imagined myself to be treated by men, people, /H: right! and
just that I had no identity or individuality of my C.) self. So I decided to give up on trying to Look
nice, just wore baggy cLothes and didn't care.
In these extracts both Lynn and Olivia construct 'femininity'
in terms of appearance and in opposition to identity. Lynn
proved an account of how she admired Marie Helvyn and wished
that she could look like her. Similarly Olivia equates being
a woman with looking "nice". That is, 'femininity' is
construed as a matter of attractiveness, of appearance. But it
is also associated with "no identity or individuality of my
(.) self". 'Identity' is about "the inner me rather than a
picture of someone". Whereas identity is constructed as
internal and deep 'femininity' is associated with
superficiality, with "no identity or individuality"; it is
only (surface) appearance
Discursive constructions of 'woman' are also imbricated
in the 'body boundary' metaphor of identity in which fat
represents a blurring of this boundary. Firstly, constructions
of 'woman' and of 'fat' may be read as discursively related
through the concept of excess (see chapter 10; see also
Caskey, 1989). Moreover, as Lacanian theory has illustrated,
the category of 'woman' can be understood as epitomizing the
impossibility of phallocentric notions of a unitary single
identity (Rose, 1982; see chapter 3) and therefore as
highlighting the problematic nature of this self/other
boundary. Within the Symbolic order 'tue woman' is in excess
of this boundary (see Lacan, 1982d).
As Lacan (1982a) argues, subjects take up their identity
within the Symbolic order with reference to the phallus (Rose,
1982) and hence 'femininity' is constituted as a negatively
signified subject position, a profoundly problematic identity
(see chapter t 3). Thus,
The description of feminine sexuality is ... an
exposure of the terms of its definition, the very
opposite of a demand as to what that sexuality
should be ... giving the lie, we could say, to the
whole problem outlined. (Rose, 1982:43)
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Femininity exposes the fraudulent nature of the phallus whose
function "indicates the reduction of difference to an instance
of visible perception, a seeming value" (Rose, 1982: 42).
Thus, it also problematizes the 'body boundary' metaphor which
signifies a simple visible self/other boundary. 'Woman', as a
subject position, an identity as not-I, as the Other of
(masculine) identity (Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986), can thus
be understood as problematizing the very notion of a clearly
differentiated or defined identity. In the extract below this
tension between 'femininity' and identity is again apparent.
(Tricia, pp.6-7)
H: Was Un i mean what at the time did un being fat mean (.) to you? Why was it something that you didn't
want?
Tricia: I s'pose for me it was C.) I feLt being ctuisy and being ugly, 1K: right/ being out of controL
C.) /K: rrni/ but I think as far as a woman goes, being sexually so desirable by men and not being able
to say no.
H: Right fatness meant that? C.)
Tricia: Yes, /K: oh right/ much more open to sexuaL advances from men C.) 1K: right/ but C.) because
of course being a woman one's not aLLowed to say no.
H: Right (short Laugh) yeah=
=Tricia: And also maybe it C.) more of a Link with my mother which I /H: m/ particuLarly wanted to dis'
I mean not that my mother was fat 1K: rightf but it's just the image of being a mother.
H: That that sort of motherLiness is is kind of plui-çer and C.) mn.
Tricia: And the other thing as weLL is that being quotes normal is something about C.) maybe I'd just
be subierged into sort of the rest of of womanhood /H; right/ and totaLLy Lose ray identity 1K: yeah/
in amongst everyone eLse. It's like needing needing some, to keep some sort of speciaL-ness In myself,
1K: nsn/ some identity.
H: Yeah yeah, I remeater having that feeLing that uh C.) /Tricia: mini you had to do something to to stay
yourseLf cos otherwise C.) you'd end up not being your mother but C.) not being you=
=Tricia: Just being a woman /K: rr,n/ or something. I don't know (inaud.)
H: Yeah some sort of C.) generic something.
Tricia: Blob.
Here Tricia associates being fat with being clumsy, ugly and
out of control. She also constructs 'fat' as a signifier of
'the mother' and of an uncontrolled female sexuality. And, as
argued in chapter 10, both 'the sexual woman' and 'the mother'
are often constructed as tropes of excess. Tricia then goes on
to articulate a fear that becoming a (normal) woman would
entail her being "submerged into sort of the rest of of
womanhood". To become a woman is construed as a total loss of
her identity. That is, the category of 'woman' is produced in
an opposition to identity and to any "sort of special-ness in
(her)self".
As in Lacanian theory, 'woman' is construed here as the
Other of identity, as not-I. In the Symbolic order "anatomical
difference comes to fi gure sexual difference. ... It covers
over the complexities of the child's early sexual life with a
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crude opposition in which that very complexity is refused and
repressed" (Rose, 1982: 42). That is, the phallus flattens out
the complexities of difference; it refuses Tricia's "special-
ness in (her)self", providing only the crudely oppositional
identities of 'man' or 'woman'. Thus, just as Nicki
constructed 'the fat body' in opposition to identity, as being
a "big bad blob", so Tricia has constructed 'femininity' as
the Other of identity, as a generic "blob".
11.6 Ideologies of Selfhood: A Discourse of Individualism
The two spatial metaphors of identity discussed above
might be considered as parts of a 'discourse of individualism'
which interpellates the subject as a sovereign and unitary
individual. It is a discourse which constructs the notion of
'person' as a given entity separate from society (Hirst and
Woolley, 1982) and which is prevalent not only in the
transcripts but also throughout contemporary Western society.
It is, for example, pervasive in the social sciences
(Henriques et al., 1984) and is written into social
organization, into concepts of justice, social order, and
human rights (Hirst and Woolley, 1982).
Wetherell and White (1992), in their discourse analytic
study of young women's talk about eating, dieting and body
image, also identify a discourse of individualism emerging
'very strongly' from their transcripts. They describe this
discourse as "working from a type of liberal ideology and (as)
setting up as its ideal the autonomous, self-directed, self-
governing individual who stands separate from society and
social influences" (ibid., p.6). As their analysis
demonstrates, this discourse of individualism produces an
ideal of 'being your own woman' which conflicts with
accounting for wanting to be thin.
If you t say that it is weak to be influenced by
others, then it is difficult to present the desire
to be thin as reasonable. ... To admit to being
influenced by social pressure (to be thin)
jeopardizes the ideal of being an independent
autonomous individual (ibid., 1992: 10).
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It abnegates the independence of one's inner self. This
dilemma, they argue, was often resolved by recourse to a
'discourse of natural body processes' which re-construes the
cultural imperative to be thin as a natural imperative to be
healthy. In this way the women in their study could maintain
both 'thin' and 'individualistic' subject positions through a
discursive manoeuvre that also naturalized, i.e. de-
politicized, their restrained eating.
A similar dilemma also emerged in the transcripts of the
present study. In this case the problem involves avoiding
potential constructions of the self as having a 'summers'
disease' (see also pp.290-291), as being motivated by social
pressures to be attractively thin/slim.
(Nicki, p.2)
Nicki: I never, ever Looked at Like sLim women in magazines and thought 'Oh I'd Like to be sLim' IN:
right/. it was something that you know I just didn't bother about and then when my periods started I
was very angry and then un, and I sort of noticed that I was starting to Lose weight and then /H: right/
I sort of, you know, just focused on that /H: m/, not in reLation to Like the media IH: mi, right/.
Not earlier on anyway.
In this account Nicki explicitly dissociates her losing weight
from media images of 'slim women'. Emulating "slim women in
magazines" was something that she "just didn't bother about".
Her losing weight is presented as having nothing to do with
social pressures to be thin.
Within the framework of a discourse of individualism
accounting for one's 'anorexia' in terms of social pressures
to be thin might further undermine one's already precarious
interpellation as a sovereign and unitary individual, as
'one's own woman'. However, the transcripts of the present
study rarely evidenced a 'discourse of natural body processes'
(see Wetherell and White, 1992), perhaps because all but two
of the women interviewed here had been medically diagnosed as
'anorexic'. To construe one's (non-)eating and weight loss as
healthy when one is under medical supervision for an eating
disorder may appear implausible. Rather, as noted above, the
construction of 'anorexia' as a 'summers' disease' was most
frequently countered by construing it as a deeper issue about
identity. Yet, whilst this discursive opposition curtails
(others') negative constructions of the self as superficial,
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as a 'fashion victim' swayed by social pressures, it also
curtails one's ability to construe 'anorexia' as a socio-
political issue, thus individualizing the desire to be thin.
Wetherell and White (1992) also identify a second
dilemma. If both thinness and autonomous individuality are
idealized how then does one explain 'failures' such as over-
eating or being fat? They argue that this was achieved by
invoking a 'confessional discourse of pathology'. The young
women in their study blamed themselves. Thus, Wetherell and
White describe a discourse of pathology which they argue has
a moralistic element and constructs a subject position of a
weak or wicked self.
It is a narrative about guilt, of appetites which
need to be restrained, of the grossness of eating,
and of bodies which give in to desire and need to be
subjugated (ibid., 1992: 8-9).
It is, therefore I would argue, a discourse which deploys
dualistic elements, locating the source of pathology or
failure in the uncontrolled, desirous, eruptive (female) body,
that is in 'the body' of dualistic discourse. It is also, as
Wetherell and White (1992) note, a discourse which
individualizes, and thereby de-politicizes, women's 'failures'
to be thin and to refrain from eating.
The discourse of individualism also provides the
positively construed subject position of 'rebel' in which the
opposition between self-directed sovereign individual and
society are emphasised (Wetherell and White, 1992). Yet whilst
this facet of individualistic discourse was apparent in
Wetherell and White's study it was not used as an explanation
for fatness or over-eating. The women in the present study did
not take up an individualistic, rebellious subject position to
construct themselves as defiantly fat. The adoption of such a
subject position would clearly be implausible for very thin
women but being 'defiantly fat' may also be socially
unacceptable.
As Millman (cited in Bordo, 1990: 99) notes, "the obese
elicit blinding rage and disgust in our culture", particularly
if an obese woman claims to be happy . Bordo, (1990: 100), for
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example, quotes the audience of a recent Phil Donahue talk
show featuring an obese woman:
I can't believe you don't want to be slim and
beautiful, I just can't believe it, ... I heard you
talk a lot about how you feel good about yourself
and you like yourself, but I really think you're
kidding yourself, ... It's hard for me to believe
that Mary Jane is really happy ... Mary Jane, to be
the way you are today, you had better start going on
a diet soon, because if you don't you're just going
to get bigger and bigger and bigger. It's true
(taken from transcripts of the Phil Donahue Show).
Similarly Jane Walmsley, author of the recently published
'Thin Think' writes that she:
refuse(s) to regard Roseanne Arnold as a heroine for
the Nineties ... Only her wallet weighs more than
she does. ... She ODs on junk food and is
unapologetically obese ... She is an undisciplined,
ungrammatical big-mouth, an unreconstructed porker-
and-proud-of-it. ... What a con. ... She has simply
made a polemic out of bad manners, self-indulgence
and uncouth behaviour. She has turned vulgarity into
an art form, gluttony into a political statement -
and she has cleverly created a myth around
herself.	 (Walinsley, 1994: 46)
This myth, Waimsey claims, is that Roseanne Arnold is happy
with her weight. That Arnold could take up an individualistic
rebellious stance, discursively constructing herself as
defiantly fat is construed by Walmsey as both outrageous and
unbelievable. In these two extracts, Mary Jane and Roseanne
Arnold are construed as appalling, enraging, and unbelievable
not only because they are fat but particularly because they
present themselves as happy with being fat. To take up a
rebellious subject position in a discourse of individualism,
to construe oneself as defiantly fat rather than as a
pathological failure, is dismissed here as illegitimate. That
is, despite the social idealization of 'the subject as an
"autonomous, self-directed, self-governing individual who
stands separate from society and social influences" (Wetherell
and White, 1992: 6) the interpellation of the fat, female
subject within a discourse of individualism may itself be
construed as unacceptable.
Thus, I would argue that a social proscription against
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locating the fat woman within a discourse of individualism
ensures that the 'failure' to be thin is construed within an
individualizing discourse of pathology. Moreover, the 'body
boundaries' metaphor of identity, explicated in the present
analysis, construes fat as a blurring of the defining borders
of the body and as submerging the boundary between the self
and the outside world. Hence 'the fat (female) body' may
signify a lack of or in identity. This construction thus
compounds the difficulty of positively construing the fat,
female subject as defiantly or happily fat within a discourse
of individualism. As Wetherell and White (1992: 12) conclude,
there appears to be no way out of this cage.
The women in the present study also located themselves
within a discourse of pathology in terms of their body weight,
eating and non-eating. Inevitably, however, there were
differences in the ways in which the women in Wetherell and
White's study and the women in this present study are
discursively positioned in relation to pathology. Those women
diagnosed as anorexic have already been institutionally
pathologized as eating disordered, and have often experienced
the discursive and material consequences of medical
intervention. And as argued above, the medical pathologization
of the self was frequently resisted.
The diagnosis of anorexia was not always construed
negatively in terms of pathology. It might also be construed
as a label that confirms that one is sufficiently thin,
successful or controlled. Furthermore, in being 'çp thin',
the (very) thin/anorexic body may also produced as a signifier
of a rebellious subject position. That is, the discursive
construction of the (very) thin/anorexic body as
unattractively thin provides a subject position in which the
desire to be thin can be read as opposing rather than
conforming to social pressures. In being thin 'the
anorexic' may be discursively constructed as both thin and
rebelliously individualistic.
(Nicki, pp.5-6)
Nicki: I started Losing weight and I think peopLe say to you: Oh you're Losing Lots of weight. What's
going on? I think that, and then you think: nm. And I think that reinforces your behaviour to Lose more
weight. /H: right/ And then you have the, then you have the media images as welL which you may never
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have noticed before but you know you start Looking at the people and then you start feeLing thin. So
you just want to get smaLLer and smalLer /H: m/ And then any coolnent that people say s if they say you
Look realty dreadfuL today that just makes you feet good /H: right/ and reinforces /11: n yu your
behaviour.
In Nicki's extract, for example, she is concerned with
countering the possible interpretation of her weight loss as
resulting from social or media pressure to be thin. Hence, she
suggests that others may have noticed her weight loss before
she had and that she had not noticed media images of slim
women after she had already lost weight. She thereby opposes
the possible explanation that her desire to be thin was caused
by social pressures and ideals of the thin, female body.
The account deploys, I would argue, a discourse of
individualism and whilst it does not provide a reason for
Nicki's weight loss it can be read as producing her as a
sovereign individual: she lost weight because of internal,
individual reasons rather than because of external social
reasons. However, Nicki's strongest constructions of herself
as a self-governing, self-directed individual is where she
construes herself as rebellious: "(a)nd then any comment that
people say, if they say you look really dreadful today that
just makes you feel good". If she feels good when she is told
she looks dreadful it follows that she is not losing weight so
as to look attractively thin. She is not losing weight because
she is swayed by social pressures to be (attractively) thin.
This statement, however, does more than confirm her
interpellation within a discourse of individualism 5 . It also
constructs her as a rebel, as wanting to look dreadful rather
than attractive, as aspiring to the opposite of social
demands. It is therefore an account which produces her
positively as both thin and as a self-directed, autonomous
I would further argue that a discourse of individualism
ight also inform the discursive resources explicated in other
iscourse analytic research. Widdicombe's (1993) analysis of the
hetoric of autobiographical change, for example, demonstrates
ow 'goths' resisted potential accusations that they were merely
ollowing a fashion rather than expressing their inner selves.
heir accounts might therefore be read as being informed by a
iscourse of individualism.
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individual.
In short, a discourse of individualism constitutes an
important element of the present transcripts. As in Wetherell
and White's study, the present analysis indicates that this
discourse produces a dominant notion of the person as a given
entity, as a sovereign individual, as "the author of its acts"
(Hirst and Woolley, 1982), as unitary and separate from
society. And, as Wetherell and White's analysis also
demonstrates, the imperative to construe oneself as governed
by an internal self rather than by external society curtails
a more political construction of the self as socially
pressured to be thin.
Individualistic discourse might therefore be understood
as politically problematic in that it individualizes, and
thereby de-politicizes, the desire to be thin (or to conform
to other social ideals). Yet the recent challenges to the
individualistic concept of the person - most notably by French
theorists such as Althusser, Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, and
Lacan (Hirst and Woolley, 1982) and by feminism (Henriques et
al., 1984) - have been denounced by academics of the Left
(e.g. Thompson, 1978) as well as the Right. As Ilenriques et
al. (1984; also Hirst and Woolley, 1982) note, individualistic
conceptualizations of the subject have informed the Civil
Rights and Liberation Movements of the l960s and 70s and were
established as a defence against 'inhuman' empiricism and
behaviourism in the social sciences. Anti-humanist
philosophies appeared to undermine the conceptual basis of
these humanistic politics. The 'progressive' nature of
these political movements might lead one to assume that a
humanistic variant of individualistic discourse might be
usefully deployed in undermining the disciplinary power of
discourses which insist on the necessity of a thin (female)
body. Such a discourse was apparent in the transcripts of the
present study. This humanistic discourse dictates that it is
the inner self, an individual's character rather than their
appearance which is important and should be valued. Yet, as
the extract below demonstrates the deployment of humanistic
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discourse does not necessarily lessen the imperative to be
thin but rather may result in a negative construction of the
self as irrational and superficial, as being too concerned
with appearance.
(Ermia, pp.2-3)
Erna: And if I feeL fat and ugly /H: m/ then that's why I'm failing in the relationship. And If I
wasn't fat and ugLy then there wouldn't be a problem /H: nail which I know is probabLy quite irrationaL
/H: nai/ and that I would hope that the person that I'm with is actually looking beneath my fat
(Laughter) you know to see somebody underneath it 1K: right, yeah/. I do tend to hook everything on that
1K: nail when things are going bad. 1...] It sounds so stupid and 1 hate myself for saying It because
I know that it's probably wrong but it's purely physical characteristics IH: right/ that just turn me
over with jealousy. They realLy do. I mean I can't bear it and especiaLly when I see somebody who really
doesn't have to pay very much attention to what they eat 1K: rim!. You know and they're still so slim
and they're and they're so beautiful and you know 1K: yeahl they don't, they don't worry about it 1K:
right/. And I'm, that to me=
K: or at Least they don't worry about it as far as you know=
=E: Yes, I know that, which is the crazy thing /H: sail and I even know that one of the qualities that
I would want in friends or in relationships is for somebody to be able to disregard the physicaL to a
certain extent and realty /H: right/ be able to appreciate somebody's underneath character /N: mI which
is something that I hope I do. And yet I've got this totally other, you know other side 1K: right/ that
realLy can't bear to see somebody else who I consider to Look so beautiful /K: nail. Yeah, I don't
understand why I do it. (...] And I don't think I would Like to be friends with somebody like me who's
constantly, you know worrying about really petty things which in you know the grand scheme of things
really you know are insignificant.
(Ema, pp.3-4)
H: Nra, Is there any reason that, that you could talk about, why it is that you dislike the idea of fat
or the existence of fat?
Enina: I don't know. I don't know what it is. This is one thing that I've always tried to know why it's
become so important to me 1K: rush because I've got a couple of friends who are fairly well built who
aregreat people, reall y, really, you know great people /N: nail who I would want to spend a Lot of my
time with who don't worry about their size /H: right/. And to a certain extent that makes them even more
attractive to be with /N: m/ because they're so together and so stable /H: right/. And I don't think
I would like to be friends with somebody Like isa who's constantly, you know worrying about really petty
things which in you know the grand scheme of things really you know are insignificant.
In these extracts Emma deploys a spatial metaphor of identity,
producing an individualistic notion of the person. 'The self'
is "underneath" the appearance; it is internal and implicitly
dichotomized from (external) society. However, the extract can
also be read as deploying a humanistic variant of
individualistic discourse; the individual is valued for their
inner self. Appearance is construed as unimportant; it is
petty and should be disregarded so that tt somebody l s underneath
character" can be appreciated. Yet the deployment of this
humanistic discourse does not lessen Emma's concern with being
thin. Rather it interpellates her negatively as overly
concerned with trivia in the same way that the discourse of
individualism, discussed above, excludes the person who is
influenced by social pressures from the idealized subject
position of sovereign individual and produces her as weak and
superficial.
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Thus, as Henriques et al. (1984: 5) argue, "what counts
as positive action and resistance is not fixed once and for
all." Whilst a humanistic variant of individualistic discourse
was successfully used in the liberation politics of the 1960s
and 70s (Henriques et al., 1984; Hirst and Woolley, 1982), it
does not appear to provide an entirely successful strategy in
the transcripts of the present study. Not only does an
individualistic discourse prescribe de-politicized
explanations of the desire to be thin but its humanistic
variant both fails to undermine the disciplinary power of
discourses which insist on thinness and negatively constructs
the subject who is interpellated by such discourses.
Furthermore, as Hirst and Woolley (1982: 131) argue:
Politics and the metaphysics of the 'person' are
closely entwined. The opponents of 'anti-humanism'
were wrong to suppose that it presages a descent
into savagery. What is challenged is not the status
of person, free agent, or subject of right but
rather the claimed ontological foundations of that
status. The notion that men (sic) are 'free agents',
directed by a sovereign and integral consciousness,
is a metaphysical 'fiction'.
That is, the anti-humanist challenge to the metaphysical
fiction of 'the person' of individualistic discourse is not an
attempt to reduce 'the person' to a mere effect of the social
or to disregard concepts of human dignity or freedom (Hirst
and Woolley, 1982: 131). Rather, it is an attempt to
understand the notion of the sovereign individual not as a
given entity but as "a particular product of historically
specific practices of social regulation" (Henriques et al.,
1984: 12; see also Foucault, 1977b; Aithusser, 1977). To
insist on the fictive nature of the sovereign individual of
individualistic discourse is not to argue that it is an
illusion since not only does this discourse of individualism
interpellate the subject as a sovereign individual but it is
also written into social practices of organization and
regulation (Hirst and Woolley, 1982). In thus challenging the
ontological foundations of the concept of 'the sovereign
individual' post-structuralist/anti-humanist theorists have
attempted to re-theorize 'the person' in a way that de-centres
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subjectivity and that does not rely on an individual-society
dichotomy. Hence,
Theories of the social agent cannot conceive
individuals as necessarily unitary subjects centred
in a determinative consciousness if the results of
ethnography and cultural analysis, revealing other
modes of conceiving and specifying social agents,
and of psychoanalysis, challenging the view of the
subject as self-possessed by consciousness, are to
be taken into account. (Hirst and Woolley, 1982:
133)
Thus, I would argue that the Lacanian psychoanalytic
theorization of (gender) identity as a Symbolic subject
position and the Foucauldian theorization of discourses (and
discursive practices) as constituting rather than reflecting
their objects, as constituting fields of power/knowledge,
provide a theoretical framework within which to question the
ontological status of the sovereign individual and to re-
theorize subjectivity as discursively produced through
multiple and often contradictory subject positions (see also
chapter 3). As Foucault argues:
I do not refer the various enunciative modalities
(subject positions) to the unity of the subject
instead of referring back to Ji synthesis orthe
unifying function of , subject, the various
enunciative	 modalities	 manifest	 his	 (sic)
dispersion. To the various statuses, the various
sites, the various positions that he can occupy or
be given when making a discourse. To the
discontinuity of the planes from which he speaks.
(Foucault, 1972, 54)
11.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined a multiplicity of contending
constructions of 'anorexia' and has analyzed how the
relationship of the speaking subject to this shifting category
varies both within and across the interview transcripts. The
relationship between 'self' and 'anorexia' may be construed as
one of dissociation or as one of identification. The analysis
focused on the ways in which anorexia was constituted as an
identity that simultaneously signified a lack of or in
identity. It examined how the discursive production of
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identity often deployed topographical metaphors such as body
boundaries, internality, externality, superficiality and
depth. These metaphors were located within a discourse of
individualism which interpellates the subject as a sovereign
individual. This discourse, particularly its humanistic
variant, seemed capable of undermining the regulatory power of
discourses and discursive practices that require women to be
thin. Within the transcripts, however, the deployment of this
discourse did not undermine the idealization of thinness.
Rather, it produced the subject who is concerned with
appearance as trivial and superficial. By idealizing 'the
sovereign individual', this discourse not only precludes the
construction of 'anorexia' or dieting as a social, political
issue, it also construes a conformity the ideal of thinness as
a superficial issue. Yet, as argued above, this discourse
simultaneously constitutes the 'too thin' body as a signifier
of a rebellious individualism. The 'too thin' woman may
constituted as both thin and as a (rebellious) 'sovereign
individual'.
In short, this chapter has examined the discursive
construction of identity in relation to anorexia. It has aimed
to illustrate how anorexia might be read as a form of self-
production which is constantly contested by discursive
constructions of 'femininity' and of 'the pursuit of
thinness'. The following, final chapter of analysis extends
this theme of self-production, focusing on the ways in which
anorexia is constituted as self-punishment and self-
annihilation and simultaneously as self-production.
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Chapter Twelve
Discursive Self-production and Self-destruction
12.1. Introduction
In chapter 11 the analysis focused on the way in which
anorexia may be discursively constituted as an identity. It
explored how identity is produced within a discourse of
individualism. And, as argued above, the different discourses
that converge on the thin/anorexic body can also be understood
as producing a multiplicity of diverse subjectivities. This
reading of anorexia as a form of self-production is, I would
argue, particularly relevant to the discourse of Cartesian
dualism, explicated in chapter 9. By deploying a Stoic theme
the denial of the body through self-starvation was constituted
as a form of self-production: the thin/anorexic body signified
a powerful and independent subjectivity. Yet, as will be
argued below, self-starvation may also be construed through a
penitential theme as a form of self-punishment or self-
destruction, associated with very negative constructions of
the self. This chapter will, therefore, examine how anorexia
is discursively constructed paradoxically as both self-
producing and self-annihilating. It will begin by explicating
some of the negative constructions of the self as, for
example, undeserving of food, examining how anorexia is
construed as punishing self-destruction. The chapter then
examines how self-starvation, purging and the detailing of
diet and body weight may be constituted as self-destructive
but simultaneously as self-productive. The final section of
the analysis focuses on the way in which themes of self-
production and self-destruction are also imbricated in
discursive constructions of the thin/anorexic body as it gets
smaller and 'fades away'. The analysis examines how themes of
subjection, resistance, gender and death are imbricated in the
discursive construction of the thin/anorexic body as both a
visible and an invisible, disappearing body.
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12.2 Negative Constructions of the Self
As noted in chapter 11, 'anorexia' may be discursively
constructed as an identity which simultaneously signified a
lack of identity. This analysis converges in part with
interpretations by numerous authors of anorexia as a 'self-
pathology' (Geist, 1989), characterized by 'diffuse ego-
boundaries' (Bruch, 1973) and a lack of sense of self (Sheppy
et al., 1988). Many authors have also asserted that those
diagnosed as anorexic typically have a poor self-image and low
self-esteem (see chapter 2). The negative aspect of the
discursive construction of anorexia as identity, explicated
above, thus concurs again with previous research and converges
with other negative constructions of 'the self' apparent
elsewhere in the transcripts. Like the women in Wetherell and
White's (1992) study who construed themselves negatively
through a discourse of pathology so too did the women in this
study articulate self-loathing and extremely negative self-
constructions.
(Lynn/Jane/Siinone, p.11)
Lynn: I thought: owh I I'm worthless. Everybody hates me and, you know, I just felt un nothing you know,
didn't know why I existed all the time /H: right! and often felt Like suicidal. Thought: well it'Ll be
the best way out and peopLe wouldn't miss me anyway you know. IN: rush I used to feeL Like that a Lot.
(Cathy, p.l)
Cathy: I became very aware of what I Looked Like. I really hated myseLf. And so from then on until uhm
C.) untiL I ended up in hospitaL !H; situ! it was a question of I think, of a battLe between me and my
doctors and my parents.
Other negative self-constructions pervade the transcripts
through a variety of discourses. In chapter 9, for example,
'the self' was often implicitly constructed as 'failing' to
exert sufficient control. Food and body weight were construed
as the only arena in which one could exert control.
(Denise, p.9)
Denise: I didn't Like myseLf so C.) I saw myself as a faiLure, can't do anything right. IN: right! And
in in a way (Laughing) that Losing weight or having troubLes around food was sort of saying: welt I can
do this. IN: right! You know I'm in control of this.
(Lynnl'Jane!Simone, p.1)
Lynn: I'd always felt UseLess up to then an' !H: right! that felt Like something I couLd manage.
Whilst Denise construes herself as "in controlti of food and
body weight she "saw (her)self as a failure" in all other
areas of her life. Negative constructions of 'the self' were
also apparent in other contexts. For instance, discursive
constructions of the thin/anorexic body as a rejection of
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(heterosexually attractive) femininity or of adulthood may be
associated with constructions of 'the self' as not good enough
to fulfil these 'roles'.
(Penny/Laura, pp.1-2)
Penny: I don't think I'm worth having, you know, being toLd I Look nice or /Hz right/ stuff Like that.
(...] But us C.) it (being an aduLt) is responsibility and actually having to do things for yourself
I think, and feeling I'm not good enough. I can't do that. So Let's just hu /H: right/ stop now and then
we won't have to get there.
(Rachel, p.2)
Rachel: I couldn't see where I was going or, you know, /14: nsn/ there was no future. I was just (Laughs)
/14: right/ What was I going to do in the future? I was useLess.
Here both Penny and Rachel construe themselves as
"useless" and as not "worth having". In her account of
anorexia as an avoidance of adulthood, Penny describes herself
as "not good enough", not capable of coping with adult
responsibilities. Negative self-constructions were also
associated with the discourse of Cartesian dualism discussed
in chapter 9. This discourse provides the positively construed
subject position of the mind/self dissociated from an
eruptive, bad body. However, when this mind/body dichotomy is
collapsed, as it is in the extracts below, 'the self' too
becomes negative: hatred of the body becomes hatred of
oneself.
(Nicke, p.7)
H: What about us the idea of the idea of being thinner and losing weight? Did that have any particular
meanings for you?
Nicki: I think it's to do with the Lower self-esteem /H: right/ and just, I mean I think I separated
my mind from my body. /H: m/ But aLso I must have, like if I hated my body reaLly I was hating myself.
(...] And I think I was going against myseLf /H: irin/ or my body which was how I saw and my, I didn't
like myself either /14: right/ but /H: rrin/ and I just wanted to like starve.
(Zoe, pp.8-9)
Zoe: I feLt like such a Loser because I feLt Like I couldn't control my weight because I was overweight.
/14: right/ So there must be something wrong with me.
CEssna, pp.12-i3)
H: How do you feel it's kind of worthwhile in a sense for yourself? C.)
Ensna: What the anorexia? /H: nin/ Because there's something, something that I reaLLy hate about myseLf
you see and I think if I couLd get rid of that then it would be a real achievement for me. [...]
H: Right, yeah, I mean is it anything in particular that you feel so negativeLy about or just a general
kind of feeLing?=
=En,na: What d'you mean? In myself? /14: rrsn/ WeLL it's just, it's just my fat. /Hz right/ You know, I just
hate it.
In these extracts the body is negatively construed as hateful,
evil and uncontrollable. However, in contrast with those
extracts discussed in chapter 9, the mind/body dichotomy is
collapsed so that 'the self' too is bad and hated.
In a discourse of Cartesian dualism the thin/anorexic
body may be constructed, via a Stoic theme, as a
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controlled/denied body, a non-body signifying a powerful
identity. However, dualistic constructions of body management
may also involve a penitential theme. In the extracts below,
for example, Emma's hatred of her body and her desire to
eradicate its fat is construed in terms of past transgressions
and a subsequent need for penitent reparation.
(Enina, p.4)
Ems: It's just, it's just the fat. I just hate it. (...] And 1 feet to a certain extent that something
I did a few years ago has forced it to be there and now I've got to force it to go away again /N: right/
you know.
In a radio interview (Gillott, 1979) the interviewee similarly
construes eating more than six hundred calories a day as a
mortal sin which must be atoned for by further restricting her
food intake.
I think I settled at about 600 a day, 600 calories.
And if I exceeded that urn, then I would feel that I
had sinned mortally and I would be required to
punish myself by perhaps the next day sticking at
300.
Through the deployment of a penitential theme 'the self' is
construed negatively as transgressive or sinful and 'dieting'
as a necessary reparation. As Foucault (1988) argues in his
discussion of technologies of the self, Christian asceticism
can be distinguished from Stoicism by its concern with the
renunciation of the self as well as the flesh. Penitence of
sin serves not to establish identity but to refuse the self.
That is, when read in the context of a penitential theme,
control/denial of the body through food-refusal can be
understood as refusal of a (sinful) self, as self-destructive
rather than self-productive. Similarly the self may be
negatively construed as undeserving of food. In the dualistic
construction of 'food' as temptation (see chapter 9) the
construction of food as simultaneously desired and feared is
paralleled by a construction of the self as both sufficiently
strong to resist this debasing temptation and as undeserving
of this desired object.
(Layta, p.11)
Layta: When I was pureLy anorexic, when I was compLeteLy refusing to eat, but just appLes and /H: nm/
you know /N: yeah/ the Lowest caLorie things, I feLt as if I'd nothing to do in my Life. (.) I mean the
things that I had been doing Like the schooL C.) didn't mean anything to me /N: right/ C.) so which
meant that I didn't deserve the food IN: rrin/ because normaL peopLe do something in their Lives. They
have activities C.) uhr urges, needs C.) desire or pLans for their future and they strive for it. (...]
But as I had nothing eLse, nothing to do in my Life that I IN: nin/ C.) that I had no comitment Lets
say IN: right/ I feLt I didn't deserve it.
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(Cathy, p.12)
Cathy: I went through a stage when I was in hospitaL where I was so angry with myself. I wouldn't buy
myseLf anything. You know, I /11: irin/ wouldn't buy myself even a drink. I wouldn't buy myself a magazine.
I c' /H: right/ I wouldn't buy anything C.) un and that was because I was so angry with myself and I
didn't feel I deserved it.
(Nicki, p.7)
Nicki: And I think Like eating. It was, you'd eat if you like yourself (...] I didn't Like myseLf either
IN: right/ but /H: ran! and I just wanted to like starve.
In these extracts the self is negatively construed as
undeserving of food. Eating is constructed as an activity
which is only legitimate for "normal people (who) something
in their lives", who have "urges, needs (.) desire or plans
for their future". It is for those who "have done sufficient
exercise to earn and deserve" it. Food must be deserved.
Nicki's use of the word 'starve' rather than 'diet' and the
inclusion of magazines as well as food and drink in Cathy's
self-deprivation both function to emphasise that food-refusal
is not only about weight-loss. It also serves to mark one's
self-dislike and lack of worth.
Further negative self-constructions emerge with the
deployment of a 'discourse of self-improvement'. In the
extract below, for example, Michelle construes herself
negatively. There is nothing about herself that she likes:
"there was every single thing about me that I want to change".
(MichelLe, p.10)
H: So C.) so was it in a, in a sense maintaining being thin helped you to feeL better about yourself?
MicheLLe: Yeah IN: rim! I I think I said this last time but un C.) although there was C.) every singLe
thing about me that I want to change, some things you can change and some things you can't. IN: right!
C.) And un C.) that one thing, my weight, I can change pretty easiLy IN: right! if peopLe will Let me.
(Laughs) IN: (Laughing) right! And un C.) it just makes me feeL I can do something to inrove myseLf
(.) so I'm getting a step closer to being happy I suppose. I mean I I know IN: nin/ this is unreasonable
but C.) this is the kind of thinking that goes C.) /H: right/ behind everything that I do.
The discourse of self-improvement deployed here constructs 'an
imperfect self' which can be worked upon and improved. A
constant striving for perfection will bring one closer to
happiness. This is, I would argue, a discourse that is found
not only in talk about body management but also in the more
general context of a late capitalist, Thatcherite ethos that
asserts that all is within our grasp if only we strive hard
enough to attain it. This narrative interpellates the subject
as lacking in some way, suggesting that one will not be happy
until, for example, a perfect body-weight or shape, a better
education, a larger salary, or higher social/class status have
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been achieved. That Michelle reflexively evaluates this
construction as "unreasonable" does not prevent her being
interpellated by it as lacking and defective.
3.2.3 Anorexia as Self-punishment
A multiplicity of negative as well as positive
constructions of 'the self' thus pervade the transcripts. In
contrast with the Stoic theme in which self-starvation is
construed as a technique of self-production (see chapter 9),
self-starvation may alternatively be associated with negative
constructions of 'the self' as defective, undeserving or
transgressive. Through a penitential theme, it is construed
as the reparation of a sinful self, as a form of punishing
self-destruction. Throughout the transcripts losing weight
through self-starvation was frequently constructed in terms of
a theme of self-punishment and destruction associated with
negative self-constructions. In the two extracts below, for
example, losing weight is discursively construed as burning
fat, a construction which, I would argue, emphasises the
aggressive, self-destructive significations of 'dieting' and
exercise.
(Lynn/Jane/Simone, p.?)
Lynn: Yeah I used to do exercise Like 1K: nin/ mad. I used to think all thatfat burnt. Every time I ate
something I thought: well it must 90 to fat and it'd be aLL Like round my heart. So /H: right/ I 'd
exercise Like helL. I wanted a reaLly Lean heart.
(Jane/Lynn/Sirnone, p.8)
Jane: I just wanted to burn off the fat /H: m/ and Lose as much weight as I couLd and you know, you
know not to sort of Look feminine or anything. It was basicaLLy to kiLL myseLf.
In these extracts losing weight is explicitly dissociated from
a desire to look attractive. Rather, it is about burning up
fat, destroying one's body and, by implication, oneself. The
theme of self-punishment accompanying negative self-
constructions is also apparent in the extracts below.
(Nicki, p.8)
Nicki: It's not just eating I think It's everything, IN: mel just harming yourseLf, cos I used to Like
cut myself. I used to make myseLf really cold. (...] I just went on this rampage of Like being hungry
1K: mel which feLt wonderfuL, and finding ways to Lose weight and everything. IN: right/ And it was
just, it's hard to put into words. It was just the only important thing. And It was Like a matter of
Life and death. IH: mel And it was the onLy way of being able to feeL on top of things.
(Cathy, p.?)
Cathy: My favourite , aLthough it was tough, was Like to have urn school aLL day and then come home,
do 5,000 sit-ups, two other hours of exercise and aLl, this without even a piece of water, without
anything (...] And sometimes I mean I have to confess that sometimes I did alL the exercise and I was
crying because I was thinking: Why are you doing this to yourseLf? /ll: irm/ You know: Why am I treating
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myself Like this?
(Jane/LynnlSimone, p.11)
Jane: I think with me it was just hating myseLf so much. 1K: rightl Urn basicaLly I just wanted to C.)
InitiaLLy 1 wanted to harm myself and sort of kiLL myseLf 1K: right/ un and then it got to the stage
when I reaLty got into it C...] InitiaLLy it started cos I hated myself so much 1K: nin/ I used to cut
myself up and everything.
(Errnna, p.7)
Enina: I know it sounds crazy but the anorexic episodes are the good ones cos that feeLs reaLty good,
/ll: m/ you know because you're, that's assertion of controL and you feeL realLy together that, and
every time you feet your stomach ruitting you ignore it and when you go to bed and your stomach quite
hurts and you ignore it you feel reaLLy good.
In these extracts the self is implicitly construed so
negatively that 'it' deserves starvation, cutting, cold,
excessive exercise, long, slow, painful punishment, and even
death. Control/denial of the body through self-starvation or
other means becomes here not so much a production or assertion
of the self but a way of punishing and destroying the self. It
marks one's lack of worth. The inclusion of forms of self-harm
such as cutting emphasise this theme of self-punishment and
self-destruction. Yet whilst this self-punishment is
associated with painfully negative self-constructions it is
simultaneously construed as pleasurable. Cathy describes a day
of gruelling exercise and self-deprivation as her "favourite
day" and Nicki construed her "rampage" of hunger as feeling
"wonderful". This ambivalence might be interpreted in relation
to a dual signification of 'self-starvation'. That is, the
meaning of self-starvation is not fixed. Rather, it shifts and
may be construed as self-producing as well as self-punishing
or self-destructive. As Emma's extract illustrates, stomach
pain may be construed as "really good" because it signifies
that one has successfully asserted control as well as because
it hurts. And as Foucault (1988: 42) argues in his discussion
of penitence:
The acts by which he (sic) punishes himself are
indistinguishable from the acts by which he reveals
himself. Self-punishment and the voluntary
expression of the self are bound together.
'Self-starvation' construed as self-punishment may be
indistinguishable from 'self-starvation' construed as the
expression, the physical and discursive production, of the
self.
However, the construction of self-punishment as
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pleasurable might also be interpreted as masochistic, that is,
in terms of "a tendency which has self-destruction as its aim"
(Freud, 1933a: 136), "in which satisfaction is conditional
upon suffering physical or mental pain" (Freud, 1905: 71). And
within psychoanalytic theory masochism has frequently been
associated with feminine sexuality. Freud, for example,
described masochism as "truly feminine" (1933b: 149; see also
1905; l924b; 1931), asserting that:
It can hardly have escaped you that sadism has a
close connection with masculinity, and masochism
with femininity. (Freud, 1933a: 135)
Helen Deutsch (1944), taking up Freud's term 'feminine
masochism', argued that narcissism, passivity and masochism
constituted the three essential traits of femininity and that
masochism was normal, desirable and necessary for female
psychosexual development. In the extract below Emma construes
a comparable relationship between women and masochism,
producing a similarly naturalizing explanation of self-
damaging behaviour in women.
(9) p7
Enma: I think very much that it's you know sex characteristics /8: win! for men to turn their aggression
out, whatever the root of their aggression is and for women to tend to turn it in. /H: right/ It's a
Lot, it's a Lot more easy I think for women to controL themseLves because of the physicaL disadvantage
than it is to go out and /8: right/ you know go to the pub and stab someone or go and mug an oLd woman
or something (Laughter) you know. /8: right/ You just don't have the physicaL characteristics to be able
to do it. /8: right/ So if you want to inflict some serious damage (Laughing) then the safest option
is to do it on yourself (Laughter) you know cos at Least then you know what you're doing.
In this extract both men and women are construed as
aggressive. But men "turn their aggression out" whereas women
are construed as tending to turn their aggression upon
themselves, a discursive construction which may be read in
terms of Freud's conceptualization of secondary masochism 1 as
. In 1924 Freud added a footnote to his discussion of
iasochism in 'The Sexual Aberrations' (1905) in which he drew a
Listinction between primary and secondary masochism, writing
that: "My opinion of masochism has been to a large extent altered
y later reflection, based upon certain hypotheses as to the
tructure of the mind and the classes of instincts operating in
.t. I have been led to distinguish a primar y or erotogenic
asochism, out of which the later forms, feminine and moral
asochism, have developed. Sadism which cannot find employment
.n actual life is turned round upon the subject's own self and
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"an extension of sadism turned round upon the subject's own
self" (Freud, 1905: 71-72). Further, Emma explains this
construction of 'feminine masochism' in terms of women's
"physical disadvantage", in terms of a natural rather than a
social cause. 'Women' are too physically weak to damage others
and must therefore express their aggression through self-
injury. Her description of "inflict(ing) some serious damage"
on oneself as "the safest option" is accompanied by laughter
and, perhaps, suggests that the tensions in this argument are
apparent.
Whilst Deutsch conceptualizes masochism as an essential
trait of femininity, other psychoanalytic theorists have
disputed her assertion of the normality of masochism in mature
femininity, arguing, for example, that she had wrongly equated
feminine passivity with masochism (Gardiner, 1955), that
masochism is a caricature rather than an essential trait of
femininity (Waelder, in Panel, 1956) or that masochism is
associated with impaired object relations rather than normal
or natural feminine development (Blum, 1976).
As Blum (1976) argues, the way in which one
conceptualizes the relationship between 'femininity' and
'masochism' depends upon one's concept of femininity.
"Psychoanalytic concepts such as masochism or penis-envy
should not be invoked or utilized in a simplistic
reductionism" (Blum, 1976: 185) in which 'femininity' is
reduced to a set of traits. Indeed, Freud's theorization of
'feminine masochism' was far more complex than that offered by
Deutsch. Firstly, his assertion that masochism is often found
in men (1933b) indicates the problematic nature of any simple
equation of women with femininity (e.g. Freud, 1925) or with
'feminine masochism'. Secondly, Freud associated masochism and
sadism with passivity and activity respectively.
The term masochism comprises any passive attitude
towards sexual life and the sexual object, the
extreme instance of which appears to be that in
which satisfaction is conditional upon suffering
30 produces a secondary masochism, which is superadded to the
rimary kind."
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physical and mental pain at the hands of the sexual
object. (Freud, 1905: 71)
Masochism can thus be understood as feminine since the concept
of femininity is associated with that of passivity (Nagera,
1969) . Hence,
We should ... be inclined to connect the
simultaneous presence of these opposites (sadism and
masochism) with the opposing masculinity and
femininity ... a contrast which often has to be
replaced in psychoanalysis by that between activity
and passivity. (Freud, 1905: 73)
Yet, as Freud (e.g. 1933b: 147-148) repeatedly argued, these
associations are highly problematic. For Freud, masculinity
and femininity are combined in bi-sexuality and "sadism and
masochism are habitually found together in the same person"
(1905: 73). And although
when you say 'masculine' you mean as a rule
'active' and when you say 'feminine' you mean
'passive'. ... (e)ven in the sphere of human sexual
life, one soon notices how unsatisfactory it is to
identify masculine behaviour with activity and
feminine with passivity ... The further you go from
the sexual field, in the narrower sense of the word,
the more apparent it becomes that the two ideas do
not coincide.
Thus, the relationship of femininity to masochism becomes
problematized since there is no easy equation between women
and femininity nor between femininity, passivity and
masochism: "... pure masculinity and femininity remain
theoretical constructs of uncertain content" (Freud, 1925:
258). Moreover, in conceptualizing masochism as an essential
trait of femininity,
Deutsch did not question the relative influence of
a feminine cultural ideal of devoted sacrifice, that
a 'mature woman' should assume a masochistic
position with contentment and fortitude. (Blurn,
1976: 178)
Freud, however, argued that:
It can often be shown that masochism is nothing more
than an extension of sadism turned round upon the
subject's own self, which thus, to begin with, takes
the place of the sexual object. (Freud, 1905: 71-2)
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And further,
We are now led to consider the important possibility
of the aggression being unable to find satisfaction
in the external world, because it comes up against
objective hindrance. It may then perhaps turn back,
and increase the amount of self-destructiveness
within. (Freud, 1933a: 136)
That is, 'feminine masochism' may result, in part at least,
from social prohibitions against female aggression. Hence,
we must take care not to underestimate the influence
of social conventions, which also force women into
passive situations. The whole thing is still very
obscure. We must not overlook one particular
constant relation between femininity and instinctual
life. The repression of their aggressiveness, which
is imposed upon women by their constitution and by
society, favours the development of strong
masochistic impulses, which have the effect of
binding erotically the destructive tendencies which
have turned inwards. (Freud, 1933b: 149)
Thus, Freud argues, whilst masochism is feminine, the
concept of femininity does not coincide with woman. Nor is
'feminine masochism' a natural category since, he argues,
society plays a part in its development. 'Femininity' and
'feminine masochism' are problematic social concepts.
The discursive construction of self-starvation as self-
punishing, evidenced in the extracts above, might thus be read
in terms of a psychoanalytic theory of masochism, as
articulating a desire for punishment and suffering and as
constituting a 'femininely masochistic' self. However, as
argued above, the relationship between masochism and
femininity is both complex and problematic. It would be a
simplistic reductionism to interpret these extracts as
evidence of masochism as an essential trait of femininity (see
also Blum, 1976). Constructions of anorexia as self-punishing
and of the self as 'femininely masochistic' be viewed
therefore not as expressions of individuals' 'feminine
masochism' but rather as interpellations of (female) subjects
within already existing discourses and discursive practices
which produce women as masochistic.
322
12.4 (Un)comfortab].y Numb: Purging, Purity and Emptiness
In the above analysis I have argued that self-starvation
may be discursively construed as masochistic, as self-
punishing and self-destructive. And this theme is also evident
in talk about purging.
(Layta, p.13)
LayLa: I know that buLimia is not the right way to do it. /H: nin/ It cost me 
_L C.) /H: yeah!
physicaLly and emotionaLly. C.) It was just another mechanism to putt me down, to destroy my C.)
feelings of seLf-worth or whatever, /H: right! seLf-esteem.
4: Mm C.) so the buLimia made you you feet even worse about yourself. C.)
LayLa: I was hatefuL /H: rightf C.) for myself.
(Nicki, p.8)
Nicki: PeopLe became interested !H: m/ and I think some of my friends who I went round with, I think
some of them sort of, you know, started taking Laxatives and things which I felt reaLLy bad about, /H:
imn! which I, you know, Like with cLose friends /H: sin! but and I was Like realty unsociabLe anyway.
In these extracts binging and vomiting and laxative-abuse are
construed as self-destructive, both physically and
emotionally. Nicki's account of feeling "really bad" when her
friends started to copy her laxative-abuse implies a
construction of laxative-abuse as damaging and self-
destructive. It is a construction which differs significantly
from those in other parts of her transcript where she
construes her own laxative-abuse positively as a means of
purifying and cleansing herself.
(Nicki, pp.7-8)
Nicki: Even I mean Like if, I don't Like to say, you take Laxatives, and you take strong ones and you
can Lose Like a stone form being sick or whatever. /H: right! Then even though I knew that I hadn't Lost
any fat !H: m/ or if I had a drink it would aLL come back, it was stiLl good. It was pure and it wouLd
just be focused on the scales and weight and whatever. (...] Like if you binge !H: yeah! then
everything's gone and then if you take, then after if you Like clean yourseLf then you can begin to feeL
relieved.
There is then an ambivalence in discursive constructions
of purging as there is in constructions of self-starvation.
'It' is negatively construed as self-destructive but is also
positively construed as cleansing and purifying.
(Cathy, p.2)
Cathy: After I ended up I hospitaL for a heart condition I said that I wouLdn't take them (Laxatives)
again. And yet I did straight away. !H: sin! I mean I don't think I wiLL ever give them up. They're too
ntich of a comfort. /H: right! Even if I have a drink I have to have some, some tabLets because uhm C.)
I feel better. I feeL more cLean. That's it, I feeL clean (...] I took at these things (Indicating a
ribena carton) as being poison and I don't want poison in my body and I want to be cleansed inside.
In these extracts 'purging' is predominantly constructed as a
technique of purifying and cleansing the self. And although it
is positively construed as bringing relief and comfort this
construction of purging also resonates with the penitential
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theme, explicated above, in which self-starvation is construed
as the atonement of a sinful/fat/bad self. Here, the self is
implicitly construed as contaminated (particularly by food)
and therefore as in need of purification. Paradoxically,
however, whilst purging is construed as purifying it may also
be construed as shameful. Nicki, for example, does not like to
say that she takes laxatives and avoids using the word. She
also avoids any detailed description of their effects: they
make you "sick or whatever" and both her and Cathy's construal
of their effects as cleansing might be read as concealing
their defecation-inducing properties.
Discursive constructions of purging thus parallel those
of 'self-starvation' in that purging is represented both
positively — as producing a purified self — and negatively —
as self-punishing and self-destructive. In the extracts below
there is an emphasis on purging as an emptying process through
which the self is both purified and emptied.
(Enina, pp.7-B)
Ema: In fact it's a tot easier to make yourself sick when you've eaten vast amounts than it Is when
you've only eaten a littLe bit. 1K: yeah/ So it's much better to just Let it run it's whole course and
get it out of your system /H: emil than stop it half way through and then worry about not being able to
get it aLL out again.
(Cathy, p.2)
Cathy: Having an apple is stuffing to me uhm because I feel the whole thing is so crude and I hate the
feeling of having something inside me. /H: right/ It really freaks me out.
(ELaine, p.B)
ELaine: I got angry 1K: nn/ and I wanted just starve myseLf. I wanted to succeed at that.
H: Right, so was it that you were angry about C.) when you in a sense broke your diet or was there=
=ELaine: WelL the empty feeling /H: right/ felt good C.) for a while.
(Layla, pp.11-12)
layla: I used to feel Like that I'm pure C.) because /K: right/ I was refusing to eat. 1K: nei/ I'm not,
to know that my stomach wasempty gave me such a good feeLing. (...] I mean I had to convince myseLf
that it was good. (.) /H: right/ So I think my mind has worked in that way /K: right/ so that I couLd
be happy in that C.) shit.
Purging and self-starvation are construed here as means
of getting food out of one's body. The ideal is to have
nothing inside, to be empty. Whilst this might be viewed as a
form of weight-control it may also be read as symbolically (as
well as physically) self-destructive, as producing emptiness.
Within the framework of a discourse of individualism, in which
identity is constructed as something internal, 'purging' may
be read as an obliteration, an emptying, of one's internality.
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The production of an empty self through purging resonates with
those constructions, discussed above (see chapter 11), of the
self as an identity-less, empty shell.
To construe purging as a relieving "comfort" might
therefore be interpreted as masochistic, that is, in terms of
"a tendency which has self-destruction as its aim" (Freud,
1933a: 136). Yet, like self-starvation, purging is also
construed positively as a means of purification and of
achieving control and as a form of self-production. In the
extract below, for example, vomiting is ambivalently construed
both as hated and as a comforting means of re-gaining control
over one's eating.
(Enina, p.7)
Enina: I hate you know the bounce back afterwards because when when I binge it's just disgust. I hate
it because I don't have any control of what's /H: right/ going on at aLL. /N: m/ But then when you do
make yourseLf (sick) afterwards it's Like complete relief because you've shown yourself that even though
you haven't had any controL over what you've been eating IN: mel you can stilL do something about it
afterwards. IN: right/ But I do hate that. (...] But uLtimately anything that I do do to myself is my
own choice. /H: right/ It's nothing external you see. No-one else is teLLing me what to do. IN: me/ This
is me and I can, you know, I am in charge of my body I...] I can be in control of what goes on in my
body. /H: right irni/ And it gives me quite a Lot of comfort I think IN: yeah/ when things get realLy
tough.
Purging is construed here as a means of re-gaining the control
over one's body that is lost by binging. Within the context of
a discourse of Cartesian dualism it may therefore be viewed as
producing a positively construed self. Through purging Emma
re-asserts control and thus re-asserts herself. "This is me
and I can, you know, . am in charge of my body" (emphasis
added). Yet in emptying the self it is also self-destructive.
In other extracts too, where 'anorexic' behaviour is construed
as a numbing focus on weight and food, the self is again
constructed as emptied, evacuated of emotion. And, as in the
extracts above, the process of emptying the self is
constructed both as a means of coping and achieving control
and as a means of obliterating the self.
(Laura/Penny, pp.10-il)
Laura: It helped me no see what was C.) Un, it helped me deal with with worry and fear IN: right/ and
worry that I wasn't going, worry about work and how welL I was going to do in exams, IN: right/ worry
about (.) just worry, un (.) un IN: ml insecurity (...1
Penny: Yeah for me too, Like to cover up feeLings, IN: right/ feelings of fear, anger, any feelings.
I mean it to suppress that because I just didn't want to feel it.
H: Right, was there anything particuLar that you felt sort of fear of or angry about 7
Penny: Urn C.) hu C.) welL it's kind of C.)
H: I don't=
Penny: anger and the fear were kind of just C.) of being Penny I think, of being me /H: right/ which
was quite difficult, but un C.) just being me cos I hadn't been, you know I thought no-one Liked me.
I did everything wrong so I think it was a fear of being me totaLly (...] I didn't have to feeL. I
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didn't feeL. I feLt I was stoned aLL the time. Ill: right/
Laura: You feeL nui.
(Plicki, pp.6-7)
Wicki: And it made me able to cope, block out Lots of things. It was something to focus on. I didn't
Like myseLf either 1K: right/ but 1K: sin! and I just wanted to (ike starve and also us Like you become
nu±, 1K: sin! emotionaLly detached. And Like if Like you don't, now I couLd cry about something if I
was upset but if I wasn't eating then I'd sort of be nuit to the feelings (...1 it would just be focused
on the scales and weight and whatever.
(JanelLynnlSimone, p.15)
Jane: I was abused when I was a child (.) and I know now that it was trying to cover that up because
/H: right/ by having anorexia I didn't have to face and think about that 1K: nin/ because (.) everything
inside me was concentrated on anorexia 1...] It was all I thought about. It was alt I could concentrate
on 1K: ,rn/ and just everything else went out of my head. /K: right/ I couLdn't think about anything
else.
(MicheLLe, p.13)
MichelLe: Urn C..) it it stopped me C.) us C.) having Lots of worries and thoughts in my head IN: right/
but I I don't know where they went IN: iris! (half laughing) but they just hu 1K: right/ they did go.
In these extracts 'anorexia' is construed as a means of
coping. By concentrating on food and losing weight traumatic
memories and painful feelings, "abuse", "worry and fear"
"insecurity", "fear of being me" are blocked out, covered up,
suppressed. "I didn't have to face and think about that [...]
because (.) everything inside me was concentrated on
anorexia". Yet this coping is constituted as an obliteration
of feelings, becoming "emotionally detached" and "numb".
'Anorexia' is constituted as a way of emptying the self of
thought and emotion.
The discursive construction of anorexia as numbing can
thus be viewed as similar to that of purging. Both are
construed as emptying the self of food, of feelings, of
internality. Like self-starvation and purging, the 'anorexic'
focus on food and weight-loss may be read as an emptying of
one's feelings, thoughts and memories, as self-destructive.
The construction of anorexia as a numbing focus on food
and weight might also be read in relation to the
psychoanalytic concept of schizoid fragmentation (Bion, 1967,
cited in Sayers, in press/a). Sayers (in press/a: 3), for
example, discusses the psychoanalytic significance of focusing
on details such as "the minutiae of the calories and grammes"
that a client "ate and weighed". This "obsessive
fragmentation" of life into its agglomerated details "averts
disillusion by stripping anything that might cause it of
meaning through detaching each thought and feeling from the
next" (ibid., p.3). Focusing on the minutiae of one's life can
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be understood as warding off emotionally significant meaning
through fragmenting meaning into seemingly meaningless
details. Thus, one client
felt he was nothing but the grains of muesli he ate
Having defensively fragmented his life, David
could then only pedantically regale me with its
'agglomerated' (Bion, 1967) details till I found
myself as emotionally numbed as he sought to be
himself. (Sayers, in press/a: 3-4)
In the extracts above Nicki's construction of anorexia as
a focus "on the scales and weight", for example, might
similarly be read as signifying an attempt to erase meaning
from her life through focusing on seemingly meaningless
details such as calories and numbers on weighing-scales.
There is, then a continual shifting between discursive
constructions of anorexia as a signifier of various subject
positions, as resistance to various (im)positions of identity,
as a search for identity, as constituting one's identity, as
signifying a lack of or in identity, as an emptying of one's
internality, as an erasure of meaning or identity. It is
discursively constructed both as self-productive and self-
destructive.
12.5 'Discipline and Punish' 2 : Detailing Individuality
The discursive construction of 'anorexia' as a
fragmentation of one's life into seemingly meaningless details
of grainmes and calories, as an expunging of feelings, memories
and thoughts, may be read as discursive self-obliterating and
self-destruction. However, this focus on detail might
contrarily be interpreted as self-productive. That is, as
Foucault (1977b) argues, modern individuality is produced
through exact observation and detailed examination of the body
and the self. Detail can be understood as producing as well as
obliterating the self.
Foucault (1977b) argues that the Classical Age (the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) saw the displacement of
2• This subheading takes part of the title of Foucault's
Dook 'Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison' (1977).
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previous regimes of domination such as slavery or 'service'
with a political anatomy of power that "produces subjected and
practised bodies, 'docile' bodies" (ibid., p.138) through
detailed observation. "The Classical Age discovered the body
as the object and target of power" (ibid., p.136) and what was
new here was
the scale of the control: it was a question not of
treating the body, en masse, 'wholesale', as if it
were an indissociable unity, but of working it
'retail', individually; of exercising upon it a
subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the
level of the mechanism itself - movements, gestures,
attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the
active body. (ibid., p.136-7, emphasis added)
That is, since the Classical Age a new "machinery of power"
has emerged which functions through a multiplicity of minor
processes of domination; through supervision, observation,
surveillance, examination and the accumulation of detailed
knowledge of the individual rather than the social body. These
disciplinary processes constitute a "new micro-physics of
power", a "political anatomy of detail" (ibid., p.139). It is
through detailed surveillance and knowledge rather than
violent physical coercion that human bodies are disciplined;
are made intelligible, docile and useful.
A meticulous observation of detail, and at the same
time a political awareness of these small things,
for the control and use of men (sic), emerge through
the classical age bearing with them a whole set of
techniques, a whole corpus of methods and knowledge,
description, plans and data. And from such trifles,
no doubt, the man of modern humanism was born.
(ibid., p.141)
Discipline is exercised then through "a meticulous
observation of detail", through techniques of description and
examination and through the accumulation of detailed
knowledge, assessing and documenting the individual rather
than the social body en masse. And, as Foucault argues, this
infinitesimal control is not simply a repression. Rather
"discipline 'makes' individuals" (ibid., p. 170).
The individual is no doubt the fictive atom of an
'ideological' representation of society, but he
(sic) is also a reality fabricated by this specific
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technology of power that I have called 'discipline'.
We must cease once and for all to describe the
effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes',
it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it
'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it
produces reality, it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge
that may be gained of him belong to this production.
(ibid., p.194)
Prior to the Classical Age "the everyday individuality of
everybody remained below the threshold of description" (ibid.,
p.171). Since the emergence of modern discipline, however, the
individual is subjected through detailed observation and
description. Discipline individualizes. It produces the
individual as the effect and object of power and knowledge, as
an individual.
In short, discipline may be understood as a socio-
historically specific political 'technology of power' which,
through meticulous attention to detail, both controls and
produces the individual. The 'anorexic' focus on the details
of the grammes one weighs and the calories consumed or on the
precise details of one's exercise regime, may be viewed as an
exemplar of this discipline. The detailed self-observation,
examination and documentation of such minutiae evidenced in
the extracts above can be understood as the exertion of a
meticulous control and as simultaneously constituting the self
as an individual defined in its most minute detail3.
In short, the discursive construction of anorexia as a
focus on the details of food and body weight is paradoxical.
On the one hand 'anorexia' can be construed as numbing, as a
'schizoid fragmentation' of 'the self' into seemingly
meaningless details, as self-destructive. On the other hand
'anorexia' may be construed as self-producing, as a
See also tGutmans (1988) discussion of Rousseau's
'Confessions' (1765) in which he argues that "Rousseau
onstituted the self as subject by objectivizing the speaking
;ubject in language" (ibid., p.117). In the Confessions Rousseau
evelops a technology of the self through which the individuated
;ubject emerges "as a subject of observation and description",
;onstituted through an examination and written confession that
3tresses "the inclusion of every detail t' (ibid., pp.116-7).
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disciplinary process of detailed (self-)observation,
examination and documentation that not only controls but also
produces the individual as an individual. These paradoxical
constructions converge, I would argue, with the construction,
explicated above, of anorexia as a search for identity and as
an identity which also signifies a lack of or in identity.
12.6 The Vision Thing
12.6.1 Panopticism and the Disciplined Individual
I don't exist when you don't see me
I don't exist when you're not here
what the eye don't see won't break the heart
you can make believe when we're apart
but when you leave I disappear
when you don't see me
(The Sisters of Mercy, 1990)
In 'Discipline and Punish' (1977b) Foucault argues that 'the
examination' plays a central role in the exercise of
discipline, in the process of producing disciplined
individuals. It
introduces individuality into the field of
documentation. The examination leaves behind it a
whole meticulous archive constituted in terms of
bodies and days. The examination that places
individuals in a field of surveillance also situates
them in a network of writing; it engages them in a
whole mass of documents that capture and fix them.
(Foucault, 1977b: 189)
The examination simultaneously constitutes and dominates
the individual as an individual by meticulously documenting,
i.e. discursively constituting, him or her. It links "a
certain type of the formation of knowledge" to "a certain form
of the exercise of power" (ibid., p.187). But, as the above
quote also indicates, the examination exercises power not only
through documenting detail but also, necessarily, through
observation. It "places individuals in a field of
surveillance".
The examination transformed the economy of
visibility into the exercise of power ... In
discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen.
Their visibility assures the hold of the power that
is exercised over them. It is the fact of being
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constantly seen, of being able always to be seen,
that maintains the disciplined individual in his
subjection. (ibid., p.187)
Through the examination 'the economy of visibility' becomes an
exercise of disciplinary power through a combination of
"techniques of an observational hierarchy" with "those of a
normalizing judgement". "It is a normalizing gaze, a
surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify
and to punish" (ibid., p.184). In the two extracts below 'the
economy of visibility' is, I would argue, constructed in
precisely this Foucauldian way as a disciplinary, normalizing
gaze.
(Lynn/Jane/Simone, p.17)
Lynn: I thought peopLe must Look at me and and think I'm, that person's mentaL uh Like, you know, Like
sort of you might waLk round the town and you'LL see someone's whose schizophrenic, you know, with aLL
the homeLess peopLe and everything. And I'd think they'd Look at me and they'd think I'm Like that
/Jane: nin/ so I stopped going out /H: ninf so that peopLe wouLdn't see me. They must think: weLL she's
mentaLLy ILL, that woman. /H: right/ And I think, you know, peopLe'd think I was mentaL. I'd stay away
from peopLe, wouLdn't even Look at peopLe. I'd waLk up the road and keep my head down C.) /H: m/ so
that peopLe wouLdn't notice me.
(Mandy, pp.9-lO)
Mandy: I think doctors pay far too much attention on the weight side of it. /11: right/ And Un I mean
I had to go through UTI sort of weighing and this kind of thing and it, aLL it does is un make you focus
more on that. /H: nail If if a doctor is standing there and weighing you up and down and saying IH: yeah/
this, that and the other /H: yeah/ it makes you focus on it.
In Lynn's extract she gives an account of how she "stopped
going out [...] so that people wouldn't see (her)". The
public's gaze is constructed here as disciplinary, as
normalizing. It observes and categorizes her, judging whether
or not she deviates from 'the norm' as "mentally ill",
"schizophrenic" and "homeless people" do. Hence she attempts
to become less visible in order to avoid this disciplinary
'field of surveillance'. Mandy construes medical intervention
in a similar way. In her account she is primarily concerned to
argue that the attention doctors give to her weight is
counterproductive as "all it does is urn make you focus more on
that." However, her construction of medical intervention as
"weighing you up and down" might be read as amalgamating the
phrases 'weighing you', 'weighing you up' and 'looking you up
and down'. It suggests a disciplinary theme of surveillance in
which Mandy is subjected to an 'observational hierarchy' and
a 'normalizing judgement' that measures and assesses her,
comparing her with a norm.
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Further, the phrase "looking you up and down" can be read
as referring to a male heterosexual gaze (see Coward, 1984).
Hence, Mandy's construction of medical intervention suggests
a parallel between medical power-relations and gender power-
relations in terms of a disciplinary gaze. The account
resonates, therefore, with the discursive construction of
femininity as an appearance (see chapter 8). The romantic
construction of femininity as physical beauty can be read as
a discursive production of feminine subjectivity within a
disciplinary field of vision.
The disciplinary, normalizing gaze may also be understood
to characterize medical, psychiatric and psychological
practices as a whole in terms of their procedures of
observation, measurement and categorization and normalization
(Foucault, l977b; see also tlssher, 1991). Further, the
'anorexic' focus on body-weight, the widespread body-
dissatisfaction and associated restricted eating amongst women
(both those diagnosed as anorexic and others) (see chapter 2)
may also be understood in terms of a normalizing gaze, as
critical self-examination, as a process that disciplines
through self-surveillance, measurement and comparison with a
norm or, rather, with a fictive norm, an 'ideal'. And as
argued above (see chapter 11) the discourse of individualism
which interpellates the (disciplined) individual as an
individual militates against construing this discipline as a
socio-political issue whilst a 'discourse of pathology' (see
Wetherell and White, 1992) produces non-normative, non-ideal
bodies and eating behaviour as individuals' failures.
Since their emergence in the Classical Age techniques of
individualizing discipline developed so that by the nineteenth
century procedures of observation, documentation, surveillance
and examination were combined with procedures of exclusion
(Foucault, 1977b). Discipline involved a "constant division
between the normal and the abnormal", an exclusion of the
abnormal in asylums, prisons and hospitals and an
individualizing of the excluded through constant surveillance.
Bentham's invention, 'the Panopticon' - a building in
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which a central observation tower is surrounded by an annular
building divided into cells, each of which can be seen from
the tower - represents "the architectural figure of this
composition". "All that is needed, then, is to place a
supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a
madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy"
(ibid., p.200). In this way the inmate never knows when s/he
is watched but knows that s/he may always be watched. As
Foucault argues,
he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the
constraints of power; he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself
the power relations in which he simultaneously plays
both roles; he becomes the principle of his own
subjection. (ibid., p.202)
The Panopticon thus represents an exemplar of discipline,
producing disciplined individuals by making them constantly
visible. It formed an important 'figure of political
technology' not only because it is "polyvalent in its
applications" (ibid., p. 205) but also because it "automizes
and dis-individualizes power" (ibid., p202) whilst
individualizing its inmates. In the Panopticon "power has its
principle not so much in a person as in a certain distribution
of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose
internal mechanisms produce the relations in which individuals
are caught up" (ibid., p.202). Furthermore, the Panopticon is
a generalizable principle, "a way of defining power relations
in terms of the everyday life of men (sic)" (ibid., p.205). It
was "destined to spread throughout the social body; its
vocation was to become a generalized function" (ibid., p.207).
That is, Panopticism, the principle of a constant (or
continually possible) surveillance and normalizing gaze, can
be understçod not only as a disciplinary technique of
institutions such as prisons, hospitals and schools, but also
as a general principle, "a new political anatomy" of
disciplinary power diffused throughout society.
Foucault's discussion of Panopticism thus makes clear the
significance of 'the economy of visibility' in the political
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anatomy of discipline. Surveillance (or its possibility) and
the normalizing gaze are techniques of individualization and
control. It is by being visible that one is constituted as a
(disciplined) individual.
12.6.2 Visibility and the Thin/Anorexic Body
As noted in chapter 8, the thin/anorexic body may be
discursively construed as a small body, as a signifier of
petite femininity, a construction which converges with other
constructions of this body as feminine. Alternatively, it may
be constituted in a discourse of Cartesian dualism as a
controlled or denied body, signifying the ideal of a non-body
(see chapter 9). These discursive constructions may also be
read in relation to Foucault's theory of Panopticism. That is,
the construction of the thin/anorexic body as becoming
progressively smaller may be understood as signifying an
attempt to become less visible and to thus evade the
disciplinary gaze that both controls and individualizes.
Anorexia may be construed as both an exemplar of discipline
and as a resistance to the individuality that discipline
produces. In the extracts below anorexia is constituted in
this latter way as an attempt to become less visible.
(Handy, pp.9-10)
Handy: 1 think un a Lot of doctors tend to just focus on: somebody Looks that thin. They're actualLy
wanting somebody to see what's going on. /H: right/ But I think it's, it starts off with the control
over eating which is the important thing. /H: m/ Urn and I mean obviously the the thinness does come
into it III: m/ because I mean you can control your eating and stiLl maintain a stable, ordinary weight.
1...] And the actuaL un, the physicaL appearance is much more to do with Un wanting wanting to be
seen in in some ways, un. There's sort of a a feeLing there of wanting to sort of just fade Into the
background LiteraLly.
(Penny/Laura, pp.10-il)
Penny: Urn C.) hu, welt it's kind of (.) /H: I don't/ anger and the fear were kind of just C.) of being
Penny I think, of being me /H: right/ which was quite difficult, but tin, just being me cos I hadn't
been, you know I thought no-one Liked me. I did everything wrong so I think it was a fear of being ate
/H: nin/ totally. (...] I just wanted to fade away (inaud.)=
=Laura: I avoided being ne. I didn't want to know what me really was so I thought that if I just sort
of (.) you know go along Like this, just sort of hiding, I think I was just sort of hiding from myself,
/H: right/ Like afraid, I don't know, I I can't say.
(Nicki, pp.4- 7)
Nicki: It's just a way of Like trying to disappear /11: nin/ and trying to be in control and feel pure.
/H: right/ It's just the perfection /H: irin/ thing. t...1 You just want to get smaller and smaller. /H:
nin/ And then any coment that people say, if they say you Look reaLty dreadfuL today that just makes
you feeL good /H: right/ and reinforces your behaviour. (..] I mean I just wanted to die anyway IN:
rrrn/ so not eating, becoming smaLler is very relevant to that.
In these extracts 'getting smaller' is not so much about being
femininely petite as about self-destruction. Jane and Nicki
construe 'getting smaller' as a destruction of the body
334
leading to death. To become impossibly small is literally
suicidal. But 'getting smaller' is also about the desire "to
disappear", to "fade away", to "just fade into the background
literally". It is about becoming less visible. In Princess
Diana's widely publicized speech to the International Eating
Disorders Conference (1993, cited in EDA, 1993: 3) she
similarly construed eating disorders as "a compulsion to
"dissolve like a Disprin" and disappear".
This construction of 'anorexia as a fading away, a "j
wanting [...] to be seen" can be understood as signifying an
avoidance of a disciplinary gaze. As the thin/anorexic body
fades away it becomes less available to the disciplinary
procedures of observation, examination, surveillance and
normalizing judgements. This construction may thus be read as
signifying an evasion of individuality. Its construction as
less visible, signifies both a resistance to social control
and normalization but also to the individualizing effects of
discipline. Within the framework of Foucault's theory of
Panopticism the discursive construction of the thin/anorexic
body as one that is fading away or disappearing may understood
as signifying both a resistance to social control and an
evasion of the individualizing effects of discipline. Not
wanting to be seen may be read as not wanting to be (an
individual).
In short the thin/anorexic body is construed in the above
extracts as a body that is fading away. And in becoming less
visible it becomes less individualized. However, as the
extract below indicates, this ever-diminishing body also
becomes more noticeable, more visible.
(Handy, pp.9-10)
Handy: It's the way of conforming and it is a way actuaLly us not being individual. /H: right! Urn you,
you can ac', you can LiteraLly fade into the background and, and, Ill: m/ and in, it's a bit sort of
us (.) somehow it's it's not quite right. I mean on the one hand you can say that; you can fade away
into the background but then on the other hand you can't because if you're that thin /H: iris! then people
wiLt notice you anyway. IH: m/ So there there's a bit of a sort of paradox there. But /H: nin/ It's us,
I think that that, there is, I mean again it's so such a confLict. And I think the whole thing is very
much to do with conflict.
As Nandy argues, the thin/anorexic body may be more rather
than less noticeable. It becomes increasingly subject to
scrutiny both socially and medically. Her extract illustrates
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how describing the thin/anorexic body as fading away or
disappearing is a discursive construction. Whilst it is
physicall y
 getting smaller it may equally be discursively
construed as becoming more, as well as less, visible. Thus,
within the framework of Foucault's theorization of Panopticisin
- of the individualizing effects of the disciplinary gaze -
the thin/anorexic body may be understood as both an evasion
and a courting of an individualizing disciplinary gaze, as a
resistance and a conformity to social control, as both self-
destructive and self-productive.
12.6.3 Visibility and Psychoanalytic Theorizations of
Subjectivity and Gender
The importance of 'the economy of visibility' in the
production of 'the individual' is indicated not only in
Foucauldian theory, but also in psychoanalytic theory (see
also chapter 3). Visibility plays a part in 'the mirror stage
as formative of the function of the I' (Lacan, 1949: 1) and in
Oedipal development (e.g. Freud, 1905; 1924a) or the entry of
the subject into the Symbolic order (e.g. Lacan, 1958a).
During the mirror stage the infant's identification with
her mirror image "situates the agency of the ego, before its
social determination in a fictional direction" (Lacan, 1949:
2). The infant gazes at and identifies with her own
reflection. She takes up a "specular I" which pre-figures "the
social I" of the Symbolic order "in a primordial form".
This jubilant assumption of his (sic) specular image
by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in his
motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem
to exhibit in an exemplary form, before it is
objectified in the dialectic of identification with
the other, and before language restores to it, in
the universal, its function as subject. This form
would have to be called the Ideal-I if we wish to
incorporate it into our usual register, in the sense
that it will also be the source of secondary
identification, under which term I would place the
functions of libidinal normalization. (Lacan, 1949:
2)
The infant's mis-recognition of herself as her specular image
represents a primordial form identity. It prefigures both "the
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mental permanence of the I" and "its alienated destination"
(ibid., p2). As Lemaire (1970: xix, emphasis added) notes, the
ego emerges "through the necessary mediation of the perceived
image"4.
Visibility also plays a part in psychoanalytic
theorizations of the later psycho-sexual development of gender
identity. For Freud, the sight of the other sex's genitals is
central to the development of masculine and feminine
sexuality. Boys' conviction that both sexes have a penis "is
obstinately defended against the contradictions which soon
result from observation, and is only abandoned after severe
internal struggles (the castration complex)" (Freud, 1905:
113, emphasis added).
The observation which finally breaks down his
unbelief (in the threat of castration) is the sight
of the female genitals. ... With this, the loss of
his own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of
castration takes its deferred effects. ... the
destruction of the Oedipus Complex is brought about
by the threat of castration. (Freud, l924a: 317-8,
319. emphasis added)
For the girl feminine sexuality develops "when she makes
a comparison" with a boy's genitals and " perceives that she
has 'come off badly' and she feels this as a wrong done to her
and as a ground for inferiority" (ibid., p.320, emphasis
added).
The development of both masculine and feminine sexual
identity is then, for Freud, predicated, in part, on an
economy of visibility in which male and female genitals are
observed and compared with each other and, more significantly,
with the phallic 'norm' of having a penis. 'Femininity' is
conceptualized in terms of a perceived lack. Yet as Blum
(1976: 169) amongst many others argues, "Freud uncovered and
brought to the attention of the world the utterly irrational
. The notion of 'reflection' is also apparent in other
psychoanalytic theories of development. Winnicott (1967), for
example, describes the mother as mirroring the child to itself.
His conceptualization of 'reflection' does, however differ
significantly from Lacan's.
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nature of this phallic contempt and derision of women." The
girl cannot be described as lacking in the real since "there
is nothing missing in the real" (Lacan, 1982c: 113). She can
only be seen as lacking in relation to a pre-constituted
(phallic) hierarchy of values.
The phallus ... indicates the reduction of
difference to an instance of visible perception, a
seeming value. Freud gave the moment when boy and
girl child saw that they were different the status
of a trauma in which the girl is seen to be lacking.
But something can only be seen to be missing
according to a pre-existing hierarchy of values
What counts is not the perception but its already
assigned meaning - the moment therefore belongs in
the symbolic. (Rose, 1982: 42)
As Lacan's re-reading of Freud emphasises, this "instance
of visible perception" can only be si gnificant because it is
already symbolic. The girl is perceived as lacking only
because that perception is located within a pre-constituted
field of vision, the Symbolic order. This perception, like the
disciplinary individualizing gaze, can be understood as "an
exercise of power" (see Foucault, l977b: 187) which
constitutes (gendered) subjectivity within an already-
structured (phallic) field of vision.
Lacan has often been criticised for asserting that the
status of the phallus as the privileged signifier within the
Symbolic order stems from its visibility (Rose, 1982: 42);
that the phallic nature of the Symbolic order can itself be
understood in terms of the visibility of the penis. ("One
might say that this signifier is chosen as what stands out as
most easily seized upon in the real of sexual copulation")
(Lacan l982a: 82, cited in Rose, 1982: 42). However, as Rose
(1982: 42) argues,
if Lacan states that the symbolic usage of the
phallus stems from its visibility ... it is only in
so fart as the order of the visible, the apparent,
the seeming is the object of his attack.
To assert that the phallus is the privileged signifier within
the symbolic because of its visibility is fl an explanation
the origins of the symbolic in terms of the real. Rather,
Lacan argues the vision of the phallus is always already
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located within a pre-constituted 'order of the visible', the
Symbolic order in which the status of the phallus is itself
fraudulent (Rose, 1982). Whilst
the phallus is not a phantasy, if by that we mean an
imaginary effect (n)or is it as such an object
in the sense that this term tends to accentuate the
reality pertaining in a relation. It is even less
the organ, penis or clitoris, that it symbolizes.
(Lacan, 1958a: 285)
That is, for Lacan, the Symbolic order in which gender-
identities are constituted involves an order of visibility
whose ordering is always already symbolic rather than real.
In short, psychoanalytic theory, like Foucauldian theory,
asserts the importance of visibility in constituting
subjectivity. It is 'the order of the visible' which
privileges the visibility of the phallus, which renders
meaningful the Oedipal 'instance of visible perception' and
which constitutes femininity as a seeming lack. Lacan's 'order
of the visible' constitutes gendered subjectivities in
relation to the pre-existing phallic norm of the Symbolic
order. And as Foucault's 'economy of visibility' is located
within a socio-historically specific politics of discipline
which constitutes individuals so too is Lacan's 'order of the
visible' located in a Symbolic order within which masculine or
feminine subject positions are constituted. And for both Lacan
and Foucault these economies or orders of visibility always
pre-exist the individual and always constitute as well as
reveal their objects.
Within the framework of both Lacanian and Foucauldj.an
theories, the discursive construction of the thin/anorexic
body as fading away or disappearing might be read as
signifying a resistance to disciplined or gendered
individuality. The paradoxical construction of this body as
one that is both less and more visible, as a body that appears
to disapper might be read as signifying an ambivalence
towards the disciplining, individualizing and gendering
effects of the fields of vision which are always, already
located within soclo-historically specific forms of
power/knowledge.
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12.7 Anorexia, Death, the l4other and the Ethereal Woman
As the above analysis indicates, the discursive
construction of the thin/anorexic body as fading away, as
disappearing involves a theme of self-destruction. To fade
away may be read as an ambivalence towards the
individualizing, disciplining, gendering effects of economies
of visibility. It may signify a symbolical evasion of an
individualizing gaze. And, as noted above, to become
impossibly small is also literally suicidal. Nicki, for
example, construed "not eating, becoming smaller" as "very
relevant" to wanting to die (see p.334).
The construction of the thin/anorexic body as fading away
involves, then, a theme of death as well as a theme of
symbolic self-destruction. This theme, is, I would argue, also
evoked by the dualistic ideal of a non-body. It also emerged
as an extreme of self-punishment and self-destruction. Jackie,
for example, constructed self-starvation as a punishing way to
die.
(Jackie, pp.5-6)
Jackie: I mean it's onLy LateLy that I've feLt maybe I want to Live. /H: right m/ Most of the time the
resuLt (.) of doing what I've done to myself is (.) just reaLLy wanting to kILL myseLf.
H: Right, through starvation or=
=Jackie: Yeah definiteLy. /H: right! I've aLways had, aLways thought C.) the onLy way I wanted to die
was to starve myseLf.
H: Oh right. Why was that? C.) I mean why that form rather than C.) another form? C.)
Jackie: 1 don't know .1 quite Like C.) I 	 Like the idea of it being a punishment. C.) /H: right(.)
tin! C.) And it was Long and slow as weLL.
H: Right, so it was particuLarLy painfuL.
Jackie: Yeah, I used to get a kick out of that, /H: right! C.) of the punishment part of it C.) and the
pain. IH: nn/ I didn't care.
The theme of death thus emerges sporadically in the discourses
which converge on the thin/anorexic body throughout the
transcripts. In the extracts below this theme becomes
explicit. Anorexia is construed here as fatally self-
destructive.
(Lynn/Jane/Sirnone, p.21)
Lynn: I got two appointments with a therapist and then he Left. C.) And uh (short Laugh) I wouLdn't've
been abLe to see anyone untiL Last month which 1 /H: right! wouLd have been dead if I'd carried on.
(Cathy, pp.2-5)
Cathy: Uhrn Lets get back to the Laxatives, anyway. Uhm what happened was that I was taking two hundred
a day for I think it was just a week or something !H: m/ and I started feeLing very iLL and everything
and my mother caLLed my nurses and they said: bring her in, we'Ll run some tests. This was a Sunday uhm
and I was brought in and 1 was actuaLLy on the verge of having a heart attack. My potassiun LeveLs were
sky high.
(Jane!Lynn!Simone, pp.l8)
Jane: Like because of my abuse (.) it heLped me to face that. Urn C.) I don't know (.) uh because I'd
come so close to dying /H: right/ Like quite a coupLe of times isa C.) it made me reaLise that C.) It
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wasn't because I was mad I'd gone through the anorexia.
(Layta, p.8)
Layta: I think in a way it's more seLf-destructive than any other kind of depression /H: ma yeah/ unless
it's suicide /H: right/ because in a way it takes you to death.
As recent studies demonstrate mortality rates for anorexia
remain alarmingly high (see chapter 1). The construction of
self-starvation and laxative-abuse as fatally self-
destructive, evidenced in the extracts above, can therefore be
seen as an accurate description of anorexia as physically
hazardous and possibly fatal. However, whilst death is
construed here as a possible result of self-starvation or
laxative-abuse it is not construed as a desired outcome.
Anorexia is constructed here as dangerous but not as a form of
deliberate suicide. The women construe themselves as passively
(almost) dying rather than as actively seeking death: anorexia
"takes you to death". Other extracts, however, constitute
anorexia as more actively self-destructive.
(RacheL, p.6)
RacheL: It's Like a stow method, a sLow method of kiLLing yourseLf. P'raps men wouLd maybe go from their
car and put a hose-pipe round. But /H: right/ I don't know, well that's more of a conscious effort isn't
it to kiLL, /H: yeah/ kiLt yourseLf.
(ELaine, p.9)
ELaine: I did actuaLly think this time I was going to have to have a nasaL tube cos I was just didn't
want to eat. /H: right/ That was it. I was going to be in, I got /H: nln/ you know I just wanted to die.
(Jane/Lynn/Simone, p.11)
Jane: I think with me it was hating myseLf so nuch. /H: right/ Urn basically I just wanted to, initiaLLy
I wanted to harm myseLf and sort of kiLL myseLf.
Anorexia is constructed here as a form of suicide, as an
extreme of self-inflicted punishment and self-destruction. In
Rachel's extract, for example, she constructs anorexia as "a
slow method of killing yourself", comparing it with another
form of suicide, carbon-monoxide poisoning. In contrast with
this latter form 'anorexic' suicide is construed as slower and
as implicitly feminine. And whilst it is also construed as a
less conscious effort it is nevertheless constructed as
actively suicidal. Similarly both Elaine and Jane construct
anorexia as a purposeful attempt to kill oneself. It becomes
an ultimate form of self-punishment and self-destruction. In
Jane's previous extract (see pp.340-341) she constructed
herself as passively coming close to a death which was even
associated with positive therapeutic aspects. However, in this
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extract she construes herself as actively wanting a death that
is self-punishing and destructive. And as with other
constructions of anorexia as self-punishment there is an
associated negative construction of the self as hated.
A second construction of the self that emerged in
relation to this theme of death was that of the self as dying.
(Jane/Lynn/Simone, p.14)
Jane I've wasted so much of my Life /H: rn/ you know. I spent eight months Like in hospital and I was
just (.) 1K: niu/ half dead.
(Layta, p.6)
Layla: I was dying and I couldn't stop it and I was much to unhappy to do anything about it and I hated
the way I was but 1 couldn't change the way I was.
(Elaine, pp.5-6)
Elaine: I think when I lose weight I get happier but that doesn't normally work 1K: trial out cos you know
when I've been C.) you know virtually dying (half Laughing) I haven't been happy at aLL. 1K: right/ C.)
You know I couldn't say I was exactly C.) (laughing) cheerful when I come in here (...] I mean I just
wanted to die (.) /K: trial definitely.
In these extracts the dying self is construed very
negatively. Dying is associated with self-hatred, unhappiness
and a regrettable wasting of life. In Elaine's extract this
misery is emphasised through understatement: "when I've been
(.) you know virtually dying (half laughing) I haven't been
happy at all [...] You couldn't say I was exactly [...]
cheerful". It is also emphasised by contrasting her misery in
"virtually dying" of starvation with a construction of losing
weight as a key to happiness, promulgated, for example, by
romantic discourse.
The negativity of the discursive construction of death is
also consolidated through the juxtapositioning of 'anorexic'
suicide with constructions of anorexia as an attempt to fade
away. As argued above, the construction of the thin/anorexic
body as fading away may be read as signifying an evasion of an
individualizing gaze. In the extract below Penny and Laura
construe fading away as an avoidance of "being me" and as a
way of "hiding from myself" and associate this symbolic self-
destruction with suicide.
(Penny/Laura, pp.lO-li)
Penny: I just wanted to kind of fade away (inaud.)=
=Laura: I was avoiding being me. I didn't want to know what me reaLLy was so I thought that if I just
sort of C.) you know go along Like this, just sort of hiding, I think I was just sort of hiding from
myself C...]
Penny: I think it was a kind of slow suicide for me in a way, 1K: rn/an easy way out kind of thing,
aLthough (Laughing) it wasn't easy. I know it wasn't. I know, you know.
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In this extract 'fading away' signifies self-destruction on
several levels. Firstly, it signifies a symbolic avoidance of
identity. As the body becomes less visible so hiding (from and
of oneself) becomes more possible. Second, the fading body
also becomes less healthy and may eventually die. In addition,
these two significations converge so that this 'anorexic'
suicidal fading away might also be read as an ultimate
(symbolic) avoidance of identity through total (physical)
self-destruction.
In other extracts the negativity of death is discursively
produced through the construction of death as self-punishment.
In Jackie's extract above (see p.340), for example, death
through self-starvation is construed as a long, slow and
painful punishment. The extract continues, contextualizing her
wish for self-punishment and death in an account of her
mother's death.
(Jackie, pp.5-6)
H: Was there anything that you feLt you were punishing yourseLf for or? C.)
Jackie: Urn (.) I think I was very guilty about my nun's death. 1K: right/ C.) And C.) I don't know, my,
I had un my chiLdhood was quite difficuLt C.) IN: oh right/ with my dad 1K: m/ and my mun. So I think
I was probabLy quite, I did feel quite guilty. (...] aLso my nun died of an iLLness which meant she Lost
an awfuL Lot of weight. C.) 1K: oh right/ Yeah and so that, I think there's probabLy some C.)
significance with that. C.) /H: ,rnn/ It's the fact that she was reall y, she was six foot and she was uh
seven stone something when she died. C.) So she was very underweight. 1K: rrtn/ C.) And so I think there's
probabLy some sort of paraLleL with the way I've been going, C.) /H: right/ wanting to be thin Like she
was.
Several explanations for suicidal feelings are presented
in this rather harrowing extract. One is that Jackie's
suicidal feelings are caused by her guilt about her mother's
death. There is an implication here that Jackie's own death
would constitute an appropriate punishment or atonement for
her mother's death. A second explanation is that "wanting to
kill (her)self" is the result of her anorexia, of "what I've
done to myself". A third explanation again involves
autobiographical detail. Jackie associates her suicidal
feelings with the 'difficulties' of her childhood. Her
statement i informed, I would argue, by a psycho-therapeutic
or psychological discourse which provides explanatory power:
difficulties or traumas in childhood are understood as causes
of problems in later life.
In addition to these explanatory statements the extract
also evidences a construction of death as a point of
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identification between Jackie and her mother. Just as her
mother died so she is also dying. This construction of death
as a point of mother-daughter identification is consolidated
through Jackie's specifying self-starvation as her 'preferred'
form of suicide. Like her mother Jackie would die after losing
"an awful lot of weight". Both mother and daughter would die
thin.
In Teresa's transcript too 'anorexic' death was
associated with her mother's death. This autobiographical
association is particular to Jackie's and Teresa's transcripts
and illustrates the specificity of significations within the
transcripts. Whilst a number of common significations, themes
and discourses have been explicated from the transcripts there
are also many specificities both within and across
transcripts, in this case associated with the autobiographical
diversity of the participants. However, as I will argue, the
discursive relationship between 'anorexic' death and the
mother's death is also of wider significance.
Teresa's extracts below illustrate again that death is
not only construed negatively as an extreme of self-punishment
and destruction. It is also construed as a point of
identification with the mother. In these autobiographical
accounts the trope of 'the dead mother' is associated with
themes of identity, resistance and escape, themes which are
also evidenced in other transcripts.
(Teresa 1 pp.1-2)
Teresa: It (anorexia) was aLso Linked to the fact that I compulsiveLy cared for my famiLy /H: right nin/
and C.) and my mother's death. Cos my mother died by having a brain haernorrhage. It was very sort of
shocking /H: nail and trauiiatic. C...] A couple of days before she died 1 went round to give her this
present and things. And I was very, I remeniber my relationship with my mother as being much more as
friends /N: nai/ and	 worrying about Looking after j.
In this extract Teresa explicitly relates her anorexia to her
mother's death. This relationship does not focus on a suicidal
aspect of anorexia and a substantive similarity with her
mother's death as Jackie's did. Nevertheless, Teresa is
herself intrpe1lated by the discourse in which she construes
her mother and her mother's death. She takes up a 'maternal'
position associated with her dead or dying mother. It is
who "compulsively cared for (her) family" and who worried
about looking after her mother. And it is her mother's death
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that is in some way associated with her anorexia. In the
extract below the discursive relation between Teresa and her
mother becomes more complex. Teresa describes how she chose a
career "that was the complete opposite and anathema to what
(her) mother was", thus effecting an ostensibly categorical
distinction between them. However, this distinction soon
collapses into a further identification which focuses on self-
sacrifice.
(Teresa, p.3)
Teresa: I chose to do something that was the coipLete opposite and anathema to what my mother was. /H:
right/ Uhm and that destroyed me too /H: rrin/ because there was nothing of the identity that I had in
relationship to what I could say was me. But also that the two things that they had in comnon was that
my mother sacrificed herself as a mother and I was sacrificing myself as a nurse.
The extract produces a sense of ambivalence in Teresa's
relationship to her mother. There is a discursive shifting
between separation and identification and both of these
relationships involve self-destruction. Being a nurse, an
anathema to her mother, destroyed her "because there was
nothing of the identity that (she) had in relationship to what
(she) could say was (herself)." But her identification with
her mother also involves destruction through self-sacrifice.
In the next two extracts this theme of sacrifice is again
linked with Teresa's mother, her anorexia and with themes of
identity and escape.
(Teresa, p.2)
Teresa: In our society mothers are not meant to have desires, to be angry, to be powerful, to be
seLfish, They're meant to Like /H: rrin/ compLeteLy orientate themselves and nurture /H: mI other peopLe
and I suppose I saw that destroy my mother. /H: rim! And Looking after us meant C.) that she had to kind
of give up C.) had to be this sacrificial. /H: right/ She became very religious and sort of became this,
I think she transcended it aLl by her religion. It was an escape. /ll: m/ And I'm, I'm very angry with
her for that. tIm (.) /H:rrrn/ but uh yeah definitely that was to do with my anorexia. And also it was an
identification with her because she was a very eLusive figure, my mother /H: yeah! in a Lot of ways.
(Teresa, pp.1-2)
Teresa: I always felt that she wanted to die /H: right/ because, you know, she was always escaping from
her Life as a wife and mother because it was just so awful. /H: sin rrin/ She'd done this sort of degree,
her post-doctoral degree in classics and she (laughs) she was just stuck in this suburban house, you
know, like taLking to all these (.) suburban housewives and well she she never fitted in. I mean she
just wore odd clothes and spent the whole of, collecting for Oxfam and working poLiticaLly and, and as
I said sitting up trees /14: Iris! painting pictures and writing poetry. I mean she didn't do the things
that a wife and mother should. I mean she didn't. We never had proper cLothes to wear and she didn't
do the housework or /H: right/ she didn't fit in with the neighbours and she seemed very, very
eccentric. /H: right! But also she was completely trapped. She one' one', once she applied to be a
missionary in South Africa and my father just like attacked the vicar. He was just, I mean she didn't
go. /14: sin! But I mean there were aLways routes out for her. /14: yeah/ And she used to write a lot of
poetry about death and us I was aLways convinced that she wanted to die so when she did /14: nm! I just
feLt angry about it.
Here Teresa provides a critique of a dominant idealogy of
motherhood. 'The mother' is construed as devoid of desire and
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subjectivity. 'She' should be completely oriented to other's
needs. This construction is, I would argue, consonant with a
discursive relationship between 'the mother' and death since
it produces 'her' as a function without subjectivity, whose
subjective desire is sacrificed to others. The relationship
between the mother and death is strengthened by Teresa's
description of her mother being destroyed by arid sacrificed to
this 'role'. The extract thus illustrates a symbolic or
discursive dual relationship between the mother and death
whose significance, I would argue, extends beyond the
specificity of Teresa's autobiography. Not only is Teresa's
mother construed as sacrificed to motherhood but this 'role'
is itself construed as sacrificial. And sacrifice is
constituted as a point of identification between mother and
daughter.
However, Teresa's mother is also discursively produced as
"always escaping her life as a wife and mother because it was
just so awful". Her 'eccentricity', her religious
transcendence and her death are all construed as "routes out".
As an eccentric her mother is portrayed as "sitting up trees"
writing poetry about death rather than doing "the things a
wife and mother should". She is artistic, elusive and ethereal
rather than mundane. And as a religious figure she is again
constructed as spiritual and other-worldly. Ultimately,
however, Teresa construes her mother as having to escape her
life in order to escape "her life as a wife and mother". These
extracts thus construct a figure of a mother who is spiritual,
ethereal and elusive and whose escapes are closely associated
with death. "(S)he was a very elusive figure, my mother, [...]
in a lot of ways."
This construction of an 'elusive' mother not only
discursively consolidates a specific autobiographical
relationship between the mother and death; it also constitutes
a second point of identification between Teresa and her
mother. In these extracts the mother-daughter relationship is
again construed ambivalently: Teresa is "very angry with her"
for escaping but 'escape' is constructed as precisely a focus
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of an identification between mother and daughter. Moreover, it
is 'escape' and the 'elusive figure' that are produced as the
links between Teresa's anorexia and her mother's death. It is
her mother's multiple elusiveness which is construed both as
"an identification with her" and as "definitely [...] to do
with (her) anorexia". The implication is that in 'being
anorexic' Teresa construes herself, like her mother, as a
"very elusive figure".
The discursive construction of 'the anorexic woman' as
elusive converges with the construction, discussed above, of
anorexia as fading away or disappearing, as an evasion of an
individualizing, disciplining or gender-ing gaze. 'Anorexia'
might therefore be read as self-destructive in that it
signifies an anonymity and an avoidance of identity. However,
in the extracts above the elusive figure is itself constructed
as subject position which at once signifies an identity and an
escape from identity. As argued above, this elusiveness is, in
part, effected through death. The elusive figure is construed
as dead (the dead mother who escaped her allotted life by
dying), as thoroughly destroyed. Yet it also signifies a
particular subject position of an ethereal figure who is
spiritual and other-worldly rather than bodily and mundane. In
the extract below Tricia construes anorexia/thinness in
precisely this way.
(Tricia, pp.7-8)
H: Were there any particular kind of (.) characteristics or C.) something that you associated with with
this thin ideal?
Tricia: I s'pose this sort of ethereaL sort of fairy creature C.) Ill: right/ that never quite Landed
on Earth, IH: yeah/ didn't realty want to be here at aLL. /H: yeah, yeah/ I think that's some of the
reason in a sort of quotes spiritual sense. There's C.) part of me just didn't really want to C.) to
be here at all /H: rrn/ really. (...] I mean at one time I remember feeling C.) I was so up realty out
of my body /H: rrin/ that I remember sort of C.) looking in the mirror and being actualLy surprised that
I saw a form in the mirror /H: right/ and not just a nothingness.
In this extract 'being anorexic' is associated with being "up
really of my body". The construction converges with the
dualistic construction of the (very) thin/anorexic body as a
signifier of an 'ideal' non-body and pure consciousness (see
chapter 9). In its emphasis on a dis-einbodied subjectivity and
out-of-body experience it also evokes, I would argue, a theme
of death and dying. However, in contrast with the often
harrowing constructions of 'anorexic' suicide as punishing
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self-destruction, this deathly ethereal figure is construed
quite positively. The thin/anorexic ideal signifies the
subject position of an "ethereal sort of fairy creature [...]
that never quite landed on Earth". This figure evokes Teresa's
construction of her mother as elusive, religiously other-
worldly and artistic, sitting up trees writing poetry about
death to escape her mundane life. It is a subjectivity that is
simultaneously associated with death but that is also
positively construed. It is, in addition, a gendered subject
position. Tricia's use of the word 'fairy' and Teresa's
constructions of a 'maternal' death both produce this
ethereal, elusive and deathly figure as feminine. Rachel
similarly produced a gendered construction of death by
contrasting 'anorexic' suicide with a construction of carbon-
monoxide poisoning as masculine (see p.341).
'Death' thus appears in the transcripts as a further
example of a signifier of unfixed meaning. It is construed as
an ultimate form of punishing self-destruction associated with
very negative self-constructions. But the 'deathly' figure of
'the elusive, ethereal woman' is positively constructed as a
spiritual dis-embodied "fairy creature" who escapes above the
mundanity of her allotted role. The positivity of this
construction should not, I would argue, be understood as a
distortion particular to pathologized individuals. Rather, as
Bronfen (1992; see also de Beauvoir, 1953) has argued, there
is a long-standing cultural association between 'woman' and
'death' upon which these extracts draw.
The cultural significance of 'the dead woman' is evident
in numerous forms. De Beauvoir (1953), for example, discusses
a variety of mythological female figures of sirens,
sorceresses, mother's and mistresses in which death is, in one
way or another associated with 'woman'. "Woman" she writes
"is not fully integrated into the world of men; as the other,
she is opposed to them." And in
seeking to appropriate the Other ... (man) plunges
into the depths of fleeting and deadly waters. The
Mother dooms her son to death in giving him life;
the loved one lures her lover on to renounce life
and abandon himself to the last sleep. The bond that
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unites Love and Death is poignantly illuminated in
the legend of Tristan, but it has a deeper truth.
Born of flesh, the man in love finds fulfilment as
flesh, and the flesh is destined to the tomb. Here
the alliance between Woman and Death is confirmed;
the great harvestress is the inverse aspect of the
fecundity that makes the grain thrive. But she
appears, too, as the dreadful bride whose skeleton
is revealed under her sweet, mendacious flesh. (de
Beauvoir, 1953: 197)
A cultural fascination with death and femininity is also
apparent in the prevalence of pictorial representations of
dead women such as Delaroche's 'La leune mart yre', Millais'
'Ophelia', or G.F. Watts' 'Found drowned' which were
particularly prevalent during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries (Bronfen, 1992). Lichtenstein's 'Drowning girl', or
Dali's 'In voluptate Nors' in which a skull is formed out of
7 naked female bodies constitute more recent examples. The
connection between 'woman' and 'death' is also evident in, for
example, the late nineteenth century cult associated with
'L'inconnue de la Seine' (a smiling death mask of an unknown
young woman) and, more widely, in poetry (e.g. the works of
Plath or Poe), opera (e.g. Carmen), literature (e.g the Emily
Brontes' Wuthering Heights, Wilkie Collins' The Woman in
White, Anne Rice's The Queen of the Damned or Toni Morrison's
Beloved) and film (e.g 'Dracula', 'The hun ger' or countless
films revelling in the violent murder of women).
As Bronfen (1992) asserts, there is undoubtedly a
misogynistic element to this long-standing cultural
association between death and femininity. Edgar Allan Poe, for
example, has been much criticised for his assertion that "the
death of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most poetic
topic in the world" (1846, cited in Bronfen, 1992: 59).
Bassein (1984, cited in Bronfen, 1992) described his
connecting women with "the most passive state occurring, that
of death" as damaging to women's self-image and aspirations.
Similarly, Dijkstra (1986, cited in Bronfen, 1992) has argued
that the nineteenth century portrayals of the dying or dead
woman as an 'icon of femininity' facilitated a suppression and
greater marginalization of woman as Other.
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Yet the astheticized of the dead woman as an ethereal and
elusive figure also has more positive aspects. Cultural
representations such as 'Ophelia' are not only aesthetically
'appealing', they are also liminal. They are at once feminine
and beyond/above (mundane) femininity. In addition,
representations of 'deathly' women such Bronte's Catherine
Erneshaw, Brain Stoker's or Coppola's Lucy or the female
vampire of 'The hunger' provide a construction of 'woman' that
whilst 'feminine' is also powerful and independent of the
external world. Their liminality allows them to transgress
social regulations, particularly those associated with their
gender. Cultural representations of 'deathly women' thus
provide a subject position which is both 'feminine' and
liminal or subversive.
Discursive constructions of 'the anorexic woman' as
deathly, ethereal, elusive and dis-embodied can therefore be
read as re-presentations of a culturally prevalent figure.
This physical and discursive construction of 'the (female)
self' as deathly is undoubtedly dangerous, not uncommonly
resulting in actual death. Yet the figure of the 'deathly'
woman can signify a positively construed subject position
which is very 'feminine' and yet, through 'her' liniinality,
eludes and subverts the (im)positions of femininity. In a
social context in which the dominant ideal of 'femininity' is
an ever-decreasing thinness (see chapter 2) the thin/anorexic
body construed as an ethereal, elusive, deathly figure may
appear as a perfect, though double-edged, solution.
(Penny/Laura, pp.14-15)
Penny: Cos I always wanted to be the perfect anorexic, but I know the perfect anorexic's a dead one
basicaL Ly.
The construction of the thin/anorexic body as deathly,
ethereal, elusive and dis-embodied converges, in its (extreme)
thinness with dominant constructions of feminine beauty, in
its frailty t
 with constructions of feminine fragility and
sickness; in it's smallness with constructions of the feminine
as child-like; in its 'androgyny' as a masculine ideal. In
denying the body almost to the point of death it converges
with the dualistic ideal of the non-body and pure
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consciousness that transcends gender. The discursive
construction of 'the anorexic' as an ethereal, elusive and
deathly figure appears to provide a solution to the always
socio-historically specific problem of feminine subjectivity.
The deathly thin body signifies a point of closure, the
fiction of a fixed identity (see Wetherell, 1991). As the
following extract illustrates, the discourses which converge
upon the thin/anorexic body are very powerful in constituting
and regulating women's experiences of gender, subjectivity and
embodiment.
(Jackie, pp.12-13)
Jackie: I mean god if I was going to write a book I think I'd have to write a Lot
about the misery of what it's actuaLLy Like /H: right nin/ because you even forget
yourseLf. C.) /H: right/ Because for this time 1 got to my target weight and I'd been
Losing and C.) I'd been deLighted at Losing C.) /H: nin/ untiL I just hit a point where
I've been getting reaLLy down (.) again /H: right/ because you forget aLL of the (.)
/H: sin! you know, it's not a soLution C.) Ill: right/ unLess you you actuaLLy kILL
yourseLf.
12.8 Conclusion
Chapters 11 and 12 have aimed to explore how subjectivity
is discursively constituted in relation to 'anorexia' and the
thin/anorexic body. Chapter 11 demonstrated the multiplicity
of constructions of 'anorexia' and analyzed how 'anorexia' may
be constituted as an identity that simultaneously constituted
a lack of or in identity. This chapter has extended this
focused on the mutually conflicting but profoundly related
themes of self-production and self-destruction. After
examining some of the very negative self-constructions
evidenced in the transcripts the analysis explored how
anorexia could be construed as self-punishing and self-
destructive as well as self-producing (see also chapter 9).
And the construction of anorexia as self-punishment could, it
was argued, be located within pre-existing discourses and
discursive practices which interpellate the (female) subject
as 'feminineLy masochistic'. The themes of subjectivity, self-
punishment and self-production were also analyzed in relation
to discursive constructions of self-starvation and purging and
to the detailing of diet, body weight and exercise. These
discursive practices, it was argued, can be read as both
productive and destructive of subjectivity.
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The chapter also explored how subjectivity was imbricated
in constructions of the thin/anorexic body as an ever-
decreasing body. In constructing the thin/anorexic body as a
body that is fading away and disappearing, this body was
constituted as evading a disciplinary, individualizing and
gendering gaze. 'Fading away' can thus be understood as a
resistance to a number of socially available subject
(ixn)positions. Yet, in evading an individualizing gaze,
'fading away' can also be understood as literally and
discursively self-annihilating. At its most extreme this was
articulated in terms of death and dying. The analysis explored
how constructions of anorexia as a fatal process were often
associated with emotionally harrowing accounts of the self.
But death was also, in some instances, constituted as a site
of identification with the mother. Further, it was argued
that, as a point of closure, death could be read as a site of
a (fictively) fixed identity (see Wetherell, 1991). The
extreme and paradoxical convergence of self-destruction and
self-production in these discursive constructions could be
understood within the context of cultural re-productions of
the deathly woman (see Bronfen, 1992). That is, the
thin/anorexic body as 'fading away' and dying was produced as
a signifier of self-annihilation. Yet it simultaneously
signified a positive subjectivity which can be located within
the pre-existing discourses and discursive practices that have
constituted figures of the ethereal and liminal woman.
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Chapter Thirteen
Conclusions
13.1 An Overview
I chose to explore the problem of 'anorexia nervosa'
because it seems to me to crystallize many of the complex
issues surrounding femininity, subjectivity and the body (see
also chapter 1). I also felt that 'anorexia' could be more
adequately understood from a feminist post-structuralist
perspective (informed by psychoanalytic Lacanian theory)
rather than from the positivist, medical and quasi-medical
perspectives that characterize much of the current literature.
There is now a large body of literature, theorizing and
researching 'anorexia' and other eating disorders from a
variety of perspectives (see chapter 2). Yet, the limitations
of current perspectives have made further research and theory
necessary.
Despite the fact that many more women than men are
diagnosed as 'anorexic' (see chapter 1), issues of gender are
marginalized in much of the literature (see chapter 2). And,
where it is addressed, the concept of gender is frequently
under-theorized (see chapter 3). similarly, too little
attention has been given to the socio-cultural context of
'anorexia'. The current literature has tended to uncritically
adopt a medical model of 'anorexia' as an individualized
pathology and as an objective diagnostic category, existing
independently of psychological, medical or popular discourses.
Research has often been conducted within a positivistic
framework in which 'anorexia' is conceptualized as an
objective, a-historical category whose aetiology and defining
characteristics can be objectively discovered and documented
(see chapter 2).
Yet, as argued above (see chapters 3 and 4), this
scientific epistemology is profoundly problematic. Scientific
discourses, like other discourses, do not simply describe or
reflect the world more or less accurately. Rather, discourses
"systematically form the objects of which they speak"
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(Foucault, 1972: 49) and "it is in discourse that power and
knowledge are joined together" (Foucault, 1979: 100). That is,
'anorexia' is constituted and regulated in particular ways by
the discourses and discursive practices by which it is
investigated, described and treated. In short, post-
structuralist theory has demonstrated the implausibility of
producing an objective, a-historical or universalistic
knowledge of 'anorexia nervosa'. And it has provided a
framework within which to investigate 'anorexia' as it is
located within its socio-historically specific discursive
contexts (see chapters 3-5).
This thesis has, therefore, critically reviewed the
current literature on 'anorexia' (see chapter 2). And, by
drawing on feminist, post-structuralist and psychoanalytic
theories, it has aimed to overcome some of the limitations in
that literature. The theoretical framework of this thesis has
provided more thorough conceptualizations of subjectivity and
gender and of the individual-society relationship (see chapter
3). That is, subjectivity is conceptualized as a shifting
plurality of discursively constituted subject positions.
Hence, the individual-society dichotomy is refused. Discourses
and discursive practices both constitute and regulate 'the
individual' and other objects in a variety of socio-
historically specific ways (see chapter 3). And, similarly,
they produce and regulate a multiplicity of feuiininities,
anorexias and thin bodies. Discourses constitute women as
'women', as 'other' (see Benvenuto and Kennedy, 1986),
regulating our subjectivities, our desires and our bodies
through "a multiplicity of minor processes of domination"
(Foucault, l977b: 138; see chapter 3).
By applying this theoretical framework to the problem of
'anorexia' I have aimed to provide an analysis in which gender
is more adequately theorized and in which 'anorexia' is more
fully contextualized within its socio-cultural, discursive
locations. I have sought to guestion the empiricist or
positivistic assumptions of much of the current literature and
to resist and deconstruct the medical model of 'anorexia
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nervosa' as an individual pathology.
Hence, the first study of this thesis provides a
genealogy of 'anorexia nervosa', exploring how it first
emerged as a diagnostic category. It examines the 'surface of
emergence' (Foucault, 1972), the socio-cultural conditions
that made it possible for 'anorexia' to be formulated as a
clinical entity (see chapter 6). In particular, it focuses on
Georgian and Victorian pre-occupation with sickness and
'nerves' and on the medical concepts of hypochondria and
hysteria. It examines how medical discourses, in continual
dialogue with the wider culture, constituted the body as
nervous and simultaneously feminized nervous disorder. In the
concept of hypochondria nervousness was associated with
gastric disorder whilst 'hysteria' epitomized the feminization
of nervousness and the pathologization of 'woman' (see chapter
6). The already-existing medically and culturally entrenched
concerns with nervousness, gastric disorder and pathologized
femininity thus converged in the medical formulation of
'anorexia nervosa'.
By analyzing the medical journal articles in which
'anorexia' was first constituted (chapter 7), this study
demonstrated that 'anorexia nervosa' was not 'discovered'
through scientific endeavour. Rather, its emergence was a
discursive event made possible by the gaps in and the
relationships between already existing discourses (see
Foucault, l977a). It emerged at the interface of medical and
cultural discourses on hypochondria, hysteria and femininity.
And, at a time when explanations of female nervous debility
were shifting, 'anorexia' figured as a forum in which to
consolidate feminine nervousness.
In explicating the discourses evidenced in the nineteenth
century journal articles this study also indicated the socio-
historical specificity of these discursive constructions of
'anorexia' and of 'woman'. It illustrated the discontinuities
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus sought
to counter the notion of 'anorexia' as a trans-historical and
objectively knowable disease (see chapter 7). In the
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nineteenth century journal articles on 'anorexia', the
concepts of femininity and pathology were merged to produce a
profoundly gendered (anorexic) subject whose very nature
required the existence of a medical (masculine) authority.
There are, however, continuities as well as
discontinuities between nineteenth and twentieth century
discourses on 'anorexia'. Femininities remain profoundly
imbricated in its current discursive constructions.
The second study of this thesis has explored these
contemporary discourses that surround 'anorexia', femininity,
subjectivity and the body. It has analyzed the transcripts of
interviews with women diagnosed or self-diagnosed as anorexic.
As with Study One, the analyses drew on feminist, Foucauldian
and psychoanalytic theories, adopting a post-structuralist
approach to discourse analysis. The study explored how (a)
'anorexia' and the (thin/anorexic) body are multiply
constituted in discourse and (b) how gender and subjectivity
are imbricated in these discursive construction.
Although informed by psychoanalytic theory, particularly
Lacanian theory, the analyses were not an attempt to
'psychoanalyze' the women who were interviewed. Within the
theoretical framework of this thesis subjectivity is
conceptualized as a multiplicity of discursively produced
subject positions (see chapter 3). Hence, the aim of Study Two
was not to analyze the individual women but, rather, to
analyze those discourses and discursive resources deployed in
the transcripts (see chapter 8; see also chapter 5). These
discourses, it has been argued (see chapter 3), do not arise
from 'within' the individual. Rather, they are social and pre-
exist the speaking subject. This study has sought to examine
those discourses that converge upon the thin/anorexic body to
produce the body, anorexia and gender in a variety of ways.
And it has examined how these discourses interpellate the
subject in a multiplicity of often conflicting subjectivities.
Study Two, therefore, began with an analysis of how the
thin/anorexic body sustains a multiplicity of meanings and how
different discourses gender that body in different, often
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conflicting ways (see chapter 8). It also analyzed how the
thin/anorexic body is discursively constituted as a controlled
body (see chapter 9). This construction was located within a
discourse of Cartesian dualism which produced the body as
eruptive, alien and threatening to the mind/self. This
discourse thus produced the necessity of exercising control
over the body and constructed the thin/anorexic body as proof
of such control. The thin/anorexic body was produced as a
signifier of an idealized non-body and of an independent,
disembodied and therefore gender-less subjectivity. Yet whilst
this subject position appears genderless, gender is
nevertheless imbricated in this discourse. As the analysis in
chapter 10 indicates, the alien and threatening excesses of
the dualistic body may be signified by both fat and
femininity. This discourse of Cartesian dualism consolidates
the polyvalent figure of 'woman' as bodily, excessive,
uncontrolled, dangerous and alien, as other.
The thin/anorexic body has thus been shown to signify a
multiplicity of subjectivities. Hence, the production and
maintenance of this body can be understood as a management of
subjectivity. Yet it is also self-destructive. Chapters 11 and
12 explored these mutually conflicting but profoundly related
themes of self-production and self-annihilation. Chapter 11
examines some of the different discursive relationships
between the speaking subject and 'anorexia', focusing on the
construction of 'anorexia' as an identity that simultaneously
signifies a lack of or in identity. It also explored how
constructions of 'the self' resist other potential identities
and examined how identity is constituted within a discourse of
individualism. Chapter 12 examined a number of negative
constructions of 'the self' and focused on the discursive
production of 'anorexia' as a form of self-punishment and
self-destruction. It explored how constructions of self-
starvation, purging and a detailed attention to food and body
weight simultaneously signified the annihilation of a very
negative 'self' but also the production of positively
construed subjectivities. Similarly, constructions of the
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thin/anorexic body as disappearing and as dying could be read
in terms of both self-production and self-destruction. The
chapter analyzed how the themes of visibility, of death and of
femininity were imbricated in the discursive construction of
the thin/anorexic body. The paradoxical construction of the
thin/anorexic body as a signifier of both self-production and
self-destruction could, it was argued, be located within the
pre-existing discourses and discursive practices, within the
'micro-processes of domination' that converge on the
thin/anorexic body, constituting and regulating women's
subjectivities, femininities and our bodies in their socio-
historical specificities.
In short, the analyses presented here constitute only one
possible reading of the transcripts, of the discourses and
discursive practices surrounding 'anorexia'. And, like the
analyzed texts, it produces rather than reflects ith objects
(see chapters 3-5). It is not intended as an objective or
universalistic account of 'anorexia' or 'anorexics'. Rather,
it has aimed to demonstrate the socio-cultural, discursive
nature of 'anorexia' and of the ways in which 'anorexia',
'femininity', subjectivity and the body are multiply
discursively constituted. It has sought to demonstrate how the
socio-historically specific discourses and discursive
practices of the late twentieth century Western society
produce and regulate the female body.
13.2 Limitations of This Thesis and Directions for Future
Research
There are a number of limitations to this thesis and a
number of further questions raised by my research which
further research could usefully address. Firstly, there have
been a number of critiques of Lacanian and Foucauldian theory
(see chapter 3) which could raise some interesting questions
in relation to the research in this thesis. In this thesis I
have adopted a theoretical framework informed by Foucauldian
and Lacanian theory because, as discussed above (see chapters
3, 5 and 8), it provides a useful framework within which to
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'deconstruct' the concept of 'anorexia' and to locate anorexia
within its socio-historically specific and gender-specific
(discursive) contexts. However, future research could usefully
engage more thoroughly with these critiques.
Secondly, care must be taken not to over-interpret the
research in Study Two by generalizing the analyses to all
women or to all women diagnosed as anorexic since the study is
based on interviews with only a small number of women.
Moreover, in the process of interviewing these women I
participated in the discussions. It might therefore be argued
that I influenced the interviewees and that the interviews
were often emotionally charged rather than 'neutral'
situations in which 'objective' data could be gathered.
However, as argued above (pp.203-211), the purpose of the
interviews was not to elicit 'facts' about anorexia or
femininity (see also Griffin and Phoenix, 1994; Silverman,
1993). Rather, the study aimed to explore the discourses and
discursive resources deployed in talking about anorexia,
gender, subjectivity and the body. In adopting a feminist
post-structuralist perspective (see chapters 3-5), both of the
studies of this thesis have eschewed the positivistic criteria
of objectivity, validity and reliability in favour of more in-
depth and theoretically informed analyses. In this thesis I
have not sought to present a universally applicable or
'objective' knowledge of 'anorexia'. Indeed, in aiming to
'deconstruct' the category of anorexia this thesis also aims
to undermine the very notion that one could produce objective
knowledge about a representative sample of 'anorexics' (see
also chapters 3 and 4).
Following on from the research conducted in this thesis,
further research could also adopt a more reflexive approach.
The omission of a more reflexive element in my research
represents significant absence, particularly in Study Two.
Further research could usefully attend to the interactions
between the researcher and the interviewee. It could also
explore the ways in which the researcher's own subjectivities
and therefore her biography are imbricated in the research
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process. Attention to this aspect of research would be
particularly useful, given the importance of reflexivity in
feminist research (see Griffin and Phoenix, 1994). However, as
discussed in chapter 8, the quantity and density of interview
material necessitated a prioritization of certain aspects of
the transcripts over others. The principal aim of Study Two
was not to analyze the interview process itself but to analyze
those discourses and discursive resources that produce and
regulate 'anorexia', subjectivity, gender and the (female)
body.
The adoption of a more reflexive stance would have
involved an exploration of my own subjectivities as a (thin)
woman and as a researcher; of the ways in which I participated
in the interviews and then read and analyzed the transcripts;
of the ways in which I too am imbricated in the discourses
which I have analyzed; and of the politics of feminist and
post-structuralist research and of women researching women.
However, an exploration of these complex issues would have
foreclosed the possibility of producing a lengthy and detailed
analysis of those discourses and discursive resources that
produce and regulate 'anorexia', subjectivity, gender and the
(female) body. Moreover, reflexivity involves a fictioning of
'oneself' into the account which may be both personally and
theoretically problematic. Firstly, such an account may be
read as 'authentic experience' of the author rather than
as a particular account of oneself that is produced
specifically in relation to one's research. Secondly, a
'sincere' fictioning of 'oneself' involves a self-disclosure
which can be difficult, particularly as that disclosure is not
anonymous. It is a process of making oneself visible which, as
the analyses in chapter 12 illustrate, is complex and
problematic, particularly in relation to the categories of
woman and pathologized woman (see pp.334-9). The absence of an
explicit authorial voice in this thesis could, therefore, be
read in relation to the issues of vision, visibility,
subjectivity and femininity discussed in chapters 11 and 12.
It would also have been interesting to have involved the
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women in the analytic process or to have discussed the
analyses with them. Unfortunately, although the women were
sent copies of their transcripts and invited to comment, none
did. (Several women replied to me, for example, wishing me
luck with the study but none of the letters included comments
about the transcripts or the interview process.) It also took
several months to complete the analyses by which time I would
no longer have been able to contact most of the women. Further
research could therefore include a more collaborative approach
to analysis.
There are also other issues that are not covered in this
thesis which it would be important to examine in future
research. Firstly, further research could also examine the
ways in which class and ethnicity are imbricated in the
discourses and discursive practices surrounding 'anorexia',
'femininity' or medical practice. Further analyses of both
historical and contemporary discourses surrounding anorexia
could also be expanded to encompass an exploration of, for
example, the relationships between a genealogy of anorexia and
the feminist movements of the late nineteenth and late
twentieth centuries. Such analyses could also be expanded to
include, for example, an exploration of these discourses in
the contexts of the politics and economics of food, capitalist
ideologies of consumption and production (see Bordo, 1990,
1992), and the commercial and media promotion of dieting and
idealization of thinness. Similarly, it would also be useful
to expand an analysis of contemporary discourse (see Study
Two) by taking a broader genealogical perspective. The
discourses explicated in this study have their own genealogies
in addition to the genealogy of anorexia presented in Study
One and these too could be explored.
Moreover, it would also be useful to expand upon the
empirical work of this thesis by attending to the material,
non-linguistic aspect, as well as the linguistic aspects of
discourse. As argued above (see chapter 3), the Foucauldian
concept of discourse is not reducible to that of language.
Rather, the concept of discourse includes discursive practices
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and there is a theorization of the way in which the material,
extra-discursive is imbricated in the discursive. In practice,
however, this thesis, like many other discourse analytic
studies, has tended to focus on talk and text and has omitted
an analysis of the material practices surrounding anorexia,
gender, subjectivity and the body. That is, this thesis has
focused on talk and texts about anorexia as an aspect of the
discursive practices in which it is produced but it has not
attended to the non-linguistic, material aspects of these
practices or to the physical aspects of embodiment.
Future research focusing on material practice could
involve an analysis of medical and psychiatric treatments and
of other therapeutic interventions; of the practices that take
place in GP surgeries, eating disorder clinics, in psychiatric
units, psychotherapy settings or, for example, in self-help
groups. Such an analysis could explore the non-linguistic as
well as the linguistic aspects of the discursive practices
such as diagnosis, hospital admission, behavioural weight-gain
regimes, force-feeding, psychotherapy and discharge (see also
pp.197-201). Nineteenth century accounts of medical treatments
were analyzed in chapter 7 and the patriarchal and
disciplining aspects of these treatment regimes were
discussed. However, a more thorough attention to the material
as well as the linguistic aspects of both nineteenth and
twentieth century clinical practices would contribute further
to our understanding of the ways in which medical,
psychological and cultural discourses and discursive practices
constitute and re-constitute 'the anorexic woman' in
particular (often dis-empowering) ways. It could elucidate
further the patriarchal, disciplining and normalizing aspects
of these practices and the ways in which they impinge upon and
penetrate (sometimes literally) the female, anorexic body. It
might thereby provide further insights into the reasons for
the limited success of current treatments; into the inefficacy
as well as the barbarousness of some treatment regimes that
invade women's bodies and their privacy and that further
deprive them of any sense of dignity and self-determination
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they may have. Equally, there are many more positive
therapeutic practices and such an analysis might also
elucidate how these particular interventions are effective and
helpful to those women who are diagnosed as 'anorexic' or
'eating disordered'.
By focusing on the material aspects of discourse, further
research could also involve an analysis of particular
discourses and discursive practices associated with the
biographies or the families of women who have been diagnosed
as anorexic. It would be particularly important in such an
analysis to not re-individualize 'anorexia' as an individual
pathology that could be explained in terms of 'abnormal'
biographies or 'deviant' and 'dysfunctional' families. One of
principle aims of this thesis has been to demonstrate how
'anorexia is produced by socio-cultural discourses and
discursive practices. Nevertheless, the densities of
particular discourses and discursive practices, of religious
practices for example, will vary between families. And within
different families there will be different constellations of
the various discourses and discursive practices that pervade
society. An analysis of, for example, particular
constellations of discourses may provide further insights into
how some women come to be constituted and interpellated as
'anorexics'. And, as noted above (pp.197-201), future research
could also focus on the ways in which discursive practices
associated with the institution of the family are imbricated
in a genealogy of anorexia.
A more thorough attention to the material as well as the
linguistic aspects of discourse could also involve an analysis
of the physical aspects of body-management, self-starvation
and purging. Clearly, those discourses discussed in Study Two
constitute parts of discursive formations (Foucault, 1972)
that include these bodily practices. They interpellate women,
constituting and regulating our subjectivities and our bodies
in particular ways, producing a 'need' or 'desire' to starve,
purge or binge.
In Study Two I aimed to analyze the transcripts in a way
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that acknowledges the material aspects of embodiment and
starvation. The analysis of the discourse of Cartesian
dualism, for example, includes an explication of a dualistic
construction of eating and illustrates how this discourse
constitutes the body in a way that simultaneously produces the
'need' to control the body through self-starvation. The
ordering of the analyses also represented an attempt to
emphasise the serious physical aspects of these discourses and
discursive practices. Study Two progresses from an analysis of
discursive constructions of the thin (and the fat) body
(chapter 8) to an analysis of the ways in which particular
discourses produce a 'need' to control and starve the (female)
body (chapters 9 and 10) and finally to an analysis of
discursive self-production and self-destruction, of the
discourses that converge on the very thin, dying body
(chapters 11 and 12). That is, Study Two elucidates those
discourses that converge upon the female body, the thin body,
the anorexic body and finally the dying (female) body. It aims
to demonstrate how these discourses constitute and regulate
women's subjectivities, women's bodies and women's eating or
not-eating. It aims to illustrate how these discourses
constitute part of a discursive (linguistic and physical)
process that inevitably produces deep distress for many women
and that all too frequently results in serious physical damage
and even death. It is important, therefore, that future
research should expand upon this research by focusing on the
material and physical aspects of embodiment as well as the
linguistic aspects of these discourses and discursive
practices so as to elucidate more thoroughly the distress, the
physical damage and the fatalities produced by these
patriarchal discourses of late twentieth century Western
society. As Jackie's comment below illustrates, these
discourses have very powerful, real effects (Walkerdine,
1986); they are fictions that function in truths, that induce
the effects of truths (Foucault, 1980) but that also veil
other truths (see Foucault, 1972; Rose, 1982). They are
patriarchal fictions that constitute and regulate women and
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that produce appalling distress, physical damage and, too
often, death.
I mean god if I was going to write a book I think
I'd have to write about the misery of what it's
actually like ... because you even forget yourself.
you forget all of the (.) /11: mrn/ you know,
it's not a solution ... unless you actually kill
yourself. (Jackie, pp.12-13)
In short, further research should expand upon the
analyses in this thesis to explore the non-linguistic,
material aspects of discourse; of clinical practices such as
diagnosis, medical intervention, hospitalization and
psychotherapy; and of the discursive practices of (women's)
body management and self-starvation. Such an analysis would
further exnphasise the powerful and very real effects of these
discourses on women's lives (and deaths). Such research could
use video to explore both the linguistic and the non-
linguistic aspects of these discursive practices. Future
research could also examine discourses and discursive
practices surrounding body-management, embodiment, femininity
and subjectivity using data from the media or using interviews
with women (or men) who have not been diagnosed as 'eating
disordered'. And, as noted above, it would also be useful to
expand upon the analyses presented here by examining how class
and ethnicity are imbricated in the discourses and discursive
practices surrounding 'anorexia', 'femininity', subjectivity
and the body and by locating these discourses in the contexts
of, for example, the feminist movements, familial discursive
practices, the politics and economics of food, the commercial
promotion of dieting and thinness and the capitalist
ideologies of consumption and production.
13.3 The Implications of This Thesis
This thesis also holds a number of implications in terms
of clinical and other practices and in terms of the wider
social-political issues surrounding 'anorexia', women, women's
bodies and women's food. Firstly, as discussed above, the
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feminist post-structuralist perspective of thesis has
implications for further research. The critique of
positivistic methodologies (chapter 4) and of current research
in anorexia (chapter 2) elucidates the limitations of
conducting research based on a medical or quasi-medical
conceptualization of anorexia and of conducting research
within a positivistic framework. This thesis has aimed to
demonstrate how a post-structuralist, feminist approach to
research can be fruitfully applied in this field.
Secondly, the critique of 'mainstream' perspectives on
anorexia (chapter 2) has implications for clinical practice.
The elucidation of the limitations of these perspectives
indicates that the treatments based on these perspectives and
on medical or quasi-medical models of anorexia are similarly
limited. This critique may, therefore, go some way towards
explaining the limited efficacy of current treatment
approaches and the concomitant alarmingly high mortality rates
of girls and women diagnosed as anorexic (see chapter 1). And,
by presenting an alternative, feminist post-structuralist
conceptualization of 'anorexia', this thesis also has
implications for how therapeutic interventions may be
improved.
The location of 'anorexia' in its socio-historically
specific discursive contexts and the elucidation of the gender
power-relations, the 'micro-processes of domination' in which
'anorexia' is constituted, implies that clinicians and
therapists might usefully work within a framework that
questions the medical model of 'anorexia', that acknowledges
its socio-cultural context and that acknowledges the central
place of gender ideologies in women's experiences of eating
and of their/our bodies and subjectivities.
Thus, this thesis indicates the necessity of adopting
therapeutic models that do not individualize women's problems
and distress around food and the body; that do not pathologize
women but that understand women's distress within its socio-
cultural, discursive contexts. This thesis also strongly
indicates the necessity of feminist therapies; of therapies
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that attempt to empower women raLher than rendering them
passive 'patients' whose one arena of control is denied them
(see also Orbach, 1993). By further elucidating the ways in
which issues of control are imbricated in 'anorexia' (see also
Bruch, 1974), this thesis implies that therapists and
clinicians should work with the client, exploring alternative
ways in which to exert some control in one's life and in which
positive subjectivities can be maintained. Through an
explication of the discourses that converge on the
thin/anorexic body, this thesis has shown how these discourses
constitute that body in various ways that often signify very
powerful and independent subjectivities. It thus indicates the
necessity of acknowledging these positive subjectivities, of
acknowledging some of the positive as well as the negative
ways in which 'anorexia' is discursively constituted and
thereby experienced (see also Bruch, 1974). It indicates,
therefore, the necessity of attempting to make available
alternative (feminist) discourses and discursive practices in
which positive subjectivities and experiences can be
constituted.
Furthermore, by explicating the discourses that converge
upon the thin/anorexic body, I have illustrated the
multiplicity of meanings sustained by that body. And, in
analyzing those discourses, I have also shown how these
discourses produce a number of different, often conflicting
subjectivities, desires, 'needs', 'motivations' and
'attitudes'. The analyses of Study Two have aimed to
demonstrate the heterogeneity both within and across the
women's accounts. In 'deconstructing' the concept of
'anorexia' I have aimed to elucidate the heterogeneity of the
category of anorexia. This thesis has, therefore, implications
for clinical and other understandings of anorexia. It
undermines universalistic notions about 'typical anorexic'
attitudes or personalities. It thereby illustrates the poverty
of therapeutic approaches that 'treat the disease' and the
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necessity of working with women in their own specificities1.
This thesis, therefore, similarly illustrates the poverty
of many popular media (and academic) accounts of anorexia
which are often very derogatory in their banal homogenizations
of girls and women diagnosed as 'anorexic'. Such accounts
often trivialize 'anorexia' as a 'slimmer's disease',
dismissing many women and girls as vain and childish. Yet many
accounts are simultaneously infused with surreptitious
admiration for these women's thinness and self-control (see
also Hsu, 1989). The discourses manifested in these accounts
and the discursive practices of which they are a part can only
exacerbate women's distress. They are not only insulting. They
do not only veil the seriousness of 'anorexia' - of women's
distress and of the physical damage and the fatalities caused
by self-starvation - by glossing 'anorexia' as a 'feminine'
and 'trivial' issue; they also simultaneously re-produce and
thereby consolidate those discourses and discursive practices
which produce the desire to be thinner and which constitute
and interpellate women as 'anorexic'. By analyzing those
discourses that constitute and regulate women's bodies as
thin, as starving, as anorexic and as dying bodies, I have in
this thesis aimed to illustrate how these discourses produce
very real, serious, even fatal effects for many women. I have
aimed to show the necessity of taking these issues around
women's bodies and food very seriously; of producing
thoroughly theorized, feminist knowledges of 'anorexia' rather
than seeking glib, superficial answers.
Finally, by presenting a critique of individualizing
concepts of anorexia and by elucidating how 'anorexia' is
discursively constituted, this thesis also suggests that the
efficacy of
	 individually-focused intervention will
1 See Bentall (1990) for a similar discussion in relation to
schizophrenia. See also Gallop's (1985: 206) discussion of
Freud's analysis of 'Dora' in which she argues that one possible
reason for the failure of this analysis was the predictability
of Freud's interpretation, his denial of "the specificity of her
signifiers (by not attending to her but merely applying general
formulas)".
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inevitably be limited in terms of helping those women who
experience such distress about their bodies and about food and
in terms of reducing the risk of girls and women starving
themselves to death. That is, the critique of current
'mainstream' perspectives of anorexia and the presentation of
a feminist post-structuralist theorization of 'anorexia'
undermines the categorical distinction produced in medical and
psychological discourses between those women diagnosed as
anorexic and so-called 'normal' women'. It undermines the
notion that 'anorexia' can be conceptualized as a deviation
from the norm and indicates instead that it can only be
adequately understood in terms of the socio-cultural
discourses and discursive practices that pervade this
(patriarchal) society. The analysis of those discourses and
discursive practices that converge upon the (female) body has
demonstrated that 'anorexia' is not a pathology that
originates within the individual woman. Rather, it is a
problem produced by socio-historically specific discourses and
discursive practices; it is a social problem manifested in
individual women. Hence, individually-focused interventions
will inevitably be of limited efficacy because they cannot
hope to fully counter the powerful effect of these
patriarchal, hegemonic discourses that pervade society and
that constitute and regulate women; women's lives, women's
distresses and women's deaths. This thesis indicates that the
problem of 'anorexia' - of women's distress about food and our
bodies - can only be fully counted at a socio-political level.
It suggests the need for feminist political action that
resists these 'micro-processes of domination', the gender
power-relations that are constituted in these
power/knowledges, these fields of discourse that converge upon
the female body. Feminist political action and educational
programmes may go some way to educating girls and women about
the serious consequences of food-restriction and self-
starvation and to facilitating resistance within this field of
(patriarchal)	 discourse. As post-structuralist theory
illustrates, the tactical functions of discourses are neither
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uniform nor stable (Foucault, 1979).
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to
power or raised up against it, any more than
silences are. We must make allowances for the
complex and unstable process whereby discourse can
be both an instrument and an effect of power, but
also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of
resistance and a starting point for an opposing
strategy. (Foucault, 1979: 101)
13.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, I have, in this thesis, explored the
problem of 'anorexia' within a theoretical framework informed
by post-structuralist and psychoanalytic theories. I have
thereby presented a critique of 'mainstream' accounts of
'anorexia' and produced an alternative feminist, post-
structuralist account of 'anorexia' as an object of medical
and cultural discourses and discursive practices. I have
analyzed the discourses in which 'anorexia' was first
constituted as an object of medical discourse, exploring the
ways in which socio-historically specific constructions of
femininity were (and are) imbricated in these discursive
constructions. I have shown some of the discontinuities as
well as the continuities between nineteenth and twentieth
century formulations of 'anorexia' and analyzed how the
contemporary discourses and discursive practices that surround
women's genders, subjectivities and bodies converge to produce
and regulate a multiplicity of femininities, subjectivities
and thin/anorexic bodies.
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Appendix 5a
Nineteenth Century Medical Journal Articles
on Anorexia used for Discourse Analysis in Study One
non. (1873a) Foreign gleanings: Hysteric anorexia, Lancet, July
12, 49.
non. (1873b) Clinical Society, Friday, October 24, Medical Times
and Gazette, 2, Nov. 8, 534-536.
Anon. (188la) Clinical Society of London: Report of the committee
on excision of the hip-joint in childhood - aortic aneurisin -
anorexia nervosa - antiseptic osteotoiny of the tibia, Lancet, May
21, 826-828.
Anon. (l888b) Editorial, Lancet, March 24, 581-584.
Anon. (l895a) Emsworth Cottage Hospital: Case of anorexia
nervosa; necropsy, Lancet, Jan. 5, 31-32.
Anon. (1895b) Northumberland and Durham Medical Society:
Exhibition of cases and specimens, Lancet, Oct 19, 987-988.
Anon. (1896) A case of anorexia nervosa, The Northumberland and
Durham Medical Journal, pp.7-8.
Adams, J. (1888) Sir W. Gull on anorexia nervosa (letter),
Lancet, March 24, 597.
de Berdt Hovell, D. (1873) Hysteria simplified and explained,
Lancet, Dec. 20, 872-874.
de Berdt Hovell, D. (l888a) Sir W. Gull on anorexia nervosa
(letter), Lancet, March 24, 597.
de Berdt Hovell, D. (1888b) Anorexia nervosa (letter), Lancet,
May 12, 949.
Collins, W.J. (1894) Anorexia nervosa, (letter), Lancet, Jan. 27,
202-203.
Dowse, S.T. (1881) Anorexia nervosa, Medical Press and Circular,
32, Aug 3, 95-97.
Drummond, D.A. (1896) A case of anorexia nervosa,
Northumberland and Durham Medical Journal, 4, 7-8.
Edge, A.M. (1888) A case of anorexia nervosa, Lancet, April 28,
818.
Garry, T.G. (1888) Anorexia nervosa, (letter), Lancet, May 19,
1002.
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Gull, W.W. (1868) Dr. Gull's address in medicine, Lancet, Aug 8,
171-176.
Gull, W.W. (1874) Anorexia nervosa (apepsia hysterica, anorexia
hysterica), Transactions of the Clinical Society, 7 (2) 22-28.
Gull, W.W. (1888) Clinical notes: Medical, surgical, obstetrical,
and therapeutic: Anorexia nervosa, Lancet, March 17, 51-6-517.
Lasegue, C, (1873b) On hysterical anorexia, Medical Times and
Gazette, 2, Sept 6th & 27th, 265-266 & 367-369.
Mackenzie, S. (1888) On a case of anorexia nervosa vel hysterica,
Lancet, March 31, 613-614.
Marshall, C.F. (1895) Clinical notes: medical, surgical,
obstetrical, and therapeutic: A fatal case of anorexia nervosa,
Lancet, Jan 19, 149-150.
Myrtle, A.S. (1888) Anorexia nervosa (letter), Lancet, May 5,
899.
Playfair, W.S. (1888) Note on the so-called "anorexia nervosa",
Lancet, April 28, 817-818.
Taylor, S.A. (1904) A case of anorexia nervosa, West London
Medical Journal, IX (2, April) 110-204.
Wilks, S. (1888) Anorexia nervosa, (letter), Lancet, March 31,
646-647.
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Appendix 5b
Other primary sources used in Study One
Allbutt, C. (1913) Neuroses of the stomach and other parts of the
abdomen. In T.C. Allbutt and H.D. Rolleston (eds.) Systems of
Medicine, Vol. VIII, General Diseases of Obscure Ori gin, Diseases
of the Alimentary Canal and Peritoneum, pp.386-408, Macmillan and
Co., London.
Anon. (1874) Abstract of the introductory lectures delivered at
the various medical schools of London at the opening session
1874-1875. Guy's Hospital. Introductory lecture by Sir William
Gull, Lancet, Oct. 3, 485.
Anon. (l88lb) A mirror of hospital practice, British and Foreign:
Middlesex Hospital: Hysterical vomitinf of eight months duration,
Lancet, Feb 19, 291-292.
Anon. (1885) Medical Society of London: Gastric ulcers, Lancet,
Dec. 5, 1048-1049.
Cavafy, J. (1874) A case of male hysteria, Lancet, Dec. 26, 899.
Charcot, J.M. (1889) Lecture xvii: Isolation in the treatment of
hysteria. In Clinical lectures on diseases of the nervous syst
delivered at the infirmar y of La Sal petriere by Professor J.M.
Charcot, Vol iii (trans T. Savill), pp. 207-219. The New Sydenham
Society, London. Reprinted in R. Harris (ed.) (1991) Clinical
lectures on diseases of the nervous systems. A translation of
Lecons sur les maladies du systeme nerveux, Tavistock/Routledge,
London.
Medley, W.S. (1893) The insomnia of neurasthenia, Lancet, June
10, 1381-1382.
Marce, L.V. (1860b) On a form of hypochondriacal delirium
occurring consecutive to dyspepsia, and characterized by refusal
of food, Journal of Ps ychological Medicine and Mental Pathology,
13, 264-266.
Mitchell, S.W. 1881 Lecture xii: Gastro-intestinal disorders of
pp.201-216 hysteria. In S.W. Mitchell, Lectures on diseases of
the nervous system especially in women, Henry C. Lea and Co.,
Philadelphia.
Robinson, T. (1893) Sudden death in a case of hysterical
vomiting, Lancet, June 10, 1380-1381.
Salter, H. (1868) Clinical lecture on hysterical vomiting.
Lancet, July 4, 1-2.
Sutherland, H.A. (1881) A case of chronic vomiting in which no
food was taken, except Koumiss, for sixteen months, Transactions
of The Clinical Society , 14, 113-114.
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Appendix 6
Reconstructed quote from Morton's
'Phthisiologica: or a treatise of consumption' (1689/1694)
quoted in Bliss and Branch (1960: 9-11) and Waltos (1986: 1-2)
A Nervous Atrophy or Consumption is a wasting of Body
without any remarkable Fever, Cough, or Shortness of Breath; but
it is attended with a want of Appetite, and a bad digestion, upon
which there follows a Languishing Weakness of Nature, and a
falling away of the Flesh every day more and more ... The
immediate cause of the Distemper I apprehend to be in the System
of the Nerves proceeding from a Preternatural state of the Animal
Spirits, and the destruction of the Tone of the Nerves; whereupon
I have used to call this a Consumption in the Habit of the Body.
For as the Appetite and Concoction are overthrown by the weak and
infirm Tone of the Stomach, so also the Assimilation, the
Fermentation, and Volatilization of the Nutritious Juice are
hindered in the whole Habit of the Body from the distemper'd
state of the Brain and Nerves.
The Causes which dispose the Patient to this Disease, I have
for the most part observed to be violent Passions of the Mind,
the intemperate dfrinking of Spirituous Liquors, and an
unwholsome Air, by which it is no wonder if the Tone of the
Nerves, and the Temper of the Spirits are destroy'd. This
distemper, as most other nervous diseases, is chronical, but very
hard to be cured unless a physician be called at the beginning
of it. At first it flatters and deceives the patient for which
reason it happens for the most part that the physician is
consulted too late. And at last it terminates in a hydroptical
and oedamatous swelling of the body, especially of the lower and
depending parts, in which case there remains no hope of the
patient's life, neither is there anything more to be done for his
cure, than giving him some ease, whereby his miserable life may
be lengthened for some days.
Mr. Dukes Daughter in St Mary Axe, in the Year 1684 and the
eighteenth Year of her Age, in the month of July fell into a
total suppression of her Monthly Courses from a multitude of
Cares and Passions of her Mind, but without any Symptoms of the
Green-Sickness following upon it. From which time her Appetite
began to abate, and her Digestion to be bad; her flesh also began
to be flaccid and loose, and her looks pale ... the Winter
following, this Consumption did seem to be not a little improved;
for that she was t.iant by her studying at Night to the injuries
of the Air, which at that time extreamly clod ... So from that
time loathing all sorts of Medicaments, she wholly neglected the
care of her self for two full Years, till at last being brought
to the last degree of a Marasmus, or Consumption, and thereupon
subject to Frequent Fainting Fits, she apply'd her self to me for
advice.
I do not remember that I did ever in all my practice see
one, that was conversant with the Living so much wasted with the
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greatest degree of a Consumption (like a Skeleton only clad with
skin) yet there was no Fever, but on the contrary a coldness of
the whole Body; no cough, or difficulty with breathing, not an
appearance of any other distemper of the lungs, or any other
entrails, no looseness or any other sign of a colliquation, or
preternatural expense of the nutritious juices. Only her appetite
was diminished, and her digestion uneasy, with fainting-f itts,
which did frequently return upon her.
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Appendix 8a
Text of Posters Requesting Participants
Spring Term 1993
WOMEN PARTICIPANTS WANTED
for 1/2 hour interviews on gender and anorexia.
If you have (or have had) anorexic-like problems
(whether diagnosed by a doctor or not) and would
be willing to be interviewed, please contact
Helen Malson on ext 5345 (Room 515) or leave a
contact address or phone no. in the cominonroom
pigeonholes.
Similar posters placed in other universities and in clinics
provided a more detailed address.
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Appendix 8b
Interview Schedule
1. Often it is whilst we are teenagers that we first start to
think of ourselves as becoming adult women, as feminine. Is that
your experience? Do you remember any particular times or events
when you first began to think of yourself as a woman?
2. How was this different to feeling like a child or a girl?
3. Did you have a particular idea of an ideal woman, someone that
you would like to be like as a woman? What was it that made you
want to be like her? Is that something you still feel or do you
have different ideas now?
4. What about other girls, your friends, did they have similar
ideas?
5. There are a lot of images in the media, in magazines and
newspapers and on TV of so-called 'perfect' men and women. How
would you describe these images or stereotypes?
6. What do you feel are the important differences between these
ideas of how men and women 'should' be? Do these differences come
naturally or do we have to work at becoming 'masculine' or
'feminine' people?
7. Do you think it is difficult being a girl or a woman? How is
it difficult? Have you felt any pressure to conform to particular
ideas about how girls and women 'should' be?
8. What about the media, magazines, our families or schools? Do
you feel they affect our experiences as girls and women and as
people with eating problems?
9. As I am sure you already know, far more girls and women are
diagnosed as anorexic than boys and men. Why do you think this
is? Why is it that some women become anorexic and other do not?
Is there a particular sort of person that becomes anorexic?
10. When you first became 'anorexic' how did you feel? How did
you feel about yourself, about your body, about food?
11. How did you react when you were diagnosed as anorexic or as
having 'anorexic' eating problems?
or 11. What was it that made you decide that you were 'anorexic'
or having 'anorexic' eating problems? Was it your decision?
12. A lot of people who write about anorexia describe it as a
pseudo-solution, meaning it is a troubled way of trying to sort
things out or deal with a problem. Did you feel being 'anorexic'
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would help you in some way?
13. What sort of things did food, not eating, losing weight and
being thinner mean to you?
14. What would you say being anorexic means (to you) now? How is
it different from not being anorexic? Is this a different
experience from when you first became 'anorexic'?
15. Is this how other people - other 'anorexic' people, family,
friends, doctors, the media - see anorexia?
16. Do you think there are ways in which anorexics are similar
to each other and different from non-anorexics?
17. If you were going to write a book about anorexia what sort
of things would you want to say in it?
18. A lot of people have pointed out that there has been an
increase in anorexia in the last twenty years. Why do you think
this is? Do you think it has anything to do with the ideas we
were talking about earlier, about being girls and women?
19. Is there anything that we could change in society or in our
families to stop this increase or not? What sort of things do you
feel contributed towards you becoming 'anorexic' or developing
'anorexic' eating problems, and towards 'recovering'?
20. Are there any other things that we have not talked about that
you feel are important?
379
Appendix 8c
Transcription Convention
=	 indicates an overlap or the absence of a gap
between two consecutive utterances.
1/	 indicates an interjection, for example "I think
yeah /H: mm/ I could be like her".
(.)	 indicates a pause.
Italics	 indicates	 where	 words	 or	 phrases	 are
stressed.
indicates that part of the transcript has been
omitted.
(inaud.)	 indicates where a part of the recording of the
interview was inaudible.
( ) brackets surround words where the accuracy of
transcription is in doubt because of the poor
quality of the recording.
( )
	
brackets surround explanations that are not part
of the transcript but are added to clarify the
meaning of an utterance. For example, "It
	 (aixzda)
was about not having feelings".
{ ) are also used where extracts are quoted in the
text to indiacte where words have been altered.
Sounds such as "mm" and "uhr" are transcribed phonetically as
are colloquialisms, abbreviations, stutters and half-said words.
Where utterances are not grammatical, punctuation is used so as
to make the transcript as readable as possible.
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